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Abstract 
This thesis is a study of the British intelligence assessments produced by the UK's Joint 
Intelligence Committee regarding the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities and intentions. 
It examines the origins of such intelligence, the various organisations that collected, 
collated and analysed it and how it fed into the Joint Intelligence structure. The thesis 
seeks both to synthesise existing historical analysis and add new evidence on 
intelligence organisation, collection, analysis and dissemination by examining the 
development of such assessments over a twenty-five year period and considering how 
well they reflected and informed British governments about the status and progress of 
the Soviet nuclear threat. Lastly, it analyses how this intelligence fed into and may have 
affected wider British military and ministerial decision-making regarding the course of 
the UK's nuclear weapons policy between 1945 and 1970. 
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Introduction: A `sombre' picture 
In March 1955 an inter-departmental group of officials under Sir William Strath, Head 
of the Cabinet Office's Central War Plans Secretariat, produced a report on `The 
Defence Implications of Fall-Out from a Hydrogen bomb'. ' The Strath report, as it was 
known, was only released into the UK's National Archives in 2002, having been 
withheld from the routine release of government documents after 30 years because of its 
highly sensitive nature. When it first circulated within Whitehall, with each Cabinet 
minister receiving a personal copy, its central conclusion represented a defining moment 
in the British Government's understanding of the effect on the UK in the event of a 
Soviet thermonuclear attack: 
Fall-out, combined with the vast explosive power of the hydrogen bomb, presents problems of a 
revolutionary character for the defence of this country and a threat of the utmost gravity to our 
survival as a nation. 
The report also demonstrated the importance of obtaining accurate information on the 
Soviet Union's nuclear capability and intentions. It went on to consider, `in light of 
advice by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the threat which this weapon poses to 
the United Kingdom. '3 
The Soviet Government are most unlikely to provoke general war deliberately, particularly 
during the next three or four years when the U. S. S. R. will be vulnerable to nuclear attack by the 
Allies and unable effectively to strike against the United States. However, the possibility of an 
accidental general war cannot be ignored.... In the event of general war, the Soviet aim would 
be to put the United Kingdom completely out of it ... Whatever the Soviet potential, and 
1 The National Archives, Public Record Office [hereafter TNA] CAB 134/940, Home Defence Committee, 




whatever the date of the outbreak of war might be, it is believed that these objectives would 
remain constant and that the Soviets would not hesitate to destroy great parts of this country to 
secure them. 
At the heart of this was the rationale behind `nuclear deterrence'. Perceptions of the 
quality and competency of Britain's nuclear capability were closely tied to expectations 
of how far its ability to retaliate would deter a Soviet nuclear strike. This thesis will 
look at the relationship between intelligence and nuclear weapons policy, specifically 
the form of the nuclear deterrent and how it was influenced by the threat that it was 
intended to counter. 
Context 
The devastating power of the atomic bomb was demonstrated with hideous effect on the 
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945. The explosive 
power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was roughly the equivalent of 20,000(2OKt) 
tons of Trinitrotoluene (TNT). In November 1945 a British team travelled to Japan to 
analyse the effects of the bombs. 5 The mission was to apply `a scientific method for the 
measurement of the effect of air attack' to `an investigation into the effects of the 
bombing of the two Japanese cities' in relation to the substantial damage and loss of life 
the UK suffered from conventional bombing during the recent war. 6 Whilst a section on 
`the effects of atomic bombs on the human structure' was contained in the report, their 
initial summary of the Hiroshima attack is only suggestive of the scale of the human 
COST: 
The bomb exploded near its centre over a point approximately 300 yards from the T-shaped 
4 Ibid. 
s The Effects of the Atomic Bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Report of the British Mission to Japan, 
(London: HMSO, 1946), p. 4 
6 Ibid., p. iii 
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bridge which is a conspicuous feature of Hiroshima; and thence spread its destruction with great 
uniformity... no civilian defence services in the world could have met a disaster on this scale, 
and these services were in fact overwhelmed. On 0 August, the authorities in Hiroshima were 
making preparations to meet what they believed to be a threatened incendiary attack: they were 
not prepared for a holocaust. ' 
Even with their detached approach, the enormity of the new weapons was starkly 
apparent to the British team at this early stage. It was another ten years before the 
effects of even more powerful thermo-nuclear weapons, and the fall-out that would 
accompany them, was set-out in Strath. The UK Hiroshima team concluded: 
The overall picture, then, is sombre. Even ignoring changes in attack and in the development of 
the bomb, the damage figures given ... are very serious. And these figures are a measure only of 
the blast effect of the bomb. With them must be kept in mind the grave problem of fire, direct 
and indirect, which the bomb has created ... Both are overshadowed by the scale of casualties 
produced by the bomb, which make the mere disposal of the dead a major problem. The figures 
given ... speak for themselves! 
The team's figures were based upon the average loss of life in both cities, but they also 
explained the likely effect should the UK suffer such an attack, which was a central 
purpose of the mission. Taking into account `the better protection afforded by the 
houses' in British cities, the `standard figure in British conditions would therefore be 
approximately 50,000 dead'. 9 Compared to the average 15 dead from German V2 rocket 
attacks, this figure was considered `the most important' conclusion of the report. 
The `sombre' picture was not lost on British defence planners. In 1946 the Joint 
Technical Warfare Committee (JTWC), a body subordinate to the Chiefs of Staff of the 
7 Ibid., p. 2 
8 Ibid., p. 20 
9 Ibid., p. 19 
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British Armed Forces, considered whether nuclear weapons represented a `fundamental 
change in the nature of warfare and, if so, when this change would take place. ' 
lo By 
1947, following the Attlee Government's decision in January of that year to proceed 
with a British atomic bomb, the Chiefs of Staff were adapting Britain's defence policy 
to meet this fundamental change. " They set out the rationale behind nuclear deterrence, 
stating that that the `supreme object of British defence policy is to prevent war' and that 
`the only effective deterrent to a potential aggressor is tangible evidence of our intention 
and ability to withstand attack and to hit back immediately. ' 12 Intelligence was 
explicitly identified as showing that `from 1956-57 Russia will probably be in position 
to use some atomic bombs' and consequently the `only means whereby we can prevent 
her using them, therefore, is by facing her with the threat of large-scale damage from 
similar weapons if she should employ them. ' 13 Intelligence, accurate or not, was a pre- 
requisite in determining the future deterrent requirements for the UK from the 
beginning. 
In the early 1950s, the development of the hydrogen14 bomb brought an explosive 
power capable of yields in the megaton range, the equivalent of a million tons of TNT 
and hundreds or thousands of times as powerful as atomic explosions. 15 The 
unanticipated rapidity of the Soviet atomic and thermonuclear programmes brought 
many of these issues into even sharper focus. In March 1955, the British Prime 
'o TNA, CAB 134/316, Home Defence Committee, Joint Technical Warfare Committee, `Future 
Developments in Weapons and Methods of War', T. W. C. (46) 15 
"TNA, CAB 130/16, 'Research in Atomic Weapons', GEN163/1st Meeting, Confidential Annex, 8 
January 1947 
12 TNA, CAB 131/4, Chiefs of Staff Committee, COS(47)102, `Future Defence Policy', Report by the 
Chiefs of Staff, 22 May 1947 
13 Ibid. 
la The term 'nuclear intelligence' will be used throughout to denote intelligence relating to either atomic 
fission or hydrogen fusion/thermo-nuclear weaponry. Contemporary terminology does cause problems as 
'atomic' was often used as an umbrella term, especially in late 1940s and early 1950s in organisations. 
15 http: //www. atomicarchive. com/Effects/effectsl. shtml. The Atomic Archive, part of the US National 
Science Digital Library, estimates that a single megaton bomb would be capable of destroying 80 square 
miles, 8 July 2008 
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Minister, Winston Churchill, whose Government had taken the decisions to proceed 
with a British thermonuclear weapons programme the previous year 
16, described `an 
immense gulf between the atomic and the hydrogen bomb'. 17 Churchill warned that the 
`atomic bomb, with all its terrors, did not carry us outside the scope of human control or 
manageable events', whereas there `is absolutely no defence against the hydrogen 
bomb. ' 18 The importance of nuclear deterrence as the only protection for the UK against 
this threat was in the forefront of his mind. He told his parliamentary colleagues in his 
last Commons speech before retiring as Prime Minister that `it may well be that we 
shall, by a process of sublime irony, have reached a stage in this story where safety will 
be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation. ' 19 
As the prospect grew of a very real and utterly gruesome Soviet thermonuclear attack on 
the UK, the dire necessity of avoiding war only heightened the debate on the British 
nuclear deterrent. In the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s the increasing swiftness of 
delivery systems, particularly the development of ballistic missiles, further enhanced the 
danger the Soviet nuclear arsenal posed to the UK. The degree to which nuclear forces 
would deter aggression was further defined by the ability to counter improvement in the 
enemy's offensive and defensive measures. Keeping up with the pace of technological 
change and calculating its impact on deterrence standpoints was a primary, and 
sometimes controversial, focus for both intelligence and nuclear weapon designers. 
Confidence in the impasse created by the nuclear arsenals of East and West was subject 
to controversy from both those seeking reduction and those arguing for expansion of 
Western nuclear capacities. In 1959 Albert Wohlstetter, one of the foremost Rand 
Corporation analysts on this subject, wrote that the balance `is in fact precarious ... 
16 TNA, CAB 128/27, Cabinet Conclusions, CC(54)47t'Meeting, 7 July 1954 
17 Winston Churchill, House of Commons Official Report (Vol 537), 1 March 1955, column 1894 
18 Ibid., columns 1894-1895 
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Deterrence in the 1960s is neither assured nor impossible but will be the product of 
sustained intelligence effort and hard choices. 920 Anticipating the `hard choices' that 
would face all governments, especially the UK, he criticised those he felt had been 
`confusing deterrence with matching or exceeding the enemy's ability to strike first ... 
To deter an attack means being able to strike back in spite of it'. 21 
Wohlstetter's emphasis on the difference between first and second strike capabilities 
also came to the heart of understanding of Soviet intentions and their view of the 
West's. Lawrence Freedman, examining the range of nuclear strategising that 
characterised the Cold War, has written of the difference. 
A First Strike was taken to refer to a strike that was not only the opening volley of a nuclear 
war, but was also directed against the nuclear capability of the enemy with the intention of 
crippling his means of retaliation. A Second Strike force was one capable of ensuring effective 
retaliation even after absorbing an enemy First Strike. 22 
Debate over the form and influence of nuclear deterrence was epitomised during Robert 
S. McNamara's time as US Secretary of State for Defense between 1961 and 1968. 
McNamara explored the possibility of some agreement with the USSR to target, in the 
event of war, enemy nuclear forces (Counter-force) rather than civilian areas (Counter- 
City). This instead contributed to concern in the USSR that the US was attempting to 
maintain a First Strike capability. 23 Indeed, in 1967 McNamara himself acknowledged 
that Western misunderstanding of the Soviet perception of US policy might have 
contributed to the arms race. 
19 Ibid., column 1899 
20 Albert Wohlstetter, `The Delicate Balance of Terror', Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37/2 (January 
1959), pp. 211-234, p. 211 
21 Ibid., pp. 212-3 
22 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Third Edition (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003), p. 128 
23 Ibid., pp. 216-242 
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Our goal was to ensure that they, with their theoretical capacity to reach such a first-strike 
capability, would not outdistance us. But they could not read our intentions with any greater 
accuracy than we could read theirs. The result has been that we have both built up our forces to 
a point that far exceeds a credible second-strike capability against the forces we each stated 
with. In doing so neither of us has reached a first-strike capability. 24 
McNamara had effectively described another form of Churchill's `sublime irony', 
whereby the `assured destruction' each side were capable of inflicting became known as 
`Mutually Assured Destruction' (MAD). 25 
McNamara's UK contemporary, Denis Healey, Britain's Secretary of State for Defence 
between 1964 and 1970, later pondered in his memoirs the development of heavily 
theoretical concepts of nuclear war. Healey felt the `universe of nuclear strategy was so 
difficult to comprehend, and the horrors it contained were so repugnant to normal 
people, that its study required ... clinical detachment [that] tended to blind the experts 
to the human realities, and to enslave them to abstract concepts, the validity of which 
had never been tested, and in many cases could never be tested. '26 
Even the concepts of `first-strike' and `second-strike', `counter-force' and `counter-city' 
required assumptions about the enemy reaction which might be quite unfounded. I remember 
reviewing an American book on Soviet strategy which argued that, because Soviet missiles 
were heavier and more accurate than American, the Kremlin must be planning a first-strike 
against America's retaliatory power; it never occurred to the writer that the Russians might 
prefer as a matter of common sense to build heavier and more accurate missiles if they were 
able to do so. Similarly, the Russian leaders found it difficult to accept the concept of `mutual 
24 Robert S. McNamara, `The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy', Department of State Bulletin, LVII (9 
October 1967). Quoted in Freedman, Evolution, p. 241 
25 Ibid. 
26 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), p. 246 
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assured destruction. 7 
Healey's criticisms were, in part, a reflection of the rigorous debate over upgrading the 
UK nuclear delivery system he participated in during those years. Calculating the 
`minimum' deterrent requirement for the UK, the degree to which it would fulfil its 
objectives in the face of Soviet defences and the view the Soviet leadership took of it 
were all questions intelligence impinged upon and all formed part of that debate. Yet the 
`assessment of adversary intentions and capabilities was only one of a number of factors 
which influence weapons procurement decisions'. 28 In Britain, as in the US, `there were 
a number of technological, military, budgetary, and political factors at work' in addition 
to the intelligence input. 29 Even when intelligence was not a decisive factor, it still often 
formed part of the overall context in which decision-making took place. 
Calculating the `delicate balance' and making `hard choices' about future nuclear 
requirements, while not solely determined by intelligence, did bring it to the fore and 
pushed forward new and revolutionary methods of collection. The complexity of 
technological developments in the design of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and Anti-Ballistic Missile 
defence systems (ABMs) during the late 1950s and 1960s added to the pressure for 
ever-more detailed and accurate intelligence on their comparative development by the 
USSR. 
In some ways the impact of nuclear weapons development on twentieth century history 
is difficult to ascertain because, as John Lewis Gaddis has argued, we `cannot rerun the 
27 Ibid. 
28 Freedman, Evolution, p. 241 
29 Ibid. 
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experiments, assuming away nuclear weapons to see what happens'. 30 Churchill's 
`sublime irony' has, in a sense, been realised in that, `having been demonstrated against 
human targets at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, tens of thousands of nuclear 
weapons were produced and deployed provocatively around the world - yet, not one of 
them was ever again used. 01 Indeed, the apocalyptic prospect of nuclear war may have 
had some `civilising influence' on the `ultimate political decision-makers', as former 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, Sir Michael Quinlan, has argued. 32 
Nevertheless, the `logic of preventing war did nevertheless require that terrible `What- 
if? ' questions be truly faced. '33 As Peter Hennessy has argued, whilst the `unimaginable 
body counts of Mutually Assured Destruction' thankfully did not transpire, this should 
not divert attention from `the degree of peril generated and the scale of impact involved 
within the state, society and economy of even a second-rank participant such as the 
United Kingdom. '34 Nuclear deterrence and diplomacy thus formed an ominous 
backdrop to the second half of the twentieth century. It also meant that knowledge of 
`an adversary's nuclear capabilities, and the likelihood and imminence of attack became 
of paramount importance to national and international security. '35 
Indeed some, including Michael Herman -a former British intelligence officer who has 
since written on the subject - have interpreted the role of intelligence in the Cold War as 
a further stabilising influence. 
American Presidents never believed that they were about to be Pearl Harboured. Western 
30 John Lewis Gaddis (ed), Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb (Oxford University Press, 1999) 
260 
' Ibid., p. 261 
32 Sir Michael Quinlan, quoted in Peter Hennessy, The Secret State. Whitehall and the Cold War (Revised 
and Updated Edition) (London: Penguin, 2002) p. xiii 
33 Ibid. 
34 Hennessy, Secret State, p. xv 
35 Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, The United States and the Command of 
Western Nuclear Forces, 1945-1964 (Amsterdam: Harwood, 2000), p. 231. 
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confidence in intelligence warning provided some stability in Cold War Management 36 
It is difficult to establish whether British prime ministers consistently felt this degree of 
confidence in intelligence warning that Herman described. Indeed, because of its 
singular role, there are problems in judging the influence of intelligence. Focusing 
solely on the failure or success of predicting particular events or in swaying government 
policy belies the role of intelligence. As a former US intelligence official has recently 
written, intelligence `is fundamentally about managing risks and reducing uncertainties' 
and, therefore, there is a risk of `inflated demands or expectations [being] applied 
retrospectively'. 37 
No blame for an intelligence failure has been meted out when dire predictions turned out to be 
unfulfilled; rather, the dire event which occurs unpredicted is the one which costs the 
[intelligence] community its reputation. 8 
It is the very scale and seriousness with which intelligence operated in the Cold War 
that demands its inclusion in histories of the period. As Herman put it, `the Cold War 
was peculiarly an intelligence war' with `an almost warlike intensity 9.39 
Sources 
To define British intelligence it is worth examining how intelligence historiography 
more widely has developed in the UK. Literature on Britain's main intelligence services 
has paralleled their development since their establishment in 1909. The complete 
disavowal by successive British Governments of the very existence of some of their 
36 Michael Herman, `The Cold War: Did Intelligence Make a Difference? ', Intelligence Services in the 
Information Age (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 159-63 
37 Bowman H. Miller, `Improving All-Source Intelligence Analysis: Elevate Knowledge in the Equation', 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Vol. 21/2 (Summer 2008) pp. 337-354, 
337 
38 Ibid. p. 346 
39 Michael Herman, Intelligence Services, p. 160 
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intelligence agencies until ' i' L. has, over the majority of the last century, only 
exacerbated this misperception. 0 It has only been in the last twenty years that historical 
analysis of them has been able to present a more in-depth and evidence-based picture of 
their influence. As a subject UK intelligence history is still developing and the focus of 
this work is in adding to this picture and synthesising what is now known with wider 
historical appreciations. 
The colossal growth of intelligence and the major successes it wrought for the allies 
during the Second World War brought intelligence work to the forefront of that conflict. 
Yet the greatest achievements involved huge operations that were run in extraordinary 
and unprecedented secrecy. 41 Thus while espionage found its way into the public 
imagination before the establishment of the modem agencies as they are now 
understood, the greatest twentieth century intelligence successes were kept out of the 
public eye long after their zenith. Richard Aldrich has argued the traditional secrecy 
surrounding intelligence ensured that histories on the Second World War written before 
the 1970s were effectively `methodologically airbrushed' through the absence of Allied 
intelligence successes. 42 Christopher Andrew, now the official historian of MI5, is even 
more trenchant. He has argued that given the knowledge of British Intelligence 
successes in the First World War and of US interceptions of Japanese ciphers during the 
Second World War, post war historians displayed a remarkable level of what he terms 
40 MI5's 1952 Directive was published in the 1963 inquiry into the scandal involving Minister for War, 
John Profumo. Cmnd. 2152, Lord Denning's Report: Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister, 
(HMSO, 1963). M15 was the first agency officially legislated in the Security Service Act of 1989. 
Available at: http: //www. opsi. gov. uk/acts/actsl989/ukpga19890005_en_l. htm In 1984 the exposure and 
conviction of Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Officer Geoffrey Prime for espionage 
saw the acknowledgement of GCHQ's intelligence function, Hansard, Written Answers, The Prime 
Minister, Terms of Reference for Security Commission (Bettany Inquiry), 26 March 1984. The 
Intelligence Services Act of 1994 legislated for GCHQ and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also 
known as M16) and gave the agencies parliamentary oversight in the form of the Intelligence and Security 
Committee (HMSO, 1994). Available at: htip: //www. ol2si. izov. uk/ACTS/actsl994/ukp2a 19940013 en 1 
a' John Cecil Masterman, The Double Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (London: New Haven, 
1972); Frederick W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974) 
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`Historical Attention Span Deficit Disorder' for failing to infer that British intelligence 
activity would have continued from the First to the Second World War. 43 
Histories of the Second World War now highlight the importance of intelligence to its 
progress and outcome. 44 R. V. Jones provided an illuminating account of his own 
remarkable achievements in developing the field of scientific intelligence during that 
conflict. 45 Jones' memoirs give a unique insight into the personalities and day-to-day 
world of scientific intelligence including, although it was not his specialised area, 
intelligence work on the possibility of German nuclear development. Most Secret War 
and its sequel Reflections on Intelligence provide an illuminating account of the 
problems in the organisation of intelligence in the post-war period and the failure of 
Jones' own argument on the need for centralised scientific intelligence 46 
Organisation, and the question of centralisation, is particularly important at the all- 
source assessment and dissemination level. The body that is now considered the fulcrum 
of the British intelligence community, the Joint Intelligence Committee, was first set-up 
as a sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff in 1936 to link intelligence and joint planning 
between the three separate armed services. 47 By 1939 its terms of reference were 
formally extended to include the assessment and co-ordination of intelligence from 
abroad in order that `any Government action was based on reliable and co-ordinated 
information' 48 The JIC was also to consider `any measures needed to improve the 
intelligence organisation of the country as a whole'. 49 In theory, the JIC's terms of 
42Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand. Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, (London: 
John Murray, 2001), p. 1 
43 Christopher Andrew speaking at the International History Seminar at the LSE, 10 November 2003. 
as The most comprehensive account being Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War _5 Volumes (London: HMSO, 1979-1990) 
45 R. V. Jones, Most Secret War, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978) 
46 Ibid.; Jones, Reflections on Intelligence (London: Heinemann, 1989) 




reference gave it a wide remit over intelligence work. In practice, it had little power to 
exert and was prone to the divisions between those departments it sought to bring 
together. 
During the early part of its existence the JIC was often treated as a peripheral body, 
caught between the different viewpoints of the three armed services and the Foreign 
Office, let alone other departments such as the intelligence agencies themselves. As the 
official historian of British intelligence during the Second World War, F. H. Hinsley, put 
it, these `departments of state, each having different and onerous responsibilities to the 
central government and subordinate authorities both at home and abroad, were naturally 
reluctant to exchange reliance on inter-departmental bodies for their own long- 
established control of the acquisition, the interpretation and the use of whatever 
information might bear on their work'. 50 From 1945 to 1957 the JIC formed part of the 
Chiefs of Staff organisation. From 1957 it operated under the Cabinet Office, thus 
feeding automatically into official and ministerial political thinking. 
The purpose of intelligence, in Quinlan's words, is to `offset gaps, uncertainties and 
distortions in what we can find out openly, in order that we may judge more wisely, 
explain more pertinently, and act more confidently and successfully. '51 The same is to 
some extent true of history and certainly intelligence history. In the United States it has 
been a more accepted and better-sourced part of wider Cold War histories for a much 
longer period. 52 Intelligence history in this country has altered dramatically in the last 
two decades. One of the main reasons is increased access to material previously 
withheld. Before 1992 the wholesale release of any official documents relating to 
50 F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War. Its Influence on Strategy and 
Operations, Volume 1 (HMSO, 1979), p. 4 
s' Michael Quinlan, `The Future of Covert Intelligence', in Agents for Change. Intelligence Services in 
the 21s` Century, (edited by Harold Shukman) (London: St Ermin's Press, 2000), p. 63 
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intelligence was prohibited, although in practice intelligence material did appear in the 
files of other departments. 
Concern over improving public access to government information, and therefore 
records, altered dramatically in 1992 under Prime Minister John Major's government. 
William Waldegrave, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and minister with 
responsibility for open government, was asked to identify areas of excessive 
government secrecy and look at methods to increase openness. The proposals that 
resulted in the 1993 White Paper aimed in the context of public records to make 
`changes in the criteria governing decision to withhold material for longer than 30 
years'. 53 It was to be achieved `through a reduction in the periods for which such 
material can be withheld, and new operational measures in the management of 
departmental records'. 54 Thus material emanating from intelligence assessment, as 
opposed to collection, was no longer held under a `blanket ban' that can only be 
reviewed every twenty-five years and was instead now `reviewed with a view to release, 
like other documents under the thirty-year rule. '55 
This initiative to redefine the criteria under which documents can be retained took some 
years to catch up with the 30-year norm for the release of public records. A substantial 
amount of previously retained material continues to be released as it is reviewed. New 
material from the working parties and sub-committees of the JIC which dealt with 
nuclear intelligence as well as the files of scientific departments of the armed services 
and files from the Atomic Energy Authority, continued to be opened as this thesis 
progressed. As former Director-General of the Security Service (MI5), Sir Stephen 
52 K. G. Robertson, `The Politics of Secret Intelligence - British and American Attitudes', in British and 
American Approaches to Intelligence, (Ed K. G. Robertson) (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 244-272 33 Open Government, Cmnd 2290, (HMSO, 1993) 
54 ibid. 
55 Ibid., p19 
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Lander, was keen to demonstrate at a 2001 conference at the then Public Record Office 
at Kew, the attitude of the government and the intelligence services towards public and 
scholarly debate of intelligence had become more sympathetic 56 
Releases since 1992 have enabled greater quantity and quality in both intelligence and 
nuclear history. Files from intelligence services are, given their nature, subject to 
different rules than those of other government departments. The files of SIS are still 
wholly withheld in order to protect sources and methods. 7 The archives of the 
intelligence agencies are as a general rule retained under blanket exemption through 
section 3(4) or 5(1) of the Public Records Act 195858 and clause 24 (3) of the Freedom 
of Information Act 2000. The latter allows Ministers to sign exemption certificates for 
information past the 30-year rule that is deemed to be `required for the purpose of 
safeguarding national security' S9 The same clause is applied to documents relating to 
nuclear war planning, the design of nuclear weapons and aspects which touch upon 
relations with foreign countries. 60 
In practice the current state of documentary release is, whilst considerable in 
comparison to twenty years ago, not entirely as consistent as portrayed. There has been 
notable access to M15 material from that agency's inception in 1909 through the two 
World Wars and early Cold War, which has provided a significant insight into their 
work. Papers released include, notably for this study, the M15 interrogation of Soviet 
56 Sir Stephen Lander, `British Intelligence in the Twentieth Century', Intelligence and National Security, 
Vol. 17/1 (Spring 2002), p. 9 Also published as Oliver Hoare (ed), British Intelligence in the Twentieth 
Century: A Missing Dimension (London: Frank Cass, 2003) 
57 http: //www. intelli eg nce. gov. uk/intelligencerecords. aspx, 8 July 2008 
58 Open Government, Chapter 9.8, p. 64 
59 Freedom of Information Act 2000, Section 24 (3) 
60 JIC files relating to Israel's nuclear programme. Those relating to French nuclear development are less 
restricted 
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atomic spy Klaus Fuchs. 61 Likewise, selected files from the GCHQ's First World War 
and Second World War predecessors, the Admiralty's Room 40 and the Government 
Codes and Cipher School (GC&CS), have been fairly extensively released. 62 These 
include the files from the Second World War Bletchley Park work. 63 Also in the public 
domain are the decryptions of wartime Soviet communications from the American 
Venona operation including those that revealed evidence of the USSR's penetration of 
the wartime Manhattan project to produce the atomic bomb. 64 
These releases will be supplemented by official histories on various aspects of the UK 
intelligence community. Official histories by some of the UK's foremost intelligence 
historians are intended for M15, SIS and the JIC, although much of the material on 
which they are based will remain locked away. 65 Reflecting the tradition established by 
the publication of earlier official histories - on British intelligence during the Second 
World War and on the Security Service up to 1945 - such studies will undoubtedly 
broaden our understanding and provide new areas for deeper research. 66 
Whilst the limited release of pre-GCHQ and M15 records represents only a fraction of 
their work, they provide rich pickings, particularly in conjunction with the much larger 
volume of higher assessment intelligence work that has also been made available. An 
exception to this is the records of SIS. These remain under blanket closure on the 
61 First World War historical reports from M15 are located in class TNA, KV; records created and 
inherited by GCHQ are located in class TNA, HW; Special Operations Executive (SOE) material is 
located in TNA, HS. Files on Klaus Fuchs including his interrogation are located in KV2/1245 - 1264 
62 TNA, HW contains the records of GCHQ's predecessors. Those of Room 40 are located in HW7/1-35 
63 TNA, HW5/1-767, Reports of German Army and Air Force High Grade Machine Decrypts, 1940-45 
64 TNA, HW15/1-62, `Government Code and Cipher School and Government Communications 
Headquarters: Venona Project: Records', 1940-49 
65 Home Office Announcement, 18 December 2002. The Official History of SIS by Professor Keith 
Jeffreys, Queen's University, Belfast is planned for 2010. Professor Christopher Andrew, Corpus Christi 
College, Cambridge, is due to complete his study of MIS by 2009. Dr Michael Goodman, War Studies 
Department, Kings College, University of London is undertaking the JIC history. Prime Minister's 
morning press briefing from 26 April 2007. Professor Richard Aldrich, University of Warwick, is 
currently researching an, unofficial, history of GCHQ and its predecessors 
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grounds that any disclosure would be detrimental to their `commitment to the protection 
of intelligence sources. '67 Eschewing the selective releases of other agencies, any 
exception is considered detrimental to the secrecy with which the agency operates and 
at risk of prejudicing future operations. All these arguments were recently rehearsed in a 
court case brought by the family of Paul Rosbaud, a man widely believed to have been a 
hugely significant SIS asset throughout the Second World War. 68 
There have, however, been occasions whereby details of SIS cases have made it into the 
public domain. In the United States, two authors were able to use American Freedom of 
Information legislation to obtain the vast majority of the CIA's files relating to Colonel 
Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet military officer run as an agent jointly by the CIA and SIS in 
1961-2.69 SIS's involvement had been implicitly acknowledged in 1965 with the leaked 
release of some of the material in an autobiography that was actually ghost-written by 
the agencies from information revealed by Penkovsky. 7° It is possible, from the CIA 
files, to read at great length the majority of the forty-plus meetings that took place 
between Penkovsky and his handlers. There are papers on the handling of the case and 
disagreements on such with SIS. There are also translated and circulated copies of 
articles from the top secret Soviet military journal he was able to microfilm and pass on. 
Nothing has been released on the British side, despite the opportunity to redress any 
66 Hinsley et al, British Intelligence in the Second World War, John Curry, The Security Service, 1908- 
1945. The Official History, (Introduction by Christopher Andrew), (PRO, 1999) - the latter was written in 
1945 as an internal M15 history and was only released in 1999 
67 SIS website statement on access to records. Accessible at http: //www. SIS. gov. uktoutput/Pa eg 5. htm15 
April 2008 
68 Ben Macrntyre, 'Family at War with M16 over secret files of Britain's greatest spy against the Nazis', 
The Times, 16 December 2006; Owen Bowcott, 'Spy left out in the cold: how M16 buried heroic exploits 
of agent 'Griffin', The Guardian, 22 September 2007 
69 htti): //www. foia. cia. gov/r)enkovsky. asp . Jerrold Schecter and Peter Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War, (London: Charles Scribner and Sons, 
1992) 
70 Oleg Penkovsky, The Penkovsky Papers. The Russian Who Spied for the West, (Translated by Peter 
Deriabin), (London: Doubleday and Company, 1965). The decision to produce this book for propaganda 
purposes followed the very public Soviet trial of Penkovsky and one of his British contacts, the 
businessman Grenville Wynne. The CIA files reveal disagreements over the decision. Wynne's own 
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mistaken appreciations resulting from the US version of events. 
In addition to greater government-led openness, and in some cases agency-led, there 
have also been legislative moves to allow researchers to test the limits of exemptions. 
The Freedom of Information Act came into force in 2005 bringing with it some greater 
accessibility for historians and the general public. There have been teething difficulties, 
yet the Act has already brought some major benefits. Requests made for this study on 
the files of the Atomic Energy Intelligence Unit whilst it was part of the Ministry of 
Supply has made some progress. By testing the exemption it is possible to argue in 
favour of documents that contain large amounts of redacted sections to be released 
despite their limitations. 1 Thus the papers of the AEIU in 1954 and 1955 have now 
been placed in the National Archives. 72 Some of the papers included those released 
under other departments but not redacted. It is possible to see some areas where 
inconsistency of approach, particularly in defining the letter of the law in terms of 
exempted areas, have led to greater restriction. 3 Yet there are other concerns. Papers 
that encroach upon detailed nuclear science and technology are approached extremely 
cautiously to avoid revealing significant technological insights that could pose security 
threats 
A comprehensive study of the secret sources on which nuclear intelligence in Britain 
was based will remain problematic with the notable continuing absence of the files from 
the collection agencies in the postwar period. The records from further up the 
intelligence tree are far more prevalent than those of collection, reflecting the fact that 
version of events was published in 1967. Grenville Wynne, The Man From Moscow, (London: 
Hutchinson, 1967) 
" FOI request 02-02-2005-0983832-003,2 February 2005 
72 TNA, ES 1/877-878. The original files are marked on the catalogue as retained. Photocopied extracts 
have been placed in the file under ES 1/877/1. 
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for reasons of security in the dissemination of intelligence assessments information on 
sources and methods are not revealed at this level. The less problematic area of 
intelligence assessment is still subject to exemptions, on national security and foreign 
relations grounds. Yet large amounts of material that reveals intelligence advice are now 
in the public domain. The release of Joint Intelligence Committee files has led to 
important books drawing strongly upon this very material. 74 The records themselves do 
not provide the complete picture of British nuclear intelligence, not least because of the 
occasional blandness of JIC minutes and memoranda, even on such an electrifying 
subject. However, given the massive expansion of intelligence records in the National 
Archives, continuing through the research of this thesis, the focus is therefore upon this 
source more than any other. 
A particular focus for research is, therefore, upon the longer-term assessments that 
provided a constant reference point for those, in the Chiefs of Staff machinery and later 
the Cabinet, that the JIC was to advise. The JIC would produce several extensive reports 
each year under such titles as `The Likelihood of War with the Soviet Union', `Soviet 
Intentions and Capabilities' and `Soviet Bloc War Potential'. Consecutive comparison 
of these alone shows developments in the JIC's view and the requirements set them 
through the changes in wording and emphasis. Some of the periodic assessments, 
providing an overview of a variety of subjects, represented the consensus view and 
were, therefore, somewhat sanitised in their portrayal of the ebb and flow of the latest 
intelligence thinking. This was even more the case in JIC appreciations intended for 
73 One of the files released referred to the three nuclear powers in 1954. The UK is mentioned but the 
identities of the other two countries was blacked out, despite only having been two other nations, the US 
and USSR, who had achieved this status at the time. 
74 Peter Hennessy, Secret State. Hennessy draw upon years of interviews with public officials involved in 
British defence and intelligence, unidentified, which supported the wealth of newly released documents in 
the book. Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy. How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World, (John 
Murray, 2002). Cradock, a former Chairman of the JIC and Margaret Thatcher's Foreign Policy Adviser, 
utilised released JIC memoranda and minutes in his book 
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NATO distribution. 75 
Analysis of the debates that preceded these papers, when they appear in the minutes of 
JIC meetings, reveals more about the analytical process. Sub-committees and working 
parties illuminate further the collation of intelligence in the drafting of reports, and 
occasionally something of the methods and sources of collection. The files of the 
Secretary to the JIC, the Secretariat's minutes, correspondence and notes, gives a 
flavour of the life of the Committee and much of the context of JIC meetings. 
Unfortunately, or perhaps consequently, these files are among the scarcest of the JIC 
files and many are listed, or referred to in other files, but not released. 76 
Greater access to the files of the JIC working parties and sub-committees since Percy 
Cradock published his work provide greater insight into how these reports were 
compiled, and, therefore, the use and significance of this work to policy-making. They 
show how information was presented to the JIC itself and how assessments of Soviet 
nuclear potential were made. The sub-JIC files allow a reconstruction of the 
organisation and processes of nuclear intelligence during the Cold War in a way that 
was previously not possible. Tracking the files of various sub-committees, working 
parties and individuals involved in nuclear intelligence is in itself a useful technique for 
working out the organisational structures and how they changed over time. In particular 
some of the files of the JIC secretariat and of the Nuclear Weapons Working Party 
provides useful information on staffing numbers, the duties of the secretariat and even 
give diagrams showing the structure of the JIC at various times. 77 
75 The `Periodic Intelligence Summary for NATO Commands' would often be the first paper circulated in 
the year. For example TNA, CAB158/1, JIC(58)1,23 September 1958 
76 TNA, CAB 163, Joint Intelligence Committee: Secretariat files, 1939-77 
77 TNA, CAB 163 contains 252 files. Many of the ones on nuclear-related matters are still withheld; CAB 
182/11-27 Missile Threat Co-ordination Sub-Committee and Working Party Minutes, Memoranda and 
Secretaries Minutes, 1961-1970; CAB 158/30, 'History of the Joint Intelligence Committee', November 
1957, Annex B (see Appendix D) 
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Historiography and focus of study 
Taken as a whole, the opportunities for researchers of UK intelligence and nuclear 
weapons history are more positive than ever before. Herman's eloquent encouragement, 
in 1997, for those studying these areas of the UK's Cold War history still holds some 
poignancy a decade later: 
To young Cold War historians Wordsworth's words must apply: [`]Bliss was it in that dawn to 
be alive, But to be young was very heaven! ['] They will soon be able to decide whether 
intelligence made a difference. 78 
The quantity and quality of historical analyses of these most secret functions of the 
British government during the Cold War is developing into a strong and well- 
documented subject. As well as contributing to understanding of the contemporary role 
of intelligence and nuclear weapons in the UK, the more analysis that is done on these 
topics only emphasises the degree to which they defined and helped to shape the course 
of the Cold War. In the US, literature on Cold War intelligence on the Soviet military, 
and particularly nuclear, threat have been far more plentiful and sometimes driven by 
greater public awareness of `bomber gap' and subsequent `missile gap' debates that 
have strayed into the political realm. 79 In the UK exploration of the intelligence picture 
7 Herman, Intelligence Services, p. 159 
79 John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (New York: 
The Dial Press, 1982); Lawrence Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, (London: 
Macmillan, 1986); Peter Hoffman, 'The Making of National Estimates during the period of the `Missile 
Gap', Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 1/3 (September 1986), pp. 336-356; Raymond L. Garthoff, 
Assessing the Adversary: Estimates by the Eisenhower Administration of Soviet Intentions and 
Capabilities (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1991); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. A 
Critical Appraisal of Post-War American National Security Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 
1982); Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American 
Presidency from to Washington to Bush, (London: Harper Collins, 1995); Charles A. Ziegler, 
`Intelligence Assessments of Soviet Atomic Capability, 1945-49: Myths, Monopolies and Maskirovka', in 
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 12/4 (October 1997); Oleg Bukharin, 'US Atomic Energy 
Intelligence Against the Soviet Target, 1945-1970', Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 19/4 (Winter 
2004), pp. 655-679; Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett (eds), Watching the Bear. Essays on the 
CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union (Washington: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2004). Also 
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of the Soviet nuclear threat has expanded with greater access to the documentary record. 
Richard Aldrich's wide-ranging study of British and American intelligence, The Hidden 
Hand, has four chapters covering the assessment of relative nuclear forces. 8° Cradock 
included a chapter on JIC assessments of the Soviet threat in his own history of that 
body. 81 
Peter Hennessy also covered this area in his analysis of Cold War Whitehall in The 
Secret State and, unlike many other authors, has sought to integrate intelligence into his 
analysis of wider Cold War machinery. 82 Elsewhere, Hennessy has incorporated both 
intelligence and nuclear weapons policy into research into the office of the Prime 
Minister in the postwar period and in histories of Britain in the 1940s and 1950S. 83 
Naturally, with a wider focus and more ground to cover, his works do not provide 
systematic analysis of the link between intelligence and nuclear weapons policy. One 
book, Cabinets and the Bomb, comprising documents on the nuclear weapons decision- 
making of the postwar governments, has attempted this task, quite successfully. 84 This 
thesis, and the research upon which it is based, contributed to the development of that 
work. 
Recent studies, more narrowly defined in focus, have provided greater analysis on 
nuclear and intelligence topics. Paul Maddrell's account of the Anglo-American 
intelligence effort in post-war Germany has added to understanding of the importance of 
that country as a source for scientific intelligence in the early years of the Cold War. 85 
available online: https: //www. cia. gov/Iibrary/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books- 
and-monographs/watching-the-bear-essays-on-cias-analysis-of-the-soviet-union/index. html, 9 June 2005 
80 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, especially Chapters 10,17,23 and 24 
81 Cradock, Know Your, especially Chapter 3, pp. 50-67 
82 Hennessy, Secret State, especially Chapter 1, pp. 1-43 
83 Peter Hennessy, Never Again. Britain 1945-51, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992); Peter Hennessy, 
Having it So Good: Britain in the Fifties (London: Allen Lane, 2006) 
84 Peter Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb (London: British Academy/ Oxford University Press, 2007) 
85 Paul Maddrell, Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945-1961, (Oxford 
University Press, 2006) 
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Maddrell has analysed the mass of files now available both in America and in the UK to 
explore the use of divided Germany as a point of contact with the Soviet Union and the 
massive effort that went into collecting intelligence on German scientists and 
technicians exploited by the USSR for its own missile and nuclear programmes. 
One of the most significant contributions to the history of this area, however, has been 
the study by Michael Goodman, specifically on British nuclear intelligence on the 
USSR up to 1958.86 Goodman brings in the Anglo-American relationship and includes 
research on the US side as well as much greater depth on the British archives. He also 
examines more closely the organisation, collection, and use of intelligence on the Soviet 
threat highlights than previous studies. Aldrich, Cradock and especially Goodman have 
provided researchers with a much deeper analysis and far more evidence of Cold War 
British nuclear intelligence and there is insufficient space available here to go over the 
subject in the same detail that Goodman, in particular, has produced. However, though 
there is some examination of the impact of this work on British defence policy and 
strategic planning in all three books, and Goodman's thesis, there is insufficient 
interplay between intelligence and ministerial policy, particularly the vital moments of 
decision-making that saw the development and maintenance of Britain's nuclear 
deterrent. 
Though Goodman highlights the close interrelationship between nuclear intelligence 
and wider nuclear weapons development, he does not fully explore it. As he 
acknowledges it `is in the intelligence producer-consumer relationship that many studies 
fall down'. 87 Though he brings in both `the interface of the atomic intelligence unit with 
86 Michael Goodman, British Intelligence Estimates of the Soviet Nuclear Weapons Programme and the 
Impact on Strategic Planning, 1945-1958, (PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, 2004); Goodman, 
Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb, (Stanford University 
Press, 2007) 
87 Goodman, British Intelligence Estimates, p. 442 
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the JIC' and `the JIC with the Chiefs of Staff, he does not analyse its impact upon 
British nuclear policy and ministerial use of that intelligence. Indeed, particular focus on 
that factor in this thesis has meant that, where analysis of intelligence organisation, 
collection and assessment does go over the same ground as these studies, different 
aspects come to light and are emphasised. In certain cases, such as the 1954 work on 
thermonuclear intelligence and the decision to produce a British H-bomb, new archival 
material has come to light, reflecting the pace of releases at the National Archives, and 
the impact of the Freedom of Information Act of 2005 (see above). 
Memoirs of individuals involved in or on the periphery of nuclear intelligence form an 
important part of the historiographical picture. 88 The nature of such works, and in some 
cases the sensitivity towards intelligence matters at the time of their publication, means 
they are often, unsurprisingly, lacking in detail or documentary evidence. However, 
their value is inestimable in filling in the gaps in what can sometimes be obtuse and 
incomplete documentary records, especially the contributions of Lowenhaupt, an 
American intelligence officer, and, more recently, Panton, a British nuclear intelligence 
expert. This is particularly true of the period before 1957, in which the archives are 
more often widespread and less consistent in record (see above), where both 
Lowenhaupt and Panton, and to a lesser extent Jones, Mann and Roberts, provide detail 
and colour regarding the types of collection operation, use and personalities of nuclear 
intelligence. 
One reason for researching this subject over a twenty-five year period is the ability to 
88 Henry S. Lowenhaupt, 'On the Soviet Nuclear Scent', Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 11/4 (Fall 1967), 
pp. 13-29 and `Chasing Bitterfield Calcium', Studies in Intelligence (Declassified CIA journal) Vol-17/1 
(Spring 1973), pp. 21-30; Wilfred Mann, Was There a Fifth Man? Quintessential Recollections, (Oxford: 
Pergamon Press, 1982); Jones, Most Secret and Reflections; Frank Roberts, Dealing With Dictators. The 
Destruction and Revival of Europe, 1930-70 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991); Solly 
Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles. An Autobiography, 1946-88, (Vol. 2), (London: Collins, 1988); 
Frank Panton, `Governments, Scientists and the UK's Nuclear Weapons Programme. 1957-1967', Paper 
30 
examine the continuities and complexities of nuclear weapons policy and the decision- 
making that accompanied several changes in the type of nuclear forces the UK chose to 
develop. The way in which successive British governments approached this topic 
demands analysis of the continuity of advice and information that aided them. When 
challenges to the continuance of nuclear policy did occur, within or without 
government, intelligence aspects would form part of the rationale for both sides of the 
debate. Analysing the intelligence input in particular is, therefore, greatly revealing of 
the strengths and limitations of continuity in British nuclear defence policy. As 
Hennessy has written: 
Several sets of ministers of both major parties have been involved in such decision-taking, and in each 
generation the mixture of motivations and justifications shifts and rearranges itself, though, as in a child's 
kaleidoscope, many of the particles remain the same. 89 
Historians who have focused upon the development of nuclear weapons in the UK have 
not, in any consistent manner, brought the intelligence picture into their studies. The 
story of Britain's nuclear weapons history has been more widely written about than 
related intelligence. The history of both the wartime project and the immediate postwar 
atomic work has been the subject of official histories by Margaret Gowing, who was 
involved in the programme. 90 Lorna Arnold, who worked with Gowing on the atomic 
histories, has provided a particularly rewarding account of the British H-bomb 
programme 91 Both of the authors - Arnold worked with Gowing on the post-war 
histories - focused more towards explaining the administrative and technical 
achievements involved than the political factors and do not venture into intelligence 
delivered at British Rocket Oral History Programme (BROHP) meeting, 13 April 2007. I am extremely 
grateful to Dr Panton for a copy of his remarks. 
9 Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb, p.! 
90 Margaret Cowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-45 (London: Macmillan/ UKAEA, 1964); 
Margaret Cowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 2 Volumes (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1984) 
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aspects. 
The Anglo-American relationship in this sphere is also one which, ebbing and flowing, 
forms a recurring and often decisive character. The course and troubles of the Anglo- 
American relationship more generally have been widely written about, as has aspects of 
the nuclear and intelligence relationship separately. 92 Yet the importance of the 
intelligence relationship in maintaining and furthering nuclear collaboration has not 
been fully analysed. Utilising both American and British archives, Septimus Paul has 
focused on Anglo-American nuclear collaboration. 3 Focusing on the progress of 
nuclear development in each country, Paul revealed the extreme difficulties that 
occurred both during the war and after in sharing various aspects of their nuclear know- 
how. Paul's study reveals little of the intelligence co-operation that paralleled and often 
overlapped with wider nuclear matters. However, his analysis does illuminates the 
context in which the intelligence link occurred and, therefore, the reasons why that 
aspect was so important. 
Other authors have looked at the development of British nuclear policy, its relationship 
to wider defence policy and strategic planning. 94 Again, many of these works, especially 
those of the 1980s and 1990s, did not have access to the amount of intelligence archival 
material that can now be examined and do not bring in the intelligence angle to any 
great extent, if at all. Some of the most valuable historical analysis of British nuclear 
91 Lorna Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) 
92 See for example, John Baylis, Anglo-American Relations since 1939: The Enduring Alliance 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); Eric Jones, `Introduction' to a special issue on the 
Transatlantic Relationship, International Affairs, Vol. 80/4 (2004), pp. 587-593 
93 Septimus H. Paul, Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American Atomic Relations, 1941-1952 (Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press, 2000) 
94 John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State. The United States, Britain and the Military Atom, 
(London: Macmillan, 1983); Ian Clark and Nicholas Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 
1945-1958, (London: Clarendon, 1989); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship. 
Britain's deterrent and America, 1957-1962, (London: Clarendon Press, 1994); John Baylis, Ambiguity 
and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); Twigge and Scott, 
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weapons development, particularly the responsibility of both Royal Air Force and, 
subsequently, the Royal Navy, to operate and deliver them, have no interest in 
intelligence, nor scope to analyse it, including those by military insiders. 95 
Thus, while the cumulative historiography on nuclear weapons and intelligence is 
healthy and growing, the scope for new research on their synthesis with each other is 
still deficient. Intelligence history is best understood as an examination of one part of 
`the prevailing mentalities which a government brings to bear in making foreign policy, 
military and domestic decisions'. 96 This thesis brings together research on UK nuclear 
intelligence and nuclear weapons policy in order to expand beyond the picture currently 
available in secondary literature. A particular instance of the deficiency of the 
intelligence angle in British nuclear history is in recent research on the Labour 
governments of 1964 to 1970 and the period's significance for the development of 
British nuclear policy. 97 Most recently, historical work on the Super- 
Antelope/Chevaline programme of 1967-1982, to upgrade the Polaris missiles to cope 
with Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM), reflects the release of papers from the 1970s under 
Planning Armageddon; Freedman, Evolution; Ken Young, `A Most Special Relationship: The Origins of 
Anglo-American Nuclear Strike Planning, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 9/2 (Spring 2007), pp-5-31 
95 Cecil James, Defence Policy and the Royal Air Force, 1956-1963, (Air Historical Branch (RAF), 
1987); Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident. British Naval Policy since World War II, (London: The Bodley 
Head, 1987); John Coker, `The Impact of Polaris on Strategic Deterrence, 1968-9', Mountbatten Centre 
for International Studies (MCIS) in collaboration with British Rocketry Oral History Project (BROHP), 
Conference at Charterhouse, 27 March 2008; Roy Brocklebank, 'UK-US Strategic Nuclear Targeting, 
1964-1976', Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (MCIS) in collaboration with British Rocketry 
Oral History Project (BROHP), Conference at Charterhouse, 27 March 2008 
96 Wesley K. Wark, `In Never-Never Land? The British Archives on Intelligence', Historical Journal, 
Vo135, Nol (1992) pp. 195-203, p. 202 
97 Michael Middeke, 'Anglo-American Nuclear Weapons Cooperation After the Nassau Conference: The 
British Policy of Interdependence', in Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 2/3, (Spring 2000), pp. 69-96; 
Said Dockrill, 'Forging the Anglo-American Global Defence Partnership: Harold Wilson, Lyndon 
Johnson and the Washington Summit, December 1964', in The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 23/4 
(December 2000), pp. 107-129; Saki Dockrill. Britain's Retreat from East of Suez. The Choice between 
Europe and the World?, (London: Palgrave, 2002); John W. Young, The Labour Governments 1964- 
1970: Volume 2 international Policy, (Manchester University Press, 2003); John W. Young, 'Killing the 
MLF? The Wilson Government and Nuclear Sharing in Europe, 1964-66', in Diplomacy and Statecraft, 
Vol. 14/2 (June 2003), pp. 295-324; Andrew Priest, `In American Hands: Britain, the United States and the 
Polaris Nuclear Project 1962-1968', Contemporary British History, Vol. 19/3 (September 2005) pp. 353- 
376 
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the 30-year rule. 98 However, the intelligence input into this episode has only been 
touched upon in such works, even though it forms a central and contentious part of the 
ministerial debate 99 The detailed study of the origins of the programme in Chapter 
Four, therefore, forms a significant contribution in both evidence and analysis to our 
understanding of the defence policy of the 1964-70 Labour government. 
Themes and focus of study 
As with nuclear deterrence, intelligence was to provide warning against a `what if so 
grim that the fact that it did not manifest itself, and the system never tested in anger, 
does not undermine the degree to which constant vigilance was considered a vital 
precaution. Both the centrality of the threat of nuclear war in British defence policy 
between 1945 and 1970, and the scale of intelligence efforts to gauge this peril, requires 
analysis of British intelligence assessments of this threat and how successive 
governments employed them. The issue of nuclear weapons capability was central to 
the UK's post-1945 defence policy. Soviet nuclear capabilities and intentions were from 
an early stage and throughout the period in question, the `overriding target for British 
intelligence'. 100 Given that Britain's nuclear forces were primarily intended to deter 
Soviet aggression, the way in which intelligence impacted specifically upon the 
decision-making that led to their development is a particularly important area for 
research. 
Some aspects of the history of both the UK's nuclear intelligence efforts and nuclear 
weapons policy are most clearly seen in analysis over a long timeframe. Intelligence 
98 John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart, `Britain and the Chevaline Project: The Hidden Nuclear Programme, 
1967-82', in The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 26 No. 4 (December 2003), pp124-155; Proceedings of 
the Royal Aeronautical Society, 'The History of the UK Strategic Deterrent: The Chevaline Programme', 
28 October 2004; Kristan Stoddart, 'The Wilson Government and British Responses to Anti-Ballistic 
Missiles, 1964-1970', Contemporary British History, ifirst, online publication 12 June 2008, pp. 1-33 
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organisation is a prime example. As Philip Davies argued in his study of M16, though it 
may appear `prosaic', it is important, not least because British scholarship has tended 
towards the historical rather than the conceptual. 101 Though this study falls in the former 
category, it is necessary to understand how the numerous individuals and organisations 
involved in nuclear-related intelligence interacted. This is particularly so in the case of 
intelligence as `Intelligence agencies do not exist in a vacuum; they are part and parcel 
of the overt machinery of government'. 102 The ability to set requirements, to 
disseminate material with reassurance about its origins whilst not revealing its source 
and to integrate such material into wider intelligence and defence studies is all 
dependent upon how these bodies related to each other. It is also a subject that is 
becoming more apparent as a greater amount of documentary material is released. 
Organisation, therefore, forms a continuous and well-covered aspect of this thesis. 
The structure of nuclear intelligence suffered acutely and, because of its added secrecy, 
rather idiosyncratically from the overlaps and diffusion that characterised British 
intelligence generally for much of this period. R. V. Jones' postwar memoirs describe 
many instances of conflict between departments whose scope of work paralleled or 
related to the subject. 103 In reality, as with the development of the JIC in the late 1930s, 
it is possible to detect a desire on the part of both the armed services and the Foreign 
Office to keep `in-house' intelligence analysis, which they saw as specialist to their 
department. Indeed Jones set out his anxieties in a 1945 report to the JIC on the future 
of intelligence administration: 
A fundamental difficulty of Intelligence work is that input is by source, and output is by subject. 
99 The most extensive analysis of the intelligence angle is provided in Stoddart, `The Wilson 
Government', pp. 5-8,9-12 
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A changeover has thus to occur inside the Intelligence machine, which therefore has to act as far 
as possible as a single perfect human mind, observing, remembering, criticizing and correlating 
different types of information, and then giving expression to the result. 
104 
Jones was an advocate of centralised scientific intelligence and saw great problems in 
the 1945 decision to have separate scientific intelligence branches, one for each of the 
three Services. In terms of nuclear intelligence this problem was somewhat countered 
by the fact that it was so secret that it could only be dealt with by relatively few 
individuals who would, therefore, be able to co-ordinate better than larger groups. 
However, the highly technical nature of nuclear intelligence analysis required skilled 
and experienced officials. Therefore, files are often widely dispersed under their parent 
departments and it is necessary, especially in the period before 1957, to look beyond 
those files that originate from the JIC. 105 
The collection of intelligence is another area that developed greatly over the time frame 
in question. Technical improvements during this period saw advances in the efficiency 
of nuclear intelligence, not least the analysis of debris from Soviet nuclear testing and 
the revolutionary influence of satellite imagery from the early 1960s. Aldrich has 
argued that `we do not know the full story of the Cold War, indeed we may never 
know' 106 This is, for the reasons set out above on the archives of the agencies, 
particularly true of intelligence collection. This study has benefited from the advice of 
some of those who were involved in intelligence work during this period, including 
Michael Herman, Frank Panton and Eric Younson. However, there is clearly a line over 
which they cannot stray in revealing aspects of intelligence work that have not been 
103 Jones, Reflections, p. 16 
104 R. V. Jones, Most Secret, pp. 493-494 
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shown in the documentary record. 
Analysing the results of intelligence collection, through the collation and assessment of 
intelligence in JIC reports does, at the very least, reveal most of the conclusions as they 
were passed to their customers. The fact that not all of the JIC files have been released 
again precludes comprehensive conclusions about the sources of intelligence. However, 
none of these factors should prevent the attempt to tell the story of intelligence, nor 
nuclear weapons history. Other historians covering different subjects and periods are 
subject to similar constraints. The attempt to discover and discern the true course of 
events is the prime motivator for historians. For this reason, focus upon all aspects of 
intelligence in this thesis, from collection to use, allows a greater opportunity to analyse 
the subject. 
There are, of course, several areas of this kaleidoscope that it will not be possible to 
examine fully here, and which would undoubtedly benefit from further research. It will 
not be possible here to attempt to detailed analysis of the JIC's appreciations of the 
Soviet Union as a whole. Thus the study will concentrate on JIC output dealing with the 
Soviet nuclear capabilities and intentions. Some of the JIC studies deal with the Soviet 
bloc as a whole, or the `Sino-Soviet' bloc, as an umbrella description. Many of these 
studies obviously also incorporate conventional weapons strength and intentions. There 
is also not scope here for direct and continuous comparisons of the US and British 
intelligence output, the intention here is to analyse the US angle where it has bearing on 
the British story. 
The policy of successive British governments towards nuclear disarmament, a story 
which runs somewhat in parallel, and closely interlinked, with nuclear defence policy, 
will also not be fully fleshed out although some moments of subject are touched upon as 
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they affect intelligence work. 107 There is also, in part because that is where the dearth of 
material lays, no scope here for an exhaustive analysis of the collection methods of the 
intelligence agencies on this subject. The impact of the methods, improvements in 
scientific approaches, concerted work with the US and other sharing, as well as 
significant operations, will be examined, but as one part of an intelligence process that 
also involves assessment, dissemination and use. Likewise, analysis of the wider story 
of British defence policy, the impact on the development of NATO and strategic 
planning are large subjects that require separate treatment. 108 
A last, but important, area that cannot be fully covered here is the impact of this 
intelligence on foreign policy as a whole and the wider Cold War. 109 Although this 
study seeks to provide some synthesis of intelligence history and wider British 
government history, the length of the period under review, necessary to examine the 
trends in intelligence, and the nature of the subject intelligence was covering, make it 
most pertinent to focus on the impact on British nuclear defence policy particularly. Yet 
some appreciation of the wider viewpoint, and therefore its impact upon analysis of 
nuclear capability, is necessary. 
Cold War military planning in the UK, broadly speaking, involved many different 
Whitehall and military bodies and thousands of people. Yet it was also a story of paper 
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trails, memorandum, plans and advice, all defined by focus on the possibility of nuclear 
war. It is possible to see partsof Britain's `Secret State' during the Cold War as a 
Whitehall response to an eventuality that was almost to awful to contemplate. The 
contribution of intelligence can be defined as information that emanated from secret 
sources or that from open sources that was incorporated with secret material. Or, more 
broadly, and perhaps more usefully here, it is the work that was done by those bodies 
that were defined at the time as working on intelligence. 
In the words of Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong, a full-time member of the JIC from 
1947 and the first Director-General of Intelligence at the Ministry of Defence in 1968: 
The fact must be faced that the chief rival of the Intelligence end-product in the mind of the 
policy-maker is the policy-maker's own experience, and the information available to him from 
other non-Intelligence sources. 110 
There are three main areas of focus that dominate this study. The first is the relationship 
between intelligence collection, organisation and assessment. Another important area is 
that of the impact of Anglo-American relations o(British nuclear intelligence work and 
vice-versa. The third major theme to be analysed it that of the use that was made of 
intelligence in informing British decision-making on the existence and form of their 
nuclear forces. It is worth setting out the focus and arguments for each, and how this 
differs from the conclusions of other authors who have touched upon these subjects, 
either in-depth or in part. The central argument of this thesis will show that at 
significant moments in its history intelligence helped keep Britain in the nuclear game 
and not just in the reasons why the UK chose to become and remain a nuclear power. It 
was also crucial in forging a link with American nuclear know-how at times when wider 
110 Kenneth Strong, Men of Intelligence. A Study of the Roles and Decisions of Chiefs of Intelligence from 
World War Ito the present day, (London: Cassell, 1970), p. 155 
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nuclear collaboration suffered from the ebb and flow of the `special' relationship. This 
was reflected, in one way or another, in the organisation of nuclear intelligence, the 
collection operations that produced it, the focus of assessment and the contribution that 
intelligence made to British nuclear weapons policy in the years 1945 to 1970. 
Chapter One seeks to explore how intelligence against the Soviet Union got underway 
and the impact of the curtailment of US nuclear sharing in 1946. By examining British 
assessments in the aftermath of the Second World War up to the first Soviet atomic test 
of August 1949, it explores how far British intelligence assessments over-estimated the 
timescale in which the Soviets were able to achieve this first test. It analyses the impact 
of the nuclear theme on intelligence assessments and how intelligence was organised in 
its approach 
V* the Soviet threat. Alongside this it shows how intelligence aspects 
impacted upon ministerial and military thinking surrounding the 1947 decision to 
proceed with a British atomic bomb. 
The Second chapter continues from the aftermath of this surprise end to the US nuclear 
monopoly and the development of thermonuclear weapons, particularly the 1954 
decision to produce a British H-bomb capability. New material showing the access UK 
nuclear intelligence had to US thermonuclear testing was crucial to this decision and is 
discussed in detail. The period was also hugely significant in the context of the Anglo- 
American relationship. It saw many examples of combined work at a time when 
collaboration was fettered by the 1946 McMahon Act's restrictions upon the 
dissemination of American nuclear know-how. 
The Third chapter analyses the period before and after another `shock', the launch of a 
Soviet space satellite (Sputnik) in 1957, which heralded the age of ballistic missiles. It 
was an event that led Harold Macmillan to ask urgently of the JIC `What is the capacity 
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of the Russians to make missiles to reach the United Kingdom? "" The chapter covers 
the development of guided weaponry in a level of detail that other authors have not 
attempted, and, therefore, how intelligence informed UK perspectives on the relative 
importance of missiles at a time in which the British nuclear weapons were dependent 
upon aircraft delivery. It also looks at the impact of these developments for UK-US co- 
operation and the lead-up to the resumption of nuclear collaboration in 1958. 
Chapter Four continues these themes, looking at the strategic implications, of Soviet 
missile developments and the vulnerability of Britain's V-Bomber Force. Accurate 
intelligence played a key role in the debates surrounding the cancellation of both the 
British Blue Streak and American Skybolt, and in the increasing moves towards 
dependency on US missile technology that culminated in the Polaris agreement of 
November 1962. The move towards guided weaponry, questions of vulnerability and 
second-strike capabilities were all vitally important concerns at this time and ones in 
which intelligence played a central role. 
Chapter five continues the story up to 1970, focusing on the development of Soviet 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) technology that appeared to undermine the competency of 
British offensive nuclear technology. The relationship between intelligence, military 
and scientific official thinking and the Labour Government's defence decisions in this 
period are still contended. This chapter explores and expands understanding of this 
period with new analysis of the intelligence input into the debate. 
Without examining the product of the intelligence services, and attempting to judge the 
value and impact of their assessments, studies of wider British Cold War policy-making 
are incomplete. A study of the intelligence the British government received about the 
"' TNA, DEFE7/970, `Replies to Questions Asked by the PM of the JIC in the Course of his Minute to 
the MOD No 630/57', 24 January 1958: Quoted in Aldrich, Hidden Hand p. 556 
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Soviet Union's nuclear threat in particular provides value to an understanding of British 
nuclear weapons policy. It also sheds light on questions of British influence in the 
predominantly American-Soviet Cold War clash, Anglo-American relations, the part 
played by intelligence during the Cold War and, not least, the role of nuclear weapons 
in the Cold War. 
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Chanter One: Hiroshima to Kazakhstan, August 1945 to August 1949 
In the five years following the end of the Second World War the potential nuclear 
capability of the USSR became a fixed and consistent priority for British intelligence. In 
August 1945, three months after VE day, many in Whitehall and the Armed Forces, like 
the rest of the world, only appreciated the enormous power of this new weapon after it 
had been used against Japanese cities. For British intelligence, the deterioration of 
relations between the West and the USSR meant increasing focus on the likely date by 
which a Soviet atomic weapon could be produced. Early in the morning of 29 August 
1949 the USSR did test its first atomic bomb, which the West codenamed `Joe-1' after 
the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Yet it was still not fully apparent to those involved in 
British nuclear intelligence how rapidly the Soviet programme had developed since 
1945 and it would be another three years before the UK would achieve this feat. 
The concealment of the Allied wartime project had severely limited the number of 
people in the UK able to appreciate the full technical, military and diplomatic 
consequences of the developments of nuclear weapons. Margaret Gowing, official 
historian of the wartime and postwar UK atomic programmes, has estimated that only 
`seven Ministers in the wartime coalition had been involved in the bomb project in 
varying degrees and at varying times, but only two of them, Sir John Anderson 
[Chancellor of the Exchequer] and Lord Cherwell [Paymaster-General], knew 
continuously and in detail about the whole business. '' 12 The Chiefs of Staff also had 
only been given the `barest outline' of the project, although they could see for 
themselves the potential war-winning capacity of the weapons, and were, by the end of 
1945, looking into their possible `requirements for atomic bombs and the possibility of 
112 Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Vol. 1, p. 5 
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making consequential reductions in other forms of armament production'. 113 
Postwar British nuclear intelligence, like the wider atomic energy programme, was also 
limited by the number of `properly informed advisors', as much of the wartime 
development moved to the US during crucial technical and production stages. 114 When 
the Labour Government came to power in July 1945 the number of knowledgeable 
advisors was small: `it comprised a few individuals in the Cabinet Office, the Foreign 
Office, the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, the Treasury and the Raw 
Materials Department of the Ministry of Supply. ' "s This list included those who had 
been involved in wartime intelligence work on the German atomic programme, notably 
Eric Welsh's SIS group. Yet, as with Ministers, full understanding of the scientific 
detail in the wider intelligence community, including the JIC, was heavily restricted. 
The reasons for this, and the problems that resulted, were evident in Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill's refusal to allow Sir Henry Tizard, Chairman of the Defence 
Research Policy Committee, to be fully indoctrinated into the nuclear secret. Tizard was 
a physical chemist who had been at the forefront of many of the militarily vital 
scientific developments of the First and Second World Wars, including bringing R. V. 
Jones into scientific intelligence and instigating the Maud Committee. Early in 1945 he 
was chairman of a committee charged by the UK Chiefs of Staff with examining 
`Future Weapons and Methods of War' for the following twenty-five years. 116 
A particular concern in widening the circle of nuclear knowledge was the fact that the 
latest developments in nuclear design were American. British access to them only came 
113 TNA, CAB130/2, Cabinet Committee on Atomic Energy, GEN75/81h Meeting, 18 December 1945 
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through the tricky wartime collaboration and the US was sensitive over controlling any 
proliferation of the nuclear secret. Indeed, this was the argument put by General 
Hastings Ismay, Churchill's chief military staff officer, when he offered to see Tizard 
himself and explain that it `is not our secret to give away. ' 117 With Victory in Europe in 
close sight and in the final stages of the atomic bomb project the security of the bomb 
secret was never more important. Tizard attempted to argue his case to Churchill 
directly. 
I do not want to be told details of production, etc. but there are certain broad questions which I 
should like authority to put to British physicists who are in the picture, in order that I may 
satisfy myself that developments in this field do not invalidate the general conclusions to which 
my enquiry had led me up to the present. Would you be prepared to give me this authority? "' 
Churchill's response, through the intermediary of Ismay, was clear: 
He [Tizard] surely has lots of things to get on with without plunging into this exceptionally 
secret matter. It may well be that in a few years or even months this secret can no longer be 
kept. One must always realize that for every one of these scientists who is informed there is a 
little group around him who also hear the news. 19 
When the report was produced in June 1945 Tizard's `general conclusions' were already 
out of date. Tizard had anticipated as much when, with only the limited knowledge of 
the progress that had been made since 1940, he stated that `if atomic energy can be 
released explosively, the character of war ... will be completely changed. ' 
12° His 
inability to find out more about nuclear weapons development led to vague, but rightly 
pessimistic, conclusions. His report argued that on `the assumption that this weapon 
11 TNA, PREM3/139/1 IA, Ismay to Churchill, 19 March 1945 
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materialises we are unable to be sure that there is any defence on which a country could 
rely'. 121 The study needed updating when the atomic bomb was finally unleashed on the 
world stage two months later, but it took another year for it to be fully revised. 122 
Soon after the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and having been informed of the 
atomic bomb's existence only a few days before that, the new Labour Prime Minister, 
Clement Attlee, set down his initial thinking about the new weapons. A memorandum 
prepared by Attlee in late August 1945 for his new Atomic Energy Cabinet Committee 
saw him assert that `the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ... had changed the 
world'. 123 Attlee's perceptive grasp of `the significance of what [had] happened' in his 
memorandum was described by Sir Michael Quinlan, former Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Defence, as `the richest jewel' of postwar British nuclear policy 
documents. 124 The Labour leader's `clarity', which Quinlan felt `some flashier minds 
still had not equalled decades later', was also in identifying the problems of assimilating 
these changes. 125 Attlee foresaw that the strategic shift that had occurred with the 
`advent of air power' had now been superseded by a development that made much of 
the traditional thinking about military planning `obsolete'. It was, therefore, `infinitely 
harder for people to realise that even the modern conception of war to which in my 
lifetime we have become accustomed is now completely out of date'. 126 
While the dangers of nuclear weapons were becoming apparent to many, the process of 
changing the methods and strategy by which Britain would deal with this new concept 
of war was not so easy. The JIC were also keen to direct themselves towards this vital 
121 Ibid. 
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new subject. Central to this was the question of overall responsibility for nuclear 
intelligence, whose highly secret wartime existence had kept it secluded from wider 
intelligence co-ordination. The organisation of postwar nuclear intelligence would prove 
a contentious topic, and one that was defined by relations with the US. 
Background: Nuclear intelligence in the Second World War 
There are many aspects of British Cold War nuclear intelligence work and nuclear 
weapons policy that have their origins in the Second World War. The history of British 
intelligence against the wartime German nuclear programme is still incomplete, but 
there are many strands in the various accounts of Allied atomic bomb development that 
relate to intelligence. Additionally, many of the themes that appeared during the war 
would have even greater ramifications in the postwar period. From its infancy the 
development of atomic weapons was closely related to, and sometimes propelled by, 
intelligence. 
The atomic bomb was closely tied to intelligence from the start. In January 1939 Lise 
Meitner, who had escaped Nazi Germany only months earlier, and her nephew Otto 
Frisch realised that two German scientists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman, had split the 
atom. 127 Paul Rosbaud, a science editor for the German publisher Springer Verlang who 
was in touch with both Meitner and Hahn, received an early copy of Hahn and 
Strassman's findings. 128 Rosbaud was also a hugely significant British intelligence asset 
working, at that time, with SIS officer Frank Foley. Together they had also been 
instrumental in getting Meitner and many other Jews away from German-dominated 
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Europe, and Rosbaud now applied great energy in getting a paper on Hahn and 
Strassman's work published swiftly, and in transmitting it to the British scientific 
community. 129 In March 1939 Rosbaud travelled to London to meet with the Cambridge 
scientist John Cockcroft, to brief him further on the new findings on this and related 
German work. 130 
In February 1940 two refugee scientists, Otto Frisch and Rudolph Peierls, produced a 
paper on the theoretical possibility of a `super bomb. 
131 In point three of their report 
Frisch and Peierls had effectively provided intelligence requirements for monitoring 
German nuclear progress: 
Information that could be helpful in this respect would be data about the exploitation of the 
uranium mines under German control (mainly in Czechoslovakia) and about any recent German 
purchases of uranium abroad. It is likely that the plant would be controlled by Dr. K. Clusius 
(Professor of Physical Chemistry in Munich University), the inventor of the best methods for 
separating isotopes, and therefore information as to his whereabouts and status might also give 
an important clue. 
132 
Concern about German procurement of Norwegian Heavy Water would help propel one 
person into the nuclear sphere whose influence over British nuclear intelligence would 
extend well into the 1950s. This was Eric Welsh; a former Naval officer who came to 
lead SIS's Norwegian section early in the war. 133 Arnold Kramish has written that, 
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probably in May 1942, Stewart Menzies, head of SIS ('C'), was particularly `concerned 
with atomic bombs' and, as well as being in contact with Peierls, had apparently 
assigned Welsh to atomic energy intelligence after Welsh demonstrated an existing 
capability in scientific spheres. 134 
Welsh's charter included the operational aspects of all scientific and technical intelligence, as 
defined at that time by the Oslo Report. His assignment was to parallel and support the 
analytical efforts of R. V. Jones. But Welsh's task, being operational, was covert, and the 
"customers" were to know as little as possible about the sources. Jones did not learn of Welsh's 
principal source, Paul Rosbaud, until after the war. 
135 
Jones' own recollection is starkly different, suggesting he knew much earlier about 
atomic development and had himself introduced Welsh to the `possibility of the 
devastatingly powerful atomic bomb'. 136 Jones wrote in his memoirs, many years later, 
that he had been concerned the previous year at developments towards atomic weapons. 
I therefore jumped one afternoon of 1941 when I received a telegram from Norway saying that 
the Germans were stepping up the production of heavy water... I contacted the Head of the 
Norwegian Section, Eric Welsh ... When I told Welsh that I was interested in the telegram he 
said something like, `Bloody silly telegram! Whoever heard of heavy water? ' I told him that it 
meant something very serious, and that it must be followed up. 137 
Welsh was involved in the operation to sabotage the Norwegian Norsk-Hydro plant at 
Vemork in February 1943. Whilst Jones apparently instigated the first attempts to try to 
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`knock [the plant] out', the successful mission was began when Welsh went to SOE 
with the request. 138 Following the success of this operation, Jones recalled `getting ... 
Eric Welsh together with Wallace Akers and Michael Perrin, both former I. C. I. 
[Imperial Chemical Industries] employees, but now prominently in the British `Tube 
Alloys' project'. 139 Together Welsh and Perrin, who was a secretary for the joint US- 
UK nuclear organisation, would come to dominate postwar British nuclear intelligence 
and its relationship both to the wider British nuclear community and the United States 
efforts in this area. 
Another important area that had its origins in the war was the relationship between the 
UK and US on both nuclear development and nuclear intelligence. The August 1943 
Quebec Agreement for `full and effective collaboration' held significant implications 
for postwar relations, but did not actually specify continued co-operation. 140 The 
September 1944 Hyde Park Aide-Memoire, did set-out that `full collaboration between 
the United States and the British Government in developing tube alloys ... should 
continue ... unless and until terminated 
by joint agreement. ' 141 Yet limited knowledge 
of its existence and the failure to inform Congress meant that the UK would find its 
value completely undermined within a year of the end of the war. '42 
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`Continuous improvisation'143: The nuclear intelligence structure 
The process of gearing British intelligence towards the developing Cold War, and 
particularly the priority for intelligence on Soviet nuclear weapons development, 
gathered pace during the late 1940s. Yet organisation problems, especially for nuclear 
and wider scientific intelligence, would continue beyond 1948 and into the 1960s. There 
were three interrelated reasons: wartime secrecy that had naturally restricted the 
numbers working on nuclear intelligence; the lack of a centralised scientific 
intelligence; and the need to maintain a vital but endangered relationship with the US in 
atomic matters. All of these problems were largely recognised at the time and were 
somewhat intractable. 
During the war the British atomic energy project had been under the remit of the 
relatively small Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR). 144 At the 
same time, the intelligence unit under Eric Welsh continued with one foot in DSIR and 
one in SIS. This meant that nuclear intelligence, relying as it did on the most advanced 
scientific support, was closely linked to the future of any UK nuclear research and 
development. With the end of the war and the Anglo-American-Canadian programme 
having reached its objective, the incoming Labour Government looked to place British 
atomic research under the remit of a larger department. The consensus decision, taken 
by Attlee's GEN75 Committee set-up to deal with atomic matters, was that it should be 
placed under the Ministry of Supply, `which had the necessary experience and resources 
and was in close touch with the chemical and engineering industries'. '45 Wallace Akers, 
who had come to the wartime Tube Alloys project from ICI with his deputy Michael 
Perrin (See Introduction) and worked closely with Welsh, expressed the need for 
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abnormal arrangements in this area: 
The new technical discoveries which will result from this project [to set-up a research 
establishment at Harwell] can only be followed up quickly and effectively if use is made of all 
the best scientific talent in the country ... All this will call for methods of administration and a 
degree of continuous improvisation which is not easily reconciled with the normal routine of a 
Government establishment. 146 
Sir John Anderson, who in his youth had studied the chemical properties of uranium at 
Leipzig University, had, as an independent MP for the Scottish Universities seat, been 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Coalition wartime Cabinet and Churchill's post-VE 
day government with responsibility for `Tube Alloys', the wartime codename. 
Anderson's experience was a central reason why Attlee kept him on as minister in 
charge of the remaining British nuclear work after Labour won the July 1945 election. 
He was the only person experienced enough and Attlee, with little knowledge of the 
project himself, felt the need for continuity in such a complex area. 147 Anderson was not 
only one of the few ministers well versed in the science behind the bomb, he had been 
privy to many of the political twists and turns that had accompanied collaboration with 
the US. 
Anderson was head of the Directorate of Atomic Energy, whose move to the Ministry of 
Supply took effect from 1 December 1945.148 He was also chair of the Advisory 
Committee of Officials on Atomic Energy and the senior British figure on the 
Combined Anglo-American Atomic Energy Committee, the forum through which the 
British initially hoped to continue wartime collaboration. '49 The head of research was 
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the scientist Sir John Cockcroft who directed the Atomic Energy Research 
Establishment (AERE) at RAF Harwell. Looking forward to the further development 
and implementation of atomic energy in Britain was Lord Portal of Hungerford, former 
Chief of the Air Staff, who was Controller of Production `with general responsibility for 
completing large scale plants and for the production of fissile material. ' 50 
Under Portal were two deputies, Christopher Hinton and Michael Perrin. Hinton, with a 
background in wartime work on conventional high explosives, had responsibility for 
industrial and engineering aspects. The more significant figure for intelligence, though, 
was Perrin, who had become involved in the Tube Alloys project as assistant to Wallace 
Akers when the latter was made Director of the project in 1941. Perrin had also 
performed the duties of Secretary for the Tube Alloys project and was steeped in the 
progress, significance and problems, of Anglo-American collaboration and the great 
concern over secrecy. Perrin also oversaw the Atomic Energy Intelligence Unit (AEIU) 
that was run by SIS officer Eric Welsh. 151 
Since becoming head of the intelligence unit Welsh had, like Perrin, built up important 
links with figures in America such as General Leslie Groves, who directed the wartime 
US atomic and atomic intelligence programmes. 152 It was, therefore, both because of his 
experience and for his connections that Welsh remained in charge of atomic intelligence 
in 1945. As well as being head of the AEIU, Welsh sat on the Anglo-American 
Combined Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the organisation through which all 
US-UK atomic information was to be passed. According to R. V. Jones, whose own 
work during the war had been vital to scientific intelligence, there were a number of 
steps that solidified Welsh's control over postwar nuclear intelligence. In fact, it was the 
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Anglo-American link that was the constant concern. 
Welsh's unit's transition from World War to Cold War was also defined by the wider 
desire to prevent the Soviet Union gathering the fruits of German wartime atomic 
research. One instance where Jones felt he lost control of nuclear intelligence to Welsh 
was in the running of the 1945 `Alsos' operation to capture and study, as the Allied and 
Soviet forces advanced on Berlin, any documents, equipment and personnel relating to 
the German atomic programme. '53 The priority was in gathering material that the UK 
and US authorities feared could fall into Soviet hands and be used to further their own 
nuclear work. 154 At the same time there was great concern not to spark Soviet interest 
in nuclear research by revealing the high priority it held in the West. 
In March 1945, Anderson wrote to Churchill with news from the `combined Anglo- 
American Committee on T. A. intelligence. ' 
Russian interest in the project is confirmed by recent scientific publications and the American 
T. A. organisation had detailed evidence regarding Russian attempts to learn about the T. A. 
programme in the U. S. A. 155 
The `Russian attempts' that had been identified were limited and, as will be seen, there 
was no inkling yet of the scale of penetration the USSR had actually achieved against 
the Anglo-American programme. It was known that scientists in the USSR had been as 
aware as the rest of the international scientific community of the pre-war advances 
made in theory of nuclear fission, and some had worked before the war with western 
scientists and in European and American universities on related subjects. For the Allied 
project both the Frisch-Peierls memorandum and Maud Committee report had been 
153 Jones, Most Secret, pp. 479-480 
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instrumental in proving the feasibility of the science and consequent possibility of a 
weapon. Thus, there was great concern to avoid drawing Soviet attention to the potential 
of the bomb whilst at the same time attempting to judge how far Soviet science had got 
towards this conclusion. Also sensitive to the possible impact on postwar treaty 
negotiations, the joint UK-US nuclear intelligence teams had, therefore, been `instructed 
that no attempt should be made to enter Russian controlled territory' and instead they 
should `get as much information as possible out of Germany. ' 156 The security of the 
intelligence collection was paramount; the intelligence teams were `in no circumstances 
to run the risk of the Russians learning the intensity or immediacy of our interest. ' 57 
Cherwell, Churchill's scientific adviser, duly informed the Prime Minister that 
`arrangements had been made for [R. V. ] Jones to send out the appropriate people as 
soon as the places of interest near Stuttgart are reached. ' 158 According to Jones' 
memoirs, his involvement in the subsequent operation to airlift the materials out of 
Germany was frustrated by wrangling over transportation that led to documents first 
being sent to the US, delaying their usefulness to the British. 159 Jones understated the 
ascendancy Perrin and Welsh held in nuclear intelligence and the degree to which the 
US relationship could be ignored. The US concern over containing the nuclear secret 
was the reason Churchill had given for fending off Tizard. For Jones, though, this was a 
defining moment: 
The fact is that the documents went to America, and when copies ultimately came back to 
Britain they went to Perrin and Welsh, who henceforward held the whip in all nuclear 
intelligence matters. The fact that they, rather than I, then became the authorities for nuclear 
intelligence is unimportant as regards the quality of the work for, so far as I know, they did it 
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'57 Ibid. 
158 mid., Cherwell to Churchill, 16 March 1945 
55 
well. But it was disastrous to Scientific Intelligence generally. "' 
The German nuclear scientists who were targeted for removal by allied intelligence did 
go to Britain. They ended up at Farrh Hall in Cambridgeshire, a former Special 
Operations Executive (SOE) training school. This operation, codenamed Epsilon, to 
debrief captured German nuclear scientists was a further reason, according to Jones, 
why Welsh had retained control. 161 Having been `fitted out with microphones', this was 
an ideal place to listen in on the scientists' discussions, even as they suggested and then 
dismissed the possibility that they were being monitored. 162 Again though, Jones 
remembered that Welsh had asked him to arrange for the scientists to be brought to 
Britain and that it was his idea to use Farm Hall and to kit it out with listening devices, 
and yet Welsh appears to have got the credit. 163 
The issue of coordinating nuclear intelligence was also exacerbated by the way in which 
scientific intelligence evolved in the final months of the war. Early in 1945 the JIC gave 
Professor Patrick Blackett control of an ad hoc committee to review the organisation of 
scientific and technical intelligence. Blackett was a physicist who had been a Scientific 
Advisor at the Air Ministry during the war. He submitted his report on 19 May 1945 
and the conclusions were circulated in a JIC report dated 26 July 1945.164 Jones, a 
wartime colleague of Blackett at the Air Ministry and who `assisted in the preparation 
159 Jones, Most Secret, pp. 479-480 
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of the report', felt the decision to form the committee under Blackett was a mistake. 165 
Blackett proposed that, rather than centralise scientific intelligence as Jones wanted, 
separate scientific intelligence sections would be attached to the intelligence 
departments of each of the three armed services. A `Scientific Intelligence Adviser' who 
would sit together as a committee, the Joint Scientific Intelligence Committee (JSIC), 
would head each section. 166 The same structure would apply to technical intelligence 
sections would combine to form the Joint Technical Intelligence Committee (JTIC). In 
practice the two committees sat together as the Joint Scientific/ Technical Intelligence 
Committee (JS/JTIC). 167 
Interestingly, the actual reason why the JIC, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), 
followed Blackett's proposals appears to have been one of Jones's own contributions. In 
Most Secret War Jones reproduced a paper he wrote for the Chiefs putting forward his 
own views and the reasons for a centralised scientific intelligence staff. 168 An excerpt of 
this appears, almost word for word, in the related JIC report and describes the 
`fundamental difficulty of Intelligence work' as being `that input is by source, and 
output by subject. ' 169 Because of this, Jones's version continues, the organisation `has to 
act as far as possible as a single perfect human mind ... the larger the organisation, the 
less it can resemble a single mind. An intelligence organisation has therefore to consist 
of as small a number as possible of individuals with abilities as great as possible. For 
the same reason, Intelligence is better done by a staff than by a committee. ' 170 In the JIC 
report this final sentence was omitted. The Blackett argument, accepted by the JIC and 
COSC, was that combining the three scientific advisers as a committee, rather than 
165 Jones, Most Secret, p. 493 
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coordinating a central scientific body combining the three services, would save on 
staffing numbers, that were already being reduced following VE day. 171 
The secrecy surrounding atomic matters meant that, as with Tizard, Blackett was not 
specifically asked to look at the postwar position of atomic intelligence. Following their 
use against Japan, soon after Blackett's report, the whole world now knew of the atomic 
bombs, but the science, and particularly the massive technical and industrial efforts that 
it had required, were still only known by a few. As well shall see in a moment, the JIC 
almost immediately went on the offensive, arguing that the role of atomic intelligence 
had changed and was no longer bound by the extreme secrecy of the war, and 
consequently should form part of the JIC's peacetime re-organised remit. 
The establishment of a postwar combined Anglo-American intelligence body to cover 
the field of atomic intelligence had been approved, `in principle', by Anderson `prior to 
the use of the first atomic bomb. ' 172 In June, Anderson had met with `C', Sir Stewart 
Menzies, the Chief of SIS. A summary of the meeting in a September 1945 note by the 
Secretary of the JIC, A. E. Houseman, shows that at least one of Welsh's bosses was not 
happy with the autonomy of his unit's work. Menzies had argued that `it was desirable 
that, in the course of time, the Intelligence aspect of this important matter should 
conform to the British tradition and be brought within the existing framework of the 
Intelligence services rather than confined to a purely Tube Alloy organisation'. 173 In 
fact, despite some moves towards greater integration, nuclear intelligence did not 
`conform' to Menzies' expectations until the creation of the Defence Intelligence Staff 
(DIS) in 1964 saw that body finally take over the majority of nuclear intelligence. 
The planned Combined Anglo-American Intelligence structure was explained in a paper 
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prepared by the Directorate of Tube Alloys on 30 August 1945. It was to consist of two 
offices headed by an American resident in London and a British deputy resident in 
Washington. 174 The UK-US organisation was not responsible for the collection of 
intelligence in the field', but was instead to `act as a clearing house for the already 
established organisations'. 175 If Welsh wrote this it is revealing in the degree to which 
the arrangement, and the monopoly that his unit appeared to have achieved, was 
presented as a fait accompli. A subsequent paragraph may well have raised the hackles 
of some of the JIC members: 
In order, therefore, to place this organisation in a position to exercise its functions, it is 
necessary that all appropriate Government and Service Departments should be informed 
forthwith of the existence of this organisation and be requested to furnish its office with all 
intelligence and information relevant to its objective. 176 
The September 1945 note by the JIC Secretary shows the Committee were not entirely 
happy with the plans and wished at the least to register their view. The JIC, Houseman 
explained, considered itself as the `established intelligence organisation' and felt that 
the present organisation kept atomic intelligence `outside the normal intelligence 
channels. ' 177 They also thought such a `departure from normal procedure ... should, if 
possible, be avoided in this matter'. 178 
On 11 September 1945 the JIC discussed the nuclear intelligence organisation 
proposals. Menzies reiterated his earlier argument to Anderson, that if this procedure 
was to be adopted `factual information obtained by British intelligence should, in 
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addition to being sent to the Anglo-American Intelligence Organisation, be sent to the 
Service Ministries through the established channels. ' 179 Menzies `felt that His Majesty's 
Government must be free to consider the products of its own intelligence machine. ' 180 
The Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence) (ACAS(I)), Air Vice-Marshal 
William Elmhurst, argued that the JIC must be `advising the Chiefs of Staff on 
intelligence concerning Tube Alloys [as this] would be the most important intelligence 
task of the Service Departments probably for the next ten years. ' 181 
Correspondence between the JIC Chairman, the diplomat Harold Caccia, and Sir John 
Anderson from 11 October also shows that the JIC were giving a high priority to future 
nuclear threats. Caccia told Anderson that `now the existence of the atomic bomb is 
public knowledge, that the information which can be secured by normal intelligence 
sources on developments in other countries ... has become of greatly enhanced 
importance. ' 182 An attached brief for Anderson for a meeting with Caccia concluded 
that `atomic developments [are] the paramount potentiality of the future' and therefore 
needed to be covered by the newly formed JS/JTIC for that body to `ensure the best 
possible intelligence service to our Chiefs of Staff and to the British Government. ' 183 In 
a November 1945 paper on the subject, the JIC argued that; 
While developments leading to the use of atomic bombs were still of a high degree of secrecy 
this arrangement was considered necessary. It is now, in our opinion, out-dated by events and 
we consider that all intelligence on this subject should be handled within the established 
intelligence organisation and not by independent agencies. '84 
In the end, the need to maintain links with the US outweighed these concerns. At their 
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11 October meeting the JIC members were aware that maintaining the status quo might 
be necessary `if this was the only means whereby we could ensure obtaining American 
intelligence and knowledge of Atomic Energy. ' 185 On 5 November the Joint 
Intelligence Staff (JIS) counselled the JIC members that they should not propose `any 
alteration in the existing arrangements for the handling of this intelligence as Sir John 
Anderson is of the opinion that it is not advisable to raise the matter with the 
Americans' for the time being. 186 The `existing arrangements' was again summarised, in 
the resulting JIC memorandum, as a `Combined Intelligence Organisation' established 
within the Directorate of Tube Alloys and headed by Welsh, `to work in close 
collaboration with a similar organisation [in the US] under General Groves. ' 
187 The 
lines of responsibility set out in the JIC paper saw Anderson given `the authority for 
deciding what circulation to give the intelligence reports produced in the British T. A. 
Directorate'. 188 The JIC were, therefore, dependent upon Anderson's awareness of the 
JIC's needs and ability to push Welsh towards fulfilling these needs. Anderson's 
agreement to `pass these reports to the [JIC] for comment' would prove to be greatly 
insufficient for some years. '89 
The degree to which this matched the scheme set out in the 30 August paper by Welsh's 
unit, and failed to fully address any of the subsequent concerns voiced by the JIC, 
shows how far relations with the US, and the sharing of nuclear information and 
intelligence, outweighed any drawbacks for the UK in terms of organisation. In 
November 1945 Attlee visited Washington to discuss, among other things, 
improvements in postwar nuclear collaboration. The US preparation for the summit 
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was, however, rather haphazard and 'noncommittal'. 190 Whilst Truman may well have 
been initially positive, the influence of General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan 
Engineering District Project, the wartime programme, had been a dampener on UK 
collaboration during the war and he now convinced his President against it. 191 
Having received no technical nuclear information from the US since the end of the war, 
it `was clear to the British that the prevailing view among Truman's people was that the 
Quebec Agreement [for postwar UK-US collaboration] was an executive agreement 
drawn up by a president who had exercised his emergency powers to meet the demands 
of an emergency situation. ' 192 At heart of the question of the congressional and 
senatorial response was the issue of nuclear proliferation. There was a strong line of 
reasoning that the US monopoly of this weapon should be maintained. The view of 
Groves and others in the nuclear community was that, though the science of the bomb 
could not be kept secret, the industrial `know-how' that went into its production 
could. 
193 
The security of information relating to the atomic bomb received another blow in the 
autumn of 1945 with the first signs that the Soviets knew, from espionage, more of the 
project that had been thought. In September 1945 Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the 
Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, defected with details of Soviet espionage in North America/ 
including `some of the most recent atomic intelligence traffic to and from Moscow. ' 194 
Gouzenko's intelligence revealed that Alan Nunn May, a British scientist who had been 
part of the Manhattan team working in Canada, was secretly working for the USSR. 
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Though Nunn May's access to the project had been limited, British intelligence believed 
the information he passed to the Soviets could have saved them a year. 195 More 
immediately, this early insight into the scale of Soviet espionage came at a time when 
international concern over the proliferation of the bomb was high. It provided 
ammunition to those arguing in favour of greater restrictions on the dissemination of 
American nuclear know-how at the same time as raising fears over the intentions of the 
USSR. 196 
In December 1945 Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut established and became 
chair of a Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy. By August of the following 
year McMahon's committee had introduced a bill setting forth the transfer of atomic 
matters from military to civilian control and restricting the transfer of any atomic 
information to foreign countries, including Britain. The Act banned the dissemination to 
any foreign country of `all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic 
weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the 
production of power', with severe penalties (including the death penalty and life 
imprisonment) for anyone who broke it. 197 Whilst McMahon, and others in Congress, 
did not know of the Quebec and Hyde-park agreements (see Introduction), those in the 
US who did, such as Groves, viewed them as far from binding. 
For those in the UK who had been so closely involved in the wartime Anglo-American 
collaboration this was a severe blow. 198 Most galling was the lack of access to US 
technical know-how; the large-scale industrial processes that went into the creation of 
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an atomic bomb. Wilfred Mann became Welsh's representative in Washington in 
December 1948.199 He recalled being told that the `fundamental difficulty' since 1946 
had been that the McMahon Act `made it an offence to divulge any [his emphasis] 
information relating to the development of nuclear energy' and did not distinguish 
`information that would jeopardise the security of the United States. 200 For intelligence 
analysis, it would make detailed discussion of the basis for each country's estimates 
particularly problematic. The Act did not, however, mean the death of the Combined 
Policy Committee (CPC) intelligence organisation. The relationship also continued 
through the US and British atomic intelligence representatives stationed in London and 
Washington respectively. It did mean that in 1946 there was a pressing need to maintain 
any remaining links, particularly through combined operations in postwar Europe. 
Nuclear intelligence collection in the aftermath of the war 
The primary problem that faced intelligence officials charged with investigating the 
Soviet nuclear threat was the difficulty in targeting the USSR for intelligence collection. 
In their first major postwar evaluation of `Russia's Strategic Interests and Intentions', in 
March 1946, the JIC was forced to concede that its study `must be speculative', as they 
had `little evidence to show what view Russia herself takes of her strategic interests, or 
what policy she intends to pursue'. More significantly, the acknowledged having 
`practically no direct intelligence, of a detailed factual or statistical nature, on conditions 
in the different parts of the Soviet Union, and none at all on the intentions, immediate or 
ultimate, of the Russian leaders'. 201 Consequently, the JIC warned its readers including 
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the Chiefs of Staff, their ' appreciation is based ... on the limited evidence which we 
have, on deductions made from such indications of policy as Russia has given, and on 
reasonable conjecture concerning the Soviet appreciation of their own situation' . 
2°2 
The preponderance of `conjecture' and `deductions' would prove to be another 
consistent problem. As Michael Goodman has shown in his own extensive analysis of 
early Cold War UK atomic intelligence, `the majority of intelligence came from open 
sources and scientific "guestimates" combined with a meagre flow of secret intelligence 
garnered from German scientists, technicians and POWs [Prisoners of War] working for 
the Soviet Union'. 203 The collection opportunities for nuclear intelligence against the 
USSR were, at this time, extremely limited compared to the later Cold War 
developments in scientific appreciation of nuclear weapons and in the technical 
resources that would be applied to its collection. It is worth reviewing, therefore, the 
`initial indication of the type of information of immediate interest' set out in the 30 
August 1945 paper to the JIC on UK-US nuclear collaboration. It also shows the sorts 
of questions nuclear intelligence would seek to address. As well as any mention of 
elements relating to nuclear development, such as uranium, thorium, radium, heavy 
water and Beryllium, the requirements included; 
All matters specifically relating to the scientific, political and other activities in the field of 
Atomic Energy from the industrial as well as the military aspects... the movements and 
activities of foreign scientists, mining engineers and geologists who may reasonably be 
expected to be concerned with the project... the occurrence of unusual plants or factories or the 
production, especially on a mass scale, by any factories, of unusual civil engineering or 
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electrical engineering equipment. 
204 
In July 1945 the JIC had acknowledged that scientific and technical intelligence 
collection would not be as effective against the USSR as it was in appreciations of the 
German atomic programme and that `many of the wartime secret sources such as 
prisoners of war and captured equipment and documents will disappear. '205 Instead, the 
JIC felt, `published technical and scientific literature will provide much information 
which, if suitably analysed and collated, will make an important contribution. 
206 These 
problems of collection resulted from the lack of other secret sources - notably in human 
intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) - on anything like the scale 
of success achieved against Nazi Germany. For atomic intelligence specifically the 
problems were in some ways more acute as this type of work was especially governed 
by the `high standard of security' in the USSR that, the Chiefs of Staff later warned, in 
1947, `renders our collection of intelligence difficult and makes it all the more likely 
that Russia will have the advantage of surprise' in the event of war breaking out. 
207 
The most extensive and productive SIGINT operation that the US and Britain achieved 
against the USSR during this time was started in 1943 by a US Army Intelligence chief 
who was concerned about rumours of a Soviet-German peace treaty. 
208 Colonel Carter 
Clark initiated the interception of Soviet diplomatic traffic under the code-name 
Venona, but his cryptanalysts were unable to break any of the ciphers until after the 
war. The use of one-time encryption pads by the Soviets since 1927 meant that the few 
successes the British and Americans achieved occurred when Soviet cipher clerks 
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lapsed in procedure and used the same pad twice. As a result, very few decrypts were 
obtained and the first deciphered messages were completed in 1946, but usually 
consisted of cables that were some years old. 209 Yet the evidence, especially after 1949, 
would reveal Soviet spy rings well established both within the US atomic bomb project 
and British intelligence itself. The damage (See Chapter 2) would have huge 
ramifications for the both the Anglo-American nuclear and intelligence relationships in 
the early 1950s. It would also prove to be one of the few detailed sources of what the 
Soviets had actually learnt of nuclear weapons. 
With hindsight it is clear why so many HUMINT operations against the USSR failed. 
Kim Philby's appointment in 1944 as head of Section IX, SIS's Counter-Intelligence 
unit directed against the USSR, followed his recruitment by the Soviets Q cra4 
Ji 
Cambridge in the 1930s. 21° However, this treachery would not be proven for some 
years. The first clues from Venona of the existence of this spy ring told of penetration of 
a supposedly even more secure operation, the Manhattan project itself. Harvey Klehr 
and John Earl Haynes, who encouraged the US government to release much of the 
Venona material on which their book is based, discovered that `one of the first cables 
rendered into coherent text [in 1949] was a 1944 message from KGB officers in New 
York showing that the Soviet Union had infiltrated ... the atomic 
bomb project'. 211 As 
well as damaging Anglo-American relations at a precipitous moment in attempts to 
improve nuclear collaboration, this revelation would have ramifications for the way in 
which UK intelligence viewed the capability of Soviet science and their ability to 
develop nuclear weapons. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Kim Philby, My Silent War. The Autobiography of a Spy (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1968), 
pp. xxx, 100-3; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive. The KGB in Europe 
and the West (London: Penguin, 2000), pp. 73-88 
211 Haynes and Klehr, Venona, p. 9 
67 
Perhaps the most obvious collection failure at this time, especially compared to Soviet 
achievement, was in getting agents into the Soviet Union or recruiting Soviet officials 
or military in place. In the postwar re-organisation of SIS D3, the Requirements 
Directorate, was sub-divided into sections for political; naval; army; counter-espionage 
(which absorbed Philby's Section IX); economic, scientific; SIGINT; and atomic 
intelligence (R1-9 respectively). Production of intelligence, D2, was split 
geographically, typifying the input-output conflict of intelligence that R. V. Jones 
emphasised. Initially there were five Controllers covering different regions. In the late 
1940s and early 1950s the structure shifted towards three Chief Controllers covering 
Europe, CC(E), the Mediterranean (Middle East and Africa), CC(M), and the Pacific, 
CC(P). 212 
In his memoirs, former SIS officer Anthony Cavendish explained that the Requirements 
Officer would liaise with the relevant Production officer who would `send out a request 
to the overseas station most likely to be able to provide the answer'. 213 
The [Requirements] officer would know the full details of the source, but he would not reveal 
these to his customer in the War Office. He would pass the information over under the cover of 
a source sheet, which would give some details of the source ... The customer would then be 
asked to report back on the accuracy and usefulness of the information after he had compared it 
with whatever other information he had. 214 
The close connection between Eric Welsh and the unit dealing with nuclear intelligence 
in SIS undoubtedly helped this process. 215 Yet it was dependent upon the ability of SIS 
to fulfil the requirements set upon it. Cavendish related that not until 1950 was the 
decision taken to contact resistance movements within the Soviet Union and, after this 
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proved not to be fruitful in terms of the quality and reliability of intelligence, only then 
did Stewart Menzies obtain `authority for SIS to train and drop our own agents into the 
Soviet Union'. 216 In 1949 the recruitment of Harold Shergold to SIS marked the start of 
a long and hugely successful SIS career. 217 In 1954 he took over the running of SIS 
Baltic networks, directed against the Soviet target. He quickly established that the 
networks were severely penetrated by the KGB and, after some persuasion of his 
superiors, was able to close them down. The KGB responded by dismantling themselves 
the remaining SIS Eastern European networks that they had infiltrated. 
218 Shergold, by 
revising the operational guidelines for recruiting and running such networks, was 
subsequently able to improve HUMINT operations against the USSR, but his late 
Fifties/early Sixties successes only highlight the degree to which such intelligence 
collection was, in the late 1940s, `truly disastrous'. 
219 
Covert intelligence gathering within the Soviet Union brought little or no yield in the 
late 1940s. However, there was another source from which Eric Welsh does seem to 
have been supplied with a steady stream of information inside the Soviet Union and 
which did deal directly with matters of the atomic programme. This was through the 
Foreign Office and, in particular, the energetic work of Frank Roberts, Chargd 
d'Affaires at the British Embassy in Moscow from 1945-47, whose correspondence was 
forwarded to Anderson, and thence to Welsh, via the Cabinet Office official, Denis 
Rickett. 220 Roberts's role shows the paucity of general information about the Soviet 
Union. He recalled, in his memoirs, feeling that `it was important that a diplomatic 
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mission to Moscow should have a rather more solid knowledge of what was going on in 
221 the Soviet Union than had hitherto been possible with rather small staffs'. 
Roberts gave an idea of how deficient intelligence was, for the first few years certainly, 
as he found great success in simply trawling the Soviet press, including technical and 
scientific journals, `since it was in this way that they gave a lead to their own people, 
which clearly they could not hide from others studying the media'. 
222 Thus, the British 
and US embassies each set up their own sections to analyse the Soviet media. Roberts 
believed the impact of this was invaluable in complementing other information sources, 
as `without it we should never have been able to follow what was going on and what 
were the long-term intentions of the Soviet Government'. 
223 Although nuclear matters 
were kept much more strictly controlled than other scientific subjects, there is 
considerable correspondence from Roberts to the Foreign Office, and which ended up, 
through UK atomic intelligence, in the hands of the Anglo-American Combined Policy 
Committee. These consisted mostly of references to nuclear matters during contact 
between Russians and westerners that had subsequently been passed on to Roberts. 
224 
Speaking to Peter Hennessy for a TV series Roberts acknowledged that SIS in Moscow 
had no high-level agents at this time. 225 The more overt information from the Moscow 
Embassy was therefore invaluable at this early stage. 
Initially, appreciations of the state of Soviet research were based on the Western 
scientific community's pre-war relationships with Russian scientists. 
226 Reliance upon 
scientists' understanding of the state of affairs in the USSR was, unsurprisingly, prone 
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to errors. In the UK, Sir Ernest Rutherford had spent time with Peter Kapitza, a 
prominent Russian scientist, when the latter worked at the Cavendish Laboratory in 
Cambridge. 227 A further connection was the internationally renowned Niels Bohr, who 
had taken refuge in Britain having had to flee his own laboratory in Copenhagen, and, 
as late as 1940, was still in touch with initial Soviet research. 
228 However, with both of 
these sources of information, errors were made, particularly in establishing which 
significant individuals were involved in the programme - what Welsh had termed in his 
1946 report were `known to be associated'. 229 
In September 1946 Welsh's team correctly asserted that `overall control' of nuclear 
research was under Lavrenti Beria, head of the Soviet intelligence service the NKVD 
(forerunner of KGB) and `one of the most powerful and influential members of Stalin's 
entourage'. 230 Welsh's report also stated that it was believed that the `scientific leader of 
Research was probably to begin with P. Kapitza', but that `a recent report ... makes it 
doubtful whether Kapitza is still holding the position. 231 In fact the programme had 
been placed under the command of Igor Kurchatov, a man who is barely mentioned in 
any of the intelligence reports so far obtainable. 232 The doubts about Kapitza had been 
expressed in a December 1945 note from Frank Roberts. Roberts had reported in 
December 1945 that Brenda Tripp, whose role at the Embassy included scientific 
contacts with the Soviets, had heard mentioned that Kurchatov was `outstanding in the 
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field of atomic physics' and believed to be associated with the project under Beria. 
233 
Given the overall dearth of knowledge of what was happening in the USSR, the 
mistaken identification of Kapitza as central to atomic research was explicable. 
234 Part 
of the reason why this confusion seems to have arisen is that, as Kapitza was well 
known to the West and respected as an able scientist, there was a greater tendency to 
seek out any news of him. Thus reports from Roberts in Moscow include the views and 
information passed to a `Professor Ashby', an `Australian scientist at the Australian 
Legation in Moscow', who had seen Kapitza soon after the use of atomic bombs against 
Japan . 
235 Ashby apparently reported Kapitza's `excitement of the moment' and his 
blurting out `that the British and Americans were so far ahead of the Russians', as well 
as the fact that Kapitza was known to be working on important matters in Moscow. 
236 
This seems to have been taken as evidence that Kapitza was at the very least closely 
involved with the programme. 
What was not realised was that Kapitza's links with the West and his desire to return to 
Cambridge were what made the Soviet leadership suspicious of him. Furthermore, an 
earlier note of October 1945 passed on information from a FO official, who had been in 
Moscow between 1942 and 1945, that `Kapitza had been engaged on research on 
extremely low temperatures, and had presumably no time for nuclear physics'. 237 Going 
further back into the discussion, in 1945, on Kapitza's role it is possible to see how 
reliance on the views of scientists caused partiality in the interpretation of evidence. In 
May of that year the Foreign Office passed on communications from Professor Ashby 
that revealed a conversation between Kapitza and a Hungarian scientist during which 
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Kapitza apparently displayed `the attitude of a fanatical nationalist rather than of a 
distinguished scientist', an attitude that Ashby apparently found shocking. 238 What is 
more interesting is a covering note from Denis Rickett, the Cabinet Office official who 
took the minutes at many of the key nuclear bomb committees. Rickett's note reveals 
that he felt Ashby's information put Kapitza `in a different light from that in which he 
had been represented to us by our friend Dr B[ohr]'. 239 Of course, it may well have been 
that, given the pressure that was placed on his loyalty, Kapitza might have been 
attempting to play up his nationalism. Whether this was considered is not revealed in 
the files available. 
The collection opportunities and methods available to nuclear intelligence in these early 
years were reflected in the analysis that resulted from them. In a September 1946 report 
Eric Welsh's unit reported that most of the intelligence collected on the Soviet atomic 
programme consisted of the names and details of scientists `known to be associated with 
the project', the extent of activity in areas or at factories believed to be involved and 
`rumours. 240 At that time `no information [had] been obtained on the progress of the 
Russian search for raw materials', but nuclear intelligence had able to interpret `the 
intensity of [Soviet] efforts in Czecho-Slovakia [sic] and Bulgaria' as being indicative 
of a shortage of such materials within the USSR rather than an indication of the priority 
of the Soviet project as a whole. 241 As will be seen, intelligence collection operations in 
eastern Europe would begin to provide greater awareness of the true state of Soviet 
uranium production and would also prove significant in furthering Anglo-American 
collaboration. 
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As Goodman also argued, it was the lack of detailed intelligence from inside the Soviet 
Union led to an over-reliance on `scientific `guestimates" at this time. 42 The files that 
are available show that these `guestimates' initially consisted of `academic predictions 
of Soviet uranium stocks'. 243 The process of formulating them began with the scientific 
community's pre-war knowledge of worldwide uranium sources. The use of existing 
scientific literature was certainly a useful means of preparing a picture of the USSR's 
progress before the war caused Soviet research on fission to be censored. 
244 Where 
Welsh's department had greater success was its work estimating Soviet uranium 
extraction. Again, however, the inaccessibility of the USSR meant that much of the 
information came from areas of Europe under increasing Soviet domination but still 
accessible to the West. 
Some of the most important nuclear intelligence collection operations, particularly for 
Anglo-American collaboration, were undertaken in the turmoil of post-war Europe. The 
analysis of mines in the Erzgebirge (Ore Mountains) regions of eastern Germany and 
Czechoslovakia were one particular source of information that was well used. 245 In 
February 1946, Welsh had been passed a suggestion by the Americans that a good 
method of gaining intelligence on Soviet activities at the Jachymov uranium mines in 
Czechoslovakia `would be for us to approach Czechoslovak Government requesting 
supplies of materials for ourselves. '246 At that time, before the 1948 Communist coup, 
Czechoslovakia was still accessible and its coalition government was considered 
receptive to British overtures. The expectation was that if the `request is refused nothing 
would appear to be lost and we would have an interesting slant on that Government's 
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politics ... If [the] request was acceded to, there would obviously 
be little gained from 
supply point of view but it would undoubtedly enable us periodically to send experts to 
the mine to investigate production position ... 
it would give us direct contact with our 
friends'[Soviet] technicians. ' 247 Indeed, despite General Groves `unjustified' concerns 
that the proposal might cause `exposure of our other [US] supply activities', or perhaps 
because of it, it was hoped that the British would make the approach `since it is well 
known that she has no domestic supplies. '248 
In a July 1946 report, the Combined Anglo American Intelligence Unit had to base their 
analysis of the `geography and history' of the mine on two German books written in 
1893 and 1916 249 Details of how the mine was worked and the amount of uranium ore 
that the Germans were extracting during the war were obtained from Allied visits in 
May 1945, before the Soviets `started to work the mines soon after they arrived. 9250 One 
source for this came from a `Czech officer in the British Army who had been to 
Jachymov and spoken with friends of his among the Czechs there. '251 At the time of the 
report the mines were `being worked by Czechs under Russian scientific and 
engineering control'. 252 
The post-1945 occupation in Germany was an extensive and useful collection point for 
British intelligence against the USSR as a whole at this time, particularly in co- 
ordination with the US. 253 The importance of the operations there were threefold. First, 
like the Soviets themselves, the British and US sought to debrief and gather information 
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on German scientific and technical work during the war. 
254 Secondly, Western 
intelligence sought intelligence from Germans whose wartime or postwar experience 
had brought them into contact with the Soviet Union, in particular the many scientists 
and technicians who were taken to the Soviet Union after 1945 to help in the 
development of programmes there and were later repatriated. 
255 Thirdly, as the postwar 
occupation and disagreements over the future of Germany continued, the country - and 
Berlin in particular - became a front in the Cold War and a source of much 
intelligence 
activity. 56 
Cavendish estimated that by about 1948 the number of SIS officers in Germany was 
`probably about fifty with a back-up staff (drivers, secretaries, quartermasters) of a 
further two hundred or so ... almost as 
big as SIS itself. '257 Added to this was the 
Intelligence Division of the Control Commission (BRIXMIS, the British authority in 
occupied Germany). 258 Other individual intelligence officers included those of the 
British Armed Forces stationed in Germany and the officers of the British mission 
attached to the Soviet Commander-in-Chief. The latter were given the right to travel in 
the Soviet zone and, therefore, did `more observing than liaising with the Soviet armed 
forces, being able to travel virtually anywhere while armed with cameras. '259 
An important source of scientific intelligence collection for the JIC, having little scope 
over atomic intelligence, was the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Bureau 
(STIB). 260 STIB was based in Germany and was only one of many organisations 
charged with sifting through the mountain of intelligence emanating from that country, 
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but it had its requirements set by the JS/JTIC and worked within JIC Germany structure. 
261 It was established in October 1946 and was part of the Intelligence Division. At a 
1951 Technical Conference - an event which seems to have been organised annually 
from the late 1940s to allow those working in various parts of scientific or technical 
intelligence to learn more about how their work fitted into the overall structure - David 
Evans, head of STIB since its formation, described his task as `the procurement of 
scientific and technical intelligence of a war potential nature about Russia, the satellites 
and the Russian Occupied Zone insofar as this can be procured overtly in Germany. '262 
Evans also explained to his colleagues why Berlin had, since the end of the war, become 
the frontline in the developing Cold War: 
As a springboard for intelligence operation, the value of our access to Berlin cannot be 
overrated, particularly in view of the area of contact between Russian and its zone of Germany. 
The Eastern Zone has a good deal of scientific and technical potential to the Russians and any 
use which they may wish to make of the Russian zone opens up possibilities of intelligence 
exploitation. 63 
Evans was among those who did see value in the use of `low grade sources [which] can 
in fact enable significant conclusions to be drawn even on relatively complicated 
scientific matters. 264 Certainly in the case of Germany, intelligence collected on the 
Soviet atomic programme was mostly limited or generalised, thereby reducing choice in 
the matter. 
One of the most comprehensive intelligence operations in Germany, undertaken with 
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the anticipated Soviet atomic programme in mind, involved the fate of those German 
scientists whose expertise was co-opted, willingly or otherwise, into the Soviet Union's 
workforce. Indeed, Welsh's earlier involvement in the British-based Farm Hall and 
Germany-based Alsos operations marked only the start of a wide-ranging series of 
operations by Britain and the US to debrief, monitor, rehabilitate and, most importantly, 
deny to the Soviets as a potential war resource, German scientists. By 1946 the JIC 
reported a `great deal of alarm... throughout the Russian occupied zone of Germany 
[caused] by the recent deportations of German Scientists and Technicians to Russia' and 
resulting in `many more German scientists and technicians [approaching] the British 
authorities for alternative employment'. 
265 The JIC saw this as representing a chance to 
`obtain high grade Intelligence from these men which will enable us to build up an 
almost complete picture of Russian scientific and technical activities in Germany'. 
Rather than the `fleeting' opportunity that the JIC feared, for much of the next decade 
similar activity was the basis upon which intelligence attempted to forecast `the 
progress of Russian development in modern weapons during future years'. 
266 Welsh 
had, though, found it surprising that the Soviet recruitment of German scientists and 
technicians generally had not apparently placed any great priority on the `recruitment of 
workers' in his area. 267 He pondered the fact that it `has been a matter of some 
conjecture that until very recently [August 1946] no attempt by the Russians was made 
to contact any of the group of scientists directly concerned with the German Atomic 
Energy organisation. i268 Yet he offered no detailed thoughts on why this might be so 
and, instead, put it down to incompetence on the part of the USSR. 
The autumn 1945 British intelligence report on the Czechoslovakian uranium mines had 
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also revealed that the Soviets had `removed everything available to Russia', to a site 
referred to as `Electrostahl'. 269 This piece of information, set out in a report by Welsh's 
unit that autumn, would prove significant in identifying the uranium processing plant at 
Electrostal, 40 miles east of Moscow. 270 In spring 1946 `US and UK intelligence 
stumbled onto the interception of letters from the expatriated [German] scientists. ' 271 In 
October 1946 a letter from Nicholas Riehl, a specialist in uranium manufacture, 
identified his location at Electrostal. For the American and British nuclear intelligence 
teams, the `circumstantial evidence that Electrostal was the site of the Russian uranium 
metal plant was becoming impressive. ' 272 The large-scale production of uranium at 
Electrostal consisted of three stages; the removal of impurities, reduction and the 
smelting of the metal into useable `cylindrical metal slugs'. 273 By October 1946 the 
Electrostal plant `was delivering about 3 metric tons of uranium metal a week to 
Laboratory No. 2', the experimental nuclear reactor at Moscow being built under 
Kurchatov's supervision. 274 While Kurchatov's work was largely unknown and 
inaccessible for intelligence, the few clues that did appear about the work of the 
uranium processing plant were fully exploited. 
The Electrostal site would be confirmed by another Anglo-American operation, from 
December 1946, targeting the Bitterfield calcium refinery in eastern Germany. The 
calcium was being sent to Electrostahl in large quantities for the reduction stage of 
Riehl's uranium processing. Information about the quality and quantities of calcium 
being shipped could reveal much about the methods of Soviet fissile material 
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production. An account of the Bitterfield operation by one of its American participants, 
Henry Lowenhaupt, shows that Welsh played a pivotal role; one that harkened back to 
his wartime days. 275 The operation began after one of the chemical engineers 
`volunteered' to Western intelligence that the plant had recently massively expanded the 
amount of calcium being shipped `every afternoon' to Berlin, and thence to the 
USSR. 76 Lowenhaupt recounted that some `Bitterfeld chemical engineers chose to 
resettle at I. G. Farben plants in British-occupied Germany, thoughtfully taking with 
them copies of reports on calcium production written for the Russian management'. 277 
After this Welsh `decided in mid-1947 that clandestine penetration of the Bitterfield 
calcium programme was the way of getting at the Soviet atomic program from East 
Germany'. Particularly important in Lowenhaupt's opinion was that Welsh had `the 
assets and the official backing from the MI-6 hierarchy'. This enabled Welsh to press 
the US to `lay off Bitterfield, allowing the British a free hand and reducing the 
possibility that too many (American) cooks would alert the Russians'. 278 
When the penetration of British intelligence was revealed in 1951, 'Welsh's fear of 
American "clumsiness" [would appear] misplaced'. According to Lowenhaupt, the 
intelligence officer's `penchant for operating directly for "C"' `saved the operation. 
Unfortunately the next sentence of Lowenhaupt's account of Bitterfield, from the CIA's 
Studies in Intelligence journal, has been redacted. It seems likely, however, that 
Lowenhaupt argued that Welsh's direct reporting to `C' kept knowledge of the 
operation to a minimum, and may have reduced the danger which, with hindsight, `lay 
in the Soviet penetration of MI-6 and the British Foreign Office: Donald Maclean, 
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secretary to the Combined U. S. -UK Atomic Policy Committee, and "Kim" Philby, MI-6 
representative to the CIA at the time, were later both shown to be active members of the 
Russian Intelligence Service' (see chapter two). 279 In the end the Bitterfield operation 
was a highly successful one: 
From its inception it produced long sheets of monthly shipment statistics on a box-by-box basis. 
Selected product analyses were received periodically, and Russian specifications and 
requirements as they occurred... In addition, the agent usually added comments as needed for 
understanding. Indeed it is fair to say that as far as the technical side of the Bitterfield calcium 
operation was concerned, by 1948 the British (and in turn we ourselves) knew as much about it 
as the Russians did. 280 
It was clear that the USSR was pursuing nuclear development rigorously by the 
beginning of 1946. It was not known how far the Soviets had got towards the 
development of a reactor, let alone the design of the bomb itself. For this, Western 
intelligence was forced to rely upon its own experience, and in the UK expectations, in 
going through the industrial processes of bomb production. The capability of Soviet 
industry was an area of contention with US intelligence that the JIC often referred to in 
its reports of this time. In March 1946 the JIC cited the view of `American economic 
experts' who had concluded that the recently announced `Five Year Plans' to rebuild the 
Soviet economy and industry, in order to catch-up with the West, was `already over- 
straining the existing resources' of the USSR . 
281 This, the US experts argued, meant that 
economic capability would be `inadequate for the further development necessary ... 
for 
the construction of atomic bomb production ... except at the cost of existing 
programmes. ' 282 The information had actually come from Roberts at the Moscow 
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Embassy in December 1945, who informed Christopher Warner at the Foreign Office 
`in strictest confidence' of a paper being prepared by the American Embassy in Moscow 
for the Secretary of State James Byrnes. Roberts was `only given the story in the most 
strict confidence and on the understanding that I would take every precaution against a 
possible leak. '283 Roberts summarised the US conclusions using the same phrases as the 
JIC would did in their own report. He also expanded upon the US argument: 
The American draft concluded that the Soviet Union just had not got the necessary resources to 
fulfil [their] existing short and long-term programmes adequately and at the same time lay down 
efficient atomic energy or atomic bomb production units, unless of course the Americans were 
obliging enough to give the Soviet Union the necessary credits and equipment. We have just not 
enough material upon which to base a considered judgement on this theory of the American 
Embassy experts; but it is certainly based upon the most careful research by competent and 
well-informed observers of Soviet economic developments. 84 
The JIC did make a judgement about the US theory, describing it as `dangerous' given 
the apparent determination shown by Soviet leaders in seeking to build-up industry 
through self-sufficiency. 285 Welsh had informed the JIC that Stalin had placed a `high 
priority' on industrial efforts related to the Soviet atomic programme, particularly in the 
search for raw materials. 286 Indeed, the involvement of Beria in running the overall 
Soviet programme shows the priority that the programme took after 1945.287 However, 
Welsh still had to concede in late 1946 that `very little is at present known' of the 
constitution or activities of the NKVD department under Beria charged with the 
development of atomic energy. 288 There was clear evidence in 1946-7 that the USSR 
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had been actively engaged in the pursuit of an atomic weapon since at least the end of 
the war. Yet it was only in January 1947 that the UK government firmly decided to 
engage in atomic bomb production itself. 289 
Intelligence Analysis and British Nuclear Weapons Policy 
In December 1945 the JIC had been asked to contribute to the Tizard's Committee's 
post-atomic update of `Future Developments in Weapons and Methods of War', which 
would eventually be completed by July 1946.290 The JIC were asked `what countries, 
and at what time, would be capable of operating plants to produce atomic weapons? ... 
What rate of output of atomic weapons could these countries achieve and when? '291 The 
JIC's response, based on `the present views of our experts' and `on industrial and 
technical capacity only', is a good early example of how British intelligence perceived 
the future nuclear capabilities of various countries. They provided a chart showing 
estimates of bomb numbers: 
United States Present capacity about 50 to 60 [per year], could be trebled in 
about 3 years. 
United Kingdom 60 in about 5 years. 
U. S. S. R. 5 in about 4 years; or 50 in about 8 years, if new [uranium ore] 
deposits can be found. 292 
The report conceded that `the evidence [on the USSR] is far too thin to justify a firm 
conclusion'. 293 It also betrayed a high degree of optimism about British progress in this 
289 TNA, CAB130/16, GEN 163/1' Meeting, Confidential Annex 'Research in Atomic Weapons', 8 
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field compared to the USSR, should the UK proceed with an atomic weapons 
programme. The estimates for the USSR aside, those for the UK would turn out to be 
wildly optimistic. The report does not reveal who, precisely, were the `experts' on 
whom the JIC had relied for this, but the figure of 60 UK bombs in 5 years would prove 
to be far wide of the mark; the British took seven years to achieve a first successful test. 
One explanation is that the estimate was based upon the assumption of the UK 
benefiting from the whole of UK and US atomic research during the war. The paper is 
also a reminder that early estimates saw Soviet uranium extraction as the main limiting 
factor on their programme. 
The day after the circulation of this JIC report, with Attlee's August memo in mind and 
whilst efforts to produce international control of atomic weapons were still underway, a 
select group of ministers in the Labour Government took the first steps in the 
development of the British A-bomb by authorising the construction of a plutonium pile 
at Windscale in Cumberland. 294 A year later, the McMahon Act, and its impact in 
cutting the UK off from US nuclear research, was one of the reasons put forward in 
October 1946 for a UK gaseous diffusion plant to process fissile material. 295 This step 
was also necessary to keep up the momentum of British nuclear research at a time in 
which the UK's greatest resource was the `Chief Superintendent of Armament 
Research', William Penney. 296 As the small ministerial committee who made the 
January 1947 decision to produce a UK atomic bomb, GEN163, were told, Penney 
`knows more than any other British scientist about the secrets of the American 
bomb'. 297 
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It was actually during a ministerial meeting on proceeding with a gaseous diffusion 
plant the previous October that the rationale behind the UK bomb was more deeply 
explored. This was GEN75, the ad hoc committee on atomic energy set up in 1945 by 
Attlee to cover nuclear matters but with a wider ministerial membership than would be 
given to GEN 163.298 Two ministers who would be excluded from GEN 163, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton and the President of the Board of Trade Sir 
Stafford Cripps, expressed concern over the proposal. The official minute refers to 
objections that such a project might entail `an extremely serious economic and financial 
situation in two to three years time. '299 It was also a meeting at which the Foreign 
Secretary, Ernest Bevin, made a comment that has now entered the lexicon of British 
nuclear weapons history. In an interview for a 1982 BBC Timewatch programme Sir 
Michael Perrin recited his memory of the meeting and an argument put forward by 
Bevin that did not make the minuted version of the meeting: 
Two of the other ministers, Dalton, ... and Sir Stafford Cripps, were very much against [the 
plant] Bevin turned up and said, `No, Prime Minister, that won't do at all. We've got to have 
this'... Quite bluntly, he said, `I don't mind for myself, but I don't want any other Foreign 
Secretary of this country to be talked at, or to, by the Secretary of State in the United States as I 
just have, in my discussions with Mr Byrnes. We've got to have this thing over here, whatever it 
costs, ' and I think I'm right in remembering, he ended up with saying, `We've got to have the 
bloody Union Jack on top of it. ' And that swung the meeting round. 00 
It is possible to view the decision to go-ahead with a British bomb as effectively, if not 
officially, taken at this meeting. Examining the reasoning put forward in the minutes of 
the October meeting shows how the emerging intelligence picture, and the intelligence 
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relationship with the US, impacted upon it. The sanitised, minuted version of what 
would appear to be Bevin's argument reflected concerns of UK prestige more than 
security. He argued that the UK `could not afford to be left behind in a field which was 
of such revolutionary importance from an industrial, no less than from a military point 
of view'. 301 Most significantly, he put forward arguments about the wider benefits of 
nuclear power status that would reverberate through to 1970 and beyond, stating that 
Britain's `prestige in the world, as well as our chances of securing American co- 
operation would both suffer if we did not exploit to the full a discovery in which we had 
played a leading part at the outset'. 302 These were outwardly political factors, yet 
experience of the difficulty `of securing American co-operation' was something that UK 
atomic intelligence knew all too well. Furthermore, ministerial decision-making took 
place in the context of wider strategic concerns posed by the development of nuclear 
weapons, and would have been in ministerial minds since Attlee's August 1945 memo. 
The degree to which intelligence influenced or reflected a broader Whitehall mood is 
not always apparent in the minutes but can be seen in the concurrent intelligence work 
being undertaken. 
A few days after the October 1946 decision, the JIC were asked by the Chiefs of Staff 
for `an estimate of the scale of air attack that might be directed against this country' 
incorporating `the time when the atomic bomb is likely to be used. '303 Given that the 
Chiefs of Staff had told GEN75 that they were still considering future strategic policy 
based on nuclear weapons it seems highly likely that this appreciation was to form part 
of their consideration. 304 The resultant JIC report, dated 12 November 1946, calculated 
the likely scale of attack in both 1951 and 1956. It concluded that, even taking out of the 
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equation the `possibly 60 atomic bombs' that might be available to the USSR in 1956, 
the expected growth of conventional weaponry alone was dramatic. 305 They estimated 
that in the first sixty days of an attack the USSR might be able to sustain 100 `flying 
bombs' daily in 1951 and over 1,500 daily in 1956.306 This was in addition to the tonnes 
of conventional High Explosive the Soviets were expected to be able to deliver by 
aircraft. 307 This projected threat alone, given the recent British experience of standing 
alone in the face of a sustained bombing campaign, was itself a motivation for the 
massively increased deterrence that would be offered by a British atomic weapon 
capability. 
All this occurred in the months following the passing of the McMahon Act. Bevin's 
arguments to GEN 163, again couched in Whitehall style, show that the JIC's thinking, 
and the Soviet threat, was part of ministerial thinking: 
We could not afford to acquiesce in an American monopoly of this new development. Other 
countries also might well develop atomic weapons. Unless therefore an effective international 
system could be developed under which the production and use of the weapon would be 
prohibited, we must develop it ourselves 308 
As Peter Hennessy wrote in his own analysis of the 1947 decision, `it is US factors ... 
that provided the primary motive for the British decision to become a nuclear power, as 
much if not more than the possibility of other nations, primarily the Soviet Union, 
acquiring the same status. '309 Yet the JIC's reports on the likely scale of a future Soviet 
attack on the UK and anticipated Soviet nuclear capability, combined with the resultant 
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Tizard report, undoubtedly formed part of what Hennessy describes as the `politico- 
military-intelligence atmosphere in 1947 Whitehall. '310 The JIC had made their own 
judgement on Soviet ambitions in a March 1946 paper on `Russia's Strategic Interests 
and Intentions'. 311 
[I]n seeking a maximum degree of security, Russian policy will be aggressive by all means 
short of war. In brief, although the intention may be defensive, the tactics will be offensive, and 
the danger always exists that Russian leaders may misjudge how far they can go without 
provoking war with America or ourselves. It is not for us to recommend policy, but it is clear 
that the situation will require constant watching. 312 
The JIC's view supported the need for a strong deterrent to Soviet aggression and their 
reference to the `constant watching' that was needed emphasised the importance of the 
picture provided by intelligence as a consistent backdrop to ministerial discussions. 
Tizard's paper went further, combining the latest intelligence estimates with wider 
defence appreciations to produce a chilling conclusion: 
Some 30-120 atomic bombs accurately delivered by the U. S. S. R. might cause the collapse of 
the United Kingdom without invasion. Whereas several hundred bombs might be required by 
the United States or the United Kingdom to bring about the collapse of the U. S. S. R. ... Given 
adequate supplies of uranium and the means of delivery, the U. S. S. R. could probably have 
enough atomic bombs to cause collapse in this country about 6-10 years hence. 313 
One clear link between intelligence and policy is in the 1947 paper by the Chiefs of 
Staff on `Future Defence Policy' that followed the GEN 163 decision to proceed with 
British nuclear weapon development and which was then circulated to the Cabinet's 
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Defence Committee. The Chiefs concluded that British defence policy must be `based 
on the possibility of war with Russia' and that `the only effective deterrent to a potential 
aggressor is tangible evidence of our intention and ability to withstand attack and to hit 
back immediately. ' 314 The paper also repeated the JIC's view that `from 1956-57 Russia 
will probably be in a position to use some atomic bombs'. 315 Furthermore, intelligence 
was itself seen by the Chiefs as a weapon in the British arsenal. Increasing and 
improving intelligence against the USSR, and the nuclear threat in particular, was a high 
priority in their minds. Fearing the contraction of intelligence work in a similar manner 
to that experienced in the interwar years, they emphasised the great `importance that our 
Intelligence Organisation should be able to provide us with adequate and timely 
warning'. 316 Their words echoed the conclusion made by the former director of GCHQ, 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Douglas Evill, in his November 1947 `Review of Intelligence 
Organisation': 
However we assess the immediate urgency of the world situation it has to be remembered that 
an intelligence organisation cannot with safety be expanded and contracted according to current 
needs. All experience shows that results lag far behind - indeed years behind - the application 
of effort... if we now say that we cannot afford certain processes of direction, collection, or 
collation in respect of our priority objectives, we are likely to regret this bitterly as a false 
economy later on 
317 
Evill's review would not alter the structure of nuclear intelligence, but it does provide a 
useful insight into how the intelligence organisation was faring at a time when Britain 
was committing itself to a nuclear weapons future. His review, in June 1947, consisted 
of `a consideration of whether our existing organisation is such as to make the most of 
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our available intelligence resources, or whether any adjustments are needed to enable us 
to meet the interests of economy as well as of efficiency. ' 318 Evill stated, very early in 
his report, that in relation to their main targets, such as the Soviet Union, the state of 
defence intelligence is `very disturbing' and that, in particular, `knowledge of Russian 
intentions, military doctrines, and scientific or technical capacity and plans is seriously 
inadequate. ' 319 Evill did acknowledge that part of the reason was `the inherent difficulty 
of the Russian objective and the short time during which we had been at work on it' but 
he felt that weaknesses in organisation were also partly to blame. 320 
With the impending review in mind, the Joint Scientific and Technical Intelligence 
Committee (JS/JTIC) pointed out in June the complexity in differentiating between 
forms of scientific or technical intelligence between the services and again suggested 
the need for greater interaction between atomic and other scientific intelligence: 
It is impossible to delimit modern armaments' development as between the successive stages of 
pure scientific research, applied scientific research, experimentation, design and development, 
and finally production and issue... Scientific and Technical Intelligence must, therefore, work in 
constant double-harness and, because it is equally impossible to delimit Service interests in new 
developments ... inter-service co-operation in our work must be as close as that between 
scientist and technicians. 321 
On atomic intelligence, Evill concluded that the problems facing atomic intelligence, 
much greater following the interruption of US nuclear sharing, were made worse as a 
result of the postwar compromise following Blackett's report. 322 The restriction of `raw 
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information' from the US meant that the AEIU continued to be the only centre in which 
fully informed work on atomic intelligence can be performed. 323 
Evill did agree that the continuing restriction upon access to US nuclear intelligence 
meant that wider scientific intelligence was `in a sense maimed or put at substantial 
disadvantage [and] there is undoubtedly some duplication and waste in this practice. 324 
In particular, and importantly for the JIC, Evill felt that `fundamental to any 
improvement in the intelligence position' was the means of strengthening the central 
authority on which we rely for the co-ordination and direction of intelligence activities 
as a whole' but that this would not require a `departure from our present organisation at 
this time. '325 He recommended a new charter for the JIC giving it greater control over 
other intelligence bodies under the Chiefs of Staff Committee and a greater role in 
directing the growing JIC organisation as a whole and in deciding which fields came 
under its remit. Evill's solution to the problem of atomic intelligence was not to move it 
or alter it extensively, but rather to give the JS/JTIC greater access to it, through the 
`proposed new Scientist Chairman'. 326 
The parallel organisations for atomic and scientific intelligence were strengthened and 
better co-ordinated, but the problems were not resolved. Certainly the changes that Evill 
proposed, and the importance he attached to the wider dissemination of atomic 
intelligence reports within the analytical structure, do seem to have provided more 
opportunities for scrutiny and for JIC involvement. Even before Evill had finalised his 
report, his discussions `with Lord Portal' had apparently prompted the AEN to start 
distributing Welsh's fuller reports `for comments by the JIC' and `for consideration' by 





urgently needed. '327 The remaining links for Anglo-American collaboration were again 
the trump card. After Britain decided to proceed with its own atomic bomb project the 
possibility of improving the post-McMahon state of affairs was renewed. 
Increased UK-US collaboration and estimates for the first Soviet atomic test 
The increasing intensity of the Cold War drew the UK and US further together, not least 
in the increasingly divisive occupied-Germany. 328 By 1947, the JS/JTIC was at pains to 
ensure that specialist German technicians should also be protected from the Soviets, as 
this was `a field in which the Russians (and incidentally ourselves also) are extremely 
backward, and it is one of the utmost importance to their future war potential. 329 Later 
that year fears that the Soviets might resort to abducting such scientists, which 
culminated in a report of an attempted kidnap in Gottingen, had led to the US proposal 
to plan the removal from Germany of the ten most prominent nuclear scientists under 
the codename `Operation Dinner Party'. 330 Whilst the British were prepared to plan and 
support such an operation, the concept of restrictions, or the removal, of German 
scientists had already been discounted as `clear discrimination' and `contrary to 
H. M. G. 's policy'. 331 
There was, therefore, some sense of relief in the January 1948 telegram from the 
German section of the Foreign Office to the Intelligence Division in Germany that 
`recent events in Gottingen did not repeat not constitute a serious attempt to kidnap' and 
that there was `no evidence that the Russians were in any way connected with the 
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affair'. 332 As relations with the USSR over Germany and access to Berlin reached crisis 
point in 1948, the British and American operations in Germany focused upon and 
developed operations to maintain surveillance on the German atomic scientists and 
technicians. Under code-names such as `Operation Scrum-Half', `Top-Hat' and 
`Matchbox', these schemes continued well into the 1950s. 333 As with much atomic 
intelligence collection, the information that was obtained in this manner was, however, 
spasmodic, piecemeal and required detailed collation to reveal insights. 
The increasing signs of Soviet interest in nuclear weapons during 1946 may well have 
been in the mind of Atomic Energy Commissioner Lewis Strauss when he realised, 
early in 1947, that the US had no programme in place to detect foreign nuclear tests. 334 
Strauss, although lacking any specialist knowledge in the area, `reflected two beliefs 
about atomic bombs that were common currency in the US at that time: first, that some 
other country had, or would have soon, the bomb; and second, that atomic explosions 
were always accompanied by airborne radioactivity readily detectable at great 
distances. '335 Strauss launched an inquiry arguing that `continuous monitoring of the 
radioactivity in the upper atmosphere ... would perhaps be the [best] means we would 
have for discovering that the test of an atomic weapon had been made by any other 
nation'. 336 Strauss was able to ensure a Long Range Committee was swiftly established 
but the initiation of a detection programme was dependent upon perfecting the science 
behind it and this was a more complicated matter than Strauss may have initially 
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appreciated. 337 As Goodman has shown in greater detail, around the same time, but 
independently of American efforts, the British established their own detection 
programme, one that may have had its origins in the war. 338 The British monitoring 
stations, based around the globe, came under SIS control with much of the research and 
subsequent analysis undertaken by AERE. 339 
The fledgling detection programmes also added pressure for some easing of the 
McMahon restrictions. During 1947 the US had become more concerned about securing 
supplies of uranium for the ever-expanding programme. The British `direct and indirect 
control of three principal sources of raw material', the stockpile Britain had built up in 
the UK during and after the war, future uranium mined from South Africa, and through 
agreement with the Belgian government for access to future stocks from the Belgian 
mine in the Congo, at that time the world's largest source of uranium. 340 Some in the 
US Congress toyed with the idea of threatening to withhold the vital reconstruction 
money, Marshall Aid, the US was providing. 34 1 By the end of 1947 the State 
Department was able to argue instead in favour of some increase in nuclear 
collaboration in return for a greater American share of the UK's uranium stocks, which 
were at that time larger than the UK required for its own programme. 
In January 1948 the UK and US signed a `Modus Vivendi' on the exchange of atomic 
information. 342 There were nine areas for increased collaboration including Area 5 
scientific intelligence. This was considered by the JIC one of three areas in which the 
relationship actually improved, yet still only described as `partial but valuable' co- 
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operation in a 1953 retrospective. 343 Under the terms of the agreement technical co- 
operation for the `detection of a distant nuclear explosion' was fairly broadly defined to 
include `air sampling techniques and analysis' and `new methods of possible 
detection'. 344 It was by no means an extensive change to the experience of those 
dealing with Americans face-to-face, but it did highlight the increased importance of 
intelligence sharing to the US. Mann, in 1948, found that his US colleagues were still 
`completely fettered by the restrictions of the McMahon Atomic Energy Act, but [were] 
... voraciously eager to receive British raw and processed intelligence reports, and to 
make theirs available when they did not involve AEC restricted technical information. 
This great asset was the only thing that made my job tenable. '345 
The new agreement helped cement British involvement in the long-range detection 
programme. For this reason, and without needing the direct consultation of the AEC, the 
USAF gave the UK the results from their `Sandstone' series of nuclear tests in April and 
May 1948 and their plans for a detection system. 346 British involvement benefited from 
the decision of the USAF to increase the scope of any system by including the UK. 347 
The fact that the British were already engaged in this practice, and Harwell was gaining 
experience in analysing the results, meant that the UK venture was well placed 
operationally, as well as geographically to encourage US collaboration. 
In August 1948 the US Air Force established the Air Force Office of Atomic Testing 
(AFOAT-1). 348 One of the difficulties that faced the scientists considering the problem 
343 TNA, DEFE19/45, 'Measures and Agreements affecting U. S. /U. K. collaboration in the field of atomic 
energy', Annex to A. E. (0)(53)25,13 March 1953. 
344 Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Vol. 1, p. 266 Appendix 9 'The Modus Vivendi'; TNA, AB 
16/303, `Review of Technical Collaboration in Atomic Energy Between US, UK and Canada', 10 June 
1948 
345 Mann, Quintessential Recollections, p. 65 
346 Ziegler, `Waiting for Joe-1', p. 216 
347 Ibid. 
348 Ibid., p. 203; Doyle L. Northrop and Donald H. Rock, 'The Detection of Joe 1', Studies in Intelligence, 
Vol. 10 (Fall 1966), pp. 23-33, p. 30 
95 
was the difficulty of obtaining the results from air bursts. Charles Ziegler, who has 
written on the early detection programme, summarised the problem: 
It was necessary for the monitoring system to be able to distinguish between an increase in 
airborne radioactivity caused by a bomb and that caused by an atomic disaster such as a reactor 
to simulate a bomb ... if the Russians opted to disguise the test by utilizing an air burst, then 
insider beliefs about airborne radioactivity and fallout suggested that determination of the nature 
of the explosion through fission product analysis was probably impossible. 349 
Indeed, it was for this reason that the believed Soviet choice of an air burst for their first 
test has been interpreted as a sign that they were trying to keep it secret. 350 
In April and May 1948 sonic, seismic and radiological methods of detection were tested 
at the American `Sandstone' series of atomic tests. 351 The results showed that analysing 
airborne fission products could be done from samples many thousand miles from the 
site of the explosion. This meant that, `unexpectedly, reliable long-range radiological 
monitoring of atmospheric detonations had become an immediate reality'. 352 In fact it 
was not an immediate reality as bureaucratic delays ensured the AFOAT-1 system, in 
conjunction with US private company Tracerlab, was not up and running until the 
spring of 1949.353 
In the UK, despite the best intentions of Evill, there was still a high level of restriction 
placed upon the dissemination of nuclear intelligence, particularly from the US, into all- 
source analysis. Early in 1949 the JS/JTIC voiced frustration that they were still unable 
to provide comprehensive intelligence assessments because of restricted access to the 
sources and analysis that went into the AEIU and Combined Anglo-American 
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Intelligence Unit's work. In particular were the estimates of the amount of fissile 
material available to the USSR. The JS/JTIC understood that `the present figures are an 
Anglo-American compromise, the Americans wishing to put the figures still higher. 354 
They complained that the operations Erzgebirge region had apparently led to the 
change, but that they could not access the intelligence to make a full evaluation for 
themselves 355 Eventually they received a description of the US-led operation, which 
was based on intercepting `shipments of ore and concentrates from one section of the 
Erzgebirge area over a period of 39 days', and analysis of `samples from some 
shipments', 356 
Despite the much higher figures for uranium ore the JS/JTIC, still concluded that this 
did not affect their estimates of possible and probable dates for the first Soviet atomic 
bomb. 357 When looking at the input of atomic intelligence into wider JIC reports, it is 
clear that the `effort to fix the minimum time in which the Russians could be expected 
to produce an atomic bomb' was considered the chief objective. 358 Yet the lack of any 
detailed evidence of the state of the USSR's programme had led British scientists 
advising on atomic intelligence to base their estimates on assumptions about Soviet 
scientific resources and capabilities. It also left such estimates, and indeed the overall 
expectation of Soviet scientific progress in both atomic, somewhat on the side of under- 
estimation. 
As Goodman has argued, British assessments at this time show a fixation with 1957 as 
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the date to which British defence policy should plan. 359 In their 1947 paper, `Future 
Defence Policy, the Chiefs of Staff reiterated the consensus view on the future military 
capability of the Soviet Union, that `from 1956-57 Russia will probably be in a position 
to use some atomic bombs'. 360 Those years were expected to constitute a `critical 
period' because it would also be the point when the `new weapons [were] likely to be 
available' to the British. The Chiefs, for that reason, concluded that they could assume 
the risk of war would be `small' for at least `the next five years', until the Soviets had 
produced their first atomic bomb. 361 However, it was appreciated that the timescale for 
the build-up of Soviet nuclear stockpiles would decrease exponentially after they had 
completed a test explosion. 
Looking at the JIC's contribution, it is clear that Goodman's analysis is accurate but the 
date was not the one necessarily considered most likely. The JIC were at pains to 
emphasise that their readers should not take any of these estimates as certainties and, 
following their 1947 report on `Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities', it was 
necessary to issue another paper because the earlier paper had apparently been 
interpreted `in some quarters, to state that there will be no war before 1957'. 362 
Furthermore, there is a clear indication in the Chiefs of Staff's 1947 paper that their 
estimates of the future capability of the Soviet Union to wage, and believe herself to be 
capable of engaging in, global war, were based on the overall picture of Soviet 
economic and military capability, not just supplies of nuclear weapons. 363 
It is estimated that the earliest possible date by which the Soviets may have exploded their first 
test atomic bomb is mid-1950. The probable date by which the Soviets may have exploded their 
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first test is mid-1953.64 
A JIC report `for the use of the United Kingdom Intelligence Team in their discussions 
with representatives of the United States Intelligence Committee and Canadian Joint 
Intelligence Committee' was issued on 6 September 1949 - eight days after the Soviet 
Union's first atomic bomb test. 365 The report did provide an earliest possible date for the 
Soviet production of an atomic bomb, mid-1950, that was less than a year out. 366 
However, the date they still considered, and advised, was most probable, was mid- 
1953.367 Unfortunately, the record provides no inkling of how the authors felt when they 
discovered in the following weeks that the paper had been overtaken by events. 
Aldrich has interpreted the under-estimation of Soviet industrial capacity and resources 
prior to Joe-1 as a failure of the whole ethos behind British intelligence. Writing in 
2001, he claimed that the `JIC and its subordinates had sneered at the Soviet approach 
to science. '368 There certainly was an emphasis in atomic intelligence reports on the 
belief that the Soviet Union would not test a bomb before the British because Russian 
science and technology was inherently inferior. Aldrich quoted a June 1949 JS/JTIC 
paper that concluded that `the scientific potential of the USSR, though immense in 
numbers, is in fact less formidable than it seems' and therefore `Soviet scientists are 
unlikely to rise to the greatest heights of scientific thought and imagination, from which 
the major advances in human knowledge proceed. '369 However, there was no failure of 
British intelligence, and particularly Welsh's team, to recognise the competence of the 
363 TNA, CAB131/4, COS(47)102(0), 'Future Defence Policy', 22 May 1947 
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top Soviet scientists. Instead, intelligence had underappreciated the competency of 
research workers and saw instead shortcomings of an inferior and war-wearied Soviet 
industry. 370 This was the view Welsh had articulated back in September 1946 when he 
argued that there were enough `theoretical and experimental scientists available for all 
scientific aspects of a nuclear energy project' but that `some doubt [had] been expressed 
as to whether enough technicians are available'. 371 
The under-estimation that did occur was, therefore, upon the whole of Soviet scientific 
and industrial capability rather than competency. Margaret Gowing mentioned, but did 
not specify, 1945 estimates that suggested a Soviet atomic bomb might be available 
three years after the end of the war, 1948, but which seem to have had little impact 372 
Her official history provides little in terms of documentary evidence on intelligence, 
having been written long before much of it began to be released, but her own role within 
the nuclear establishment and closeness to others involved makes it worth noting when 
she concludes that no-one seriously believed that Russia would explode atomic bombs 
before Britain. '373 This was in fact one of the main reasons why British intelligence 
failed to anticipate the first Soviet test, as well as the reason for different projected 
dates. One file in particular, a chart of expected progress in atomic development (see 
Appendix D), shows the core of the problem; the estimates were extrapolated from 
anticipated British progress and therefore were in danger of succumbing to one of the 
pitfalls of intelligence, "mirror-imaging". 374 UK involvement with the development of 
the first atomic bomb as well as successes in scientific warfare against Germany left an 
indelible mark on the consciousness of those who were called upon to effectively guess 
370 Ibid. 
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from limited information the likely progress of the USSR. 
British scientists understood the theory of nuclear weapons and the design of the 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, especially those such as Penney who had been 
intimately involved with the wartime programme. What Britain lacked was `in respect 
of the vast industrial infrastructure needed to produce fissile missile material for the 
warhead, where the Americans had so much to offer their former partner. '375 The British 
programme faced scientific and industrial set-backs, was largely cut-off from any more 
information on US trial and error thus faced with repeating them and needing to marry 
this new expenditure against the enormous, crippling costs left to the UK after the war. 
Faced with these heights to scale, British viewpoints tended towards assuming the 
Russian experience would be at least the same if not more time-consuming. Thus 
perhaps this was not purely a matter of British vanity nor entirely of prejudiced under- 
estimation of Soviet scientific and technical prowess, although both may have come into 
the equation. The, now more widely available, literature of the Soviet atomic bomb 
programme shows with what single-mindedness Stalin's regime could approach the 
development. 376 When the USSR did explode its fast atomic bomb, Joe-i, in August 
1949, it therefore showed both the limitations of intelligence work and the distance the 
British programme still had to travel. 
Detecting Joe-1: An Anglo-American success story 
If exact estimates of Soviet atomic bomb development must, in the end, be considered 
an intelligence failure, the operation that detected and identified the debris from the 
374TNA, DEFE21/45, 'Estimate of Russian Atomic Weapons Programme and Timetable', Annex A, 8 
December 1947, ; Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, (Cambridge University Press, 
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USSR's 29 August 1949 test (Joe-1) can only be seen as a resounding success. The 
effectiveness of intelligence can usually be measured in the degree of warning it 
provides to its users. President Truman's announcement on 23 September 1949 that the 
US were aware that the Soviet Union had tested an atomic device may not have fully 
detracted from the Soviet success but it appears to have given Western leaders a degree 
of control over their response to the event. 
The Soviet detonation was first detected by a US flight from Japan over the Kamchatka 
Peninsula on 3 September. 377 The news, wrote one of the analysts, Doyle Northrup, led 
to `an all-out effort to collect as many samples as feasible'. 378 The British became 
involved when the US asked them on the 10 September to confirm the nature of the 
radioactive cloud that was expected to pass over the UK. Britain was asked to carry out 
a flight north of Scotland to collect samples from the radioactive cloud as it passed. 379 
As the results of this flight, and subsequent ones, were analysed, knowledge of the event 
was still kept strictly need-to-know. The course of event also shows the degree to which 
operational needs outweighed official channels of communication. It was not until the 
14th that Wilfred Mann, Welsh's official liaison in Washington, recalled being phoned 
at 11.30pm `with one foot in the bath-tub'. 380 
I had been invited to attend a session at a "war room" which was then situated not far from the 
White House... In a hurried briefing I learned that a radioactive cloud had been detected and 
then followed by the U. S. Air Force from the Pacific, across America and to the eastern shores 
of the Atlantic. At 3am we adjourned to the Pentagon and held a top-secret teletype discussion 
establishments at Oak Ridge and Hanford worked. I am grateful to Professor Hennessy for this 
information. 
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with colleagues, including Michael Perrin ... gathered at the American Embassy in London. 
381 
The value of the UK-US intelligence relationship and the need for the UK to keep up- 
to-date on nuclear technology to utilise it fully was well demonstrated by Joe-l. Yet it 
also showed the degree to which the British were kept at arms length by the US. Prior to 
an announcement by President Truman the US asked the British to ensure secrecy, 
requesting that it be referred to only as `the Vermont matter. '382 Wilfred Mann recalled 
that after he found himself the `sole British representative' and `outnumbered fifty to 
one' in the US War Room on 15 September he had to go and fetch Lord Tedder, Chief 
of the Air Staff, to get himself noticed: 
When I re-entered the War Room... with a Marshal of the Royal Air Force in uniform the effect 
was magnificent. He was briefed by the major-general and his staff, and by the time he finally 
left my own position on the totem pole was significantly higher. 383 
Bill Penney and Welsh travelled to Washington on 17 September bringing with them 
the `radioactive analyses of the fall-out samples collected by the Royal Air Force from 
over the Eastern Atlantic. '384 Mann helped Penney to write up a report on the results of 
the British analysis, `but in the process of typing it [the report] became so highly 
classified that neither of us was allowed to proof read it. '385 On 19 September Tracerlab 
concluded that it was a plutonium bomb similar in design to that used on Nagasaki and 
that the detonation had taken place on 29 August at 0000 hours. 386 This was a 
conclusion that would be confirmed by Harwell some weeks later. 
The delay between 19 and 23 September, when Truman announced the explosion, is 
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revealing of the role of intelligence in this instance. On 29 August the British Cabinet 
took the decision to devalue the pound, `if satisfactory understanding on consequential 
United States policy could be reached'. 387 The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford 
Cripps, and the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, were to travel to Washington shortly 
and were charged with negotiating `the extent to which the pound should be 
devalued. '388 Cripps and Bevin had arrived in Washington on the 7`h, at the same time as 
the US specialists were analysing further samples of the radioactive cloud. Goodman 
has identified US archives that reveal how Cripps and Bevin were told of the Soviet 
bomb when they met with the President to inform him of the British devaluation of 
sterling. 389 Truman, fearful `that the impact of the two announcements would be too 
great a shock to the Western Nations', delayed announcing the Soviet explosion until 23 
September. 390 The detection operation provided a degree of warning and controlled 
response to the American and British governments. 
The event, or certainly the stress and urgency that surrounded it, did prove too much for 
Welsh. Mann recalled, 
Bill Penney returned home soon after the President's announcement but the strain had been too 
great for the "Admiral". He suffered a heart attack on 24 September. 391 
The impact of the Joe-1 was also apparent a month later when A. V. Alexander, the 
Minister of Defence, held talks with the U. S. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson in 
Washington on the subjects of devaluation and defence. Alexander's memorandum on 
the subject for Attlee reveals the change that was perceived in the US position. Johnson 
had told him that the Americans `were convinced that we had to do the best we could 
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collectively for the quickest and most effective action'. 392 He had also emphasised the 
latest intelligence, admitting that `the reports on the Russian explosion still needed a 
great deal of careful checking' but that it was considered `doubtful whether the Russians 
would be in a position to produce any real quantity of operational bombs'. 393 Johnson 
then suggested that it might be possible to increase sharing through a `satisfactory 
scheme... which might not need submission to Congress. '394 However, his suggestion 
that this could be achieved by limiting `the production of the actual weapons ... in the 
United States' was not met with a positive response. 395 Alexander informed Johnson 
that the British decision to produce an atomic bomb was probably too far along and 
failure `to go ahead with our plans to produce the atomic bomb in England ... might 
lead to quite big political repercussions. '396 Not least among the political repercussions 
was the view that might be taken by Churchill, Leader of the Opposition, who `had been 
displaying interest in the position [on the atomic bomb] in recent weeks'. 397 
Joe-1 had broken the American nuclear monopoly. Yet both the event, and the process 
of discovering it, reminded British officials of the problems they faced in collaboration 
with the US. It was also a reminder of the privileged but urgent subject they were 
dealing with. Mann summed up the feeling: 
For nine days I had been one of a relatively small group of people in the world outside Russia to 
know that "Russia had the bomb"; this was a very sobering thought, and it somehow made me 
fell that my shoulders were helping to carry the weight of the world. 398 
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The Soviet Union did indeed have `the bomb' in the sense of having proved their 
accomplishment of the science and design of atomic weapons. It did not, as Johnson had 
already noted and the JIC would subsequently, entail an operational capability to deliver 
such weapons in numbers. Many questions still remained regarding the types and 
quantities of nuclear weapons the USSR would produce, methods and efficiency of 
delivery and the relative strategic importance that would be placed upon a nuclear force 
compared to conventional forces in any Soviet order of battle. These would be 
important questions for intelligence to attempt to address. 
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Chanter Two: The Thermonuclear Age, 1950-4 
The USSR's first atomic test in 1949 did not lead to a total revision of Western 
intelligence assumptions about the Soviet nuclear capability. As Wilfred Mann would 
later write, `one swallow does not make a summer; nor did the detonation of one 
nuclear device imply the existence of a nuclear force'. 399 The event did provide both a 
renewed urgency to intelligence and a new source of intelligence in itself - the airborne 
by-products of the test. Despite this British intelligence in the early 1950s continued to 
struggle to provide useful detail of the ongoing Soviet nuclear weapons programme. 
Even less was known about the USSR's understanding of the drastically more powerful 
thermonuclear bomb. When first tested by the US this new weapon yielded an explosive 
power 450 times greater than the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki and double the 
combined yield of all of the explosives dropped in the Second World War. 400 This was 
at a time when those examining future war scenarios were only just coming to realise 
the impact of atomic weapons, not least the long term effects of fallout. The 
development in the 1950s of thermonuclear weapons and of controllable long-range 
missiles to deliver them marked a new and even more perilous phase in the nuclear arms 
race between East and West. 
The implications of the advent of even-more terrible thermonuclear weapons were 
increasingly recognised and stressed by returning Prime Minister Winston Churchill. 
The Conservative government, elected in October 1951, inherited the British atomic 
weapons programme. The bomb was successfully tested one year later, on 3 October 
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1952 401 Less than a month after the UK atomic trial the US exploded their first 
thermonuclear device 402 By July 1954, Churchill's government, amidst a flurry of 
advice on the realistic consequences of an H-bomb attack on the UK, decided to 
develop a British thermonuclear weapon. 403 The records of this decision suggest that 
international political concerns, not least the relationship with America, combined, and 
often coincided, with the conclusions drawn from intelligence on the likely speed and 
development of Soviet nuclear forces. 
For the scientists and intelligence officers working in the British Atomic Energy 
Intelligence Unit (AEIU), the organisation charged with the task of assessing the Soviet 
programme, the period would not be entirely dominated by these issues alone. The 
continuing dislocation of nuclear from other scientific intelligence - such as the work 
on the propulsion, electronics and guidance of ballistic missiles - created a haphazard 
approach to filling gaps in knowledge. Though the technological military advances of 
this decade were of enormous concern and preoccupation to those working on 
intelligence, the period from 1950 to 1957 still saw nuclear intelligence frequently 
absorbed in the continuing question of organisational responsibilities. 
Probably the most important theme of the period was the ongoing desire for increased 
collaboration with the US. It was aided and continued through the collection and 
analysis of intelligence, it formed part of strategic and technical appreciations of the H- 
bomb and it was a consistent priority at Prime Ministerial level. The limits of the 
relationship, defined by the McMahon Act, would continue to vex many within the UK 
nuclear weapons and intelligence communities. Yet there were important steps in 
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furthering the links between the two countries, not least in shared work on the collection 
of nuclear intelligence. The McMahon Act, whilst a significant barrier to collaboration, 
did not fully prevent it. In particular, combined intelligence work not specifically 
restricted by McMahon, but related to Soviet nuclear weapons development, continued 
to benefit both countries. 
Collection, collation and assessment of nuclear intelligence under Welsh 
Since 1945 the question of where to house atomic intelligence within the British 
defence and intelligence structure had been dominated by its separation from wider 
scientific intelligence. In September 1949, unrelated to the shock of Joe-1, the 
organisation of post-war scientific intelligence structure was again under 
consideration. 405 Greater centralisation of the higher end of scientific intelligence was 
sought through the creation of the Directorate of Scientific Intelligence (DSI). This 
body was intended to streamline control over both scientific and technical intelligence 
by replacing the previous system, which effectively required the eleven members of the 
Joint Committees to `direct an organisation of some 20 scientists and 40 technicians'. 406 
The topic had been brought up again by Dr Bertie Blount, who had been previously 
been covering atomic intelligence within the British Control Commission in Germany 
(BRIXMIS). 407 Blount became the first Director of Scientific Intelligence (DSI). By 
placing the new scientific organisation under a more prominent head the changes were 
expected to allow `scientific intelligence to speak as one voice'. 408 A summary by 
Blount of the `deficiencies' of scientific intelligence in October 1949 provides a useful 
glimpse of the practical problems he encountered. He warned of recent occasions when 
405 TNA, DEFE40/26, `Organisation of Scientific Intelligence: Deficiencies of the Present Organisation', 
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the JIC had `been briefed by individual members of the JS/JTIC contrary to the 
corporate agreed views of the JS/JTIC'. 409 If this continued, Blount felt, the position he 
had been granted would `become nebulous' and it would be difficult for him to be 
responsible for the direction of scientific intelligence'. 410 
The DSI was responsible for the `evaluation and collation of all scientific 
intelligence. ' 411 Other departments, and the Service Technical Intelligence Sections, 
would forward to DSI `all the information or intelligence reports, or copies thereof, 
received by them relating to scientific subjects. ' However, the evaluation and collation 
of atomic intelligence would continue to be covered by Welsh before being sent on to 
the DSI for collation with other scientific intelligence. A draft of the charter establishing 
the DSI specifically warned that it still did `not apply to Intelligence on atomic energy 
which occupies an anomalous position at present and is the subject of special 
arrangement'. 412 Welsh's unit remained unchanged but the act would increase the 
pressure for integration of nuclear and no-nuclear intelligence. A representative of the 
Ministry of Supply would attend the JTIC, along with the Heads of the Service 
Technical Intelligence Sections and a member of JIB. The DSI would chair the JTIC. 413 
In the early 1950s Welsh, therefore, still held responsibility for the majority of the 
collection, assessment and collation of nuclear intelligence. As well as his role 
analysing the results of the intelligence his unit obtained, he also had control in setting 
requirements and the direction of scientific collection operations. Most importantly, 
given the relatively small size of his unit, Welsh had direct access to `C' and thereby the 
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resources of SIS. 414 This allowed him to make demands on the requirements and results 
of TAL (the SIS unit dealing with atomic intelligence) more swiftly and effectively. In 
November 1949 the JIC's report on the `Soviet Use of Atomic Weapons' had no 
`agreed estimate of Soviet production rates and stocks of atomic weapons... although it 
[was] expected shortly'. 415 The reason for this was not entirely because previous 
estimates were now seen to be wrong following Joe-l. There was a wealth of 
information to be gained from the debris of the test itself that would delay any new 
assessment. More importantly, the JIC knew that the AEIU would require time to re- 
evaluate intelligence already collected, and the picture it had painted, in light of this 
new development. There were also increasing opportunities for the collection of 
intelligence elsewhere. 
As seen in the previous chapter, the collection of nuclear intelligence before JOE-1 was 
in part based upon the extensive intelligence operations in Germany run in concert with 
the US. By 1949 the information from POWs, scientists and documents that had 
remained in US and British zones after VE day about the German programme had been 
exhausted. What was now to become much more useful was the ever-increasing number 
of Germans, and other nationalities, returning from their own post-war experience in 
Soviet hands. Operation `Dragon' to identify all these scientists and their current 
location had, by 1951, identified just under 2,000 scientific workers at 125 different 
installations. 416 `Dragon Return' was the codename given to the repatriation, defection, 
and in some cases abduction, of the scientists to West Germany. 417 The programme of 
interviewing returning Prisoners of War, followed by these scientists, was extensive and 
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produced detail which required collation and verification by those with the scientific 
experience to interpret the results. STIB undertook the initial interviews, which were 
then analysed, collated and disseminated by the DSI/JTIC and their staffs back in 
Britain. 418 STIB work continued to cover all aspects of scientific and technical 
intelligence, although they did not collate the material themselves. The priority of 
nuclear intelligence in their work is apparent, and they had close communication with 
the AEIU back in Britain and with the SIS units (TAL for atomic intelligence co- 
ordination and TCS, the technical intelligence unit undertaking the initial work) in 
Germany itself. 419 
Despite the drawbacks, the sizeable operation to process returning German scientists in 
this way was a valuable resource even if the information of the rate of Soviet uranium 
and plutonium production was piecemeal. The West knew more about the Uranium 
mines in Erzgebirge, in the southern part of the Soviet zone, than other operations 
further east. Tens of thousands were brought in from nearby towns to work in labour 
camps there, but, because they were close to the border with the West, the `result of the 
terrible conditions in the mines was mass flight'. 420 The intelligence from these refugees 
formed the basis for calculations on the estimate of uranium the USSR could draw 
upon. However, an estimate of the fissile material available to the USSR only provided 
a limited appreciation of production capacity. Equally important was the analysis of 
work undertaken within the USSR on all the various procedures necessary for the 
development of an atomic bomb, the locations of these outfits, the principal scientists 
and, of course, the scientific techniques adopted. Interviews with defectors had provided 
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information and some useful detail on these questions but it was often piecemeal and 
confused compared to the success of radar and imagery intelligence in the years to 
come. 
The size of the USSR landmass was undoubtedly also a problem in identifying locations 
especially given the high Soviet security and use of `codenames' for particular sites and 
individuals but there were some notable breakthroughs. Henry Lowenhaupt, involved in 
the American work on the Soviet programme at this time, described the `rather clever 
analysis by the Directorate of Scientific Intelligence in the UK in 1951' in narrowing 
down the location of the biophysics group under Dr Hans Born. 421 Born was one of 
eighteen German atomic scientists whom the USSR specifically desired to remain 
within the Soviet Bloc and had been working in the atomic research team at Electrostal 
near Moscow, a main target for western intelligence. 22 The DSI began by using the 
intercepted letters of those working with Born. This was a technique that formed an 
important part of the massive British and American intelligence operations in Germany. 
Regular correspondence from all German scientists still in the USSR back to friends and 
family in Germany was not permitted until 1951. However, some scientists had been 
allowed letters home from 1946 onwards and `there was sufficient correspondence even 
in the late 1940s for a great deal of intelligence to be gathered' and the operation as a 
whole `made a significant contribution' to understanding of the Soviet project. 423 
In the case of the installation in which Hans Born was working, the DSI were able to 
identify the area that it was likely to be in the Urals from descriptions in letters 
intercepted. 424 Next they used weather charts of the USSR cross-referenced against 
descriptions from certain days - which given the censoring of the letters was often all 
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that was left - to narrow down the region. Finally the British analysts turned to a single 
letter that described a train trip by a group of German scientists to the Born group's site. 
From a reference to travel by underground analysts were able to identify Moscow as the 
starting point. By examining the timetables of the region, and by estimating the distance 
of the two-hour bus journey, the DSI were able to suggest a location of some 20-30 
miles from the town of Kyshtym in the south-central Urals. 425 They would later learn, 
when the authors of these letters and their colleagues returned from the USSR, how 
accurate they had been. The actual location of Born's group, working on the `biophysics 
of radioactive substances' was at a place called Singul, close to Kyshtym. 426 
Operation `Dragon Return' consisted both of dealing with defections and in positive 
identification of individuals by the JS/JTIC (and later DSI) for `evacuation and 
interrogation'. 427 This, in the years before the Soviet Union fortified the border, often 
involved evacuation from Eastern Germany by SIS or CIA operatives. Addressing the 
DSIIJTIC in June 1953, the head of STIB, David Evans, criticised the less selective US 
approach that he felt was jeopardizing British efforts. He `felt that the Russians must be 
aware of this excessive activity and sooner or later the flow of returnees would stop'. 28 
Evans, therefore, `wondered whether anything could be done in Washington to persuade 
the Americans to be more selective when making their plans and so reduce the number 
of returnees interrogated'. 429 A year later, Evans was still expressing his concern that 
`Dragon Returnees' might dry up `within two or three years. 430 
The pessimism over intelligence coming out of Germany was matched by a wider 
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decline in scientific intelligence collection against the USSR. In February 1952 the JIC 
warned the Defence Research Policy Committee (DRPC) of the problem: 
In scientific intelligence undiminished efforts by the agencies concerned have produced 
decreasing returns of intelligence material in face of increased counter-measures, and although 
new techniques are being developed or investigated they have not so far had much effect on this 
trend; nor can there be any assurance of much success, Meantime, our stock of knowledge is 
becoming on average more out of date, and the situation as a whole must therefore be said to be 
deteriorating. 431 
The JIC's conclusions about Soviet guided weapons research were, therefore, based 
`almost entirely... upon the reports of repatriated Germans' and their contact with 
Russian scientists. 32 They acknowledged that these contacts were only ever with low- 
grade Russian scientists but it was suggested that, although possibly the result of 
security, this might actually prove the `absence' of high-grade projects433. By 1954, the 
German sources would still dominate, although the judgment on their value became 
more critical as none of the Germans was given access to native Russian research or 
encouraged to show an interest outside his own limited sphere'. 434 This left them with 
inadequate evidence on which to form a clear picture of the Russian guided-weapon 
programme 435 
As well as using debriefed German scientists, the US and UK had been running a series 
of operations maintaining lists and surveillance of German Scientists who `should be 
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evacuated Westwards in an emergency' and therefore denied to the Soviet Union. 436 By 
September 1953 the Defence Research Policy Committee (DRP) were questioning 
whether this practice should continue. 37 The Chiefs of Staff called for the JIC to give 
their views; the latter, although initially reluctant to drop the operations, were coming to 
the same conclusion. 
As regards value to the Russians, few German scientists have been employed in Defence 
Research since the war, and Russia has already gained all the benefit she is likely to get from 
German Scientists' war experience. There are now no fields of pure science in which the Soviet 
Union is so noticeably weak that we should expect them to look for German assistance. We 
therefore consider that the case for denial is no longer strong 438 
At the subsequent JIC meeting Sir Frederick Brundrett, now Scientific Adviser to the 
Minister of Defence, warned that the US were `unlikely to agree' with the abandonment 
of denial operations. 439 However, it was decided that the British would look to the 
government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to `take the initiative' should it 
become `desirable to reconsider this policy. '44° In 1953, the STIB were still only 
interviewing scientists `employed on the fringes of that [atomic] programme' . 
44 1 By 
1954, that the STIB, AEIU, DSI/JTIC and JIC were all coming to the limits of the use 
they felt could be achieved by such intensive operations in Germany. 
Despite such reservations, the mid-1950s actually saw some of the most fruitful nuclear 
intelligence from German scientists. The exhaustive operation of mail interception had 
revealed in 1951 that those Germans most closely involved with the early Soviet atomic 
436 Ibid., JIC(54)79, 'Denial of German Scientists to the Soviet Bloc', 22 September 1954 
437 TNA, DEFE5/49, COS(53)481, 'Denial of German Scientists to the Soviet Bloc', Report by the 
Defence Research Policy Committee, 28 September 1953 
438 TNA, CAB 158/18, JIC(54)79, `Denial of German Scientists to the Soviet Bloc', 22 September 1954 
439 TNA, DEFE4/73, COSC(54)107th Meeting, 14 October 1954, Minute 1, 'Denial of German Scientists 
to the Soviet Bloc' 
440 Ibid. 
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programme were being transferred to eastern Russia for a `cooling off' eriod. 442 In 
April 1955 these scientists finally returned to East Germany and `defection plans' went 
into operation in the West. 443 The most senior - men like Nobel Prize winning physicist 
Professor Gustav Hertz, the cyclotron constructor Baron Manfred von Ardenne, and the 
nuclear reactor physicist Dr Heinz Pose, who were well known from their wartime work 
- did not answer to the Western overtures, but some of their subordinates did. 444 The 
importance of the operation, and the success of its results to those working in atomic 
intelligence is revealed in Lowenhaupt's description of the `skillful and exhaustive 
interrogation' which `revealed technical details, individuals names... in a richness 
unbelievable to one who has never witnessed this procedure. '445 
The information obtained from sources in Germany through defections and covert 
operations brought results, even if the picture was still confused and incomplete. More 
importantly for future years, especially after 1957, would be the ability to compare this 
carefully, often painstakingly, accumulated knowledge with the results of over- 
flights. 446 Extensive photo-reconnaissance, by aircraft capable of reaching the heights 
and speeds necessary for covert operations against Soviet air defences had been 
undertaken since the war but would prove a huge asset in the later half of the decade 
(see next chapter). 447 In 1954, however, Welsh had concluded that obtaining 
information from the `conventional methods' of espionage, and in the interrogation of 
German POWs returning from Russia, did not provides., the best intelligence for his 
44' TNA, DEFE41/92, T. Young to Evans', 29 September 1953 
442 Lowenhaupt, 'On the Soviet Nuclear Scent', p. 27 443 Ibid. 
4" Ibid., pp. 14-16,27 
445 Ibid., pp. 27-8 
446 Ibid., p. 29; Goodman, 'British Intelligence Assessments', pp. 371-2 447 Paul Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War, (Stroud: Sutton, 1996), pp 77,89 and 139 
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department. 448 Not only were these forms of intelligence more susceptible to Soviet 
counter-measures but also could `be distorted in transmission or falsified by the Russian 
themselves. '449 Welsh felt more assured `applying scientific techniques to long-range 
detection of the "by-products" of Russian atomic energy plants and explosions. '450 Of 
course, this evidence was only available after a Soviet test. A 1954 review of atomic 
intelligence explained the process of long-range debris analysis: 
The technical interpretation of the results of the instrumental collection are carried out in two 
stages. The first consists of extremely delicate and laborious chemical analysis of debris or 
gases. The second consists of the interpretation by scientists of the results of these analyses. The 
chemical analysis is carried out by a staff of about 20 scientists at AERE. The technical 
interpretation is the responsibility of a committee under the Chairmanship of Director, AERE, 
or informal meetings of the Director, AERE, the Director, AWRE, and other scientists 451 
The collection of radioactive remains from a nuclear explosion required continuous 
monitoring, at ground level, as well as atmospheric collection flights. The analysis of 
this debris was sometimes a slow process. This was particularly true for the scientists at 
AERE who were developing new chemical means of analyzing the radioactive remains 
and samples collected. They were also aided a great deal by the limited, but highly 
useful, information the US were still able to provide as part of the 1948 Modus Vivendi, 
which provided for limited cooperation including which the `detection of a distant 
nuclear explosion' 452 
The growth of the JIC's information about the first Soviet test can be seen through 
aas TNA, DEFE19/38, Daniel Report Notes and Papers, 'The Organisation of the Atomic Energy Unit', 
Report by Eric Welsh, 17 December 1953 
aas Ibid. 
450 Ibid. 
451 TNA, DEFE19/38, Daniel Report (Draft), paragraph 11 
452 TNA, DEFE19/45, `Measures and Agreements affecting U. S. /U. K. collaboration in the field of atomic 
energy', Annex to A. E. (O)(53)25,13 March 1953 
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successive annual reports. By March 1950, the analysis of airborne material from the 
August 1949 test allowed Welsh to provide the JIC with `good evidence that an atomic 
explosion had taken place, but still `no clear evidence regarding the present rate of 
production of atomic bombs' 453 In April 1951 the JIC could state merely that it was `a 
plutonium bomb, probably similar to that which destroyed Nagasaki. '454 But the 
following year, the JIC's report on `Soviet and Satellite War Potential' could only 
conclude from this that the Soviet programme was on a very large scale.., [with] an 
overriding priority' and `ample' supplies of uranium `for the foreseeable future. '455 
Again, the most detail in the report appears to come from long-range analysis of the 
1949 explosions and `two further explosions [which] have taken place in September and 
October 1951' [Joe-2 and Joe-3]. Yet it still only allowed only the vaguest of 
conclusions, stating that `the Russians have at their disposal at least one and probably 
more plants for the manufacture of plutonium and these must have been in operation 
456 since about mid-1945', 
As well as the collection of the remains from an explosion, scientists sought more 
assured methods of being able to detect a Soviet test from long distance. In a recently 
released but heavily redacted report in June 1954, Welsh outlined the `continuous 
efforts.. . and considerable refinements of method' achieved 
in the five years since the 
457 US and British collected samples of Joe-1 
Additions have been the detection of explosions by measurement of ground, air and gravity 
453 TNA, CAB158/8: JIC(49)118, `Soviet Long-Term Preparations for War - Review of Major 
Developments during the Year Ending 31st December, 1949', 17 March 1950 
454 Ibid. 
ass TNA, CAB158/13, JIC(51)117 (Final): `Soviet and Satellite War Potential, 1952-55', 22 April 1952 
456 Ibid. 
457 TNA, ES1/877, `AEIU Operations in Spring 1954', Report by the AEIU, 2 June 1954. 
Although much of the text has been blanked out it is clear that the file relates to British observation at the 
American H-Bomb test series that took place in the Spring of 1954. The FOI official who cleared the file 
appears to have deleted the word Soviet in reference to JOE-1, the `first - atomic 
test'. It is possible 
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waves; these methods give instant notification of an explosion and therefore obviate the 
continuous monitoring of the atmosphere for radioactive debris. Yet another method of 
detection is the measurement of the radio-flash generated by these explosions. "' 
Britain was still, in 1950, two years away from exploding her own atomic bomb, so 
there was also a value in the development of long-range detection and nuclear test 
sampling to the British atomic bomb programme. 459 The results of this work provided 
information on the nature of the atomic devices exploded and therefore an indication of 
the types and efficiency of the warheads being produced by the USSR. When, however, 
this was collated into JIC reports descriptions of Soviet test shots remained hesitant. 
The nature of the two atomic tests of September and October 1951 were referred to as 
`still somewhat uncertain' in 1955 460 A further fifteen Soviet tests through 1953 and 
1954 provided more evidence of the extent of Soviet capability but in their quantity 
were an indication of how little was known. 461 The only conclusions that could be 
drawn from the 1954 tests were that it was `probable' that the Soviets were developing 
small tactical weapons 462 
There was another development that was to prove increasingly useful, and a further 
opportunity for the British for increased collaboration with their US counterparts. 
Operation `Nomination', discussed in greater detail by Goodman, originated out of a US 
programme to identify levels of Krypton-85, an isotope that appeared in radioactive 
material 463 The US had worked on this problem themselves since 1945 and had even 
gone as far as releasing a significant amount of radioactive material from one of their 
that the reference is to the first American tests but given the history of atomic detection processes the 
1949 Soviet test is more likely. 
458 Ibid. 
459 TNA, ESI/877, `The Activities of the Atomic Energy Intelligence Unit', 3 June 1954 
460 TNA, CAB158/19, JIC(55)3, `Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1955-1959' 24 March 1955 
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own plants in order to measure the levels of Kr-85 464 The results from `Green Run' 
were significant as scientists were able to establish that the `number of grams of 
plutonium produced in a natural uranium pile is directly proportional to the number of 
grams of krypton-85 produced by fission of uranium-235 in the pile'. 465 In other words, 
the US could establish exactly how much plutonium the USSR had produced since 
1945, and locate their atomic piles, but only if they could identify and subtract the levels 
of Kr-85 produced by US, British and Canadian work on plutonium production. 
66 To 
do this, they would need the British co-operation, but more than this, the British would 
require greater understanding of the US atomic plants. As Goodman explained, in his 
detailed analysis of `Nomination' (as the operation came to be known), the solution 
`was to make the programme so secret that many American politicians would not know 
it existed. '467 
Scientific detection programmes like Nomination typified improvements in nuclear 
collaboration between the UK and US. 468 The impact of British involvement in air- 
sampling was more than just the additional resources afforded by British involvement, 
but the very fact that `Britain was running an independent air-sampling operation 
[which] therefore forced the United States to maintain some contact with it'. 469 Aldrich 
pointed to evidence from the US archives that the British were deliberately informed 
about an impending series of US nuclear tests in 1951 `to avoid British intelligence 
collecting the increased debris in the atmosphere and concluding from the data that new 
464 This release of radioactive material from the Hanford plant under the code-name Operation `Green- 
Run' was only disclosed by the US government in the early 1990s. I am grateful to Michael Goodman for 
identifying the American files that can be accessed on the internet 
465 `Notes on Technical Cooperation with British and Canadians in the Field of Atomic Energy 
Intelligence', Memorandum for R. LeBaron [Deputy to Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy], 23 
March 1951. Accessed on 2 July 2007 via National Security Archive Electronic Reading Room: 
www. gwu. edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB7/ael-l. htm 
466 
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Soviet tests had taken place'. 47° The US were motivated by both the possible injurious 
effect on British estimates and to prevent `widespread false press reporting of a large 
Soviet test programme'. 471 In fact, though US-UK relations in this field would continue 
to stifle the organisation of nuclear intelligence in the UK, the degree to which the 
Americans would ease certain restrictions on the sharing of nuclear research and the 
importance of this to British nuclear policy was, by 1954, even greater than Aldrich and 
Goodman portray. This is particularly apparent in looking at new material on the British 
role in American thermonuclear testing and its impact of the Churchill government's 
decision to develop a British H-bomb, as will be seen. 
More immediately, in the early 1950s, there were many continuing and new problems in 
attempts towards improving collaboration with the US. Partly thanks to the Modus 
Vivendi, many points of US-UK nuclear collaboration continued and developed despite 
the McMahon restrictions, including the long-range detection programme that 
developed after Joe-1 and close liaison between Welsh's unit and the CIA's Nuclear 
Energy Group. 472 It was the success of British involvement in the detection and analysis 
of Joe-1, which persuaded the US Air Force (USAF), who ran the US long-range 
detection programme, to continue and increase collaboration with British efforts in this 
sphere. 473 The 1949 test had shown to the Americans the usefulness of combining 
operations on the scientific detection of nuclear explosions. The continuation of these 
operations, and work in Germany, maintained a level of contact when other pressures, 
such as the McMahon restrictions but also questions of the security of British 
intelligence, looked likely to undermine all the hard work put in from the British side. 
The practical problems from McMahon, and the degree to which it was adhered to on 
470 Ibid. 
a" Ibid. 
472 Goodman, British Intelligence Estimates, pp. 242-246,289-291 
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the US side, were usefully described in the memoirs of the British atomic energy 
representative in Washington from 1949, Wilfred Mann: 
When I presented myself to my future colleagues at CIA I heard much to depress me. Two of 
them in separate discussion spoke very frankly. They were themselves cordial and friendly, and 
they clearly felt it was their job to warn me against expecting too much... Even a report on 
heavy water might not be handed to us as the AEC were objecting to our getting their restricted 
technical information... On the other hand, if I went home [to the UK] that would mean a 
cutting off of all British information on the assessment of raw intelligence, about which they 
hardly dared think. 474 
If Mann had hoped that relations between the two countries would improve promptly, 
he was soon to be let down by the discovery of espionage at the heart of the British 
nuclear community. On the 2 February 1950, to the huge surprise of those who knew or 
had worked with him, Dr Klaus Emil Fuchs was arrested for espionage. He was 
discovered and placed under observation for some months after being identified through 
decoded Soviet communications in the Anglo-American Venona project. 475 Fuchs had 
been passing on information to his Soviet handlers throughout the war both in Britain 
and in his time at US locations including the supposedly top secret Los Alamos base 
where the US bomb was completed. Assessments of the importance and impact of 
Fuchs' espionage have been explored in several books and Michael Goodman has 
provided a lengthy and persuasive account of his atomic intelligence importance as well 
as that of other important spies on matters atomic. 76 It is worth, however, discussing 
473 Northrup and Rock, `The Detection of Joe-1'; Mann, Quintessential Recollections, p. 70 
474 Wilfred Mann, Quintessential Recollections, p. 64-65 
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the view that contemporary intelligence analysts took on the impact his espionage may 
have had for the Soviet atomic programme. 
Fuchs described the entirety of his activities to Michael Perrin, Welsh's superior at the 
Ministry of Supply in 1950, in an interview in which Fuchs appeared to be `trying his 
best to help me [Perrin] evaluate the present position of the atomic energy work in 
Russia in the light of the information he had, and had not, passed to them'. 77 Fuchs told 
Perrin that he would have expected the recent test, 
to be due to a plutonium bomb in the light of all the information he has passed to the Russians. 
He, personally, believed that this conclusion was confirmed by the measurements on the 
airborne fission products that had been collected... He said that he was, however, extremely 
surprised that the Russian explosion had taken place so soon as he had been convinced that the 
information he had given could not have been applied so quickly and that the Russians would 
not have the engineering design and construction facilities that would be needed to build large 
production plants in such a short time. 
78 
In fact, as was seen in the previous chapter, the Soviet success did stem from the scale 
of resources that were devoted to the programme. Fuchs' intelligence may have 
foreshortened the Soviet programme by one or two years, thereby, to a degree, 
validating western intelligence. This is because his description and blueprint of the US 
bomb design was adopted as the Soviet bomb model, copying the implosion method 
used for the first American bomb in July 1945 and that used against Nagasaki 4 79 Yet 
too much reliance upon Fuchs' confession was a danger to future understanding of the 
Soviet programme and the success of entirely Soviet-developed weapons. Yuli Khariton 
and Yuri Smirnov, two Russian scientists deeply involved in the Soviet nuclear 
47 TNA, AB 1/695, Ministry of Supply files, `Interview with Klaus Fuchs', 30 Jan 1950 
478 Ibid. 
479 Goodman, 'The grandfather', pp. 6-7; Holloway, Arms Race, pp. 24-5 
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weapons programme from its inception through to the 1960s described the success of 
the Soviet design tested in October 1951: 
After deciding to use the American design for the first explosion, Soviet scientists temporarily 
slowed down the development of their own, original - and more effective - design. 
Nevertheless, their experimental work resumed in spring 1948, and in 1949, a "report/proposal" 
... provided the experimental basis and calculations for a new design that, without a doubt, was 
more progressive than the American design 480 
It was also half the physical size of the American design and twice as powerful. There is 
no way of knowing whether, had Fuchs' intelligence been unavailable, the Soviet- 
designed weapon would have been ready sooner. Likewise, it is impossible to know 
whether certain scientific blind alleys were avoided by knowledge that the American 
design would work . 
481 The fact that Western intelligence services, particularly the US in 
their concern over so many nuclear breaches of security, could attribute Soviet success 
to espionage at this time could lead to misinterpretation of the true state of the Soviet 
programme and where its strengths, and weaknesses, lay. This would be particularly 
important in terms of estimates on likely Soviet thermonuclear development, a scientific 
advance which was clearly, and with greater significance, brought to the Soviet 
scientists' attention by Fuchs' spying. 482 
The impact of Fuch's espionage, and defection to the USSR of the Bruno Pontecorvo, a 
naturalised British nuclear physicist who had worked alongside Nunn May in Canada, 
was not as damaging to the UK-US relationship as the revelations that were to follow. 483 
In May 1951 Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean fled to the USSR having been tipped 
480 Y Khariton and Y. Srnirnov, `The Khariton Version', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (May 1993) 
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off about the latter's imminent arrest by their, as yet unidentified, accomplice Kim 
Philby. 484 The scandal that followed `descended like the proverbial last straw on the 
back of the collaboration effort' that had been underway at that time. 
85 Of the two, 
Maclean was by far the most damaging in terms of nuclear cooperation. Maclean had 
been posted at the British Embassy in Washington from 1944 to 1948, at one point as 
temporary head of Chancery, and served was a Secretary for the CPC from 1947-8. As 
well as some knowledge of nuclear development, fissile stocks and atomic relations 
between the two countries, he also had access to the progress of British and American 
nuclear intelligence operations, results and their overall impression of the Soviet 
programme. 486 
These latest spy scandals and consequent concerns about British security saw the 
Americans abandon plans that had been afoot on the provision of US bombs and the 
secondment of British scientists to the US in return for British plutonium. 
87 The 
consequent October 1951 amendment to McMahon was, therefore, of limited value to 
the expansion of UK nuclear know-how. 488 It allowed some exchange `on the purely 
scientific and industrial aspects of atomic energy but specifically [excluded] all data on 
the design and fabrication of atomic weapons'. 489 Work towards improving this state of 
affairs had also reached the highest level of the British government. Looking at the 
efforts by Churchill to achieve greater leeway from the US and concurrent work by 
Welsh's unit it is clear that nuclear relations with the US were improving, and this 
483 Goodman, British Intelligence Estimates, pp. 169-175, gives a fuller account of Pontecorvo's 
significance; Paul, Nuclear Rivals, pp. 166-187 
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would have important ramifications for British policy. 
British and American nuclear test collaboration 
Immediately after he returned to office in October 1951 Churchill, annoyed at the 
reversal of the closer wartime relationship in nuclear matters that he had been so 
instrumental in developing, had been seeking means to improve this state of affairs ago 
On 21 November his scientific adviser, Lord Cherwell, attempted to instil a sense of 
realism, stressing that the `wartime agreements have been superseded. We should gain 
nothing by referring to them now' 491 In December 1951 Cherwell outlined the three 
particular areas of Anglo-American nuclear relations that were causing concern and that 
he felt Churchill should pursue when he met with President Truman early the following 
year. They included the `modifications in strategy and tactics resulting from the use of 
atomic weapons', `technical co-operation with the U. S. on atomic energy matters' and 
`a matter of extreme importance concerning atomic energy intelligence in which co- 
operation with the Americans is vital to both sides'. 
492 The latter, Cherwell felt, was `so 
secret that I would prefer to explain it orally' 493 
An earlier reference to intelligence cooperation on `aspects concerning Russian atom 
bombs' suggests that the `matter' concerned cooperation on intelligence collection from 
Soviet nuclear tests. This reflected the fact that the British were playing a full part in the 
worldwide Anglo-American collection of debris, telemetry and other communications 
resulting from these tests through radar installations, by aircraft and, in its early stages, 
by submarine. As well as aiding analysis of this mass of evidence, greater technical 
489 TNA, PREM 11/292, `Atomic Energy Summary', Cherwell to Churchill, 21 November 1951 
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know-how improved requirements and methods of collection. The desire to deal with 
this aspect separately reflected the degree to which American cooperation in this sphere, 
and awareness of the value of the British contribution, was more forthcoming than 
wider nuclear relations. 
In January 1952, on the eve of their trip to the US, Cherwell was counselling Churchill 
to `aim at getting is a decision from the President that those concerned should 
endeavour to get the maximum possible co-operation with us within the limitations of 
the Act and not the minimum'. 494 He reiterated that this was to be tackled separately 
from the question of improving intelligence collaboration. In May, he advised the Prime 
Minister on the latest developments in intelligence cooperation: 
Difficulty seems likely to arise about cooperation with the Americans in estimating the Russian 
stock of atom bombs. The Americans are anxious to cooperate but say that their hand will be 
much strengthened in squaring Congress if they can send over their Director of Security and a 
man from the F. B. I. to assure themselves and report back that our security standards are 
adequate... If our Security arrangements are adequate we have nothing to fear; if they are 
inadequate it would be a good thing to know it and to improve them. Our obstinate refusal 
would make a very bad impression and might stand in the way of cooperation in the future 495 
The impact of the recent spy-scares and the question of British security were certainly a 
factor in any future expansion of cooperation. The British concluded that only a 
demonstration of their nuclear capability would improve conditions for collaboration. In 
July 1952 the British Chiefs of Staff circulated a paper on `Defence Policy and Global 
Strategy', giving even greater primacy to a nuclear force in future military planning. 496 
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The paper also outlined the importance of Britain attaining an operational atomic 
weapon to greater involvement in American military planning. 
We feel that to have no share in what is recognised as the main deterrent in the cold war and the 
only Allied offensive in a world war would seriously weaken British influence on United States 
policy and planning in the cold war, and in war would mean that the United Kingdom would 
have no claim to any share in the policy or planning of the offensive. 
'497 
Thus it was with a certain amount of `congratulation and relief' hat Britain exploded 
her first atomic bomb on 3 October 1952 at Monte Bello in Australia. 
98 Yet the act 
itself did not entirely impress the Americans, who were a month away from completing 
their development of a thermonuclear bomb. 99 Greater hopes therefore rested with a 
change in the American administration. 1953 saw the inauguration of President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, whose wartime military career had brought him into close contact with 
many in the British government, military and intelligence world. 
500 It was hoped that his 
term in office would bring a change in the climate surrounding nuclear collaboration. 
50' 
In August 1953 the Chiefs of Staff set out the kinds of information that the UK wanted 
from the US. It included, `such things as the fissile materials used and how produced, 
the detailed design of the several American atomic weapons, and the various techniques 
that are employed in all stages of the production of the weapons. 
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be used, when Churchill met with Eisenhower at Bermuda in December 1953 
503 At this 
meeting Churchill also discussed with Eisenhower `the difficulties we were in as a 
result of U. S. the inability or unwillingness to discuss freely with us intelligence about 
Russian atomic weapon development'. 504 As will be seen, subsequent events suggest 
that the `difficulties' related to British analysis of Soviet nuclear experiments, which, 
without information from equivalent US testing, was becoming problematic. The UK 
received `assurances' and the following year, greater cooperation was achieved in 
sos 
combined work on developing nuclear explosion detection methods. 
Early in 1954, as Goodman has shown the British were given access to the US nuclear 
test series, codenamed `Castle', partly in reciprocation for earlier US access to British 
testing. 506 Files obtained for this thesis through British Freedom of Information 
legislation reveal much more about this operation than Goodman was W4507 In a2 
June 1954 report, which has been released with heavy deletions, Welsh explained that 
the UK had found it `difficult to interpret without more experience' the analysis of 
samples obtained from nuclear tests. It had therefore been considered `especially 
desirable', for the refinement of thermonuclear detection methods, to be able to `obtain 
good information' of the `Spring 1954 [US thermonuclear] tests at close range'. 508 The 
6 shots in the Pacific began on 29 February and included `Bravo', the largest ever US 
nuclear explosion, and one that would have enormous international repercussions. 
509 
The Chiefs of Staff had asked Cherwell to request from the American authorities that 
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the UK be allowed to use their Canberras to `obtain close-range samples', arguing that it 
would improve British techniques against the USSR's tests. Eventually this request 
appears to have been accepted and a plan for the UK's involvement was hastily 
prepared, but the operation was beset with tragic complications. 
The Royal Air Force accepted this emergency task. One of the Canberras, with its whole crew, 
was lost on the last lap of the journey to base; later its replacement was also lost (on the same 
flight stage), though this time the crew was saved. 510 
A further Canberra was flown out but arrived late. The remaining aircraft that was 
available for sampling had some success during one of the test shots, but was affected 
by `fuel feed trouble' prior to a subsequent test. Thanks `to the excellent relations 
established at the site between the R. A. F. ' and the US Air Force the British appear to 
have obtained the results anyway. The British managed to get both aircraft in the air to 
`collect sufficient samples' at a further shot, possibly the final. In every case Welsh was 
able to obtain long-range samples for comparison. 511 
As well as the loss of the Canberra crew, the Castle series would have further tragic 
consequences. The Bravo shot on 1 March on Bikini Atoll produced a yield of 15 
megatons, much larger than expected because of a miscalculation about the lithium 
content of the bomb. 512 The `widespread devastation and heavy fall-out made Bikini all 
but uninhabitable' and left servicemen and the nearby Marshall Islanders suffering from 
the effects of radiation and requiring mass evacuation. 513 The miscalculation also meant 
that the exclusion zone that had been declared prior to the test was inadequate. A 
Japanese fishing crew, the Lucky Dragon, were 85 miles away, outside the danger zone. 
510 TNA, ES1/877, 'A. E. I. U. Operations in Spring, 1954', 2 June 1954. 
511 Ibid. 
512 Arnold, H-Bomb, pp. 18-19 
513 Ibid. 
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By the time they reached Japan, two weeks later, most of the crew were sick and one 
later died. The incident caused international furore and heightened public anxiety about 
the threat of these weapons and their testing. 
In the UK a flurry of parliamentary questions were swiftly directed at the Prime 
Minister. Particular concern surrounded possible dangers to shipping but it was also 
asked whether Britain `has resolved its policy with regard to the production of the 
hydrogen bomb in this country'. 514 They had not, and Churchill avoided this question 
but he did attempt to quell concerns by pressing the danger of heavily criticising the US 
at this time: 
As is well known, the President is appealing to Congress for a greater latitude of 
communication on certain nuclear matters with us... I trust nothing will be said here which will 
set back the many favourable tendencies in this direction which are now evident in the United 
States 515 
Churchill also revealed to Parliament something of the long-range detection 
programme, though not the close-range operation: 
Our own instruments, which are highly developed, of course recorded the explosion of Friday 
last [26 March] as soon as sound waves or pressure waves reached us 516 
It is impossible to know with perfect certainty, given the many deletions in the file, 
whether the Canberras were definitely present at Bravo. It was one of the earlier shots 
and the rush for the British to get involved, and the number of tests mentioned in the 
report, suggests it was one of the ones during which the British suffered difficulties but 
may have received US results. The fact that the British were present during this test 
spa House of Commons, Official Report, 30 March 1954, Col. s 1842-1861 
315 Ibid., Col. 1847 
516 Ibid. 
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series at all is hugely important. Not only was it representative of a major improvement 
in Anglo-American collaboration, Penney's knowledge, as Arnold has argued, greatly 
increased as a result of this series and, as will be seen, would help inform and persuade 
Churchill to opt for a UK H-bomb. 517 It would appear, therefore, that Penney's 
information from these tests came not only from his presence in Washington at the time, 
as Arnold emphasised, but also from the more detailed information Welsh's team were 
able to pass on. The longer-term analysis of the results would also form the basis for the 
conclusions of Sir William Strath's team as they set out in 1955 the full effects of an H- 
bomb attack on the UK. 
The results, and the evidence of what the debris from a fully thermonuclear megaton 
explosion looked like, also led Penney to question the value of certain sampling 
techniques. In a discussion on 9 June of the value and results from various detection 
methods (acoustic, gravity wave, radio flash, seismic and dust analysis) he questioned 
the ability of the UK to analyse the results from the analysis of the radioactive `dust' 
without even greater access to US testing. 
It had become clear to him that there were so many unknowns that it was highly unlikely that 
any results of value could be obtained except on a basis of comparison of the dust of one 
explosion with samples collected after the explosion of bombs whose comparison and method 
of firing were known 518 
Cockcroft responded that, as his department would take at least two months to analyse 
the results from Castle the matter should be revisited in the autumn `and thereafter 
decide the scale on which continued effort was worth while. Cherwell `added that for 
political reasons it would be advisable for us to collect what samples we could of any 
sly Arnold, H-Bomb, p. 42 
518 TNA, ES1/877, AEIC(SCI)/M(54)2,9 June 1954 
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dust from forthcoming Russian explosions. '519 The value of particular intelligence 
collection operations was, therefore, as important for the Anglo-American relationship, 
if not more so, than for what it told of the Soviet nuclear programme at that time. 
Eisenhower's influence did bring greater pressure to bear for a revision of the Atomic 
Energy Act. 520 Congress amended the McMahon Act in August 1954 allowing for 
greater exchange of information with the UK `provided that such transfer will not 
contribute significantly to that nation's atomic weapon design. '521 This was dependent 
upon Presidential approval and `provided that such nation has made substantial progress 
in the development of atomic weapons. ' It still did not allow for provision of 
information relating to the production of warheads. The following year the provisions 
set out in the Act were cemented in a bilateral civil and military atomic co-operation 
agreement. 522 
Thanks to greater political will, and alongside closer involvement in the collection of 
nuclear debris, collaboration was also becoming regular on estimates of fissile material. 
By 1954 the respective US and British estimates of the Soviet programme were 
deliberately phased six months apart `so that each group can have the opportunity of 
discussing the other's report before it writes its own next report'. 523 The importance of 
co-ordination was to ensure military planners, coordinating through NATO, would not 
`receive contradictory advice about Russian potential. '524 The members of the AEIC 
were therefore concerned when, in what was probably their first task, the latest US 
estimate of Soviet uranium production in February 1954 had unexpectedly given `much 
519 mid. 520 Goodman, Nuclear Bear, p. 99; Maddrell, Nuclear Rivals, pp. 199-201 
521 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Public Law 83-703,30 August 1954; Ball, 'Military Nuclear Relations', 
p449; John Baylis, `Exchanging Nuclear Secrets: Laying the Foundations of the Anglo-American Nuclear 
Relationship', Diplomatic History, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 33-61,36-7 
522 Co-operation regarding Atomic Information for Mutual Defence Purposes, Cmd 9555, (HMSO, June 
1955) 
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higher estimates' than the previous American, let alone the most recent British, 
estimate. 525 
No reference is made in the American paper to this change in their estimate, and no reason is 
suggested for the change. Moreover, recent conversations with their experts, who are frequently 
in London, have not foreshadowed any such change... If the US have reason for more than 
doubling their estimate of Russian uranium stock, it is supremely important that we should 
know these reasons, and increase our estimate accordingly s26 
The concern at being left out of American thinking, whilst also accepting the increase, 
shows confidence in US intelligence, as well as reflecting a wider interest in retaining 
the special relationship. Indeed this difference did mark a step-change in American 
thinking as estimates by Britain and the US had, for the previous five years been 
reasonably in concert. By late 1954 and early 1955, the US were coming to the 
conclusion, in part from the results of Nomination, that Soviet uranium levels were 
sufficient enough that they no longer needed to be considered as a limiting factor in the 
efficiency and speed of the Soviet programme. 
Furthermore, the yields the US was achieving in thermonuclear explosions meant that 
the damage able to be inflicted was of a completely different order. This altered 
thinking on the numbers of bombs required. More immediately, the thermonuclear 
achievements of the US and USSR required that the British government consider 
whether to pursue this course for themselves. At a time in which UK understanding of 
the principle of thermonuclear warheads was not fully understood and the impact of 
nuclear fallout only starting to be fully appreciated, the role of intelligence was under a 





greater spotlight. 527 It was possibly because of this greater focus on UK understanding 
of the science behind fusion explosions, and the demonstration of an apparent Soviet 
thermonuclear explosion in the autumn of 1953, that moves were also underway to 
remove the task of nuclear intelligence analysis from Welsh and give it instead to the 
UK's leading nuclear minds. 
'A Broody hen on the Gem': The end of Welsh's monopoly 
In 1952, at the insistence of Churchill, Professor Jones returned to government service 
to replace Dr Blount as DSI. It was unsurprising that unease over his Directorate once 
more being denied access to atomic intelligence took little time to arise. In November 
1952 he produced a report for the Chiefs of Staff and his colleagues in intelligence on 
the `general problems still outstanding in the field of organisation and staffing of 
Scientific Intelligence'. 528 The `note' was actually a wide-ranging consideration of the 
nature of scientific intelligence, focused mainly on the problems in obtaining high- 
calibre scientists for government work and the problems inherent in his Directorates 
`relationship with the Service Ministries'. 529 
Jones did not at this stage offer any thoughts on the `arrangements for collating atomic 
energy' but expected them to be resolved `within the Intelligence organisation itself'. 
530 
The responses Jones received agreed, with reservations, that there were problems with 
Scientific intelligence's `relation to the Ministry of Supply'. 531 By the end of 1952 
Jones's disillusionment with his scope of responsibility led him to decide to abandon 
government work once again and return to academic life. The date for his retirement 
527 Arnold, H-Bomb, pp. 49,84 
Sts TNA, DEFE21/3, Records of the Joint Intelligence Bureau, `Note on the problems in organising and 




was set for March 1954 and an enquiry into the future of the DSI under Sir Frederick 
Brundrett, Chief Scientist at the MOD and the Deputy Chairman of the Defence 
Research Policy Committee (DRP), was to begin after he had gone. 532 
At the same time a parallel development was taking place in the organisation of the 
whole British atomic programme. Lord Cherwell, given the role of Paymaster-General 
but with a remit as wide as Churchill desired, was closely involved in the impetus 
leading to establishment of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) in 
July 1954. Following a review under Sir John Anderson, the UKAEA, a civilian body, 
was to cover all matters relating to non-military nuclear power. 
533 The wider energy 
programme was headed by Sir Edwin Plowden and separated from the weapons work. 
The move, it was acknowledged in classic understatement, would therefore trigger 
`some change in the existing organisation for intelligence. ' 534 
Admiral Sir Charles Daniel had just finished a stint as Director-General of GCHQ and 
had overseen that agency's enlargement and move from Eastcote to Cheltenham in 
1952.535 In 1953, he was asked to look at the changes that would be necessary to the 
atomic intelligence structure in light of the UKAEA change. 
536 The original terms of 
reference provided for Daniel by the Chiefs of Staff in November 1953 show that the 
original intention was to commission a committee, chaired by Daniel, but in practice 
Daniel consulted the committee, which comprised Cockcroft, the Service intelligence 
53' Ibid., Dr O. H. Wansbrough-Jones, Principal Director of Scientific Research (Defence) to R. V. Jones, 
28 November 1952 
532 TNA, DEFE32/4, Chiefs of Staff Committee Secretary's Standard File, COS(54)70, 'Directorate of 
Scientific Intelligence', 2 March 1954 
533 The Future Organisation of the United Kingdom Energy Project, Cmd 8986, (HMSO, 1953) 
534 TNA, DEFE19/38, Records of the Chiefs Scientific Advisor and predecessors, Daniel report Papers 
and Notes. These notes and a draft version of Daniel's report have been released in the files of the Chiefs 
Scientific Advisor, MOD, following a request by Michael Goodman. The full Daniel report from the 
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heads, Sir Kenneth Strong, head of JIB, and the new head of SIS, Major General Sir 
John Sinclair. 537 Daniel also sought the views of Welsh, Sir William Penney, Director 
of AWRE, and Jones. Although the UKAEA changes were given as the main reason for 
the review the discussion that followed show that money and collaboration were also 
causing concern. 538 The Daniel Report, as it came to be known, was in essence a 
complete review of nuclear intelligence and, with the benefit of nearly a decade of 
operations to examine, Daniel's review was much more centred on Welsh's working 
practice than Evill's or Blackett's inquiries had been. Although the changes it produced 
were envisaged as temporary, it would lay the groundwork for much more significant 
reorganisations in the years to come. 
Along with the other members of the consultative committee Penney provided Daniel 
with his own view of, first, the weaknesses and, second, the strengths of the AEIU `at 
present': 
1. Welsh has two bosses539 - neither knows what he is up to. 
2. Welsh spends large sums of money with little check. Nobody compares value of his 
expenditure with expenditure on other intelligence purposes. 
3. Welsh is like a broody hen on the gem which comes to him and rather asks for trouble. 
4 Welsh cannot make a verbal quick and good summary. Very prolix... 
1. For all his funny appearance and aggravating slowness in verbal presentations, Welsh is very 
good a getting stuff out of scientists. He is good at interpreting what they find. 
2. Welsh is very good at "laying on" Service help in collecting material for scientific study eg 
536 TNA, DEFE32/3, Confidential Annex to COSC(53)135`h Meeting, 27 November 1953; TNA, 
DEFE19/38, Daniel report Notes and Papers 
537 TNA, DEFE32/3, Confidential Annex to COSC(53)135th Meeting, 27 November 1953 
538 Ibid. 
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planes, ships etc. 
3. Welsh is persona grata with the nuclear scientists at Harwell and Aldermaston. Gets good 
results and cooperation with AFOAT/CIA 540 
4. Welsh seems to be a good boss for his own staff since they are very loyal to him. 541 
Daniel found that Welsh was not only responsible for writing up the technical 
interpretations of his scientists and collating this with other atomic intelligence sources, 
but also `for passing the results of his collation with other scientific intelligence on its 
way to the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Chiefs of Staff. '542 Another submission 
to Daniel, either sent anonymously or unsigned, argued that this state of affairs could 
not continue and that Welsh `must either be taken out of collation altogether or, if he is 
left in it, he must not have control of it. '543 Daniel's solution was to pass this task over 
to the experienced and more ordered Joint Intelligence Committee organisation. 
Collation would instead be carried out by the formation of a special team, not 
necessarily full-time, within the Joint Intelligence Staff, who, with representatives of 
technical and scientific intelligence and of JIB, would normally carry out the collation 
of atomic energy intelligence with intelligence on other matters. 544 
Given the evidence of these submissions about the character of Eric Welsh, it is hardly 
surprising that he sought to make his own case to Daniel defending his department. He 
emphasised the `peculiar nature' of the AEIU's work `which lays great emphasis on 
scientific methods of collection, and which therefore demands different treatment from 
539 Welsh's SIS status and his position in the Ministry of Supply 
54° AFOAT was the US Air Force Office of Atomic Energy 
541 TNA, DEFE19/38, Penney to Daniel, 20 December 1953 
542 Ibid., Daniel Report (Draft), paragraphs 12-13 
sas Ibid., Anonymous note 
544 Ibid., Daniel Report (Draft), paragraph 32 
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more conventional forms of intelligence gathering. '545 A particular passage may have 
been the deciding factor for Daniel's decision to keep atomic intelligence separate from 
DSI. Welsh warned that the long-range collection methods required `interpretation not 
merely by scientists but by the best scientific brains available, and essentially by men 
with the insight which can only come from active engagement on the forefront of 
atomic energy research' : 546 
It cannot be over-emphasised that there are very few scientists capable of this difficult work, 
and that interpretation which is not quite good enough can lead to startlingly wrong conclusions. 
Moreover, the methods themselves are so new that they require continual guidance and 
assessment in the light of our rapid progress in the atomic energy field 547 
The most telling part of Daniel's report is in its analysis of the continuing personal 
difficulties between Eric Welsh and R. V. Jones not resolved since Blackett handed the 
atomic intelligence portfolio to Welsh in 1945. One, unidentified, observer in 1954 
described Daniel's review as having arisen `primarily because of personalities and a 
refusal to cooperate rather than any constructional failure. '548 The views of the two men 
were felt at this stage to be so entrenched that `no solution is possible' which might see 
both Welsh and Jones remain. 549 Jones's decision to retire was felt to have eased this 
difficulty but Daniel still had to play the peacemaker. Daniel concluded that `the 
achievements and the deficiencies of the present organisation seem to me to depend so 
much on personalities and personal relations that a completely logical organisation 
would not necessarily in present circumstances be the most efficient. 'sso 
545 Ibid., `The Organisation of the Atomic Energy Unit', Report by Eric Welsh, 17 December 1953 
s*5 Ibid. 
say Ibid. 
sas Ibid., Anonymous note to Daniel. Its position in the file suggests it was dated November or December 
1953 
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Aldrich suggested that the 1954 review saw the transfer of Eric Welsh's Atomic Energy 
Intelligence Unit to the military' under the Joint Intelligence Bureau [JIB], the defence 
intelligence body under Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong. 55' In fact, Daniel made it 
clear that, `in view of the necessity for maintaining close personal relations with the 
atomic energy scientists and very close and direct relations with a variety of collectors 
[he] did not think that at present the A. E. I. U. ought to be made part of the Directorate of 
Scientific Intelligence or any other existing intelligence organisation in the Ministry of 
Defence. '552 Instead for the time being the unit should become a separate intelligence 
organisation administratively within the Ministry of Defence and under the direct 
authority and command of a small committee', the Atomic Energy Intelligence 
Committee (AE1C). 553 The committee was to be chaired by Brundrett and consisted of 
the J1C Chairman [Patrick Dean], the Chief of SIS [Sinclair], the Director of the JIB 
[Strong], the DSI [Hugh Young as Deputy], the Director of AERE [Sir John Cockcroft] 
and the Director of AWRE [Penney], with Welsh and any others attending when 
necessary. Daniel's solution was a temporary compromise; the unit would be more 
closely controlled but would remain independent and the arrangement reviewed the 
following year. 
Daniel agreed that the AEIU's budget needed to be `examined and a proper assessment 
made of the worth of the unit's activities and expenditure compared with intelligence 
operations in other fields'. 554 According to one correspondent with Daniel, the AEIU's 
financial `state of affairs... is one of which we were all aware in a general sort of way, 
and one about which we have all been increasingly uneasy. So that if there is - and 
don't suppose for a moment that there will be - any tendency to make light of the 
551 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, p. 420 
552 TNA, DEFE19/38, Daniel Report (Draft), paragraph 29 
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554 Ibid., Daniel Report Notes and Papers, Draft of JIC response to Daniel, undated 
141 
inadequacy of the financial control which has been obtained hitherto, you will certainly 
be entitled to say that the Treasury take a poor view of it, and must insist that, even in so 
technical and highly secret a field as this, some improvement in the administrative and 
financial co-ordination simply must be achieved'. 555 Increased scrutiny from the AEIC 
seems to have caused some frustration in his unit's work; its members now had to ask 
for operations and equipment through the scientific sub-committee and AEIC, rather 
than directly from the scientists or director at AERE as before. 
Kramish described how `R. V. Jones and Eric Welsh fought bitterly for the control of 
post-war atomic intelligence... Welsh won. '556 For R. V. Jones, consulted by Daniel in 
the run-up to his retirement, the result certainly was a failure. After seeing a draft of the 
report, while still DSI, Jones wrote to Daniel complaining that to continue the 
separation did not take into consideration the `maiming effect it has had on my 
Directorate'. 557 He therefore asked, should the report's conclusions `remain 
substantially unmodified', that his own `comments... be placed in the permanent files of 
the Ministry, so that someone at some future time may see which of us was right. If I 
have read you report correctly, and if you are right, I must be very, very wrong in my 
own conclusions'. 558 Jones was wrong about the degree to which his complaints had 
been heeded. In November 1954, Kenneth Strong of the JIB was systematically going 
through Jones's `Some Aspects of the Directorate of Scientific Intelligence' and dealing 
with the points raised. 559 
If this episode was to be a victory for Welsh, it was unfortunately a short-lived one, 
quite literally. On 21 November 1954, aged 57, Eric Welsh died after a further heart 
sss Ibid., Daniel Report Notes and Paper, [illegible] to C. W. Wright (Assistant Private Secretary to 
Daniel), 20 January 1954 
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attack, following the one in September 1949, and caused, in part, by `chronic 
alcoholism'. 560 When Welsh passed away it would not have been obvious how well he 
and his unit were adapting. The changes resulting from Daniel's report were approved 
after in April Alexander informed both Churchill and Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony 
Eden 561 Welsh and his unit made the move in May 1954. The decision to insist that 
Welsh not be solely responsible the collection, collation and dissemination of the work 
must also have been a blow to his prestige. 562 His replacement, Dr Robert Press, would 
instead see the unit through this disordered period. Press, who had experience as the 
attache at the British Embassy in Washington dealing with atomic collaboration, took 
over early in 1955.563 
The development of the AEIU after 1954 is less clear. The reviews that the AEIC would 
have undertaken in 1955 or 1956 were considered too technically sensitive to be made 
public until requested under new Freedom of Information legislation. 5M Although only 
two of the AEIC files from this period have been declassified so far, and in heavily 
redacted form, their release marks a further step-change away from the past invisibility 
of nuclear intelligence work in British files and in setting a precedent for what 
documents can be expected to be released in the future. 565 Sometime in 1955 the AEIU 
was renamed the Technical Research Unit (TRU) 566 Technical Atomic Liaison 
559 TNA, DEFE21/3, Strong to General Brownjohn, 30 November 1954 
560 TNA/Family Records Centre - General Register Office, Death Certificate of Eric Welsh, 21 
November 1954 
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(TAL)567, a cover name for the SIS unit working on the Soviet atomic programme, 
undertook much of the secret intelligence collection. 
568 
The Chiefs of Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, Field-Marshal Sir 
John Harding, and Air Chief Marshal, Sir William Dickson, discussed the Daniel 
proposals alongside the proposed members of the AEIC in March 1954. The JIC 
Chairman, Dean, staking a claim for the JIC in the future, gave the Chiefs of Staff his 
views on the re-organisation: 
In due course the interim committee proposed in the report would fade away and atomic 
intelligence would come under the Joint Intelligence Committee in the same way as other forms 
of intelligence... The proposed arrangements, if adopted, should be kept under constant review 
in order to decide the moment when atomic intelligence should come under the normal 
intelligence machine. 569 
After all, Dean took pleasure in observing, the `proposed committee [AEIC] was 
virtually the Joint Intelligence Committee less some of its members. '570 
Not all agreed with this view. Among the Chiefs and the other senior figures involved - 
Penney, Cockcroft and Brundrett among them - the major disagreement seemed to 
remain between wider scientific intelligence and the nuclear specialists. Hugh Young, 
acting as DSI after Jones' departure, restated the scientific intelligence view that the 
reasons given to maintain atomic intelligence separately were `not valid. 571 
567 TAL appears to have stood for either Tube Alloys Liaison (perhaps in earlier days when the whole 
project was referred to as Tube Alloys) or Technical Atomic Liaison which appears in mid-1950s 
documents 
568 The exact date and reason for this renaming is not clear from the archives. Amongst the intermittent 
files of 1956-1958 the unit is referred to as both and references to TAL also occur, although less 
frequently and some files appear to have redacted references to this body. Michael Goodman has 
identified it as occurring in the aftermath of Daniel's changes which is logical but he does not give any 
evidence of when nor the specific reason. Goodman, British Intelligence Estimates, p. 350 




Undoubtedly Young was particularly rattled that the membership of the `interim' AEIC 
did not include the Director of Scientific Intelligence. The acting DSI argued that, as 
collation of atomic intelligence was already undertaken by the Joint Technical 
Intelligence Committee some of the proposals were superfluous and, in respect of 
collation, he `did not see how the establishment of the interim committee would 
improve matters. '572 To this Penney responded, showing his view of the AEIC role, that 
`far too much effort was now being taken... in trying to ascertain requirements' and that 
the committee proposed `would be in a position to give the necessary direction', 
perhaps implying the JIC could not. 73 The director of the AERE, Cockcroft, discussing 
the temporary nature of the changes, felt that it should be maintained as a separate 
subject until `the method of merging it into the ordinary intelligence field could be 
foreseen. '574 He did not seem to have disagreed with Dean's view that the JIC was the 
natural and eventual home for nuclear intelligence. 
The theoretical centrality of the JIC in the intelligence assessment process, even though 
in practice it was not fulfilling this role, was also seen in a memorandum from Lord 
Alexander, Minister of Defence, to Churchill, informing him of the changes. Alexander 
reiterated the point that `Atomic Energy Intelligence must be collated with other forms 
of defence intelligence so that the Joint Intelligence Committee may present a 
comprehensive picture to the Chiefs of Staff and through them to Ministers. '575 The 
views expressed about the JIC's role during this appraisal of nuclear intelligence are 
important to understanding the development of that body. The JIC represented a means 
by which the Chiefs of Staff could gain more control over this subject. As the Minister 
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of Staff machinery for advising the Government on defence intelligence matters'. 576 
However, a greater and more immediate concern was again, avoiding upsetting the 
Anglo-American nuclear intelligence applecart. This was the ultimate reason why such 
an ad hoc system was to be maintained and the reason why, despite Young's objections, 
the AEIC was to be set-up. Those individuals who still figured at the heart of the British 
nuclear programme - Cockcroft and Penney most specifically - had been working on 
the subject since the war and had therefore built up reputations, expertise and good 
relations with their US counterparts. It was for this reason that Daniel, on the advice of 
many, had concluded that there should not be any widening the circle of those allowed 
to view the detailed sensitive assessment from the US which, given the dearth of secret 
sources, formed a significant part of British atomic intelligence work. Alexander 
informed Churchill that, `in the interests of close collaboration with the Americans ... 
detailed knowledge of the highly secret scientific and technical assessments which have 
to be made should be confined to the narrowest possible circle'. 577 
Maintaining the `narrowest possible circle', and yet ensuring the best possible advice, 
was further emphasized in the establishment of a `small committee' to work under the 
AEIC, known in its minutes as AEI(Sci). Effectively the AEIC but without the 
intelligence heads, it was chaired by Brundrett and consisted only of Penney, Cockcroft, 
and Lord Cherwell, Churchill's scientific advisor. 578 Cherwell, Paymaster-General until 
November 1953, had, by this time, returned to academia. Yet the note reveals that his 
particular relationship with the Prime Minister, and undoubtedly his past involvement 
with the subject, ensured his continued involvement. Alexander wrote that `so long as 





good thing if he were also a member of this committee. '579 Churchill minuted a 
distinctive `yes' in red pen in the margin. 
The sub-group was to be `responsible for the necessary scientific and technical 
assessments and will report to the main committee the conclusions reached on scientific 
grounds, but not details of the scientific methods and assessments on which these 
conclusions are based. 580 The truth, as seen in the communications between the 
members of this small sub-committee, was that much of the `details of scientific 
methods and assessments' consisted of scientific information and assessments from the 
US, which would invariably be consulted continuously and formed a large part of their 
work. In fact, this small committee were already meeting by June of 1954 and 
represented the same core group who dominated the British nuclear community, the 
`atomic knights' and who were a driving force behind the decision to develop a British 
hydrogen bomb, and who formed the core of the Advisory Group that had advised 
Anderson on Atomic Energy. 581 The changes that resulted from Daniel thus gave them 
virtual hegemony over nuclear intelligence assessment at exactly the time they were 
being called upon to advise the government over the UK's response to the 
thermonuclear age. 
Going Thermonuclear: intelligence and the British H-bomb decision 
On 18 June 1952, meeting with the Chiefs of Staff to discuss the latter's paper on 
`defence policy and global strategy', Churchill set out his views on the likelihood of a 
Soviet first-strike that was far more pessimistic than the assessments the JIC had been 
giving. He argued that `the Russians would be prepared to put up with a lot of 
disadvantages in order to launch the full weight of their atomic attack to knock out this 
579 Ibid, 
580 TNA, ES 1/877, `Atomic Energy Intelligence' 
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country as a "bolt from the blue"' and that `such an attack might well come at a time 
when they were talking "peace"'. 582 The Chiefs, reflecting the JIC view, were more 
sanguine, cautioning that `the possibility of an unheralded opening to the war, in the 
form of an atomic attack on the United Kingdom, was unlikely'. S83A handwritten note 
to the Chiefs the following week related further, typically poetic, comments by 
Churchill that `the Western allies had continually hanging over the heads the sword of 
Damocles of a Russian attack on the Pearl Harbour model; they might at any time be 
caught by such an attack unawares'. 584 
Less than a month after the success of Operation Hurricane, Britain's first atomic bomb 
test on 3 October 1952, the United States tested successfully their, and the world's, first 
megaton bomb, Mike, on 1 November. 585 Although, `less a thermonuclear bomb than a 
very big and dirty boosted fission bomb', the `principles of the new Super had been 
proved'. 586 Cherwell wrote to Churchill in December 1952: 
If it is decided not to make bombs of our own and to rank with the other European nations who 
have to make do with conventional weapons, we may be able to save about £7 million a year on 
Penney's establishment. But there would be no other major saving unless of course it was 
decided to give up all serious work on the development of atomic energy. And I cannot believe 
that you would contemplate adopting such a disastrous line which might well in the long run 
spell national suicide. 587 
As the quote reveals, Cherwell supported Churchill's belief in the need for Britain to 
marry the problems of financial constraint and international status, but thought that the 
581 Hennessy, Having It, p. 329 
582 TNA, DEFE32/2, COSC(52)7`h Meeting, Confidential Annex, `Defence Policy and Global Strategy', 
18 June 1952 
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UK could only do so through continuing development of the latest nuclear technology. 
The process that led to the formal Cabinet decision to proceed with a British H-bomb on 
27 July 1954 reveals that although intelligence supported and contributed to the 
decision, Britain's status was an equally important factor. 588 Nonetheless, whilst the 
conclusions of intelligence were not necessarily the prime motivator, the efforts that had 
been made to improve the capability of UK nuclear intelligence did prove to be the 
facilitator of the British H-bomb decision. Though Churchill may have been more 
pessimistic about the likelihood of the USSR initiating war than the JIC, it was the 
results of ostensibly intelligence related work, particularly the information received 
following the Castle series, that convinced Churchill of the urgency of the Soviet threat. 
At the time the world became aware of the development of significantly more powerful 
nuclear H-bomb weapons, particularly after the Lucky Dragon incident, British 
intelligence was still struggling to appreciate how advanced the Soviet atomic 
programme was, let alone thoughts of Soviet thermonuclear success. The organisational 
changes to the AEIU in July 1954 would, later that year, lead to a complete overhaul of 
the JIC's assessments of Soviet atomic capability. 589 The fact that the AEIC, and 
especially the AEIC(Sci) consisted of those who were also at the forefront of the British 
nuclear programme undoubtedly contributed to the prominence of intelligence in 
nuclear weapons policy. 
Cockcroft, Brundrett and especially Penney, now had `the broad task of collating all 
types of atomic intelligence, of preparing appreciations for the Joint Intelligence 
Committee and Chiefs of Staff, of advising on the volume of effort that should be put 
into, and the priorities for, the work of the Atomic Energy Intelligence Unit, and of 
587 TNA, PREM11/290, Lord Cherwell to Prime Minister, 29 December 1952 
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overseeing generally U. K. intelligence activities in this field'. 
590 They would never 
become fully comfortable with producing consistent and timely reports in this period 
and the inclusion of nuclear intelligence into the JIC's work would remain somewhat 
irregular while the AEIC existed. Yet astonishingly, the very period in early 1954 when 
the AEIU was undergoing the most extensive re-organisation since the war, intelligence 
on the Soviet nuclear programme was to undergo its most specific test since 1949; to 
inform ministers and defence chiefs of the Soviet threat whilst they weighed up the 
option of a British H-bomb. 591 
On 12 March 1954, Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, arranged a meeting in his 
office which was to examine issues relating to the development of the hydrogen bomb 
and, in particular, whether Britain should follow suit. 
592 The meeting, as well as 
consisting of Brook himself, Sir Richard Powell of the MOD and General Sir Neville 
Brownjohn who was liaison for the Chiefs and Sir Edwin Plowden, shortly to become 
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority, brought together, again, those few who so 
dominated nuclear and related intelligence work in these years, Cockcroft, Penney and 
Brundrett. Brook told them that he had called the meeting because the `development of 
[the hydrogen bomb] had now reached a stage which required us to re-assess first, our 
foreign policy and general strategy and, thereafter, the "size and shape" of the Armed 
Forces, our civil defence policy and out atomic weapons programme. '593 The meeting 
was in fact the first minuted step in a process that would lead to the official Cabinet 
decision to produce a British H-bomb, but Brook's approach shows how it was also a 
wider opportunity to take stock of the situation and high-level examination of current 
sag TNA, CAB 158/18, JIC(54)88, 'Military and Economic Strength of the Soviet Union', 11 November 
1954 
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intelligence suppositions about the Soviet threat would form an important part of this re- 
assessment. 
One of the first issues to be discussed was the nature of thermonuclear explosions and 
the difference between the American and the 12 August 1953 Soviet test. The latter, the 
USSR's first attempt at a thermonuclear device, had a yield approximately one twenty- 
fifth of the first US thermonuclear test, MIKE. 594 It was, therefore, a `hybrid' 
thermonuclear explosion. According to Lorna Arnold, understanding of the difference 
between the `hybrid' and `true' H-bomb, and therefore the science behind nuclear 
fusion, was not fully appreciated by British scientists including Penney until early 
1954.595 By the 12 March meeting, Penney, felt he understood enough to provide his 
colleagues with a summary of the difference: 
There were two forms of hydrogen bomb -a "hybrid" bomb and a "true" hydrogen bomb. The 
"hybrid" bomb was something like the earlier atomic bomb but "boosted"... The Russians had 
developed a "hybrid" bomb of about 1 megaton in 1953. The "true" hydrogen bomb was a new 
departure: it involved a series of chain reactions which at the last stage produced very fast 
neutrons; and in theory there was no limit to the size of the explosion which could be produced 
by a bomb of this type 596 
The difference between the effects of such devices was also spelled out. The `hybrid', if 
dropped on London, Penney told his colleagues, `would produce a crater 1,000-yds 
across and 150-ft deep; the Admiralty Citadel would be wrecked at a distance of 1,200- 
yds from the point of burst, houses would be wrecked at 2 miles, and bad blast would be 
'93 Ibid. 
594 Arnold, H-Bomb, p. 28 
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experienced at 4 miles'. 597 The `true' was even more devastating. Penney warned that 
the latest US tests had shown that a5 megaton bomb `dropped on London and bursting 
on impact would produce a crater 3/4-mile across and 150-ft deep, and a fire-ball of 21/a - 
miles diameter'. 598 It would, therefore, be capable of crushing the `Admiralty Citadel at 
a distance of 1 mile', wrecking houses `at a distance of 7 miles' and causing fire in all 
habitations `over a circle 2 miles radius from the burst'. 599 
The minutes of the 12 March meeting show that in order to make any decision, Sir 
Norman Brook wished the Chiefs of Staff and ministers to be provided with the most 
relevant and up to date information. This, in his mind, consisted of: 
(i) The likelihood of war... (ii) The form which war was most likely to take if it came... (iii) The 
changes which would need to be made in the pattern of our defence arrangements, active and 
passive, in order to adjust them to meet the most likely contingency... (iv) The extent to which 
we should ensure against the possibility that war might take some other form than that which 
now seemed most likely. 600 
The fact that the wording of the first two problems exactly mirrors the titles of JIC 
reports shows where Brook had in mind the information would come from. The fact that 
Brook had asked for these to be re-assessed `in light of the new information about the 
hydrogen bomb' suggests he could not wait for this to be done within the normal JIC 
timetable. 601 Indeed, before examining the JIC and Chiefs of Staff response to Brook's 
request it is worth probing what British intelligence understood about the Soviet 
thermonuclear programme. 






surmounted the details of the difference between chain-reaction fusion and boosted 
fission devices. In March 1955, eight months before did achieve a `true' thermonuclear 
weapon (Joe-19) on 22 November, ongoing analysis of the test debris from nearly two 
years before was merely thought to prove Russian interest in the development of high 
energy weapons but was not believed to be evidence that `it would lead directly to the 
development of a useful weapon'. 602 But they, the Chiefs of Staff and Sir William 
Penney, were warning in 1954 that the Soviet Union was `likely to develop the "true" 
hydrogen bomb before long', or `within one or two years. '603 This suggests that for the 
purposes of the H-bomb decision a pessimistic outlook was put forward. Yet there is 
also evidence that the deficiency in intelligence collection in organisation meant that 
JIC reports could not fully appreciate the character and competence of Soviet scientific 
and technological in a way that would be important when assessing likely Soviet 
success in future technological advances. In February 1954 a DSUJTIC report, 
discussed by the JIC (Deputy Directors) just two weeks before Brook's meeting, 
summarized the problem. They argued that because `the Russians have achieved a 
thermonuclear reaction on a considerable scale, within a year of a similar American 
success' this should `influence our assessment of the Russian capacity of boldness, 
originality and speed in research and development matters'. 604 Despite this, in another 
veiled complaint of their lack of access to atomic intelligence, they warned that a lack of 
`detail of the Russian success, and of what may have led up to it', prevented them from 
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One of the reasons for the success of the Soviet thermonuclear programme that British 
intelligence did not fully appreciate was that it was distinctly separate from the atomic 
project. Andrei Sakharov, the `Father' of the Soviet H-bomb, described how, in the run- 
up to the thermonuclear test, a fission test also took place in Kazakhstan. This, Sakharov 
later wrote, would ordinarily have been a great event for me, but I was so completely 
absorbed in the forthcoming thermonuclear test that I barely noticed it. '606 This 
compartmentalised structure was part of the intense security surrounding the Soviet 
venture. This meant that the entirety of the various scientific and technical endeavours 
in the USSR, which were working on aspects of the atomic and thermonuclear 
warheads, and guided weapon design, was only fully appreciated by a limited number of 
individuals at the top. 607 Most of the thousands involved would have had little idea of 
how their work fitted it to the larger project and some did not even know they were 
involved in producing nuclear Weapons. Andrei Sakharov recalled an excellent 
example: 
One of the chiefs of the design bureau was talking to his colleagues on the eve of the first test of 
the Soviet hydrogen bomb, leaning against the very device, `it is incredible how far secrecy 
goes in our country! " he said... "Yesterday Malenkov [Chairman of the Council of Ministers] 
delivered a speech and said that hydrogen weapons have been created in our country. And we 
don't even know who did it and where! "608 
Indeed, Russian scientists who had been closely involved with the projects have since 
argued that the high-calibre of the Soviet scientists and the high priority given to all the 
nuclear and related weapons programmes were `critically important' to their success. 609 
Addressing in 1992 the question posed by `some physicists in the United States', that 
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the first Soviet thermonuclear test was simply a boosted fission device, Khariton and 
Smirnov also illustrate the relevance such a question should have posed for intelligence 
analysts contemplating the Soviet scientific capability. The acknowledged that the `two 
Soviet hydrogen bombs tested in 1953 and 1955 were indeed different'. However, 
because the `yield of the bomb tested in 1953 was 20 times greater than that of the 
bomb dropped on Hiroshima, yet it had the same dimensions and weight', the two 
scientists felt that `the tested charge was a major step in the development of nuclear 
weapons. 610 A Chiefs of Staff memorandum to the Defence Policy Committee reported 
that the latest US test explosions, the Castle series in May, had achieved `a weapon 
approximately 1,500 times more powerful that the "nominal" atomic bomb' whereas the 
Soviet test had achieved an explosion `about 50 times... the "nominal" bomb. 9611 Thus, 
whatever the definition, the implications for British nuclear defence were dramatic: 
A provisional estimate of the effect of 10 bombs dropped one each on 10 selected cities in the 
United Kingdom indicates that, if they are of 100 times "nominal" power, the death toll would 
be 5 millions, and, if 1,000 times "nominal" power, 12 millions. It is therefore clear that a 
country which can equip itself with the means of delivery needs only a comparatively small 
stockpile of such weapons in order to be able to deliver a devastating attack on an enemy. 612 
The devastation that the USSR could inflict on the UK with only boosted devices would 
be cataclysmic enough, but it was the huge power the US were achieving, along with 
the fact that Penney had come to understand the science that made `true' thermonuclear 
weapons so powerful, and likely to be increased in yield that strongly affected British 
defence planners at this time. Estimates of Soviet bomb numbers that the JIC had been 
presenting to the Chiefs of Staff in spring 1954, based on AEIU's latest estimate, 
609 Khariton and Smirnov, `The Khariton Version', p. 23 
610 Ibid., p. 30 
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warned fairly accurately that `at the end of 1953 the USSR held between 190 and 265 
atomic bombs of conventional type (20-100 kT), and, possibly a very small number of 
thermo-nuclear weapons. '613 There were problems, as the DSI/JTIC had previously 
informed the JIC, in calculating such a figure because `the numbers of bombs just 
quoted is based on the convention that all the fissile material is made into bombs of a 
single standard type' and any `other type of bomb estimate would have to make 
allowance for what bombing targets the Russians might select. 
614 
In terms of the likely form a future war would take, the latest JIC papers and the 
resultant Chiefs of Staff review were continuing to stress that if a future global war 
occurred it was necessary to plan `on the assumption that... nuclear bombardment will 
become general' and the USSR would use `every weapon at its disposal. '615 These 
conclusions, however, focused upon the likelihood of atomic weapons being used in 
warfare. The Brook meeting, knowing that it would take fewer H-bombs to cause utter 
devastation, now asked the JIC to analyse the Soviet means of delivering bombs of a 
dimension corresponding to the US H-bomb specifications given by Penney. 616 The JIC 
were to look at the problem in respect of manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft and 
ballistic missiles against both the UK and US. 
The JIC warned that, against the UK, the USSR could deliver such weapons by aircraft 
`now ... in large numbers' which, given the warning that 
Penney had provided on the 
H-bomb's power, was a very worrying picture. 617 Against the US the Soviets could 
launch a strike with aircraft but only with `slow and vulnerable aircraft, mid-air 
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refuelling, described as `quite feasible', and the use of `one-way missions'. 618 This was 
not expected to change until 1957 when the employment of short-range missiles against 
the UK and two-way missions for aircraft against the US would improve the Soviet 
threat. Most surprisingly, but showing how lacking in this subject British intelligence 
was in the mid-1950s, the JIC stated that the Soviet ballistic missile threat against the 
US would not be apparent until 1970-80. If the British government was to place its 
security on the basis that the Soviet's would not start a war if they could not effectively 
target the US, this was a problem. 
Indeed, this was exactly the conclusion which the Chiefs of Staff submitted to the Prime 
Minister's Defence Policy Committee (separate from the Cabinet Defence Committee), 
and which was forwarded, with some redactions, to the full Cabinet. They argued, 
mirroring the JIC's wording, that `Russia is most unlikely to provoke war deliberately 
during the next few years, when the United States will be comparatively immune from 
Russian attack' and that, even `when the Russians are able to attack North America 
effectively, the ability of the United States to deliver a crippling attack on Russia will 
remain a powerful deterrent to the Soviet Government. 619 The subsequent statement by 
the Defence Policy Committee, which formed the basis upon which it was decided to 
proceed with a British hydrogen bomb, highlights how closely this intelligence 
appreciation was connected with the need to remain a `world power': 
we must strengthen our position and influence as a world power and maintain and consolidate 
our alliance with the United States. If we do so, it is reasonable to hope that major war may be 
averted, at any rate during the next four or five years, during which the United States will retain 
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their superiority in atomic weapons and will themselves be comparatively immune from 
attack. 620 
As well as seeing a major policy decision, ostensibly based on current nuclear 
intelligence, having to be taken during a period in which the atomic intelligence 
organisation was being modified, there also appears to have been a major re-analysis of 
the conclusions that intelligence had previously reached that viewed the Soviet nuclear 
capability even more pessimistically. The annual JIC review of the `Military and 
Economic strength of the USSR', issued in November 1954, had no estimate of the 
USSR nuclear programme as `a reassessment of Soviet potential is being made. '621 This 
appears to have been the result the American amendment, which had `more than 
doubled' previous estimates of Soviet uranium production in May 1954. From their 
studies of the fissile material being shipped from East Germany to the USSR the JIC 
would estimate in March 1955 that since 1946 `the production of East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia together has probably roughly equalled the total consumption, so that 
production from other areas has been available to build up a reserve. Consumption is 
now believed to be running parallel with total production, so that the reserve is no 
longer increasing. ' 622 From this, scientists were able to make an `assumption... of the 
stock of U233 which would, technically, balance the plutonium stock. '623 
By April 1955 another report on `Russian Research and Development' showed that the 
JIC still lacked a contribution on atomic energy and suggested that the re-assessment 
was particularly extensive to be taking so long. 624 There is evidence that this `re- 
assessment', perhaps also a result of the greater demand and closer scrutiny on atomic 
620 TNA, AB 129/69, C(54)250, 'Report by the Committee on Defence Policy', 24 July 1954 
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intelligence during the H-bomb decision, had led to questions about the accuracy of 
Welsh's assessments. In a note for the Prime Minister and Lord Cherwell in October 
1954 Brundrett informed them that the AEIC `has some doubts whether the picture is 
quite as black as is painted by Commander Welsh'. 625 
This picture unquestionably reflects the opinion of the Americans. Sir William Penney has been 
going over once again the analytical results of the British observations of these [latest Soviet] 
explosions and is tending to come to the conclusion that the Russian state of development is 
probably less advanced than we have been inclined to assume in the past 626 
However, the most important factor was the ongoing comparison with the US of 
estimates of uranium reaching the USSR. In May 1954, as discussed above, amidst 
reorganisation and the H-bomb decision the JIC stated that they had no figures for likely 
numbers of atomic bombs available to the USSR as the US had recently produced 
significantly higher estimates in their calculations on fissile material available to the 
USSR and the AEIC were in the process of reviewing the figures. 627 In June 1955, an 
updated version of the report reveals that the AEIC had, on the whole, accepted the US 
increase, but wished to qualify the reasons. Now they gave a total of 300 weapons likely 
to be available but qualified this by pointing out this the calculation was on the basis 
that all the USSR's `estimated fissile material was put into a single type of 30kt 
weapons'. 628 This yield was the lowest and therefore the lightest and most easily 
deliverable that the USSR was at that time believed capable of producing. The next full 
review, in July 1956, the JIC estimated that 500 20Kt weapons could already be 
available but acknowledged that further Soviet tests in the previous year had suggested 
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capability of both low and high-yield (megaton) weapons. 629 The reason for 
concentrating on the number of low-yield weapons the Soviet Union might have 
available was because it showed that the JIC considered there was `no reason why they 
should not design and construct a rocket or guided missile that could carry a nuclear 
warhead'. 630 
JIC assessments on Soviet warhead production, the numbers and yields they could 
achieve, had therefore altered more favourably towards the USSR in the period after the 
H-bomb decision. The reason why previous under-estimation, albeit to a limited degree, 
on this issue was not questioned at the time was that it had no longer become the central 
concern in estimating the Soviet threat. Atomic intelligence work on the types and 
numbers of nuclear weapons being produced by the Soviet Union was now only one 
aspect in JIC appreciations of the threat posed to Britain. As the decade progressed, the 
development, efficiency and vulnerability of delivery vehicles became more important. 
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Chapter Three: The Development of Guided Weapons, 1955-9 
Admiral Daniel's 1954 report had revealed how the emphasis of British intelligence 
requirements was changing in the middle of the decade: 
We now know that the Russians have carried out experimental explosions of conventional and 
advanced types. The Chiefs of Staff are therefore less interested in the scientific capabilities of 
the Russians in this field and far more than before in their production capacity of fissile material 
and in their capacity to develop and produce means of delivery of atomic weapons. Thus for the 
immediate future it may be more important for us to discover, for example, the guidance 
systems of Russian manned bombers or long-range unmanned vehicles than to find out anything 
more about their atomic weapons. 631 
British strategic planning during the early 1950s had been forced to resign itself to the 
fact that the USSR could inflict a devastating nuclear attack on the UK through standard 
heavy bomber delivery alone. The Soviet Long Range Air Force (LRAF) consisted 
largely of the turboprop Tupolev TU-95 (NATO designation `Bear') and the turbojet 
Myasishchev M-6 ('Bison' ). 632 The TU-20 entered service in 1956 and had an 
`immense range' of 14,800km whilst carrying at least three nuclear bombs. 633 It could 
target the UK with ease and the US at a more vulnerable altitude as seen in regular 
training missions in which pilots approached within eighty kilometres of the US and 
British coasts. 634 The M-6 was never produced in the quantities feared by the West and 
did not live up to its operational requirements in range and the size of the bomb bay but 
it still `caused much excitement in the United States and led to a great increase in the 
631 TNA, DEFE19/38. Daniel Report (Draft), paragraph 25 
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production rate of the B-52, '635 
Britain's own aircraft delivery force, the `V-bombers', was given added priority from 
1952.636 The force consisted of the Vickers-made `Valiant', the Avro `Vulcan' and the 
Handley Page `Victor'. 637 By 1958 the UK would have a strike force capable of 
targeting the USSR with both atomic (the `Blue Danube' and, interim, `Violet Club') 
and thermonuclear (the Yellow Sun Mk. l) bombs delivered by the growing V-Bomber 
force. It included `seven operational Valiant bomber squadrons... three operational 
Vulcan squadrons ... and two operational 
Victor squadrons. '638 However, as Tim 
Laming has argued, the pace of the arms race continued to put pressure on the UK's 
new strategic air capability. Though, the `RAF now possessed more destructive power 
than at any time in its distinguished history... improvements in Soviet defence 
technology meant that the V-Force could not stand still' 639 The V-bombers needed to 
be `capable - and seen to be capable - of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets' 
64° 
From the mid-1950s, as the V-bomber force built up its strength, UK intelligence would 
turn increasingly to concern itself with the Soviet development of guided weaponry. 
This focus would push British nuclear weapons policy towards re-consideration of the 
capability of aircraft as the delivery-vehicle of choice, and the options available to the 
UK. 
Intelligence on Guided Weaponry 
Guided missiles were also an area in which the extent of Anglo-American collaboration 
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on intelligence increased from 1954. At the second 'US/UK Conference on Guided 
Weapons' in November 1954 staffs from each country addressed questions such as 
whether the development of short and medium-range missiles continued `directly from 
the German work or in parallel' (on the latter point the UK acknowledged 
inconclusively that it could be either). TM1 There were some disagreements. The UK team 
did not agree with the US view that `full scale production of short and medium range 
missile probably will not be initiated until such time as the USSR estimates that 
improving Allied air defences pose a major threat to successful weapon delivery by 
manned aircraft. 642 A table compiled by the JIC comparing US and UK projected 
estimates of Soviet missile production shows that the UK believed the Soviets would by 




















1954 300-400 2,000 1-2 n. m. 350 n. m. 2,000 2 
1955 450 2,000 1 500 3,000 2.5 
1956 600 2,000 1 




1959 1,300 3,000 3-4 




In their introduction to this assessment the JIC acknowledge, once again, that the 
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`amount of direct evidence' on which the figures were based was `extremely limited. '645 
They also accounted for the differences, explaining that they were `primarily due to 
differences in approach, scope and terminology', but that `in spite of this... the 
respective estimates of the threat are very close. M6 Close they may have been, yet the 
exact nature of the `approach' reveals how a relatively small modification in calculation 
method, rather than separate sources of intelligence, could lead to much wider disparity 
in their respective stance on the threat posed: 
The dates given in the U. S. brief are the estimated earliest dates at which small quantities of 
missiles could have been produced and placed in the hands of one operational unit, thus 
constituting a limited capability for operational employment... The dates given in the U. K. brief 
are the estimated earliest dates at which sufficient quantities of missiles could have been 
produced and deployed operationally on a scale to meet the estimated military requirement' 7 
Despite these differences the JIC argued that the value of this forum demanded future 
conferences be more frequent and allow more time in order to `cover the ground 
properly. '648 By 1956 views of Soviet scientific and technological capability were more 
favourable. Their review of Soviet R and D in 1955 the JIC admitted that they knew of 
no reason why the Russians should not design warheads of any of the types that we 
think are practicable. ' 
649 
Scientific and technical intelligence, not Welsh's unit, dealt with guided weapons, their 
propulsion, electronic components and guidance systems. Combining this analysis with 
the intelligence on nuclear warhead development was a problem that was not resolved 
by Daniel. The JIC looked for a solution in September 1954 when they established a 
645 Ibid. 
646 Ibid. 




We have no evidence on the production of guided weapons in the USSR for operational use, nor 
do we know the Soviet's intentions in this field. This lack of evidence together with the known 
extensive research and development programme suggests that rather than having produced 
German wartime weapons in quantity, the USSR has in hand a programme of development and 
production of missiles whose performance would exceed that of the German weapons. 655 
Intelligence on guided missile development was gathered from the various data that 
accompanied Soviet missile test launches, including communication signals before, 
after and during tests and the radio-telemetry and other non-communication signals for 
missile guidance and tracking during the launches. The collection of signals intelligence 
generally had been divided geographically between British and American spheres of 
influence in the 1948 UKUSA agreement. 656 GCHQ establishments in `Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Ceylon the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and on the east coast of Africa', 
places where the US struggled with permission to construct facilities, allowed Britain to 
derive `substantial yet discreet advantage', from UKUSA. 657 As with the joint Anglo- 
American collection of samples from Soviet nuclear test explosions, those bases close to 
areas of Soviet missile testing were able to monitor guided weapon activity. Intelligence 
also came from increased radar coverage from the British and American bases near the 
border of the USSR, particularly Turkey. 658 By measuring the amount of microwaves 
reflected, known as a radar cross-section, scientists could establish the size of an object. 
The increased coverage and signal strength made it was becoming possible to judge the 
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speed and height of the targets and therefore some indications of the types of 
missiles. 
659 
More recently it has become clear that the collection of signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
and electronic intelligence (ELINT) from missile testing was also undertaken by 
increasing numbers of British and American submarines. 660 In 1949, an American 
submarine, the Cochino, had been sent out to monitor communications between the 
Soviet code rooms and communication centres based at Polyarnny, on the Kola 
Peninsula. 661 Whilst the technology and the submarines themselves improved greatly 
during the 1950s, the operations and methods of data collection that would subsequently 
be replicated in numerous British and American missions were demonstrated in this 
early submarine reconnaissance. The submarine had been fitted with a piece of 
equipment `built to capture the radio signals that the Soviets would have to use to send 
telemetry instructions to any missiles they were trying to test'. 662 
Standing but two and a half feet tall, [this] box was designed to record signals on slivers of wire 
tape, and it was probably the most sensitive and secret device on Cochino. The line from that 
box would run up through the hull and connect to new "ears" placed on the side of the sub's 
sail 663 
The combined collection of intelligence from signals, radio-telemetry, and radar from 
ground bases, submarines and aerial reconnaissance on the edge of the USSR, as well as 
the evidence from German scientists, had revealed some of the sites of the Soviet 
missile work, including the testing site at Kasputin Yar, east of Stalingrad . Detail on 
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Espionage, (London: Arrow Books, 1998) The authors, American investigative journalists, gathered 
much of their new evidence from interviewing former submariners who participated in these operations; 
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the types and success of missiles being launched there was also collected but such 
evidence could provoke as many questions as answers. The great secrecy of life behind 
the Iron Curtain, and difficulty for western intelligence in penetrating it, led to some of 
the most hazardous intelligence operations of the Cold War, sending planes high over 
the USSR with all manner of technological devices to record, sample and photograph a 
variety of military targets. 664 Bob Amory, Deputy Director of Intelligence at the CIA, 
later described the priority for aerial reconnaissance of the site: 
When we first heard of the Russian missile centre in 1952, or about then, at Kasputin Yar on the 
Volga, we demanded that we get photographs of it. `We just can't ignore it. This is going to be a 
major new thing, this whole missile development, and we've got to get on top of it in the 
beginning and judge it'... The RAF actually did it for us with the Canberra all the way from 
Germany to the Volga and down into Persia, a risky thing but they got some fair pictures... But 
the British said: `God, never again', so to speak. The whole of Russia had been alerted to the 
thing, and it damn near created a major international incident. But it never made the papers. 665 
Aerial reconnaissance, including both overflights and ELINT and SIGINT collection 
from flights on the periphery of the USSR, had been underway for some years by both 
the British and Americans. By the mid-1950s, the development of the American U-2 
(from the code-name `Utility') marked a new phase in this collection method. 666 The 
single-engined, unarmed U-2 plane could reach heights in excess of 70,000ft, high 
enough to avoid the most advanced Soviet anti-aircraft missiles and fighter planes of the 
era. 667 The first twenty came into operation, under CIA auspices rather than the USAF, 
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in early 1956.668 One of the most crucial effect of the U-2 missions before Sputnik was 
in undermining the fears that had developed in the US about a possible `bomber gap' 
favouring the USSR. 669 In July 1956 one of the first U-2 flights travelled over `the 
Ramenskaya airfield... saw the airplanes that they had... saw these `Bison' bombers 
down there... and there weren't that many'. 670 
However, manned-overflights were also risky, not least because of the political 
ramifications of them being shot-down. Prime Minister Anthony Eden's agreement to 
the use of UK bases to fly the missions, known as Operation Aquatone, had been cut 
before they began because of a different intelligence-related political crisis. 671 The 
discovery of the body of M16 frogman, Commander `Buster' Crabb, after what appears 
to have been a bungled surveillance job on a visiting Soviet warship, led to a 
curtailment of sensitive intelligence operations by Eden. 
672 The American U-2s, 
Detachment-A, transferred to the US base at Wiesbaden in Germany. Despite their 
fame, only twenty-four U-2 overflights of the USSR itself occurred between 1956 and 
1960, the majority between 1957 and 1958. When they did they had to `cram as many 
targets as possible into each flight' because, by the time the U-2 missions started, `the 
intelligence community had a huge list of aerial reconnaissance targets behind the Iron 
Curtain. ' 673 
Richard Bissell, the CIA Director of Plans, had encouraged the training of British U-2 
crews to increase the number of operations and allow alternative consent to come 
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through the British Prime Minister. 674 The British U-2 flights, from the US Incirlik base 
in Turkey where the US Detachment-B was located, were codenamed 'Oldster'. 
675 
Officially, they were `temporary employees of the Meteorological Office in London', a 
continuation of the cover story given for the first U-2 squadron, originally based at RAF 
Lakenheath, as the `Weather Reconnaissance Squadron'. 676 According to one of the 
British U-2 pilots interviewed by Paul Lashmar `American intelligence always knew in 
advance when the Soviets were about to launch a test missile. '677 This was achieved 
through the interception,, Soviet communications from bases in Turkey. The US radar 
installation there, the `world's largest and most powerful operational radar', also 
monitored the launches at Kap h,. Yar. 
678 A U-2 `loaded with special electronic 
listening and telemetry devices was always on alert. '679 It would be sent up in advance 
of the test and would usually fly along the border of the USSR, capable of collecting 
masses of data from test sites hundreds of miles away. Over-flights of the USSR itself 
were much more limited. 
Changes to the intelligence structure and the 1957 Defence White Paper 
The failed Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of the Suez canal zone in November 1956 has 
been seen as a `turning point' in post-war British history and a `flash of lightning' 
illuminating Britain's true standing in the world, particularly in relation to the US Ego 
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Suez marked a watershed in many aspects of British policy, not least, as will be seen, 
through renewed endeavours in Anglo-American nuclear sharing and a major rethink of 
British defence policy that would see increased reliance upon the nuclear deterrent. It, 
and the simultaneous crisis that led to invasion of Hungary by Soviet troops, was also 
important in highlighting the deficiencies of the intelligence organisation. Herman has 
written that the Suez and Hungary crises `tested' the committee in a way it had not been 
in its postwar manifestation. 681 
Under a powerful and influential chairman, Patrick Dean, there was, in January 1957, a 
general mood in favour of learning the `lessons of Suez'. 
682 The consequent November 
1957 `re-subordination' of the JIC to the Cabinet Office was, to a degree, a `useful 
tidying up' exercise that built upon more organic changes that had been occurring to the 
remit of the JIC throughout the 1950s. 683 By 1955, the dominance of military 
representation on the committee was well balanced by the influence of the Foreign 
Office chairman, Dean. 684 Indeed, before the centralisation and expansion of the 
Ministry of Defence in 1964 brought service intelligence organisations together as the 
Defence Intelligence Staff (see chapter four), the `only way any agreed tri-service view 
could be produced was via the JIC', which remained a `device for knocking senior 
armed forces' heads together'. 685 
Even before the JIC discussions on their own future were fully underway, the 
committee were already examining yet again their role in the tricky area of nuclear 
intelligence. At their meeting of 22 January 1957, the Chiefs of Staff Committee had 
before them a memorandum by Directors of Intelligence `concerning certain proposals 
681 Herman, Intelligence Services, p. 112 
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for the organisation of Atomic Energy Intelligence'. 686 Although the original 
memorandum is still withheld in the files of the JIC Secretary687, the Chiefs revealed the 
core proposals as they considered them `one by one'. 688 The explicit reason for their 
review was that the recommendations of Admiral Daniel in 1954 had been envisaged as 
temporary, and the file implies that the Directors had recently remembered this. 689 Yet 
the course of the debate reveals that economic reasons for centralisation were also a 
strong factor. 
The simplest suggestion was to simply turn atomic intelligence over to the JIC. The 
AEIC `should disappear and its function should be taken over by the Joint Intelligence 
Committee with suitable scientific representation' "690 This `representation' would, they 
thought, merely require that the JIC should be `advised in the Atomic Intelligence field 
by a panel of scientists'. 691 In a sense this continued the habit of some years that 
scientific advice was provided both in ad hoc fashion and through the DSIJJTIC. But 
this was insufficient for this important subject and Sir Frederick Brundrett, Chief 
Scientific Advisor (CSA) to the Ministry of Defence, considered it necessary that 
scientific advice in this area be more formally recognised. 
The most significant change proposed at this meeting, however, concerned the future of 
the specialist unit that analysed scientific intelligence on the Soviet nuclear programme, 
the Technical Research Unit (TRU). It still existed in the same form as when it was run 
by Eric Welsh three years earlier. Sir Richard Powell, Permanent Secretary to the 
Ministry of Defence, having `spent some time on an investigation of T. R. U', provided a 
useful summary to the Chiefs of the unit as it stood in 1957. He described its function 
686 TNA, DEFE4/94, COSC(57)7t'Meeting, 22 January 1957 
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as only `to produce estimates of the output of fissile material which the Russians might 
have and as assessment of the kind of explosions they could carry out by analysis of 
their nuclear tests'. It `did not attempt to work out what sort of atomic weapons 
programme the Russians might have and in fact it was not competent to do so'. Despite 
some pressure for wholesale change, Powell `had formed the firm conviction that it 
should not be split but ought to be kept as a unit'. Instead, the JIC agreed with the 
Directors' memorandum that a section should be added to the JIB in order `to carry out 
assessments of the Russians' weapons programme'. 
692 Dean told them he was happy 
with this `so long as there were freedom of contact at all levels between the two 
organisations', 693 
Revealing a frustration with the status quo, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff 
(Intelligence), Air Vice-Marshal Bill MacDonald, argued `it was essential for the 
Service Ministries to have ready access to atomic intelligence'. Brundrett countered that 
, it would be no advantage to the service intelligence staffs to receive the detailed 
information on which the interpretation of the atomic intelligence gained was based. '694 
The record does not specify, but it seems possible that MacDonald felt the interpretation 
of intelligence his department received from the TRU lacked detail and thought the raw 
material might provide it. In fact intelligence at this time could not provide what was 
needed about actual numbers of nuclear weapons possessed by the USSR, only 
illustrative numbers and types, based on estimates of fissile material stocks and analysis 
of Soviet test explosions. 
The TRU was tasked to continue `collection and interpretation of scientific intelligence 





the JIB. To facilitate this, the TRU was to be located alongside the JIB `but not merged 
with it'. A new body in the JIB would `take over the function of collating all atomic 
intelligence' from the AEIC. 695 Robert Press continued heading what remained of the 
TRU. 696 The new Deputy Head of the TRU was Frank Panton, formerly an intelligence 
officer in Berlin working on Soviet uranium mining in East Germany. 697 
The job of establishing the future role of the JIB body appears to have fallen upon Eric 
Williams, Scientific Adviser (Intelligence) at the MOD, and Major-General Kenneth 
Strong, the Director of the JIB. These two, with Brundrett, were to work out the 
composition of this `new nuclear section of JIB'. 698 Strong was also to prepare its 
charter. When the Committee reconvened on the 24th January 1957 Williams cautioned 
against haste as he `was confident that a most satisfactory organisation could be built up 
at a steady pace, but we ought not to rush our fences'. 699 Strong, on the other hand, 
seems to have revelled in the growth of his domain. The results of his negotiations with 
Williams and Brundrett saw a new JIB assessment department. 70° This provided the JIB 
with much greater responsibility for the collation and assessment of intelligence on the 
nuclear threat. 
Under the new structure the `Division of Atomic Energy Intelligence' (DAEI) was now 
formally located within the JIB alongside the `Division of Scientific Intelligence' which 
had taken over the originally independent Directorate of Scientific Intelligence. 701 
Archie Potts was appointed head of the DAEI as Deputy Director for Atomic Energy, 
JIB. He had been involved in non-nuclear scientific work in the Air Ministry since 1939 
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as well as a period on the Defence Research Staff in the Ministry of Defence in the early 
1950s. 702 By October 1957, when reporting to the JIC on the progress of the move, Potts 
warned them that he `had made a fairly slow start, largely because of the difficulty of 
finding suitable staff. 703 
As the new organisations for nuclear intelligence were being constructed, consideration 
of the wider structure of British intelligence was also underway. 704 As a former JIC 
chairman, Percy Cradock, has written, by 1957 `the Committee had outgrown its old 
framework. '705 Its intelligence work `was now covering a variety of fields outside those 
purely military' and as such it required a wider customer base than to the Chiefs of 
Staff, specifically the Cabinet itself. 706 By the autumn of that year the JIC became a 
Cabinet Office body with a larger intelligence responsibility. A JIC internal history 
compiled for the move, in November 1957, provides a useful insight into the thinking 
behind the shift. 707 
In June 1957 it became apparent that, in the prevailing international conditions of competitive 
co-existence, intelligence had spread increasingly into the political, economic and scientific 
fields. The functions of the Joint Intelligence Committee covered a wide range of important 
topics concerning Soviet and Communist activities and other developments which threatened 
our national interest and security... Moreover, the constitutional limitation imposed on the Joint 
Intelligence Committee by having only one channel for reporting - i. e., to the Chiefs of Staff - 
was considered to be inconsistent with the broadened scope of intelligence. 08 
Whilst `prevailing international conditions', in particular the Suez and Hungary crises, 
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may well have been the guiding force, the move was apparent in the thinking of Dean 
far earlier than June. At the JIC's 7 February 1957 meeting, Dean `suggested that the 
Committee might like to discuss a letter which he had circulated personally to Directors 
[of the Agencies], which set out certain thoughts on the organisation of the Joint 
Intelligence machine. 1-709 Dean's original letter, dated 1 January 1957, initially 
suggested that the JIC should report to the Cabinet's Defence Committee, although 
Dean conceded this might not be an `adequate solution'. 710 After all, as was pointed out 
in debate during the JIC meeting, the most recent charter for the JIC, in 1955, had given 
them scope over `intelligence as a whole' not just defence. 711 Dean also revealed that 
one of his motives for this change was that he wanted more direct interaction with 
ministers as customers of intelligence, having felt the lack of this during Suez. 712 
At a special JIC meeting convened on 26 February 1957 to discuss the issue Dean stated 
he felt the point had been reached where the Committee `must either go forward or go 
back. '713 Prompted by the course of the debate, he suggested that the JIC become itself a 
Cabinet Office Committee, but have a special designation in order to continue to serve 
the Chiefs of Staff. 714 The secretariat would be integrated into the Cabinet Office's staff. 
A suggestion was made whereby the work could be split between two Joint Secretaries 
(Civil and Military) and divide reports to either COSC or the Cabinet Secretary but this 
was fairly swiftly rejected. 715 
Showing their awareness of the JIC's reliance on the co-operation of other departments, 
the Committee also pondered the need for a wider submission of material to the JIC, for 
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example from the Foreign Office, in order that the JIC not mirror the work of political 
departments. Such departments would still follow their normal process of submitting 
assessments to ministers but would also brief to the JIC so that their reports could be 
comprehensive. 716 Yet the JIC would continue to avoid stepping on the toes of other 
departments. In their final report outlining the proposed changes to the Chiefs of Staff, 
the JIC therefore took pains to reassure that they sought to `usefully supplement... not in 
general replace, the present system whereby Ministers are advised either by their own 
Departments or by the groups of officials from several Departments set up from time to 
time to deal with specific problems. '717 
In discussions on restructuring the atomic intelligence organisation it was also admitted 
that `there was no intelligence information on which estimates could be based of the use 
which Russia was making in her weapons programme of the fissile material 
available. '718 Co-ordination of intelligence on fissile production and the wider Soviet 
nuclear weapons programme had been given greater value both within Strong's 
organisation and in their representation in JIC Sub-Committee system. According to the 
November 1957 `History of the JIC', the DAEI (the JIB body) was responsible for the 
collation of `all intelligence on atomic energy and nuclear weapons, except for the 
collection and interpretation of intelligence on fissile material stocks and on Soviet 
nuclear explosions' which suggests its remit could expand to provide analysis of 
delivery systems. 719 In June 1958 there were moves towards giving the DAEI control of 
the nuclear detection monitoring stations, and therefore more of collation of intelligence 
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on fissile stocks and bomb design. 720 
The JIC had maintained a Guided Weapons Working Party (GWWP) since 1945.721 The 
November 1957 JIC History stated that since 1954 a further sub-committee on 
Intelligence on Nuclear Weapons (SCINW) had supplemented this, tasked to `survey 
the whole field of intelligence on nuclear weapons. '722 The role of the SCINW is less 
clear than the History implies, and the lack of documentary records from it makes it 
difficult to assess its importance, composition and remit. 723 What is clear is that in 1957 
the focus was providing forums to bring together the different bodies and individuals 
dealing with aspects of missile intelligence and to ensure this fed into the JIC work and 
was better co-ordinated with related nuclear intelligence work. According to Herman, 
who attended the GWWP in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the GCHQ representative, 
intelligence work on guided weapons was divided between development and 
deployment, the latter being more problematic. Development and testing was analysed 
by S15 (Scientific Intelligence 5), `a miscellaneous dozen under Colin Knight, part of 
the Scientific and Technical part of the JIB' that was worked alongside the three small 
service technical intelligence sections that also dealt with this subject. Herman has 
explained how this fed into the wider JIC structure and the problems it encountered: 
No-one knew which service was going to `possess' ICBMs... They all met in the Guided 
Weapons Working Party under Colin Knight. GWWP was subordinate to the STISC. The 
GWWP was an active talking shop, not an intelligence producer... The search for deployed 
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missiles was a prime concern... In practice S15 and Colin Knight... was the leading figure -a 
little like the wartime R. V. Jones... There was a regrettable conflict between the big battalions 
at GCHQ and the under-resourced underpaid London efforts amid the inter-service rivalry of 
nuclear politics, in which advertising was necessary for survival. 
24 
As will be seen, establishing deployment numbers and operational sites would remain 
problematic and a point of contention for the different bodies and service 
representatives in the GWWP into the early 1960s. It did, however, emphasise the 
growing importance of the JIB in Scientific and Technical Intelligence, now 
supplemented by the DAEI. The STISC was the only JIC Sub-Committee to meet `at 
regular intervals', once a fortnight. 725 
The November 1957 JIC History also explained that the SCINW and the STISC were to 
maintain a close working relationship through their composition. The Deputy Director 
(Scientific Intelligence) of the JIB chaired the STISC and the Head of the Atomic 
Energy Intelligence Division of the JIB chaired the SCINW. Each sat permanently on 
the other's committee specifically `in order to secure the maximum co-ordination in the 
field of guided weapons, scientific and electronic intelligence. ' 726 A final tie was the 
role of Scientific Advisor (Intelligence) who was to sit on both sub-committees and the 
JIC `when appropriate. ' 727 Thus the Deputy Director of (Scientific Intelligence) (DDSI), 
the Head of the DAEI and the SA(I) were to ensure this much needed `co-ordination' 
over a complex and multi-faced subject. 
The 1957 structural changes to the JIC represented a significant organisational event 
and recognition of the central role of intelligence in ministerial advice. This was 
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apparent in the subsequent November 1957 internal history of the JIC: 
The types of intelligence needed include political, economic, general, scientific, atomic, order of 
battle and other subjects... With [such a] large number of `contributors' in many parts of the 
world, there is a great risk of duplication of effort which must be avoided, if only in the interests 
of economy... there must be some central authority responsible for planning and co-ordinating 
the effort and giving it the strong impetus necessary for obtaining the required results. This 
central authority is the Joint Intelligence Committee. 
28 
The 1957 move did not have as great or immediate an impact as the creation of an 
Assessments Staff would in 1968. Nonetheless, the centralising effects and the 
increased potential use of intelligence by ministers would be important for the collation 
and dissemination of nuclear and guided weapons work. As Michael Herman has 
written, its Cabinet Office location meant that, in theory, `the Committee benefits from 
the central authority of the Cabinet Office and the role of the Cabinet Secretary. '729 But 
this is only part of the story, the sub-JIC work on guided missiles and the continuing ad 
hoc and overlapping arrangements for both this and for the still separate core of nuclear 
intelligence work showed the limits of the JIC's role. That role would increase in the 
next five years because of the changes put in place in 1957. 
At this time, and also partly a result of the post-Suez rethink, British defence policy was 
engaged in a major reformation under Minister of Defence Duncan Sandys. 730 The 1956 
Policy Review, which led to the 1957 White Paper, was well under way before Suez. 731 
Indeed, as Cecil James noted, when Duncan Sandys became Minister of Defence in 
728 Ibid. 
729 Herman, Intelligence Power, p. 271 
730 Defence: Outline of Future Policy, Cmnd. 124, (HMSO, April 1957); Commonly known as the Sandys 
Review; Martin S. Navias, "Vested Interests and Vanished Dreams': Duncan Sandys, the Chiefs of Staff 
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January 1957 the planned White Paper was `not only incomplete ... it was deemed to be 
defective in one essential respect', it had not taken the decision to end National Service, 
and the consequent loss to future manpower numbers, into account. 732 However, the 
White Paper will be most remembered for the degree to which it placed the future of 
Britain's defence in the hands of nuclear deterrence. It stated that `there is at present no 
means for providing adequate protection for the people of this country' against nuclear 
attack as `a proportion would inevitably get through [and even] if it were only a dozen, 
they could with megaton bombs inflict widespread devastation'. 733 
This makes it more than ever clear that the overriding consideration in all military planning 
must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for it... While comprehensive disarmament 
remains among the foremost objectives of British foreign policy, it is unhappily true that, 
pending international agreement, the only existing safeguard against major aggression is the 
power to threaten retaliation with nuclear weapons. 
34 
Michael Quinlan, later Permanent Under-secretary at the Ministry of Defence, recalled 
in 2007 his experience of the review: 
As I remember, we all hated it at the time -I was Ian Orr-Ewing's [Secretary of State for Air] 
Private Secretary ... It was not that [Sandys] suddenly elevated nuclear weapons in the sense of 
expanding the force or anything like that; he was under great economic pressure, with less 
money, and he left the nuclear force alone and cut the rest. It was not... an elevation except in a 
priority sense of what went out, and much as we hated it, I think he was probably very broadly 
right. 35 
Matthew Grant, who has examined the history of British civil defence in the nuclear 
732 Ibid., p. 47 
733 Defence: Outline of Future Policy, Cmnd 124, (HMSO, April 1957); Duncan Sandys, Minister of 
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age, has argued that the strategic justification for nuclear dependence was partly a 
justification of cuts and partly a realisation of the changed military priorities for the 
defence of the British mainland. Grant emphasised that Sandys allowed the cutting of 
British fighter forces by stressing that `there is no adequate defence against hydrogen 
bombs. '736 More immediately, and fortuitously, concern about the projected cuts in 
conventional forces was at least one of the factors in US motives for increased nuclear 
collaboration. 37 
Panton has recalled the importance of maintaining the status quo in Anglo-American 
relations in the attempts to change TRU's role: 
After Welch's [sic] death, proposals to dismember the unit gained force... At this time, another 
review of the TRU/TAL set-up finally decided [to] break it up, and to subsume TRU into DSI, 
leaving the clandestine work of TAL with M16. However, so as not to risk sending unhelpful 
signals to the US at a time when negotiations were, hopefully, proceeding towards conclusion of 
an agreement to provide for US/UK exchanges on nuclear warhead design information, action 
on... the demise of TRUTTAL was not taken. 
38 
In fact it was the pressure of a Soviet technological feat that would be the catalyst for a 
new era in the Anglo-American nuclear relationship. 
Sputnik and renewed Anglo-American collaboration 
By mid-1957 British and US intelligence were both much better informed about the 
Soviet nuclear programme than at the beginning of the decade, particularly from the 
many developing SIGINT, IMINT and ELINT methods. Nonetheless, US legislation 
still prevented the British hnd Americans working together as closely as the UK would 
736 Matthew Grant quoted in Ibid. See also, Matthew Grant, Civil Defence Policy in Cold War Britain, 
1945-68, (Unpublished PhD, Queen Mary, University of London, June 2006) 
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have liked. In April 1957 the JIC summarised how they saw the future importance of 
guided weapons to the Soviet Union. They argued that the USSR would `wish to 
destroy, at the outset, the Western bases in the United Kingdom and North-West 
Europe'. 739 This set the requirement for a' 600-700-mile rocket with a nuclear head 
with as high a yield as possible', a missile they classified as `the "surprise" weapon in 
the interim period, [which]... so long as the Satellites remain under Soviet control, will 
be capable of dealing with most of the NATO bases'. 
740 On the basis of this rationale 
they expected, `in view of the number and importance of the targets, that large numbers 
would be ordered 741 Specifically, a 600-mile missile was expected to have `completed 
trials by 1957 and be available for operations in 1958'. 742 In July 1957, however, in 
their `Six Monthly Intelligence Digest for Ministry of Supply', the JIC took a slightly 
different view arguing that, although `weapons of these ranges could be operational by 
1958, there is nothing to suggest that the firings reported are other than R. and D'. 743 
The requirement for ICBM capable of reaching the US was more tentatively 
approached: 
[T]he USSR regards the United States as her main enemy and will seek to provide herself with 
weapons to attack the American continent. Initially this attack can come from one-way missions 
of medium bomber (the TU-16 `Badger' jet) aircraft and from her limited heavy-bomber (Bison 
and Bear) force using flight refuelling. Therefore a priority requirement exists for the I. C. B. M. 
of range 3,500-5,000 miles. It is unlikely that very high accuracy will be possible and a high 
yield nuclear warhead will be a requirement 
744 
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The JIC acknowledged that they had no direct evidence on the USSR's likely ICBM 
programme. Their estimates on this and upon intermediate range missiles (IRBM) of 
around 1,600 miles were therefore extremely tentative. They posited that IRBM's could 
become available within the 1957-1961 period, but that ICBM's would probably not 
complete the test stage during this period, let alone become operational. 
745 
In 1956-7 the Soviet government had foregone their tendency towards suppressing 
sensitive scientific publication and provided their own public, and the West, with `much 
canvassed' announcements on USSR's project to launch `one or more scientific earth 
satellites. 746 UK intelligence knew from published information that the Soviet satellite 
was to be an aluminium sphere some 620 to 24 inches diameter and weighing about 
1001b', and therefore larger and heavier than the planned US satellite. 747 The Soviets 
had also revealed that it was `to occupy a polar orbit rather than an equatorial and to be 
somewhat further from the earth - in a 103-minute instead of 94-minute orbit. '748 
The satellite programme was viewed differently from the military ICBM programme. 
The JIC were able to provide the a fairly detailed analysis of the likely missile type 
necessary as a launch-vehicle, control and guidance requirements, possible launch sites 
and the implications for military programmes. On the last point, the relevant passage in 
the JIC's report emphasised that producing a successful orbiting missile did not in the 
short-term represent the achievement of an effective means of delivery for nuclear 
weapons: 
A satellite differs from a very-long-range missile in circling the globe a great number of times, 
before returning to earth (if it does this at all) in so imperceptible a spiral that any control or 
las Ibid. 




computation of the eventual point of impact is out of the question. 
49 
In the long-term, however, the significance of such an achievement, and the prestige it 
would afford the USSR, was accepted. The precision necessary to achieve orbit, the JIC 
warned, `coupled with the refinement of accuracy that may be expected at any rate from 
a second generation of long-range ballistic missiles, may eventually place a very 
effective cold war threat in the hands of Government of the USSR. Therein, we believe, 
lies the prime military significance of the first successful Soviet earth satellite. '750 From 
this the JIC were able to state that there is `no reason to suppose that the first launching 
might not be attempted early in the IGY [International Geophysical Year], i. e., Summer 
or Autumn 1957'. 751 
A 
Sputnik could not, when it was launched in August 1957, be described as "anethcr 
surprise to Western intelligence. 752 Nonetheless, it was to have an impact on wider 
public opinion and, particularly, on the fears of some parts of US intelligence and 
military, which was to bring British and American views of the Soviet Union into 
greater dispute than they had been for most of the previous decade. UK intelligence had 
not drastically underestimated the likelihood of this event before October 1957, and was 
conservative in what they thought the event implied about Soviet ICBM success. The 
unit in the JIB that covered missile development and testing, S15, was reluctant to refer 
to the Soviet missiles being tested at this time as ICBMs. 753 It is now known that the 
USSR's subsequent ICBM programme suffered major setbacks, which were somewhat 
masked by the stream of propaganda and claims of success by the Soviet leadership, 
749 Ibid., 
750 Ibid. 
751 Ibid., p. 51 
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especially the Soviet Premier Khrushchev. 754 Sputnik also highlighted the priority for 
intelligence to identify operational sites and deployment numbers, particularly on 
missiles capable of reaching the UK. 
Sputnik would also prove a significant stimulus in bringing about the longed-for 
comprehensive Anglo-American nuclear collaboration. As the world entered the missile 
age, UK nuclear weapons policy moved towards increasing interdependence with the 
US. Closely linked to the `independence' of the UK deterrent was the connection 
between intelligence and Anglo-American nuclear relations. British efforts in this 
sphere had actually been consistently sought by the UK, but not pressed, since the 
McMahon Act 11 years earlier. The Soviet technological feat was a catalyst, but more 
importantly it brought a political context in which both Macmillan and Eisenhower 
could press for greater co-operation. John Simpson that argued there is `little doubt that 
between 23-25 October 1957, spurred on by the "peaceful" Russian Sputnik, Macmillan 
and President Eisenhower forged the basis for the creation of a substantial stockpile of 
operational nuclear weapons in Britain at a reduced cost and a faster rate than would 
otherwise have been possible'. 755 Improved nuclear collaboration was not as complete, 
or `forged', in 1957 as Simpson suggests, but the period between the launch of Sputnik 
and the resumption of full Anglo-American nuclear collaboration in July 1958 saw 
greater concern over the pace of Soviet nuclear weapons development. Intelligence was 
front and centre in this debate. 
As Panton explained, any termination of TRU/TAL had been postponed until after `the 
conclusion of an agreement to provide for US/UK exchanges on nuclear warhead design 
information. ' 756 This agreement, described by Harold Macmillan in his memoirs as `the 
754 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, P. 534 
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756 Panton, 'Governments, Scientists', p. 2 
186 
great prize'757, was eventually achieved in July 1958 after Congress amended the 
McMahon Act to allow for it. From January 1957 the influence of Macmillan, thought 
Panton from the perspective of the TRU, `was absolutely instrumental in getting 
alongside Eisenhower'. 758 Macmillan's overtures to Eisenhower were aided by the 
extent to which Suez also motivated the American President to expand Anglo-American 
relations 759 A reversal of McMahon had been a British objective in one manner or 
another since it was passed and some leeway had been achieved through the 1948 
Modus Vivendi and agreements in 1951 and 1955.760 Yet fundamental areas of research 
such as nuclear submarine propulsion information and warhead design were still 
prohibited. It was the determined influence of Presidential power in the aftermath of 
Suez that `produced the conditions for a major surge forward in nuclear cooperation. 9761 
On 22 January, thirteen days after the resignation of Eden, Eisenhower sent an 
invitation to Macmillan for a bilateral conference at Bermuda in March. The scope of 
their talks was decided in a series of meeting between Sandys and his opposite number 
in Washington, Secretary of State for Defense, Charles Wilson. 62 The talks established 
a number of areas for increased nuclear collaboration including storing nuclear weapons 
on British bases, allocating American nuclear weapons to RAF bombers and greater 
targeting co-ordination between their respective nuclear commands. 763 The resultant 
March conference in Bermuda is most remembered, however, for the decision to site 
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American `Thor' IRBM's on the British mainland. The restrictions of American law 
meant many months of discussions about command and control. The warheads 
remained under American control, entailing the posting of US military to British bases, 
but the use of the missiles would require a joint UK-US decision. 764 The missiles were 
deployed in October 1958. 
In the year between the Suez crisis and the launch of Sputnik, there were, therefore, a 
number of developments and determined efforts that created the conditions for the 1958 
Agreement. 765 Yet, it was the launch of Sputnik in the autumn of 1957 that provided 
Eisenhower with the ammunition to `override congressional opposition and achieve the 
kind of nuclear partnership he had been advocating for some time. '766 Macmillan, 
supported by officials such as Plowden, Powell and Brundrett, went on an offensive. 767 
The Prime Minister wrote to President Eisenhower shortly after the Sputnik flight 
arguing that the event showed `clearly that the Russians have advanced much further 
than we had thought in the field of inter-continental ballistic missiles and that their 
achievements in association with their successful firings of large thermo-nuclear devices 
will enable them, in a very short space of time, to offer a direct nuclear threat to the 
whole of the free world. o768 Macmillan sought to restate the case for greater US-UK 
collaboration in the defence field. He wrote that the Soviet `success has no doubt been 
achieved by the creation and concentration of tremendous technological resources under 
the single direction that their form of government makes possible. '769 
7 Supply of Ballistic Missiles by the United States to the United Kingdom, Cmnd. 366 (HMSO, February 
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These resources may not be larger in total than those available to the West, but the free nations, 
and in particular the United States of America and the United Kingdom, who command the bulk 
of the free world's military and scientific effort, have so far very largely gone their own separate 
ways. The only way I can see in which we can increase our efforts quickly and restore the 
position is to return to that close integration of our efforts which brought us such striking 
success during the war. 770 
In America Sputnik was a greater shock to the public than the President and many of his 
advisers. 77' Macmillan travelled to Washington in October primarily to discuss Sputnik 
and restoring collaboration and saw the emotional impact of the Soviet success. He 
likened it to `something equivalent to Pearl Harbour' in his diaries, stating that `the 
American cocksureness is shaken. '772 The US now took the lead in moving towards 
collaboration, including plans to amend the McMahon Act. Macmillan recorded that he 
`could hardly believe my ears - such rapid progress, to be publicly announced. 773 
The way in which Sputnik impacted upon wider intelligence assessments of Soviet 
ICBM capability demonstrates the increasing sense of urgency surrounding the subject. 
The CIA, like the JIC, had been warning of the prospect of a Soviet satellite, but the 
reports of Soviet ICBM testing that preceded it `failed to make a big impact in 
Washington. '774 A March 1957 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) reported no `direct 
evidence that the USSR is developing an ICBM. '775 They had estimated that a few 
prototype missiles with a 5,500 NM [Nautical Miles776] range could be ready for 
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`operational use in 1960-1961. '777 By November, NIE 11-4-57 shows a post-Sputnik 
change: 
The probable Soviet firing of two ICBM test vehicles in the summer of 1957 and the successful 
Soviet launch of earth satellites attest both to the high capabilities of the USSR in long-range 
ballistic missile development and to the extremely high priority this program enjoys. In light of 
this and other new evidence, we have re-examined our previous estimate of Soviet ICBM 
development, and have tentatively advanced from 1960-61 to 1959 the probable date when a 
few (say, ten) prototype missiles of 5,500 nautical miles (n. m. ) range could first be available for 
operational use. 78 
There were still qualifications in the NIE that mass production was dependent upon the 
Soviets resolving technical problems believed to have troubled them during the summer 
1957 tests. 779 A lull in testing during the latter-half of 1958 led to the USAF producing a 
more pessimistic view that the USSR had fixed the difficulties and might shortly move 
into mass production. 780 This would form the basis of the `missile-gap', feared by the 
public and stressed by John F. Kennedy in his 1960s presidential election campaign. 781 
The JIC, like their US counterparts, appear to have been impressed in the short-term by 
Sputnik and concerned about the Soviet earth satellite and ICBM programme, but there 
was also great caution in attributing operational capability to a single technical 
achievement. In November 1957 the impact of Sputnik instigated a paper on the 
question "how is it that the USSR, which in 1945 was regarded, probably rightly, as 
scientifically relatively backward, has in so short a time been able to outstrip the West 
"7 Ibid. 
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in the most modem scientific developments? ' 082 The report, `Some Reasons for Soviet 
Technological Successes', gives a sense of the immediate urgency inspired by Sputnik: 
These spectacular successes come at a time when the United Kingdom, largely for lack of 
resources, is lagging far behind and when even from the United States, where the effort in the 
missile field has been far greater than in the United Kingdom, there have been reports of initial 
failures. 83 
The report concluded that Soviet success in this field was due to the ability of the Soviet 
government, `being completely autocratic', to prioritise, most likely to the detriment of 
other industries. 784 This meant that taken `as a whole Soviet industry thus presents a 
patchwork picture of strong contrasts, some of it extremely primitive, parts of it more 
advanced than the West. 785 
There was a sense of concern and urgency in Britain about the Soviet ICBM threat post- 
Sputnik. The sub-JIC organisation, bringing together Armed Forces, JIB, GCHQ and 
SIS opinions at the GWWP, the STISC and thence to the JIC, provided several forums 
for departmental disagreements. Colin Knight, who headed the S15 unit dealing with 
missile development in the JIB, led for the UK at CANUKUS (Canada, the UK and US) 
guided missile conferences and, as will be seen, was able to push his department's 
interpretation, that the success did not denote ICBM mass production. 786 On the whole 
UK intelligence sided with those in the US, such as the CIA, arguing that intelligence 
collected from the USSR's missile testing showed continuing problems of weight and 
accuracy in their guided weapon designs. The pooling of the results of intelligence 
collection meant that the UK provided an alternative analytical voice for US 
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assessment. It was a benefit that had repeatedly been stressed by the, more limited, 
collaboration in the collection and analysis of nuclear intelligence, and would be again 
in the wake of Sputnik. 
A final consideration in the move towards restoring Anglo-American nuclear 
collaboration was the degree to which Britain now felt able to bring something to the 
nuclear collaboration table. On 28 April 1958 Britain tested `Grapple Y', achieving an 
explosive yield of 3 megatons and Britain's second detonation of a thermonuclear bomb 
in the megaton range. 787 Importantly, with Grapple Y, Aldermaston `had demonstrated 
their ability to design and test an effective multi-megaton warhead with an enhanced 
thermonuclear yield and much less dependent on the fission components. This was 
without question successful hydrogen bomb. '788 
The successful Grapple tests had bestowed thermonuclear status on the British. Baylis 
sees this as having provided `further confirmation to those officials in the United States 
who wanted assurance that Britain had something to offer. '789 More than the H-bomb 
alone, the breadth and depth of British nuclear know-how was greater than many in the 
US expected . 
790 Panton has described how continuing `contacts between UK and US 
nuclear scientific communities... provided a valuable link in the lean time before the 
1958 agreement, which... helped to ensure that US nuclear scientists had had sufficient 
contact with their UK counterparts over the years to welcome deeper contacts with them 
787 Arnold, H-Bomb, p. 174 Appendix 2, pp. 234-5. Arnold gives Grapple Y as Britain's first 'true' H- 
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on device design. 9791 
On 30 June 1958 the US Congress passed the Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 
1946.792 It became law on 2 July and on the 3`a the US and UK signed a bilateral 
agreement `for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence 
Purposes'. 793 As well as exchanges of defence plans, personnel training and delivery 
system development, the Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) of 1958 was most 
significant in allowing for `the communication of information... necessary to improve 
... atomic weapon 
design, development and fabrication capability'. 794 It also reiterated 
the provision for collaboration on `the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies 
in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic 
energy. '795 It also authorised the `transfer by sale' to the UK `one complete submarine 
nuclear propulsion plant' and `such classified information as is necessary for the design, 
manufacture and operation' of the reactor. 
796 The following year, at Eisenhower's 
instigation, an amendment to the MDA provided for transmission of `non-nuclear parts' 
of the nuclear submarines system. 
The MDA truly was `one of the most remarkable agreements ever reached between two 
sovereign states. '797 The move towards interdependence with American nuclear 
weapons had begun. As Panton has pointed out, before 1958, Aldermaston had `a whole 
host of requirements' for various weapons for each of the services. After 1958, nuclear 
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weapon design moved to concentrate on two systems, Polaris, after 1963, and the 
WE 177 `Family of Free Fall weapons' for the Air Force and Navy. 798 William Penney 
informed Macmillan in 1959 that the outcome of the Agreement had meant that 
`weapons being produced for delivery to the Services [were]... virtually copies of tested 
United States designs. '799 
For Harold Macmillan, British nuclear policy and relationship with the United States 
were closely intertwined. Evidence of this was clearly laid-out than in the reasons he 
gave for Britain's nuclear capability in October 1958: 
To retain our special relation with the United States and, through it, our influence in world 
affairs... To make a definite, though limited, contribution to the total nuclear strength of the 
West... To enable us, by threatening to use our independent nuclear power, to secure United 
States co-operation in a situation in which their interests were less immediately threatened than 
our own... To make sure that, in a nuclear war, sufficient attention is given to certain Soviet 
targets which are of greater importance to us than to the United States. 800 
Macmillan saw the `independence' of the British nuclear force in terms of UK 
command and control and the increased deterrent value it afforded. He saw the growing 
`interdependency' of US assistance as a means to obtain this. 
Nuclear sufficiency and deterrence, 1958-60 
In 1957 and 1958 the main work of the TRU was still the scrutiny of Soviet nuclear 
trials. Analysis of these test explosions, according to the JIC, provided `evidence of 
interest in ground, air and underwater bursts' and revealed that `the pattern of testing is 
798 Panton, workshop, 27 March 2007. As well as those carried by the remaining V-Bombers, these 
included bombs carried by Navy Buccaneers and depth charges carried by helicopter 
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consistent with a programme of development of efficient warheads in a range of sizes 
and yields. 801 The operation that had brought so much intelligence on Soviet fissile 
material stocks, the joint Anglo-US Music programme, was no longer considered a top 
priority: 
by 1956/7 the UK was moving towards abandoning the Music programme, partly on the 
grounds of expense and also because estimates indicated that the USSR had by then enough 
Plutonium to have built a large enough stock of atomic weapons to demolish the UK. 802 
Its continuation reflected American wishes and the reluctance of the UK to undermine 
efforts in restoring collaboration. 803 Nevertheless, the JIC were increasingly warning 
their readers that the capability of the Soviet nuclear threat was no longer so contingent 
upon fissile stocks and the ability to produce a range of warheads. By February 1958 the 
JIC was able to state that the USSR had adequate fissile material to support their 
programme and produce warheads with a range of yields. 804 
Overflights of the USSR itself revealed more about the sites of interest and could help 
establish the scale of missile production and deployment. 805 From the combined aerial, 
sea and ground-based intelligence collection western intelligence was able to observe 
the increased ballistic missile testing at Ka et+n Yar during the summer of 1957 that 
preceded the Sputnik launch. 806 SIGINT also identified tests of ballistic missiles now 
launching further east, near Tashkent and referred to as `Tashkent 50'. A U-2 flight, 
with its improved camera facility, was sent to search the area for the new site and 
1958; Hennessy, Having It, pp. 467-8. I am grateful to Professor Hennessy for drawing my attention to 
this file. 
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photographed a `speck on the horizon', showing a `huge launchpad'. 
807 From this 
evidence US analysts were able to pinpoint the location of `Tashkent-50' as Tyuratam, 
west of the Aral Sea in present day Kazakhstan. 
808 
In June 1957 the U-2 was also used, with limited success, to photograph the impact site 
of the Tyuratam launches, the Kamchatka Peninsula on the far eastern coast of the 
USSR 809 The accumulation of evidence showed the Soviet missile work was `shifting 
into higher gear. ' 810 As well as studying the locations of missile testing and the 
preparation for individual tests, the overflights allowed Western intelligence a limited 
opportunity to search for sites of deployed missiles. However, by 1958 President 
Eisenhower was reluctant to authorise flights because of their political impact and the 
danger of them being shot-down. 811 In 1959, the pressure of increased USAF 
intelligence warnings about the Soviet ballistic missile threat put pressure on 
Eisenhower to reverse his position. Soviet claims of success in their ballistic missile 
work needed intelligence refutation. 
812 
In November 1958 Minister of Defence Duncan Sandys told the Cabinet's Defence 
Committee that current assessments of Soviet policy consistently argued that the USSR 
would not risk war if they did not think they could win it: 
It is inconceivable that the Russians would ever make an unprovoked, surprise attack on Britain, 
unless they were confident that they could simultaneously eliminate the strategic bases of the 
United States all round the world.... it is out of the question that the Russians could ever knock 
out American retaliatory power by an attack with manned aircraft. Therefore, for all practical 
B07 Ibid., p. 102 
sog Ibid. 
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811 Lashmar, Spy Flights, p. 148 
912 TNA, CAB 158/39, JIC(60)2, `Khrushchev's Statements of Strategic Attack Weapons', 29 January 
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196 
purposes, the possibility of any such attack can be ruled out until such time as the Russians have 
built up powerful long-range missile capacity. 813 
Consequently, the point at which the USSR might achieve nuclear sufficiency also 
represented the point at which the USSR could risk war. As Sandys also pointed out, the 
concept of nuclear sufficiency through long-range bombers was no longer considered 
applicable - they were too vulnerable to pre-emptive attack and problematic in terms of 
reaching the US mainland in numbers. Therefore, having based military planning on the 
assumption that the USSR would be in a position to wage war when sufficient warheads 
were obtained, thinking, including the JIC's, moved towards consideration of when the 
USSR would have sufficient and efficient delivery systems. 
This change can be seen in Sandys own words. A note by Sandys dated 14 November 
1957, a year before his comments to the Defence Committee, seems to represent an 
earlier draft of his comments quoted above. The subtle difference speaks volumes about 
the changing perspective underway in British military thinking. 
it is inconceivable that the Russians would make an unprovoked surprise attack upon the 
American air bases in the United States and around the world. In order to mount an air offensive 
of this magnitude and complexity large-scale preparations would be needed. 814 
Both drafts argue that any attack on Britain by the USSR was extremely unlikely whilst 
the US was capable of annihilating Russia in response. The difference in Sandys 
comments from 1958 is the degree to which the possibility of the USSR obtaining 
superior ballistic missile forces became the dominant consideration. Whilst the JIC and 
British intelligence could not accurately be accused of `missile-gap' exaggeration after 
813 TNA, CAB131/20, Cabinet: Defence Committee, Minutes, D(58), 14 November 1958 
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Sputnik, they were more conscious of the ballistic missile threat to the overall balance 
of nuclear forces and the priority that this question now held for future defence 
planning. 
It was only by the mid to late 1950s that the three countries who had achieved nuclear 
status - the Soviet Union, USSR, US and Britain - were actually in a position to be able 
to deliver those weapons in numbers that military planners considered anywhere near 
necessary to `win' in such an exchange. Peter Nailor, administrator in the 1960s for the 
MOD's Polaris Executive (responsible for seeing through Polaris development), 
described the pace of events in the late 1960s: 
The V-bombers free-fall [bomb] combination was a jolly good combination, but it was already 
obsolete almost before squadron service capability had been reached, and the question, the 
specific question for British defence planners. Was: what came next? ... [In] 1954-5 nobody 
thought would be an immediate problem. By 1957-8 it was already knocking on the door. 815 
By 1957-8 long-range bombers were still anticipated to be the main vehicle for 
delivering nuclear warheads in the event of war, but were not expected to be so for 
long. 816 In 1958 the JIC still believed the main form of a future Soviet attack against the 
UK was likely to consist of medium-range jet bombers (Badger) as the heavy bomber 
force (Bison and Bear) would be directed against North American continent. 817 Taking 
into account efficiency and the use of some aircraft on one-way missions to supplement 
the heavy bomber force, the JIC estimated in 1959 that some 300 aircraft might be 
815 Professor Peter Nailor, interview for BBC Radio 4 Analysis, 'A Bloody Union Jack on Top of It', 30 
March 1989; Hennessy, Muddling Through, p. 109 
816 TNA, PREM11/1192, Prime Minister; Correspondence and Papers, `Maximum Range of Valiant, 
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directed towards the UK. 818 
At the same time, though, the JIC were recommending a theoretical assumption of East- 
West parity in guided weapon production, believing it likely that the USSR would have 
`the ability, comparable with that of the West, to develop and produce guided weapons 
of any type. '819 Late in 1959, two years after the first Sputnik, the JIC considered the 
`launching of three Sputniks and three luniks [lunar orbiter and lander] evidence of 
considerable propulsion ability and sufficient to meet ICBM needs'. 
820 The JIC stressed 
that the views were not dependent on old sources: `Current intelligence continues to 
support the view that the USSR has a very large guided weapons' research and 
development programme. 821 Yet the way in which this was translated into estimates of 
operational readiness for Soviet nuclear forces show the degree to which the JIC had not 
over-reacted and maintained a sense of perspective. This was despite basing their 
forecasts, in part, on expected western missile development; a practice that the post- 
Sputnik re-appraisal, `Some Reasons for Soviet Technological Success', had argued 
was often misleading. 
In 1956, and before, mention of Soviet ICBM production in JIC reports had been mostly 
limited to imprecise conclusions often simply stating that they had no evidence and that 
any estimates were therefore based on western expectations. 
822 One of the few times at 
which a date does appear is in a 1956 JIC paper covering the 'US/UK Guided Weapons 
Intelligence Conference' from January of that year. It reveals how western intelligence 
viewed not only the prospect Sputnik, but also the test flights of ICBMs earlier in the 
818 TNA, CAB158/35, JIC(59)7, 'The Soviet Strategic Air Plan in the Early Stages of a Global War, 
1959-63' 
819 TNA, CAB158/31, JIC(58)1, `Periodic Intelligence Summary for NATO Commands', 23 September 
1958 
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summer of 1957. The paper concluded that there was `probably a [Soviet] requirement 
for an inter-continental ballistic missile ... and that this missile could complete 
its trial 
stage in 1960/61 at the earliest'. 
823 
For the two years after Sputnik, the JIC appears to have maintained the view, as S15 
argued, that the better-than-expected success of the USSR in this field only represented 
the `trial stage', and not operational capability, of the USSR's ICBM development. 
Colin Knight the Head of S15, the JIB unit dealing with missile development and 
testing, discouraged use of the term `ICBM' in descriptions of Soviet long-range 
missiles before 1961.824 In September 1958, with a year's reflection from Sputnik, the 
JIC estimated dates when limited numbers of prototype missiles would or were already 
available: 825 
Range Estimated 50% C. E. P. Date 
300nm 'h -lnm 1958 
650nm 1-2nm 1958 
1,600nm 2-3nm 1961 
5,500nm 3-5nm 1962 
The distance between the Soviet Union and the UK was that of intermediate range 
ballistic missiles (IRBM), which had roughly a 1,600km range. If the USSR placed 
rockets in its satellite states, particularly East Germany, the range was reduced to that of 
medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM). The JIC were warning of the threat to Britain 
from MRBMs before the Sputnik launch. In May 1957 the JIC had argued that `the 
822 TNA, CAB 158/24 and CAB158/25. The various JIC memorandums in these files mention this in some 
way 
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Russians have carried out extensive and successful research and development firings of 
ballistic missiles at ranges up to 650 nautical miles', the distance required to reach 
Britain if launch sites were placed in Eastern European Soviet satellite states. 826 
Although the JIC acknowledged that they did not know when the missiles would 
become fully functional, nor in what numbers they might be deployed, they were 
prepared to estimate that `the first units equipped with missiles to reach the U. K. could 
be operational in 1958. '827 
By September 1958, in accordance with their earlier judgement, the JIC concluded that 
a `large number of missiles have been fired to [MRBM] range and the largest missile 
shown on the 1957 Moscow Parade is estimated to have a range of about 700 nautical 
miles and may be the same weapon. For planning purposes, it should be assumed that 
this weapon is operational. '828 This missile, the R-5M (SS-3, NATO designation 
`Shyster') was indeed in service and had been, unbeknown to the JIC, since 1956.829 It 
was the first Soviet missile to carry a nuclear warhead (40kt), had a range of 1,200 km 
(approx 650nm) and was liquid fuelled. It was tested with a warhead in February 1956, 
launched from Kasputin Yar and detonating in an area near Lake Balkhash. 830 In fact, it 
was the very success of this missile in providing a capability of `striking targets in the 
nearby theaters of war' that allowed the USSR to concentrate `its efforts on the 
development of intercontinental missiles. '831 
The JIC also had no evidence of missile tests to the range of 1,600 nm needed `to cover 
825 TNA, CAB 158/31, JIC(58) 1, `Periodic Intelligence Summary for NATO Commands', 23 September 
1958 
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the NATO bases in Europe from within the USSR. s832 Discussing a 1949 Soviet 
requirement (put to the German engineers in the USSR who later returned to the West 
and reported such instructions) for a 1,600nm IRBM rocket, the JIC could only state 
that `no firings to this range have been reported. '833 A few months later they estimated it 
`could become available in 1961 and it will probably have a megaton warhead. ' 834 In 
fact, this weapon, the R-12 (SS-4 `Sandel') was commissioned after a number of 
successful test flights in 1957 and 1958.835 It did carry a 1MT warhead and, utilising 
storable fuel, was the first of the Soviet missiles to be capable of being launched `hot' 
from a silo as well as mobile launching units, with around 600 missiles eventually 
deployed. 836 In 1960 and 1961 the USSR was testing the more reliable R-14 (SS-5 
`Skean'). It had a range almost double that of the R-12, was quicker to launch and was 
subsequently in service, approximately 100 at its peak, from 1961 to 1983.837 The 
medium-range R-12 (SS-4) and the intermediate-range R-14 were the only operational 
deployed Soviet ballistic missiles, but they were capable of reaching targets almost 
anywhere in Western Europe in the early 1960s. 838 
Given the highly secretive nature of Soviet nuclear and missile programmes, and the 
difficulty of intelligence penetration of the USSR, one of the simplest sources of 
intelligence came from Western observers with cameras present at Soviet Military 
Parades. 839 The latest and most prestigious Soviet weapons were shown off, sometimes 
with the same missile or aircraft shown several times to give a false impression of the 
numbers available. The difficulties in obtaining sources of information made such 
832 TNA, CAB 158/31, JIC(58)1, `Periodic Intelligence Summary for NATO Commands', 23 September 
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visual evidence appealing to western intelligence. However, the propaganda value of 
these displays masked the actual progress of the Soviet designs. The expense and effort 
invested by the USSR in research and development did not imply effective capability. 
Rather it showed the Soviets as vulnerable to costly and time-consuming design 
problems as the British were to experience over the Blue Streak and Skybolt 
programmes. 840 This was exactly what occurred in the USSR's ICBM programme at 
this time. 
The intercontinental rocket of which the West had heard so much during the summer, 
the massive SS-6 ('Sapwood') (official Soviet designation `R-7' or `8-K-3'), was far 
from successful. The initial tests in August 1957 were discussed in JIC reports based on 
radio-telemetry collected during the tests and certainly suggested a successful and 
threatening weapon. As well as being used as the launch vehicle for Sputnik it may well 
have been the delivery vehicle for a nuclear test conducted at the Novaya Zemlya Test 
Range on 6 October 1957 that achieved a 2.9-megaton yield. 
The JIC did know that success in launching such a beast (the SS-6 carried a heavy 
10,000 lb. three-megaton warhead, combined with the massive 200 tonnes of fuel 
necessary for intercontinental range) was a long way from achieving operational status. 
They warned in September 1958 that although the tests `demonstrated an appropriate 
propulsion capability' this did not necessarily mean `the solving of the re-entry 
problem. '841 The JIC concluded that these difficulties would delay the availability of 
such a rocket until 1962 but it would have be accurate to `better than 1/500 of the 
839 TNA, CAB158/31, JIC(58)1, `Periodic Intelligence Summary for NATO Commands', 23 September 
1958 




range. '842 In fact, the SS-6 was operational by 1959, but the problems were much 
greater than the JIC thought at the time. Not only was the CEP more like 8km, the use 
of cryogenic fuel entailed a poor reaction time. It was too large to be put in an existing 
silo and, therefore, more vulnerable; and it had unreliable electronics. 843 Despite the 
`major psychological impact' of `such a powerful launch vehicle' only `fours SS-6s 
were ever deployed operationally as ICBMs. '844 
The discrepancy between the actual performance and production of the SS-6 and JIC 
intelligence assessments highlights the difficulty pre-1961, in estimating deployment 
numbers. UK intelligence, in concert with the US, was able to monitor and amass 
evidence on the patterns and results Soviet missile testing through ground-based, 
aircraft and submarine collection. The interception of radio-telemetry from the missiles 
in flight very gradually enabled estimates of the character and performance of the 
missiles to be produced. Whilst overflights also brought some imagery on deployment 
patterns and operational sites, their coverage was extremely limited given the size of the 
USSR landmass and the hazards of such flights. The problem remained that estimates of 
the likely eventual operational quantities of such missiles were often dependent upon 
guesswork and little intelligence could be gathered on deployment. The urgent question 
by 1960 was, therefore, did the deployment missiles `exist, well hidden, or did they not 
yet exist'. 845 
Between 1957 and 1960 the JIC were consistently reminding their readers that the 
USSR was not at that time in a position to rely on guided weapons in a nuclear 
exchange and that US and British nuclear forces remained sufficiently numerous to 
continue to act as a deterrent. They did, however, acknowledge that by 1962, with the 
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increasing deployment of ballistic missiles, this position would begin to change. The 
intelligence assessments implied that the years 1960 to 1962 would see the increasing 
vulnerability of the UK V-bombers to pre-emptive strike and a corresponding reduction 
in their deterrent credibility as a guaranteed retaliatory `second strike'. The threat that 
the UK now faced was clearly set-out for Ministers in the JIC's 1959 paper on `The 
Soviet Strategic Air Plan in the Early Stages of Global War, 1959-63': 
The Soviet Union now has the capability to mount large-scale attacks covering all the major 
targets in the United Kingdom using her medium jet bombers supplemented by short-range 
ballistic missiles. Intermediate-range missiles are expected to become available in 1961, but 
aircraft will be the instrument for precision attacks throughout the period. 
846 
In planning for the form a future war with the USSR might take, the JIC admitted they 
had `insufficient evidence to produce a scientific `order of battle' but we know of some 
of the more important research and development establishments concerned in missile 
guidance and control, airframe development and rocket motor developments. '847 
However, `in spite of a growing accumulation of evidence of test firings of guided 
weapons in various classes... [the JIC still did not] know where these, or weapons for 
operational use, are being manufactured. ' 848 They continued to lack `evidence of where 
the major research and development establishments are located. '849 Although the JIC 
could not determine that Surface to Surface Guided Weapons (SSGW) had been 
introduced in satellite countries they feared `that the 300 and 650-nautical mile missiles 
could be based in the USSR and moved to previously surveyed firing points with little 
845 Michael Herman, email correspondence, 21 June 2008 
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or no warning. '850 
The requirement for intelligence on missile deployment put pressure on intelligence 
collection. The 1 May 1960 flight piloted by Gary Powers resulted from a CIA 
requirement to verify information it had received about `a major ICBM facility at 
Plesetsk in the north of the USSR. '851 It was last of the limited number of flights that 
had been authorised by a reluctant Eisenhower and `the longest and most daring U-2 
mission yet attempted. '852 It also took place on one of the most prestigious Soviet 
holidays, when there was little other military traffic in the skies, and a couple of weeks 
before a four-power summit due to take place in Paris. 853 Powers was to traverse `the 
whole of the Soviet Union from Peshawar in Pakistan to Bodo in Norway', but was shot 
down, along with a Soviet MIG plane, by one of the Surface-to-Air missiles (SAM) 
frantically launched by the Soviets. 854 He survived and the aircraft's remains were taken 
away for examination and its photographs developed. Khrushchev revealed their 
possession of the U-2, but not initially its pilot, four days later, leading to a diplomatic 
crisis an the breakdown of the Paris summit. 
855 The impact of the event led to the 
breakdown of the Paris Summit and a worsening of East-West relations at a time when 
the question of the future of divided Germany was putting pressure on all sides. 856 The 
decision to risk the flight demonstrates the degree to which western intelligence was 
desperate for a greater insight into Soviet missile deployment. Missile development 
would also, in the early 1960s, put increasing pressure on ministers in decisions on the 
future of the British nuclear deterrent. 
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Chanter Four: The `Independent' British deterrent, 1960-4 
According to Labour's Shadow Defence spokesman, George Brown, in the April 1960 
House of Commons debate on the cancellation of the British-designed Blue Streak 
rocket, the progress of the Soviet missile programme was a fundamental aspect of 
British defence decisions: 
I believe that throughout 1958 the evidence in favour of the rockets being mobile, if we were to 
have them, and in favour of them being solid fuel rather than liquid fuel, grew and grew, as did 
the evidence of the accuracy of Russian rocketry... It is absurd of Ministers to claim that the 
doubts and dangers became apparent only very recently... I rather gained the impression that the 
decision had been taken as soon as their intelligence warned them of Russian rocketry advance 
and of the general vulnerability of fixed-site rockets and of the practicability, to use the 
Minister's words, of delivering from a moving platform. 
857 
Three years later, in debate on an agreement to purchase the American submarine-based 
Polaris system, frustration boiled over about Brown's references to the `advice' that he 
had received. 858 In January 1963 Peter Thorneycroft, Minister of Defence, complained 
to the House of Commons that Brown `made great play of talking about high military 
sources of a somewhat mythical character who were said to communicate to him views 
utterly different from the military advice which is advanced to the Government. '859 
860 Thorneycroft's own reference to the views of his own advisers was not well received. 
It went contrary to the usual practice of ministerial responsibility and the protection of 
the anonymity and independence of such counsel. This was especially true of 
intelligence. Yet, the course of the two debates, on Blue Streak and Polaris, both hinted 
957 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 622,27 April 1960, Col. 220-221 
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at the central role intelligence had played in controversial defence decisions. As the 
pressure for information about the USSR's air defences and missile development gained 
new urgency, Western intelligence benefited from extraordinary new collection 
opportunities. In particular, the advent of American satellite imagery transformed 
understanding of Soviet progress and deployment. British access to it marked a 
highpoint in the Anglo-American intelligence relationship. At the same time, the UK 
moved towards ever-greater access to US nuclear technology and know-how. 
Soviet air defence and Blue Streak 
On 7 June 1959 Macmillan held a meeting of top officials at Chequers to initiate a 
wholesale analysis of `Future British Policy'. 
861 The review was to be chaired by Dean, 
the JIC Chairman. 
The first part would try to assess `The Setting' - what is likely to happen in the world during the 
next 10 years. The second part wd deal with 'U. K. 's resources'... The third part would be about 
`The Objectives'... It is hoped to do the job in 3 or 4 months. 862 
The official record of the meeting shows that nuclear weapons policy was to have a 
central place. 863 The issue of the possible suspension of nuclear tests, and no doubt the 
experience of the previous year, had an impact. One of the questions to be addressed 
concerned `the effects of discontinuance of nuclear tests' upon British nuclear weapons 
research as well as the future policies of the US and USSR. SM It also sought to ascertain 
the rationale behind British deterrence. Another question posed, therefore, was the 
effect of `the achievement of nuclear sufficiency? If (a) the Soviet Union and (b) the 
860 Ibid., Col. 1157 
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Western Powers acquire so great a nuclear capacity that each side is afraid to attack the 
other, by what means do we maintain this balance of tensions? '865 The study, under 
Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook, was to consider what function the future British 
nuclear deterrent should consequently assume. 
In those circumstances should we still need to make an independent contribution to the Western 
deterrent? If so, what form should it take ... Alternatively, should we need a greater degree of 
interdependence in this field? 
The Chiefs of Staff, therefore, began their own examination of Britain's `possible future 
nuclear deterrent weapon system'. 866 This would be undertaken by the British Nuclear 
Deterrent Study Group (BNDSG); a Chiefs of Staff body bringing together the military, 
scientific and political strands. 867The BNDSG began work in June 1959 and reported in 
February 1960. The group was effectively `acting as a sub-committee of Sir Norman 
Brook's Future Policy Committee', but it's `crucial' interim report at the end of 1959 
would form the basis for the cancellation of Blue Streak. 868 
The rethink was also apparent in JIC work. In November 1959 they responded to a 
specific request made by Duncan Sandys, prior to his being succeeded by Harold 
Watkinson in the 14 October reshuffle. The resultant paper examined `the probable 
course of global war in the period 1965-70, in Europe and at sea, after an exchange of 
nuclear bombardments, between the Soviet Union and the West'. 869 The `particular 
points raised by the (former) Minister of Defence' meant that the JIC had limited their 
965 Ibid 
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scope to `the assumption that a full-scale nuclear exchange has taken place. '870 They 
also justified this approach by pointing out that it was their `first attempt to forecast the 
course of a war between the Soviet Union and the West in a predominantly missile age' 
and that `a restricted study of this sort may be helpful in many future studies. '871 The 
last point shows the JIC's role in the wider studies both by the Chiefs of Staff and 
`Future British Policy' group. 
The JIC, in their report, went on to examine the likely effect of such a war upon the UK, 
having first qualified their conclusions further by explaining that they had `been able to 
consider the effects of the nuclear exchange in very broad terms only. '872 Their 
judgment was severe and concise: 
The United Kingdom would be completely devastated and the majority of the population 
killed. 873 
The necessity for UK policy to focus upon the prevention of nuclear war could not have 
been starker. The question that followed, also prompted by the wider study but one to 
which the JIC had been addressing themselves annually for some years, was the 
likelihood of war. The JIC's yearly report on such was examined by the Chiefs of Staff 
and approved for dissemination to Ministers on 17 December 1959.874 When it appeared 
on the 1 January 1960, it repeated the assurance that the USSR was `unlikely to start a 
global war as a deliberate act of policy', although there were dangers of 
`miscalculation'. 875 They concluded, in line with earlier assessments, that, 
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chance of destroying such a large proportion of the western nuclear strike force before it could 
be launched, that the Soviet Union would not herself suffer very serious damage in 
retaliation. 876 
Thus Western nuclear forces did on the whole, the JIC concluded, constitute a sufficient 
deterrent. Yet this did not apply to the British nuclear strategic forces independently of 
the US. The general acceptance that the USSR could easily destroy much of the British 
Isles had led to the conclusion that the only deterrence to a Soviet nuclear strike was the 
ability to strike back. This made the implications of Soviet anti-aircraft defences to the 
UK's strike force far more acute, particularly the development of Surface-to-Air Missile 
(SAM) systems able to target incoming aircraft. In 1958, JIC estimates were warning 
about the rapid and apparently successful development of a new level of defence: 
During the Anniversary parade in Moscow on 7th November, 1957, a surface-to-air guided 
weapon [SAGW] and two types of surface-to-surface ballistic rockets were displayed for the 
first time. It must, therefore, be concluded that considerable manufacture was taking place. 877 
The missiles were codenamed `Guideline', part of the S-75 system, given the 
designation SA-2 in the West. It was the second major SAM anti-aircraft system, 
following on from SA-1, and began in development in 1954. It was deployed 
extensively after successful tests in 1957, but improvements to associated missiles had 
already begun before it was commissioned. 878 By 1959, the system, the updated version 
known in the West as the SA-2 `Desna', was equipped with a new V-755 missile, 
capable of interception at a longer range and lower altitude than the first SA-2 
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876 Ibid. 
87 TNA, CAB 158/31, JIC(58)1, `Periodic Intelligence Summary for NATO Commands', 23 September 
1958 
878 Podvig, Russian Strategic, pp. 404-5 
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system. 879 At the upper end of the scale it was now capable of targeting aircraft at 
heights of up to 30,000 meters. The JIC's assessment of it reflected the degree of access 
Western observers had to the deployment sites and sightings of the associated 
interceptors at military parades such as the one on 7 November 1957: 
General details of the weapon system are known and fairly conclusive evidence is available of 
the system performance... It is considered that the complete system, comprising about 57 sites 
is now operational. "' 
Analysis of SAM defences was part of the JIB's remit but was also undertaken by the 
Air Ministry. The JIC 1960 report on Soviet Air Defence was intended as a `general 
guide to the subject'. Any requirement for more information for `detailed planning 
purposes' was to be directed towards the `appropriate intelligence department', the 
relevant civilian and military experts in the JIB and Air Intelligence Staff. 
881 The 
paper's conclusions had direct ramifications for the UK's present and planned nuclear 
deterrence force, especially the option of a `stand-off Air to Surface Guided Weapon 
(ASGW) delivered by the V-bombers: 
All major targets will be defended by SAGW [Surface-to-Air Guided Weapon]... By the end of 
1962, it is estimates that as well as an improved capability against ASGW at ranges of 30-50 n. 
miles, sites could have a range of 80-100 n. miles against aircraft flying at Mach=2 and 70,000 
ft. under non jamming conditions. The capability against ASGW would be dependent on the 
type of warhead used, the efficient operation of the overall early warning and control 
organisation, freedom from ECM [Electronic Counter Measures] and a simple attack plan, i. e., 
one which did not attempt a saturation technique. 82 
The SA-2 developments, and the intelligence that told of them, were central to the 
879 Ibid. 
SBO TNA, CAB 158/39, JIC(60)8, `The Air Defence of the Soviet Union up to 1964', 24 February 1960 
881 Ibid. 
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growing pessimism about the future of the high-level V-bomber strategic strike force. 
The Valiants had to be modified, soon after their deployment, from their initial optimal 
bombing height of nearly 40,000 feet to a low-level approach as Soviet air defences 
rapidly improved with the SA-2 system. 
883 This in turn affected the Valiant's fuel 
consumption and range, limiting the targets it had originally been designed to meet. The 
SA-2's deficiencies in low-altitude interception led, from March 1956, to the 
development of the S-125 (SA-3) system, a `short-range anti-aircraft system' designed 
to target aircraft at a minimum height of 300 metres and which began testing during 
1961.884 This caused an additional problem for the operational flight-plans for the V- 
bomber force. 885 
When the full complement of longer-range Vulcans and Victors become operational in 
1960 they brought the overall numbers of the V-bombers up to 180, `capable of 
reaching the majority of industrial targets in Russia from bases in Britain and 
Cyprus. '886 A second series of V-bombers came into service from 1962, the Mark II, 
which had been designed for longer range, higher flight and could carry the British- 
designed air-launched Blue Steel thermonuclear weapon. 887 Blue Steel allowed the 
Vulcan's and Victors to release their weaponry up to 100 miles from their targets. 88 
Yet, despite modifications to improve the chances of penetration, V-bomber bases 
would still be vulnerable to Soviet nuclear strikes before the aircraft took off, even with 
the `variety of techniques - dispersal of aircraft, four minute scrambles, low level 
982 Ibid. 
883 Pierre, Nuclear Politics, p. 157 
984 Podvig, Russian Strategic, p. 405 
88S Brocklebank, 'UK-US Strategic Nuclear Targeting', 27 March 2008 
86 Pierre, Nuclear Politics, p. 157 
887 Ibid.; Laming, V-Bombers, p. 144 
888 Laming, V-Bombers, p. 144; TNA, CAB 163/20, 'Response to questions from the Chief of the Air Staff 
(Intelligence) on the effectiveness of Soviet air defence systems against low-flying bombers delivering 
BLUE STEEL missiles', July 1963 
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below-radar flying', that the RAF developed after 1958 to reduce their weaknesses. 889 
Developments in Soviet air defences contributed to greater contemplation of missiles, 
either air-launched or based in the UK, which could better penetrate the USSR's 
defences. Some of the strategic air forces would get through regardless, particularly in 
concert with the massive saturation of a US strike and the employment of ECM and 
radar jamming. The destructive power of only a few thermonuclear deliveries, therefore, 
meant a continuing threat. However, the vulnerability of the V-bomber force to pre- 
emptive attack meant that this force would not guarantee a second strike capability. 
Since 1957 the JIC had been arguing that Soviet dependency on their Long-Range Air 
Force (LRAF) and its susceptibility to allied nuclear strikes would encourage Soviet 
leaders to launch surprise attack. 890 Even after outbreak of hostilities Soviet leaders 
would still seek `to reduce the Allied nuclear threat by as much as possible and as 
quickly as possible' and to achieve the maximum degree of strategic or tactical 
surprise. ' 891 
The rapid development, at this time, of both offensive and defensive systems led to one 
of the most contentious decisions in the history of British nuclear weapons, the 
cancellation of Blue Streak in April 1960. Blue Streak had originated as a 1953 
requirement for a 2,000-mile range missile892. Yet, like the V-bombers, it was `very 
quickly overtaken by technology because it was liquid-fuelled and the advent of solid- 
fuelled motors meant that you could get an enormously enhanced state of readiness, 
which would in fact make the Blue Streak missiles on pads, or in silos in East Anglia, 
889 Pierre, Nuclear Politics, p. 157 
890 TNA, CAB 158/27, JIC(57)7, `The Soviet Strategic Air-Plan in the early stages of a Global War 1957- 
1961', 28 February 1957; CAB158/35, JIC(57)7, `The Soviet Strategic Air-Plan in the early stages of a 
Global War 1957-1961', 24 February 1959 
891 TNA, CAB 158/27, JIC(57)7, `The Soviet Strategic Air-Plan in the early stages of a Global War 1957- 
1961', 28 February 1957; CAB 158/39, JIC(60)7, 'The Soviet Strategic Air Plan in the Early Stages of a 
Global War, 1959-64', 28 April 1960 
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very vulnerable to attack. '893 By the late 1950s, arguments were growing in favour of 
cancelling the missile, rather than spend further money on it, and that the British should 
look at alternative options such as the rapidly developing American Polaris system. 894 
This was the conclusion of the BNDSG's interim report in December 1959: 
Until the Soviet Union had deployed an efficient system of defence against ballistic missiles, 
BLUE STREAK would not be vulnerable once it had been fired and had successfully got away 
from the launching point. It would, whether deployed underground or on the surface, be 
vulnerable to pre-emptive attack. It would therefore be effective only if it were fired first. '895 
Their paper also set out the case for Skybolt, the American ASGW, and Polaris the 
submarine based system, both of which were believed to be realistic options for Britain. 
The Chiefs of Staff discussed the issue on 26 and 27 January 1960. Their conclusions 
show the degree to which they were aware of the implications, including the political 
ones, of moving away from Blue Streak towards greater dependency on US designs. 896 
It also shows that Mountbatten, Chief of the Defence Staff, saw Skybolt as a short-term 
solution before a British Polaris force. The resulting paper from the Chiefs of Staff set 
out their view: 
We need a new strategic nuclear weapon system to replace the V-bomber/Blue Steel Mkl in 
about 1966, but since we regard BLUE STREAK as a "fire first" only weapon we do not 
consider that it meets this need. We therefore recommend the cancellation of its further 
development ... if in the event it transpires that we cannot obtain [Skybolt] or Polaris from the 
Americans on acceptable terms, we will have to accept a gap in our nuclear capability, whilst 
892 Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy, p. 159 
893 Professor Peter Nailor, Quoted in Hennessy, Muddling Through, p. 109 
894 Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p. 235 
895 BND(SG)(59)10(Final), `The Case Against Blue Streak, Report by the British Nuclear Deterrent Study 
Group, 31 December 1959. Quoted in James, Defence Policy and the Royal Air Force, p. 239 
896 TNA, DEFE4/124, COS(60) Meetings, 26 and 27 January 1960 
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doing everything in our power to reduce it. 
897 
Despite the Chiefs' unanimity, this was a difficult political pill for some ministers to 
swallow, not least for Duncan Sandys, now Minister of Aviation. His opposition was 
one of the reasons why the Ministerial Defence Committee was unable to confirm the 
Chief's view with an official decision on 6 April. 898 On the 13th Macmillan took the 
cancellation decision to the Cabinet, but approval at this stage was merely a formality. 
The minuted summary of their reasoning shows that confidence in getting a deal from 
the Americans was an important factor. Macmillan told the Cabinet that, 
During his recent visit to Washington, he had satisfied himself that we should be able in due 
course to obtain from the United States, on acceptable terms, supplies of one or other of the 
alternative types of mobile weapon, to be armed with a British warhead. 
99 
The episode came to the heart of definitions of the credibility of the UK's deterrent. As 
Eric Grove has explained, some of the more critical estimates of the V-bomber life span 
at this time proved pessimistic, but their deterrent value was judged comparatively to 
the threat of ballistic missiles. 
In retrospect, considering that the Avro Vulcan remained in service, albeit in a theater [sic] 
rather than strategic strike role, until the early 1980s and that the V bombers ... remained the 
primary deterrent until 1969, some of the doubts about the ability of the bomber force seem 
misplaced. Nevertheless, there were real fears about the technical capability of the British 
contribution to the Western deterrent if rockets were not deployed as soon as possible. 
00 
The `independence' of Skybolt was also part of the controversy. The V-bombers, with 
897 TNA, DEFE5/99, COS(60)28,6 February 1960 
898 James, Defence Policy, pp. 246-249; TNA, CAB 131/23, Defence Committee, D(60)3rd Meeting, 6 
April 1960 
899 TNA, CAB 128/34, CC(60)26`h Conclusions, 13 April 1960 
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British warheads, were had been developed without US help. Blue Streak was also seen 
as self-sufficient in this way. Mostly, however, the degree of independence was 
questionable in terms of the possible circumstances of their use. The likelihood of 
circumstances arising in which Britain would consider `unleashing her nuclear weapons 
on her own against the Soviet Union' was something certain defence chiefs, particularly 
First Sea Lord Mountbatten, found `strategically incredible'. 901 The JIC's previous 
assertion that the USSR would consider a US response likely to any attack upon the UK 
fell in with this thinking. 
Mountbatten's conclusion, even by late 1958, was that the credibility of Britain's 
deterrent lay not in the independence of its design but in its efficacy and contribution to 
the whole of western nuclear defences. For him this meant, from quite early on in its 
development, an interest in the US Polaris system. 902 His views on deterrence are worth 
considering, not least because his establishment, in 1958, of a body that would analyse 
in greater depth than ever before the likely course of a future global nuclear war. This 
was the Joint Global War Committee and its study group, the Joint Inter-Services Group 
for the Study of All-Out Warfare (JIGSAW), whose papers give a chilling insight into 
the horrors that faced Cold War military planners. 903 One of the topics to which 
JIGSAW addressed themselves was defining concepts of deterrence and in particular, 
`the level of damage, and the consequent number of deliveries, which would be 
sufficient to deter the USSR from trying to further its aims by the use of strategic 
nuclear weapons in an attack on the West. '904 
JIGSAW's approach to define the concept of `breakdown', described it variously as the 
901 Ibid. 
902 Ibid. 
903 Richard Moore, `A JIGSAW Puzzle for Operational Researchers: British Global War Studies 1954- 
1962', The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 20, No-2 (June 1997), pp. 75-91 904 TNA, DEFE10/402, JIGSAW, SG(60)14, `Mutual Deterrence', 16 March 1960 
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point at which, following a nuclear attack, there is a `general breakdown of the national 
structure' or `when the government of a country can no longer maintain control. ' 905 
JIGSAW's definitions of breakdown were an important aspect of what was considered 
an adequate British deterrent. The question of the `minimum' deterrence necessary to 
deter the USSR would increasingly, over the following decade, form the heart of fierce 
Whitehall debates about the future of British nuclear weapons 906 More immediately, the 
amount of damage that JIGSAW, and the JIC, thought the USSR could withstand and, 
therefore, the amount of damage the West, or specifically the UK, would have to be 
capable of inflicting was at the core of the military argument that was used to cancel 
Blue Streak. 
Dr Ian Shaw, the War Office's scientific representative, captivatingly reveals the degree 
to which definitions of `breakdown' were a contentious subject in a November 1960 
JIGSAW paper who had `brought a fairly solid shower of abuse on his shoulders by 
questioning yet again our position on the concept of breakdown'. 907 Shaw's note went 
on to analyse the various conclusions of previous JIGSAW papers and the effects this 
could have on consequent planning, such as target choice. 908 The problem was that the 
concept of breakdown and the deterrent impact upon the Soviet leadership involved 
multiple variables that allowed competing voices to remain unresolved. In a letter to 
Peter Hennessy, following the release of the JIGSAW papers to the National Archives, 
one of the JIGSAW team, Dr Edgar Anstey, recalled the judgment they reached around 
the end of 1960. 
Combining these hypotheses [for three different concepts of breakdown], we calculated that the 
number of megaton deliveries required to cause breakdown was about 25 for the UK, and about 
905 Ibid., SG(60)35, `Note on the Concept and Definition of Breakdown', E. Anstey, 10 June 1960 
906 See following Chapter 
907 TNA, DEFE10/402, SG(60)79, `Breakdown in JIGSAW', I. G. Shaw 29 November 1960 
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450 for the USA or Soviet Union. Moreover, and this was the really important finding, this scale 
of delivery was well within the capacity of either the USA or the Soviet Union, even after it had 
been subjected to a pre-emptive attack by its major adversary909 
The problem that still remained, and could only be addressed by intelligence, was that 
even if the `threat of certain breakdown is a sufficient deterrent' it still required 
intelligence to `somehow in the meantime [discover] that the Soviet leaders have done 
their sums in accordance with the rules we have laid down. '910 
In January 1960 the JIC provided the Chiefs of Staff with a paper they had requested 
examining a series of recent remarks made by Khrushchev including `to the Austrian 
Foreign Minister ... [and] to the United States and French Ambassadors at the Kremlin 
New Year's Eve party, [as well as] the portions of Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme 
Soviet on January 14`h. '911 Although guarded in accepting claims at face value, the JIC 
took the statements, and their theme, as showing a `consistent pattern' in the evolution 
of Soviet military doctrine towards greater reliance on ballistic missiles. 912 An 
understanding of the mind-set, internal political scene and likely intentions of Soviet 
leaders was one of the areas on which it was difficult to obtain intelligence but when it 
did it could be particularly revealing. In August 1961 the Foreign Office reported to the 
British Embassy in Washington remarks made by Khrushchev about a conversation he 
had supposedly had with Frank Roberts, British Ambassador in Moscow. The account 
makes interesting reading compared to Anstey's summary of the number of bombs 
required to cause breakdown. 
908 Hennessy, Secret State, p. 152 
909 Dr Edgar Anstey, Ibid., Secret State, p. 153 
910 TNA, DEFE10/402, SG(60)35, `Note on the Concept and Definition of Breakdown', E. Anstey, 10 
June 1960 




Mr Khrushchev... explained that he had asked the British Ambassador how many bombs would 
be needed to put the UK out of commission. The Ambassador said six. To this, Mr Khrushchev 
continued, he told the Ambassador that he had heard an anecdote about pessimists and optimists 
in Berlin; the pessimists thought that six bombs would be required to put the UK out of 
commission while optimists felt that nine would be needed. Thus the UK Ambassador belonged 
to the category of pessimists. The Soviet General Staff, however, had earmarked several scores 
of bombs for use against the UK so that the Soviet Union had a higher opinion of the UK's 
resistance capacity than the UK itself. 
913 
Khrushchev's propensity for exaggeration may well have been a factor and it seems 
highly unlikely that Roberts would have given the official, secret, British thinking on 
the number of bombs that might cause a UK breakdown. But the conversation is 
revealing in the degree to which UK breakdown figures were somewhat irrelevant to the 
balance of deterrence between the USSR and US. Whether the UK suffered six, nine, 
twenty-five or `several scores' of thermonuclear attacks it would be devastating and 
unsustainable on any definition of breakdown. It was a further reminder of the degree to 
which the UK was unavoidably dependent on American nuclear deterrence. 
The JIC were by 1960 increasingly sceptical about Soviet boasting. Perhaps evidence of 
a desire to counter `missile gap' fears, the Committee took to directly addressing and 
refuting specific claims in their reports: 
On 14th November, 1959, Khrushchev stated that he had visited a factory where 250 rockets 
with hydrogen warheads came off the assembly line in a year... These missiles are probably of 
more than one type and it is believed that the majority are of ranges below 1,000 n. miles. 
Khrushchev's speech is calculated to give the impression that the 250 missiles were ICBM, but 
it does not actually make this claim and it is considered extremely unlikely that ICBM 
production in the Soviet Union is on such a scale. Khrushchev's reference to `hydrogen' 
913 TNA, F0371/160546, Foreign Office to British Embassy, Washington, 17 August 1961 
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warheads is taken to mean only that the missile would be capable of carrying a megaton 
warhead 914 
The scene behind closed Moscow doors only really became more accessible after 
Western intelligence achieved a significant human intelligence breakthrough. This, and 
crucial access to ground-breaking American satellite reconnaissance, would mean that 
British intelligence was better informed than ever before about the nature of Soviet 
nuclear forces. 
Penkovsky, satellites and missile intelligence 
Colonel Oleg Penkovsky was a GRU (Military Intelligence) officer who first offered his 
services to the US in August 1960.915 By spring of the following year he had made 
contact with SIS leading to an unprecedented operation involving a joint CIA-SIS 
handling team. 916 Penkovsky was able to visit the UK during the spring and summer of 
1961 as the intelligence officer attached to trade delegations. The Anglo-American 
intelligence team, consisting of two officers each from the CIA and SIS, debriefed the 
Russian in lengthy meetings in hotels around the UK and in Paris. 17 Debate over 
Penkovsky's value has often focused on the impact of the intelligence he provided on 
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. 18 Instead, the transcripts of his meetings with the 
combined CIA and M16 team show that they were attempting to glean every ounce of 
information he had on all manner of military and political topics as well as Soviet 
914 TNA, CAB 158/38, JIC(59)96, `Six-Monthly Intelligence Digest for Technical Departments - Period 
Mid-May 1959 to Mid-November 1959', 11 February 1960 
915 The CIA files available on the first approach: CIA electronic reading room for Freedom of Information 
releases.: www. foia. cia. gov/. 'Penkovsky', 23 June 2004 
916 Catherine Haddon, `Hidden Voices: Oleg Penkovsky and Cold War British Intelligence, 1961-1962' 
(unpublished MA Thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2002) 
917 Schecter and Deriabin, Spy Who. The authors are the first to provide great detail from the CIA files 
they requested under the Freedom of Information Act in the US. 
918 Len Scott, 'Espionage and the Cold War: Oleg Penkovsky and the Cuban Missile Crisis', Intelligence 
and National Security, Vol. 14, No-3 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 27-8. Scott's article actually analyses the impact 
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weaponry and technical achievements, especially rockets. 919 
In addition to over forty meetings at which he provided his own conclusions and 
thoughts on a wide variety of subjects, Penkovsky was able to photograph and pass on 
copies of top-secret Soviet military journals and missile handbooks. The two different 
forms of intelligence he gave the West, oral and documentary, were codenamed 
and 'ý'ci, ý1ook. ' respectively in America. 920 In the UK, the 
compartmentalised distribution of the material by subject led to a division between 
intelligence on the Soviet intelligence services, `Rupee', and that on Soviet military 
capabilities, 'Arnika' . 
921 The handbooks, including a manual for the SS-4, enabled the 
identification of the Soviet MRBMs photographed in Cuba by a U2 in October 1962, 
though it seems likely that comparison with satellite imagery of equivalent SS-4 sites in 
the USSR must also have played a part . 
922 The military journals, which unlike the 
handbooks are largely accessible on the CIA website, consisted of articles by high- 
ranking Soviet military officers on such subjects as Soviet order of battle, attitudes to 
nuclear warfare, division of military forces and command and control, and, crucially, 
the question of the tactical use of nuclear weapons, particularly in targeting 
submarines. 923 These would contribute to the way in which the Soviet military mind-set 
was perceived, particularly questions that dominated JIC reports such as the likelihood 
of the Soviet leadership to risk war and the balance of aircraft and missiles in Soviet 
of Penkovsky on a variety of topics; Schecter and Deriabin, in their title and through the course of the 
book, suggest his having `Saved the World' in his impact on the Cuban crisis. 
919 Redacted but still surprisingly detailed versions of the transcripts: 
httro: //www. foia. cia. gov/penkovskv. asp, 23 June 2004 
920 Schecter and Deriabin, Spy Who, pp. 93-4 
921 Peter Wright, Spycatcher: The candid autobiography of a senior intelligence officer (New York: 
Viking, 1987), pp. 208-9; Haddon, Hidden Voices, p. 16 
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defence policy. 
The West also now had, through Penkovsky, an insight into the thinking of Soviet 
military and leadership. The rumours and hearsay that Penkovsky did stress can be seen, 
in retrospect, to have been quite enlightening. Penkovsky was also able to shed light on 
one event of which the West had become aware, but because of strict Soviet secrecy 
would not be publicly revealed until 1989 
924 This was the huge explosion of a prototype 
solid-fuel ICBM rocket, the two-stage R-16 (SS-7), at the Tyuratam test range on 24 
October 1960. The accident was the `biggest catastrophe in the history of world rocket 
engineering', killing the commander-in-chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) 
Chief Marshal of Artillery Mitrofan Nedelin and more than a hundred technicians 925 
Officially, it was reported that Nedelin had been `killed in an air crash'. 926 In 1965, 
western knowledge of the true cause of his death was published in The Penkovsky 
Papers in 1965.927 Despite the accident, testing of the R-16 continued and it began to be 
deployed before the conclusions of the tests. It was smaller and much less heavy than 
the R-7 (SS-6) and could be prepared for launch far more quickly. 928 It would be `the 
first intercontinental missile suitable for large-scale deployment' with around a 197 
launchers, a third of which were placed in silos. 929 
An important area on which Penkovsky provided information was Soviet rocket 
development. He revealed the tension between air force and rocket forces. He told his 
handlers that Khrushchev `is still maintaining long-range aviation, but is keeping the 
were `plans to use Soviet tactical nuclear weapons against U. S. ships and subs', though this difference 
does not undermine the effect of the articles as an indication of Soviet thinking. 
924 The story of 'Site 41' was eventually published in President Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika 
newspaper Ogonyok Magazine in 1989 
92 Podvig, Russian Strategic, p. 125, Note 20; Transcript of 4`s Meeting with Oleg Penkovsky, 23 April 
1961 http: //www. foia. cia. gov/penkovsky. asp, 23 June 2004 
926 'Russian Rocket Chief Killed in Crash', The Times, 26 October 1960; 
927 Penkovsky, Penkovsky Papers, p. 224 
928 Podvig, Russian Strategic, p. 125 
929 Ibid. 
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production at a very slow pace... In comparison to rockets, aviation now has a relatively 
lesser significance. ' 930 Penkovsky's father-in-law and patron was Marshal Sergei 
Varentsov, Commander of the USSR's Ground Rocket Forces. The `Ground Rocket 
Forces' represented all missiles except strategic guided missiles, ICBMs, IRBMs and 
MRBMs. The division of rocket forces in the USSR in this way meant that, as in other 
areas, there was competition and rivalry. This ensured that, although biased, Penkovsky 
was in earshot of much grumbling and criticism of the newly created SRF, which, 
between its creation in December 1959 and his death in October 1960, was under 
Nedelin. 931 Indeed, the creation of the SRF as a body separate of the other Soviet armed 
forces came in the midst of a UK debate about which of the service intelligence staffs 
should cover strategic missiles. 932 This contributed to the wrangles for control and co- 
ordination of missile-related intelligence that would occur in the middle of 1961 (see 
below). 
On 23 April 1961, Penkovsky told his handlers that, although medium and short-range 
missile were being mass-produced and deployed, the progress of the Soviet ICBM 
programme was extremely limited: 
[Varentsov] has so often told me `You know... with respect to ICBMs, up to now we don't have 
a damn thing. Everything is only on paper, and there is nothing in actual existence... For short 
ranges we can fulfil the missions, but beyond that what? '933 
Seven days later Penkovsky returned to this theme, stating that `with respect to ICBM's, 
they have had one failure after another. '934 
They remain silent and they continue to throw millions into the effort and if they have one 
930 Transcript of 4t' meeting, 23 April 1961 httj2*//www. foia. cia. gov(penkovsky, asp, 23 June 2004 
931 Podvig, Russian Strategic, p. 145 
932 Private Information 
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success then it is used to impress your people by pretending that there are hundreds of these 
[missiles]. But there are no such hundreds. That is only idle talk. However, keep in mind that 
one day they will be there. This must be assumed since the entire economy and politics are 
geared for such development. 935 
In terms of specific missiles, their state of development, expected numbers and 
timescales for operational production, Penkovsky was often unsure and vague. He was 
able to pinpoint areas in which the Soviets had been struggling, particularly in terms of 
guidance systems. Yet he consistently stressed the degree to which the Soviet leadership 
was deliberately attempting to mislead the West over the success of their ICBM 
programme. Overall, the scale of the information he imparted provided a wealth of 
material from which intelligence analysts could expand and explore their appreciations 
of the Soviet nuclear threat. Significantly, members of the British intelligence 
community were being briefed about the Penkovsky intelligence on the `non-existent' 
Soviet ICBM threat just prior to being provided with the American satellite imagery that 
told the same story. 
936 
The intelligence available on missiles from radar, photoreconnaissance and Penkovsky 
certainly increased the scope of knowledge, but it could not provide detail about the 
`quality and reliability of Soviet missile designs and components. '937 It was only the 
development of satellite photography, and, therefore, the ability to examine deployment 
sites in detail and systematically, that provided enough confidence to determine more 
precisely the number of ICBMs. 938 UK access to the fruits of this technological advance 
allowed the JIC to begin to tackle a question that had been hugely problematic for some 
934 Transcript of 10`h meeting, 30 April 1961, htti): //www. foia. cia. gov/Penkovsky. asP, 23 June 2004 935 Ibid. 
936 Private information 
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years, the number of deployed, operational missile launch sites. In effect, 
comprehensive imagery of the USSR landmass `allowed the threat to be seen for the 
first time' 939 
In March 1955 the US Air Force had issued a `general operational requirement' for a 
photoreconnaissance satellite. 940 The first flight of the top-secret `Corona' satellite, with 
a recoverable capsule, took place in February 1959 but failed, as did the following 13 
attempts. On 16 August 1960, two months after the controversial downing of Gary 
Powers' U-2, the US satellite made its `first wholly successful flight' 941 Richard 
Bissell's view of this moment in intelligence history is worth noting; 
Although there were scattered failures thereafter, there has never since been a major lapse in the 
flow of intelligence from satellite photoreconnaissance. It is no exaggeration to say that what 
was accomplished in this period of less than ten years was a revolution in intelligence 
collection 942 
Penkovsky's information about the much larger numbers of MRBM and IRBM 
deployments compared to ICBMs was confirmed by satellite imagery. Thus, whilst the 
missile `gap' of greater Soviet ICBM development could be disproved by both these 
sources, the threat of MRBMs and IRBMs was in some respects greater than expected. 
At a time in which the UK government was engrossed in its own future balance of 
aircraft versus missile delivery systems, this was increasing evidence that the USSR had 
prioritised and made great strides in missiles that could easily reach the UK. It gave a 
new urgency to intelligence assessment in the UK and had an immediate effect on the 
organisation of missile intelligence under the JIC. 
939 Private information 
940 Bissell, Reflections, p. 93 
941 Ibid., p. 93; Prados, Soviet Estimate, p. 109. Prados relates that the first successful missions may have 
been on the 10th but `the Air Force publicly claimed it had carried no sensor equipment' 
942 Bissell, Reflections, p. 93 
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At some point in the early summer of 1961, soon after Penkovsky's first series of 
meetings had concluded and his intelligence was being disseminated, `someone in 
London had banged the table and said that there must be a proper estimate of the threat 
to the UK. '943 At that time intelligence on guided weapons was covered by two working 
parties. The Guided Weapons Working Party, which had existed since 1945, covered 
intelligence on missile development and testing. Another body, the Intelligence on 
Nuclear Weapons Sub-committee (SCINW), brought together missile development with 
nuclear intelligence on warhead development. 
944 There was a certain amount of rivalry 
between the two and in between the `coordination' of missile development, and more 
importantly estimates of deployment, were being neglected. 
In July 1961 a new committee was established to fill the gap. Initially it was entitled the 
`Guided Weapons Co-ordination' Sub-Committee. It was chaired by Air-Vice Marshal 
Sydney Bufton, the Director of Bombing Operations in the Air Staff between 1943 and 
1945, who may well have been the person banging on the table out of frustration with 
the GWSC. At their first meeting, and with little discussion, they immediately changed 
the Subcommittee's name from Guided Weapon Co-ordination to Missile Threat Co- 
ordination (MTSC). 945 The broader description allowed greater scope over the subjects 
to be covered and may well have been a preconceived endeavour by Bufton to ensure 
the centrality of his committee in future clashes over remit. 
At their first meeting the MTSC had note by the Secretary of the JIC providing terms of 
943 Private Information 
944 The files for the INW, like those of other JIC subcommittees prior to 1957, do not, on the whole, 
appear in the archives although some of their papers and mention of them appear amongst the records of 
the 1945-1947 JIC in TNA, CAB81, and in the files of post-1957 sub-committees in TNA, CAB 182. 
CAB 182/1, files of the Sub-Committee on Intelligence on Nuclear Weapons, Minutes, Memoranda and 
Secretaries Minutes, 1957-63, remains closed (see footnote 63), but a record of them exists in 
DEFE19/49files of the Scientific Adviser (Intelligence), 1958-9 
945 TNA, CAB 182/11, JIC(MT)(61)1, 'Terms of Reference for the Missile Threat Co-Ordination Working 
Party', 7 July 1961 
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reference `as approved by the Committee on Service Intelligence'. 
946 A file from the JIC 
Secretary that may relate to this, on the `Review of Intelligence Service organisation', is 
still withheld. 47 In addition, a paper listed as 'UK Intelligence operation of special 
nature' was removed from the files at the time by the Secretary. 
948 A further difficulty in 
the years 1960-1, even within the catalogue listings, is the absence of the Weekly 
Reviews of Current Intelligence for the years 1960 and 1961.949 The papers that are 
available are particularly revealing about how far the committee was concerned over 
specific, and considerable, current intelligence sources. References to this concern 
throughout the Subcommittee and Working Party's files are noticeably frequent. The 
JIC memoranda giving the MTSC its terms of reference reveals that the first priority 
was to keep under review information from all sources. 
950 The requirement to prepare 
and submit joint estimates of various threats was listed subsequent to this. 
951 
At their first meeting, the MTSC discussed the `draft outline of the first report' they 
were to produce. This would become the JIC paper `The Soviet Missile Threat up to 
1966', circulated the following February. 
The Chairman [Bufton] said that this outline had been produced with a comprehensive report in 
mind, covering the various categories of missiles. Broken down into components in this way, it 
would be simple to feed such elements as were required into the Joint Intelligence Staff and 
Joint Intelligence Committee appreciations, and it would be easy to amend the report as and 
when necessary, to keep it up to date. The first report should be drafted on the basis of existing 
946 Ibid. 
947 TNA, CAB163/20, Review of Intelligence Service Organisation, 20 May 1960 - 14 Aug 1962. 
Retained by Government Department under Section 3(4) 
gag TNA, CAB158/44, JIC(61)68 'UK Intelligence operation of special nature' 
949 TNA, CAB 179/7, is the WRCI for July-December 1959, CAB 179/8 covers January-June 1962. No 
mention of retention or the reason for their absence is mentioned in the catalogue 
950 TNA, CAB 158/44, JIC(61)52, 'Guided Weapons Threat Co-ordination Sub-committee. Terms of 
Reference', 28 June 1961 
9511bid; TNA, CAB182/11, JIC(MT)(61)1,7 July 1961 
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appreciations, current information and certain new intelligence. ' 952 
At the first meeting of the Missile Threat Working Party (MTWP) its chairman, 
Commander I. D. S. Forbes, spoke on the general nature of their work, stating that he 
`hoped they would work together with speed and smoothness. ' 953 He also said that the 
`task to be accomplished was a considerable one, but he agreed with the suggestion in 
the minutes that much of the work could be done in parallel. '954 However, it was the 
priority that was given to `current intelligence', that is most suggestive of the influence 
of satellite imagery. The receipt of new and updated intelligence would have been an 
accepted and expected element in any intelligence assessment body, but the degree to 
which the working party identified, from the outset, the likely added pressure from this 
and the hints that they expected it to be considerable, is hugely revealing. In their 
discussion, the point was made that `although the production of the report would take up 
the bulk of their time, they must not lose sight of current intelligence during this early 
period. '955 Therefore, they `instructed the Secretary to include "Current Intelligence" as 
an item of the agenda for each meeting. '956 
Of course current intelligence topics remain redacted parts of these files. The type of 
information that came, and other clues of attendance and division of work, are also 
revealing. The work on their report was to be divided amongst the various Service 
representatives. Thus, the Air Ministry would cover the `Strategic Threat', the current 
bomber capabilities and, showing the continuing separation and overlap of this subject, 
the `Threat Posed by Soviet Missile Defences', would be covered by JIB representatives 
whose representative on the MTSC was Hugh Young. GCHQ, JARIC (Joint Air 
952 Ibid., JIC(MT)(61) I s'Meeting, 5 July 1961 





Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre] representation and frequent US attendees point to 
the influx of satellite intelligence. Material from AEID on warhead capability and fissile 
material was to be obtained via the JIB. 957 Additionally, concerns were expressed both 
that `the closest collaboration would be necessary between Departments' 958, and that 
`there was no overlap between [the MTWP] and the Scientific and Technical Working 
Party of the STISC'. 959 
Despite the incomplete archive, it is clear from the records available that the pace of 
missile-related intelligence intensified during 1961 and, combined with the richness of 
material from Penkovsky and American satellite imagery, this represented an important 
advance for UK intelligence. At the time of their January 1962 report on `Soviet 
Strategy in the event of a General War', and in accordance with their predictions, the 
JIC no longer saw the Soviet use of ballistic missiles as `supplementary'. Instead the 
Committee consoled their customers that the missile threat would still be `less accurate 
... than aircraft armed with 
free-fall bombs. 960 Soviet leaders `would give priority to 
Western nuclear strike force targets, although the Russians would realise that even if 
they attempted a pre-emptive attack a large proportion of the first Western strike would 
probably have taken off before the first Soviet attack arrived. '961 The report had 
estimated that, taking into account the competence of personnel and technology, the 
Soviet strike force might achieve fifty percent success rate in ballistic missiles and 
eighty percent in bombers. 962 On this basis, `since the effect of attacking a 
comparatively small number of cities in Europe and N. America (say about 40 in all) is 
likely to be so great, [the JIC thought] that they would always allocate this 
937 Ibid. 
958 Ibid. 
959TNA, CAB182/11, JIC(MT)(6 1) 1 "Meeting, 5 July 1961 




comparatively small proportion of their effort to those targets at the expense of their 
effort against the Allied nuclear strike. '963 
The January 1962 figures for operational ballistic missiles from the JIC are, therefore, 
much closer to reality and show the impact of increased knowledge: 




650 and 1,000 n. mile (able to reach the majority of 250 450 
strategic targets in Europe and the peripheral area) 
} 600-700 
2,000 n. mile (able to reach the remainder of - 40 
peripheral targets) 
ICBM (able to reach all targets in North America 12-20 85-100 220-400 
Skybolt and Polaris 
By 1962 intelligence was providing Ministers with quite a considerably accurate picture 
of the threat posed by the Soviet nuclear forces. This in turn suggested a likely timetable 
that the UK would need to follow to achieve, at least, a nuclear force sufficient to deter 
the USSR. There were still large gaps in knowledge that did not provide some of the 
detail that military planners would need for order of battle plans in the event of nuclear 
war. However, as far as Ministers were concerned, the view of intelligence was fairly 
consistent. They were told to assume that the Soviet Union was capable of destroying 
the UK, but lacked accurate ICBMs to target North America in sufficiently large 
numbers. From 1962 onwards, the JIC also warned, the danger of the Soviets being able 
to target the US would increase and that although the West still held the nuclear 




The most significant theme that comes to light was how the JIC viewed the 
development of an invulnerable, second-strike deterrent in the next few years. Whitehall 
feared the UK would have a nuclear deterrent incapable of incapacitating its Soviet 
nuclear weapons and vulnerable itself to a pre-emptive strike. Since the cancellation of 
Blue Streak in 1960, the future of the British nuclear deterrent had rested on the 
American-designed air-launched missile Skybolt. Yet, historians still disagree as to 
whether, from a very early stage, the British had been aware that Skybolt's future was 
uncertain and that grave doubts existed in the US as to its value. 
964 Mountbatten had 
seen Skybolt as only an interim solution prior to Polaris and therefore appears not to 
have set much store by the system. In June 1960, the Cabinet were told by the Defence 
Minister, Harold Watkinson, that there `could as yet be no absolute certainty that 
SKYBOLT, which was not due to be tested as a complete weapon for about a year, 
would be successful and it must be recognised that the Americans would not develop it 
X965 for our use alone. 
At this time some within Whitehall were starting to question the requirements on which 
the British nuclear deterrent was based, specifically how many targets and what level of 
damage the UK nuclear force should be capable of achieving in order to be credible. 66 
The BNDSG had, in December 1959, recommended the ability to target 40 industrial 
and administrative centres, and including Moscow and Leningrad, which would require 
`respectively four and two deliveries of 1-MT' 967 Two years later, Watkinson wrote to 
the Prime Minister in support of the latest opinion of the chairman of the BNDSG, Sir 
Peter Scott, arguing that 40 cities was unnecessary and that targeting 10 cities, including 
964 Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy, p. 349-352; Ken Young, `The Skybolt Crisis of 1962: Muddle or 
Mischief? ', The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 27/4 (December 2004), pp. 614-635 
965 TNA, CAB128/34, CC(60)35`h Conclusions, 20 June 1960 
966 John Baylis, `British Nuclear Doctrine: The `Moscow Criterion' and the Polaris Improvement 
Programme', Contemporary British History, Vol. 19/1 (Spring 2005), pp. 53-65, pp. 56-7 
967 TNA, DEFE7/1328, BND(SG)(59)19(Final), 31 Dec. 1959 
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the capital, would constitute a sufficient deterrent 
968 
The number of targets had, according to Scott, been `arrived at arbitrarily' and the 
figure of 10 may also have been 969 The JIC, in one of their most policy-orientated 
papers of the post-war period, examined the `various approaches' and concluded that 
assessment should be based upon `a degree of damage... as would severely reduce the 
Soviet Union's economic and military strength in its struggle to overtake the United 
States and dominate the world'. 970 They argued that the ability to strike 5 of the largest 
cities, including Moscow, was the minimum destruction to `put them at an unacceptable 
disadvantage in relation to the United States'. 71 Ministers discussed the issue in March 
1962, admitting that reducing the number of targets meant fewer Skybolt missiles 
required from the US. Partly because of the concerns of the Air Staff, the meeting 
settled on 15 targets. 972 
These plans were dependent upon the RAF putting them into practice. In 1961, concerns 
arose about the UK's ability to react to an incoming strike and the readiness of the V- 
bomber forces. 73 The dispersal plans, stand-by procedures for the V-Bomber crews, 
chain of command and organisation of government in the event of a nuclear strike were 
all revisited. 974 In October 1962, following the discovery of Soviet SS-4's in Cuba, the 
nuclear retaliation plans came closer than at any other time to be put into action. 
75 It is 
now clear that, rather than acting as a bystander to the confrontation between the USSR 
968 TNA, PREM11/3716, Watkinson to Macmillan, 19 Feb. 1962 
969 Baylis, "Moscow Criterion", p. 56 
970 TNA, CAB158/45, JIC(62)10, 'The United Kingdom Nuclear Deterrent', 23 January 1962 
971 Ibid. 
972 TNA, PREM11/3716, Record of Meeting, 7 Mar. 1962 
97 TNA, DEFE25/49, `Nuclear Retaliation Procedure', 13 March 1961 
974 Hennessy, Secret State, pp. 157-165 
975 Brocklebank, 'UK-US Strategic Nuclear Targeting'; Len Scott, The Cuban Missile Crisis and the 
Threat of Nuclear War. Lessons from History (London: Continuum, 2007), especially pp. 137-8. See also, 
Mark J., White, The Cuban Missile Crisis (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Fursenko, Alexander and 
Naftali, Timothy, 'One Hell of a Gamble'. Khrushchev, Castro and the Cuban Missile Crisis (London: 
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and US, the British were closely consulted by Kennedy throughout. 976 During the crisis 
Macmillan had deliberately sought to avoid moving towards the more serious alert 
levels out of concern that the act of dispersing the V-bomber force, making them ready 
to launch at a few minutes warning or even deploying them, the emergency could 
escalate further. 7 On 27 October Macmillan's feared that the following day would 
mark the make-or-break moment, and his preparations to take actions towards the 
readiness of the British strategic forces, were only neutralised when Kennedy and 
Khrushchev were able to diffuse the crisis on the Sunday. 978 
On the ground, at bases around the country, V-Bombers were closer to deployment than 
Macmillan had envisaged. Accounts from members of the RAF, both senior officers and 
those who would have undertaken the missions, reveal that some of the forces had been 
put at fifteen, and possibly even five minutes readiness. 79 Had the go been given, `from 
about 50 bases throughout the country Vulcans, Victors and Valiants, in twos and fours, 
would get airborne from cockpit readiness in under two minutes'. It would have taken 980 
the planes approximately 60 minutes to reach the point of no return, the `go/no go line', 
when orders for the positive release would have been transmitted to the aircraft via the 
BBC Light Programme from Droitwich. 981 
Conversely, had the USSR initiated an attack on the UK or on western Europe, they 
would have employed the medium range Soviet ballistic missiles that the JIC now 
warned were available in large numbers. The shorter preparation time for the solid-fuel 
missiles being developed and the decreased flight time compared to aircraft further 
John Murray, 1997); Scott, L. V., Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Political, Military 
and Intelligence Aspects (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999) 
976 Hennessy, Prime Minister, pp. 118-125 
977 Ibid., p. 122 
978 Ibid., p. 129-30 
979 Ibid., p. 129; Brocklebank, 'UK-US Strategic Nuclear Targeting'; Scott, Cuban Missile Crisis, p. 137 
980 Brocklebank, 'UK-US Strategic Nuclear Targeting' 
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highlighted the inadequacies of the British deterrent. It was a salient reminder of the 
pressures on the V-bomber forces in the event of a pre-emptive strike, one that was only 
slightly mitigated by the presence of American Thor missiles on UK soil. 
On 11 December 1962, when the US military announced the failure of Skybolt test 
flights, the prospect of its cancellation was a shock to many, including the British public 
and Labour opposition. 82 Robert McNamara, Defense Secretary under President John 
F. Kennedy, recalled the difficulty in a 1990 radio programme: 
Skybolt. It was an absolute pile of junk ... the 
development of which had been paid for 100% by 
the US, the British hadn't put in a dime... We had no obligation, or at least we thought we had 
no obligation, to produce a pile of junk for ... an ill-defined but very real political requirement 
in Britain. So when we cancelled the weapon, all hell broke loose 
983 
In hindsight, and perhaps in part because the Kennedy administration were aware of the 
huge embarrassment caused, the loss of Skybolt proved a blessing for Britain in its 
eventual replacement, the submarine-launched missile Polaris. 
84 This development 
would see Britain obtain a near-invulnerable second-strike capability. Yet the origin of 
the Polaris agreement is more revealing about both the domestic and Anglo-American 
political picture than in demonstrating a direct reaction to the Cuban crisis. 
Ken Young has argued that Skybolt `crisis' was some `muddle ... and a 
little mischief 
too', concluding that `the affair was not about the efficacy of rival weapon systems ... 
than about what they symbolised in terms of Anglo-US relations. '985 An inquest into the 
affair for President Kennedy by Professor Richard Neustadt saw it primarily as a case of 
981 Ibid. 
982 'Skybolt Fears Deepened by London Talks', The Times, 12 December 1962 
983 Robert McNamara, Speaking to Peter Hennessy for the Radio 4 Analysis Programme, Moneybags and 
Brains, broadcast in October-November 1990 
984 Ken Young, `The Royal Navy's Polaris Lobby, 1955-62', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25/3 
(September 2002), pp. 56-86 
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mutual misunderstanding. 986 Differing interpretations rested upon whether the British 
government missed signs from the US that Skybolt would not survive, or if the UK 
anticipated such a result and sought to play up the `shock' at cancellation in order to 
pressurise the US to offer a replacement. In fact, continuing optimism towards Skybolt 
also related to opinions on the purpose of Britain's nuclear forces. As Michael Quinlan 
explained, different military perspectives that existed at that time; 
One of the things that drove the preference for Skybolt ... was the passionate 
desire of the Air 
Force, with the memory of Trenchard and the Strategic Air Offensive and all that behind them, 
to hang on to the role. The Navy ... were not all that 
keen, though the debate about Polaris had 
begun. 87 
There was also misplaced confidence in some quarters. The military historian Michael 
Howard recalled hearing from the Americans `that with Skybolt there wasn't a hope in 
hell, that the whole thing was going to be scuppered'. 988 
Then I came back and there was a dinner, some kind of Royal Air Force do ... and I said `I am 
afraid that you are not going to get Skybolt', and they said `Don't believe it for a single 
moment. The United States Air Force has promised it to us, they will not let us down and that is 
going to be the decisive matter'. So there was this lobby believing that there was a reliable 
American lobby which was going to support them - and they were wrong. 
89 
A meeting between Kennedy and Macmillan had already been planned for Nassau in 
late December. After the 11 December cancellation, all thoughts for Nassau moved to 
the question of Polaris. Macmillan kept his Cabinet informed of the progress of 
negotiations via telegram. On 21 December 1962 the Cabinet discussed the proposals in 
985 Young, `The Skybolt Crisis', pp. 614-5,630 
986 Published as Richard Neustadt, Report to JFK The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective, (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1999) 
987 Michael Quinlan, workshop, 27 March 2007 
988 Michael Howard quoted in Ibid. 
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Macmillan's absence. They understood the benefits of Polaris, what was not clear, and 
would actually take further months of technical negotiation, was the deal the US 
offered. 
While Ministers were agreed upon the value to this country of an arrangement by which we 
should eventually have within our own control a virtually indestructible second-strike deterrent 
weapon of proven capability, and with prospects of a long-life, it was recognised that the 
conditions which the United States Government were stipulating represented a heavy price in 
money and otherwise. 
990 
When the Polaris Sales Agreement was signed, in mid-1963, the conditions of sale were 
more favourable. 991 David Miller, writing on the military forces of the Cold War, 
described Polaris as `one of the most successful defence programmes ever undertaken... 
it revolutionized strategic warfare. '992 The A-3 Polaris missiles were fitted to nuclear- 
powered missile submarines (SSBN - ship submersible ballistic nuclear), the first of 
which, HMS Resolution, was operational by June 1968.993 The interdependence of the 
missiles would be endorsed in their construction; they were `designed and built in the 
USA but had British warheads and re-entry vehicles. '994 Polaris represented a new era in 
nuclear deterrence, which saw invulnerable, second-strike mobile delivery systems 
bring a new level of nuclear stalemate and increase the likelihood of `mutually assured 
destruction' in the event of global war. 
The new Ministry of Defence and Defence Intelligence Staff 
The establishment of an expanded and centralised Ministry of Defence, unifying the 
"9 Ibid. 
990 TNA, CAB128/36, CC(62)76`h Conclusions, 21 December 1962; DEFE13/619, US/UK Polaris 
Agreement, 1962-3 
99 Priest, 'In American Hands', pp. 353-376, p. 356; Young, 'Polaris Lobby', pp. 56-86 
992 Miller, Cold War, p. 111 
993 Grove, Vanguard, pp. 230-242 
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administrative parts of the three services, had been a goal for some, not least Macmillan, 
since 1957.995 Ewen Broadbent, retired Second Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of 
Defence, described some feeling among notable figures that, although achieving a 
`substantive outcome' in the Sandy Review, it had done so `in spite of the 
organisation'996 In 1958 the Defence White Paper saw one major move in the direction 
of centralisation in the creation of the post of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) to 
replace that of Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 
97 This foreshadowed the 
1963-4 changes in some respects but was particularly important when the rotation of 
CDS between the services came to the Admiralty and Admiral of the Fleet Lord 
Mountbatten, First Sea Lord in 1959. He favoured `all advice on the key areas - defence 
policy, plans and operations, weapons systems - being channelled through the Chief of 
the Defence Staff to the Minister. '998 
In 1962 Mountbatten `put on paper [his] thoughts on the central organisation' in which 
he argued that the problems had `never been more apparent than today'. 999 Peter 
Thorneycroft, who had been Secretary of State for Defence for only three months, was 
reluctant to go as far as the CDS wished and was unwilling to `endorse all his proposals 
for ... reform'. 
1°°° Thorneycroft and Macmillan, therefore, sought compromise and to 
achieve this, and somewhat soften the blow, he appointed `two senior military figures 
who were by then detached from the hurly-burly but who were both held in high respect 
by the services and who had deep experience of the subject' to inquire into the form 
99a Miller, Cold War, p. 111 
993 Sir Ewen Broadbent, The Military and the Government from Macmillan to Heseltine, (Macmillan 
Press, 1988) p. 20-8 
996 Ibid. p. 20 
997 The Central Organisation for Defence, Cmnd 476 (London: HMSO, 1958) 
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TNA, AIR8/2356, `Central Organisation for Defence - Memorandum by the Chief of the Defence 
Staff, 9 October 1962 
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integration might take. 1°°' General Lord Ismay and Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Jacob 
were appointed in December 1962 and reported in February 1963.1002 
The Ismay-Jacob recommendations, which were kept secret, involved extending `the 
Ministry of Defence to include as subordinate Departments the three Service Ministries, 
the latter to be radically changed by a geographical redistribution. The three Services to 
remain intact. ' 1003 One of the reasons given for this centralisation was the demands of 
military science which tended `to unify warlike operations, and it is more important 
than ever before that objective minds should examine the application of science to 
war... the nation can no longer afford the luxury of duplication and waste'. 1 The 
change was most significant in housing the various military staffs in one ministry, one 
location and under one Secretary of State. The Chiefs of Staff Committee `remained in 
its existing form and would be the source of collective advice to the Government'. 1005 A 
Defence Council, consisting of the Permanent Secretary, the CDS, the Chief Scientific 
Adviser (CSA) and the Service Chiefs, and chaired by the Secretary of State, was also 
established as the theoretical `ultimate decision-making body', but proved `unwieldy 
and inflexible' in practice. 1006 Major policy decisions would be tackled by the new 
Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, which would be supplemented by a `high 
powered' Official version, chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and consisting of the 
Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry of Defence, Treasury and Foreign Office, as well 
100' Broadbent, p23 
10°2 Ismay had been Churchill's liaison to the Chiefs of Staff during the Second World War and Chief of 
Staff to Lord Mountbatten during his period as the last Viceroy of India; Jacob had also served closely 
with Churchill during the war and Director-General of the BBC between 1952 and 1960. TNA, 
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1963 
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as the CDS and the CSA. 1007 
The integration of the separate scientific staffs was less of a break from the old because 
it had previously been `less constrained by traditional single-Service loyalties'. 
1008 The 
new, single CSA had a more centralised role as one of three `principal advisers' to the 
Secretary of State along with the CDS and Permanent Secretary (PUS). 
1009 This gave 
the holder, in the form of Sir Solly Zuckerman, a stronger voice in the analysis of 
nuclear defence policy. In terms of nuclear weapons policy, there was greater 
coordination and through the centralised CSA and his increased scientific staff, 
including the Assistant CSA (Nuclear) (ACSA(N)). '°'° Under Zuckerman, with his 
increasing scepticism of the value of the British deterrent, the new changes would allow 
a more powerful platform for his outlook. 
Intelligence was an area not covered by the Ismay/Jacob report but was part of the 
follow-on studies that took place between March and July 1963.1011 A dedicated 
subcommittee under the Chiefs of Staff had covered the reorganisation of intelligence, 
although few files related to its work have been released. 
1012 The machinery for the 
defence re-organisation had two parallel tracks. Under the main Defence Reorganisation 
Steering Committee, itself under the Permanent Secretaries Committee, were 
subcommittees covering legislation, budgets, common services and public relationship. 
Alongside this, reporting to COS through a working party, were subcommittees looking 
at the organisation of intelligence, communications, operations and operational 
1007 Franklyn A. Johnson, Defence by Ministry: The British Ministry of Defence, 1944-1974, (London: 
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requirements. The intelligence sub-committee was chaired by Sir Kenneth Strong, head 
of the JIB, and included the Directors of Intelligence for the three services and would 
`consult the Joint Intelligence Committee and Political Departments when 
necessary'. 
1013 
The result was the creation of the Defence Intelligence Staff out of the three service 
intelligence staffs and the JIB. 1014 It saw complete integration for defence intelligence 
work and also represented the `closure of one of the longest-running battles in British 
intelligence'. '015 Strong, who would become the first Director General of Intelligence 
(DGI), had long believed in greater coordination, particularly where it related to inter- 
service concerns, including missile and nuclear subjects. 1016 Missile intelligence 
analysis had been largely the task of technical specialists from the Air Intelligence Staff, 
but the JIC debates of the last few years had often seen problems from a lack of greater 
coordination in missile and nuclear-related intelligence (see chapter three). The 
reorganisation represented a significant success for Strong in consolidating his 
intelligence `empire' and in greater coordination between the services. Alongside the 
DGI was the Deputy Chief of Defence (Intelligence) (DCDS(I)) whose first incumbent 
would be the former Director of Naval Intelligence, Vice Admiral Sir Norman 
Denning. 1017 
The Division of Scientific Intelligence now fully integrated with the separate technical 
intelligence staffs to form the Division of Scientific and Technical Intelligence (DSTI) 
within the DIS. '°'8 This body, which had paralleled nuclear intelligence work for the 
1013 TNA, DEFE7/1898, COS(63)19`hMeeting, 19 March 1963; DEFE7/1898, `Defence Re-organisation - Organisation of Committees', Annex to COS 1531/26/3/63,26 March 1963 
'ol Ibid., p26 
1015 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, p. 566 
1016 Ibid. 
'o" TNA, CAB 159/40, JIC(64)7thMeeting, 30 January 1964 
1018 TNA, DEFE19/111, Organisation and appointment of scientific staff, 1963-5 
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previous twenty years, now became the home for the Atomic Energy Intelligence 
Division (AEID), which, under Archie Potts, was part of the JIB. 1019 SIS and AWRE 
would continue to contribute significantly to nuclear intelligence collection and 
interpretation, but for the first time it was possible to argue that nuclear intelligence was 
predominantly organised through the `normal intelligence channels' that the JIC and Sir 
Stewart Menzies had called for in 1945 (see chapter one). 
For the JIC sub-committees that dealt with nuclear-related intelligence the most visible 
immediate change was that the service representatives who formed the majority 
membership of these sub-committees and working parties saw their titles changed in the 
minutes to reflect the new DIS. 1020 However, the creation of a unified and functional 
DIS would have longer-term ramifications, particularly in the demarcation and 
relationship between DIS and JIC staff work. In discussing the pressure of work for the 
Heads of Section, the JIC proposed to await the creation of DIS to see if they `might be 
in a position to help. 102' Following the change the JIC intended to consider `whether 
their composition and terms of reference required alteration as the result of the 
formation of the Defence Intelligence Staff, but propos[ed] that action on the matter 
should be deferred for about three months'. 1022 
DIS, naturally, came to dominate sub-committees and working parties of a military 
intelligence nature. 1023 Likewise, the Defence Intelligence Air Staff continued to 
dominate missile-related intelligence. '024 The DIS would appear to have been a victim 
of its own success and the pressure on their staff would also be a contributory factor in 
1019 TNA, CAB 163/50, Organisation of JIC Secretariat, 25 November 1966 
1020 TNA, CAB 182/13 and CAB 182/14, Missile Threat Co-ordination Subcommittee Meetings, 1963 and 
1964 
1021 TNA, CAB 159/40, JIC(64)6a'Meeting, 23 January 1964 
ion TNA, CAB 159/41, JIC(64)27t'Meeting, 21 May 1964 
1023 Ibid. 
1024 CAB 182/ JIC(MT)(66)3'dMeeting, 16 March 1966 
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the establishment of a full-time JIC Assessments Staff in 1968. In May 1964, when the 
JIC revisited the question of their organisation, it was to make improvements to the 
Joint Intelligence Staff. The problem was the short period of service from staff seconded 
from intelligence agencies. As Bernard Burrows, the Chairman, argued, JIS staff with 
an intelligence background had experience of `a great deal of collation and evaluation' 
that was `largely untapped' . 
1025 Seconded staff members were also considered `too 
closely tied with their Departments with the resulting danger that papers sometimes 
represented the lowest common factors in Departmental thinking rather than well- 
thought-out studies based on longer experience'. 1026 The combination of these factors 
meant that in `comparison with the U. S. intelligence organisation', the JIC felt `our 
organisation was somewhat amateur in that we had no long-term staff involved in a 
field where continuity had... some value'. 1027 
The changes that took place by the end of 1964 saw four or five members of JIS on 
five-year secondments and with a new chairman of the JIS charged with oversight and 
requirements. 1028 It would be another four years before criticisms of the Joint 
Intelligence Staff would lead to the creation of the Assessments Staff largely in the form 
in which it still operates today. 
Keeping Polaris: The Labour Government 
In October 1964 Harold Wilson's Labour government took office amidst some 
uncertainty as to whether they would continue the British deterrent at all. Their election 
manifesto was strongly critical of the deal made by the previous administration to 
purchase from the Americans the Polaris Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile 





(SLBM) system and seemed to indicate an intention to drastically alter Britain's nuclear 
weapons policy: 
The Nassau agreement to buy Polaris know-how and Polaris missiles from the U. S. A. will add 
nothing to the deterrent strength of the western alliance, and it will mean utter dependence on 
the U. S. for their supply. Nor is it true that all this costly defence expenditure will produce an 
"independent British deterrent". It will not be independent and it will not be British and it will 
not deter. We are not prepared any longer to waste the country's resources on endless 
duplication of strategic nuclear weapons. We shall propose the re-negotiation of the Nassau 
agreement. 1029 
Despite implying Labour would not proceed with Polaris, by the end of 1964 a 
provisional decision had been made to continue with its development. When the subject 
first came to ministerial discussion under Labour, in November, any question of re- 
negotiation or cancellation was instead entirely subsumed by the main topic under 
debate, how to proceed with the inherited proposal for the Multi-Lateral Force (MLF), 
the US plan to satisfy West German nuclear desires with a mixed-manned nuclear fleet. 
The reasons for and against three, four or five Polaris submarines were therefore 
discussed in relation to how they might affect negotiation for an Atlantic Nuclear Force 
(ANF), the alternative to the MLF promoted by the Wilson government. Wilson had 
already decided on this course of action earlier in the year. In February Denis Healey 
had met, confidentially, with Peter Thorneycroft, in which the former tested the idea of 
pooling the Polaris submarines with the US and assigning them to NATO. 1030 This 
reassured the Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-Home, that `when [Wilson] got into 
government I thought he would carry on the programme, so [the manifesto] didn't 
1029 The New Britain, (London: Labour, 1964) http: //www. psr. keele. ac. uk/areßa/uk/man/1ab64. htm 
1030 TNA, PREM11/4733, 'Talks on Defence Policy with Members of HM Opposition', Thorneycroft to 
Douglas-Home, 3 February 1964 
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worry me unduly. ' 
1031 
Under the ANF scheme Britain would retain control of its Polaris submarines but would 
still make them available for a joint NATO fleet, including both US and UK SSBNs 
[Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear], and which could also include for a mixed-manned 
surface fleet to allow German involvement at that level. Frank Panton, still involved in 
nuclear intelligence at this time, argued that the `main attribute of the ANF was that it 
sank the MLF without trace, and I think that was its purpose. ' 
1032 John Young, 
examining the ANF/MLF discussions, rejects Wilson's own claim that the decision not 
to cancel the whole Polaris deal was because production was `well past the point of no 
return' and the cost of cancellation or of turning those already built into non-nuclear 
Hunter-Killer submarines was too great. 1033 The memoirs of the new Minister of 
Defence, Denis Healey, corroborates this and reveals that he was told by Wilson and 
Patrick Gordon Walker, Foreign Secretary, `not to let the other members of the Cabinet 
know' 1034 
Initially, Healey and Wilson established this position with input by various officials 
involved. Focus on Polaris as a `political weapon' was strikingly put on the 11 
November by officials at the first MISC 16 meeting, an ad hoc Cabinet committee on 
the `Atlantic Nuclear Force' between just Wilson, Healey and Gordon Walker. 1035 The 
three discussed the advice of senior officials put forward by Sir Burke Trend, the 
Cabinet Secretary: 
In considering the justification for United Kingdom POLARIS submarines it should be borne in 
'o; ' Hennessy, Muddling Through, p. 114 
1032 Panton, workshop, 27 March 2007 
1033 Young, `Killing the MLF', p300 
1034 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life, (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), p. 302 
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mind that their acquisition would, after the end of service of the V-bomber Force, be our only 
means of access to United States technology in the field of nuclear missiles. 1036 
The CSA at the MOD, Zuckerman, prepared a paper setting put what he saw as the 
general policy towards which the Labour Government was aiming: 
Unless we can decrease the size of our NATO burden, few, if any, resources now going into 
defence are likely to be liberated for use in other sectors of the economy. '03' 
Combined with this was the immediate need `to find some way of satisfying West 
German nuclear aspirations', which would mean giving them a say in NATO nuclear 
control without the need for the mixed manned fleet at that time favoured by the US. 
However, bringing the West Germans into `the share of the control', Zuckerman 
believed, would `have little purpose for [Britain] unless it were made conditional on the 
Americans carrying the Germans with them in a genuine approach to the Russians to 
accelerate by whatever means possible the process of detente. ' 1038 Such a trade-off 
would only be possible, he continued, were Britain in possession of a sufficiently strong 
bargaining tool: 
Our `V' bomber force is far less impressive as a lever through which we could exercise our 
influence than is our potential fleet of POLARIS submarines. Obviously political judgement 
rather than mathematical calculation is going to decide just how big a lever we need to have in 
our hands. My own belief is that to be meaningful as a political weapon... this means five and at 
the very least four boats; three boats would not provide an assured second strike capability. 1039 
This reference to `an assured second strike capability' is the only point in Zuckerman's 
'036 TNA, CAB130/212, MISC16/Ist Meeting; `Atlantic Nuclear Force', 11 November 1964 




summary where the defensive role of Polaris appears to come into his thinking. 1040 
Indeed, throughout this November 1964 debate, the question of the threat that Polaris 
was supposed to counter seems to have played a significantly less visible part of the 
Government's thinking than any previous administration. It is only with the preparation 
of the Ministry of Defence's contribution that this aspect of the deterrent came into the 
equation. The MOD paper argued that five boats, constituting a minimum of two boats 
and 32 missiles on patrol at any time, was necessary because; 
The destructive capacity of 32 missiles is comparable to that of the present V-bomber force and 
would, in the early 1970's at least, ensure the destruction of some 20 major Soviet cities. The 
Joint Intelligence Committee consider that this would, in Soviet eyes, undoubtedly represent an 
unacceptable level of damage - and thus a credible deterrent. 
1041 
The centrality of the Soviet threat to the purpose of Polaris, whatever the political 
arguments focused upon, was made fundamentally clear in the last paragraph of the 
MOD paper when it reiterated that `the British Polaris force is planned only in relation 
to the U. S. S. R. ... There are at present no plans 
for using the Polaris force except 
against Russia. ' 1042 
Of course, it must be reiterated how far the official records denote the line which 
Wilson and Healey took in order to `sell the continuation of Polaris to a wider group of 
Ministers'. 1043 Speaking to Peter Hennessy some years later about their initial 
discussion in MISC 16 on 11 November - at which Healey and Wilson established their 
positions - Healey revealed that he felt wider strategic concerns, albeit as an 
afterthought to cost, were a strong factor: 
1040Ibid, 
1041 TNA, CAB 130/213, MISC17/7, `Atlantic Nuclear Force: The Size of the British Polaris Force', 20 
November 1964 
1042 Ibid. 
1043 Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb, p. 80 
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The basic reason [for deciding to proceed with the purchase in some form] was that the deal 
which Macmillan had got out of Kennedy was a very good one. It was a very cheap system for 
the capability it offered... the saving from cancellation would have been minimal, and given the 
uncertainties - the Cuban missile crisis was only a year or two behind us, the memory of 
Hungary [in 1956] was still in out minds, Khrushchev had been deposed the day before the 
British poll, the Chinese had just exploded their bomb the same day - we felt, on the whole, it 
was wise to continue with it. 1044 
Thus the decision was diverted into a question of how many boats to retain. Wilson 
planned to take it to a weekend Chequers meeting on `Defence Policy' on 21 and 22 
November that involved a larger group of ministers, though not the full Cabinet. On the 
Sunday discussion of the number of boats was, according to the minutes, limited to the 
three or four boat options after two or five boats were ruled out as `inadequate' and 
`unnecessarily high' respectively. 1045 It was generally agreed that a three-boat force 
would, as the cycle of operations and refits would leave Britain without a permanent 
submarine at sea, not meet the requirement of the UK being able to deter alone. 
However, those in favour of three boats questioned whether such a scenario could 
reasonably occur. It was acknowledged that while three Polaris vessels `did not provide 
full national insurance should NATO break up, not only did the latter seem most 
improbable, but even if it were to happen we could not hope to maintain our national 
security alone, but should be bound to seek the negotiation of alternative alliances. ' 1046 
This reflected the 1964 manifesto, which argued that the previous Government had 
based `its policy on the assumption that Britain must be prepared to go it alone without 
her allies in an all-out thermo-nuclear war with the Soviet Union, involving the 
obliteration of our people'. Labour felt that, by `constantly reiterating this appalling 
1044 Hennessy, Muddling Through, p115 
1045 TNA, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/4`s Meeting, `Defence Policy', 22 November 1964 
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assumption the Government is undermining the alliance on which our security now 
depends'. 1047 
It was a rejection of what had been one of the core tenets of deterrence; that, even if 
Britain was not practically likely to find itself against the Soviet Union without NATO 
or US support, deterrence had to imply that they could do so if necessary. Such a 
position, long held by officials and the military, was also shared by previous 
administrations and was clearly set-out in the Conservative government's April 1964 
Defence White Paper: 
The keystone of this policy is the prevention of war. If we and our allies fail to prevent major 
war, none of the other objectives can be attained... Yet, until true disarmament becomes a 
reality, it is the overwhelming power of these very weapons and the determination of the nations 
not to provoke their own destruction that keep the peace... Early and provident fear, as Burke 
said, is the mother of safety. 1048 
When the Chequers meeting was reported to the full Cabinet the following Thursday 
(26 November) the decision to retain Polaris was effectively a foregone conclusion. For 
one who was not at Chequers, Richard Crossman, Minister of Housing, this was a 
Wilsonian tactic: 
I soon realized that the Prime Minister was trying to get a mandate for proposing a British 
alternative to the American M. L. F. when he got to Washington. What interested me was the 
implication that he intended to retain nuclear weapons... and that Harold Wilson and Denis 
Healey wouldn't regard this as incompatible with our election pledges because they could claim 
that our Government was consciously giving up the attempt to have an independent 
1046 Ibid. 
104' Labour Party Manifesto 1964, The New Britain 
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deterrent. 1049 
Whilst there is no evidence that the JIC were thinking along the same lines as ministers, 
there is some that intelligence assessments had come to view deterrence in more 
complex terms than earlier definitions. Back in March 1964 the JIC issued a report on 
`Likely Development of Soviet Policy up to 1970'. The report's terms of reference, 
dated 1 November 1963, stated that the `JIC [had] been asked by the Defence and 
Oversea Policy (Official) Committee' to produce it, the same group of people whose 
views Burke Trend was to transmit to Wilson at MISC 16 on 11 November. '050 It was 
much more political in nature than most JIC reports, particularly the way it dealt with 
the intentions of the Soviet leadership. The JIC broke the question up into four headings 
- `strategic, economic, internal and foreign policy. 
"05' The Strategic section dealt most 
directly with their policy towards nuclear defence and the Soviet deterrent. They now 
argued that, in general, they did `not believe that the Russians are trying to match the 
United States in weight of strategic attack'. Instead, the USSR was `already able, even 
after receiving a surprise attack, to devastate large areas of Europe and to inflict grave 
damage on the United States and that the focus for the USSR would therefore be on 
continuing `to reduce its vulnerability'. '052 
Officially, according to the Cabinet minutes of 26 November 1964, the `precise number 
of these submarines would be for further consideration ... The size of the reduction to 
be made ... could be determined only 
in the light of further detailed examination of the 
requirement'. '°53 In the end this would consist of Healey informing Wilson in early 
1D49 Richard Crossman, Diaries. Vol 1 1964-66 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1976), p. 73, entry for 26 
November 1964 
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1965 that pressures of `long-lead items' required a decision, one that was taken fairly 
perfunctorily for four boats at a meeting of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, 
rather than the full Cabinet, on 29 January 1965.1054 
Wilson and Healey had successfully tackled the reconciliation of party pressures for 
disarmament with the pressures, once in government, to maintain the deterrent. 
Continuing with what was already being planned, and avoiding the consequences of 
cancellation and effective abandonment of the UK's nuclear force was one thing. As the 
decade wore on, the characteristic cycle of defence planning meant that the Labour 
Government would also be faced with the question of what to do next. The difficulty, as 
former Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence Sir Kevin Tebbit explained, was 
that if `you are sustaining a technological capacity throughout a period, when politicians 
decide to drop in from time to time to decide what they want to do next they tend to 
forget that everything has to keep happening when they are not paying attention, 
otherwise they don't have the options. 1055 Yet, both Wilson and Healey were aware in 
early 1965 that a new step in the arms race was on the horizon, one that would put 
pressure on a consideration of upgrading Polaris to keep apace with Soviet 
developments. 
1054 TNA, CAB 148/19, Healey to Wilson, 6 Jan 1965, OPD(65)4; CAB 148/19, ODP(65)5'hMeeting, 29 
January 1965 
1055 Sir Kevin Tebbit, workshop, 27 March 2007 
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Chanter Five, Intelligence, ABMs and Polaris Improvement, 1965-70 
In the late 1960s a storm brewed at the heart of the British government over the 
question of upgrading Britain's planned nuclear Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile 
system (SLBM), Polaris, to counter developing Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
defences. Though the Labour Government initiated the studies upon which it would be 
based, the Polaris improvement programme, codenamed `Super-Antelope', was not 
approved until the subsequent Conservative Government took office in June 1970, after 
which it became known as `Chevaline'. 
1056 The upgrade was operational by 1982, two 
years after its existence was finally revealed to Parliament. 
'057 Throughout its 
development, and particularly in the initial studies on its feasibility, the programme 
generated controversy because of its expense and conflicting opinions as to whether it 
was necessary-1058 Examining the impact of intelligence assessments on the late-1960s 
Polaris-upgrade debate reveals much about the origins of the programme. It also came 
to the heart of arguments about the form and purpose of the British nuclear deterrent. 
The evidence from intelligence was one of many factors that shaped the course of 
British defence policy during these years. Yet the link between intelligence and nuclear 
weapons is important because certain choices, such as Polaris improvement, were 
intrinsically tied to the threat they were intended to counter. Super Antelope was 
predicated upon the progress of a Soviet ABM system around the Moscow region. 
ABMs employed defensive nuclear explosions to disable incoming warheads before 
1056 Baylis and Stoddart, `Britain and the Chevaline Project'; Proceedings, 'UK Strategic Deterrent', ; 
Stoddart, `The Wilson Government', pp. 1-33 
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1058 Zuckerman, Monkeys, especially pp. 386-399; David Owen, Time to Declare, (London: Penguin, 
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they re-entered the atmosphere. In Britain, the consequences of this development saw 
some insiders questioning the logic of the UK `keeping up with the Joneses' in the, 
primarily bi-polar, superpower nuclear arms race. 1059 It was the view of Sir Solly 
Zuckerman, by then CSA at the Cabinet Office, who would be one of the most vocal 
opponents to Polaris upgrade, and, in the end, critical of the whole rationale behind the 
British deterrent. 1060 In 1966, Labour was re-elected on a manifesto pledging to 
`internationalise [the UK's] strategic forces' and preventing the `spread of nuclear 
weapons'. 1061 Implicit in this was the expectation that no follow-up system to Polaris 
would be adopted. 
The efficacy of the Soviet ABM programme and the credibility, in Soviet eyes, of the 
Polaris A-3 missiles were both questions to which UK intelligence had to contribute 
answers. However, the interrelation between Anglo-American collaboration on both 
nuclear weapons development and nuclear intelligence again meant that the lack of one 
would affect the course of the other. In this case, a reluctance to be drawn into costly 
commitments to developing beyond Polaris directly affected the types and amount of 
information the US were willing or able to share. This had consequences for the quality 
and timing of the advice the JIC and AWRE were able to offer on the development. 
Early ABM intelligence and Poseidon 
The threat of ABMs was a subject that Macmillan had been considering in 1961. When 
Kennedy visited him at Birch Grove in December, one of the subjects discussed, along 
with the recent crisis in Berlin and wall, was the growing question of defensive missile 
measures: 
1059 Zuckerman, Monkeys, p. 387 
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The last Russian tests are rather alarming. We know that they are working very hard on an `anti- 
missile' missile. They have built a town of 20,000 people wholly devoted to scientific work in 
this sphere... I made a tremendous appeal to the [President] that we shd make another effort - in 
spite of the Russian trickery, and bad faith - to put a stop to all this folly. We have agreed only 
now to make some preparation for renewed tests - prob at Christmas Island - on this anti- 
missile development. 1062 
The development of British intelligence assessments on the Soviet ABM threat can seen 
in the work of the JIC's subcommittee on Missile Threat (MTSC) and its working party 
(MTWP) from the early 1960s. Initially the groups continued their focus upon Surface- 
to-Air Missiles (SAMs) that had been part of the USSR's anti-aircraft defences since 
1953.1063 What is now known, and would be realised in JIC circles by 1965-6, was that 
the USSR programme involved upgrading some of these SAM sites to Anti-Ballistic 
Missiles ABMs, through improvements in radar and missiles. 1064 Thus it is worth 
tracing how and when new intelligence in this field was incorporated into assessments. 
From 1961 American satellites had brought useful imagery of both SAM and ABM 
sites, providing further detail on the types of systems used and anticipated performance. 
The UK received this via GCHQ and JARIC, the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence 
Centre, whose officers would be present in the MTSC or WP when such matters were 
under discussion. Intelligence was also collected by more traditional means, including 
photographs taken by Western military attaches both with and without Soviet 
knowledge. 1065 On 25 March 1964 the MTWP were informed that a British official in 
Moscow had flown `over two SA-1 sites in a Soviet airliner on 24th January, [but] the 
1062 Catterall, Macmillan Diaries, entry for 23 December 1961 
1°63 Podvig, Russian Strategic, p. 404 
1064 Ibid. pp. 413-5 
'°65 Catherine Haddon, UK-US Intelligence and the Soviet Nuclear Threat, 1955-1965', subsequent 
discussion, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (MCIS) in collaboration with British Rocketry 
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fact that this flight took place at a lower altitude than usual suggests the possibility that 
Western observers saw only what they were intended to see. 1066 
ABMs were, in fact, several defensive systems working together which, given the 
different technologies they incorporated, meant that they were covered by different parts 
of the intelligence organisation. 1067 They needed to `intercept one missile with another 
missile and to explode a charge in the vicinity of the former which is sufficient to 
destroy or disable the warhead'. 1068 It involved a range of technologies: 
The ability to detect, identify and track an incoming missile attack is a function of information 
technology. The ability to intercept it is, in addition, a function of missile technology. The 
ability to destroy an offensive warhead is, to a large extent, a function of defensive warhead 
design. 1069 
By 1962-3 there were signs that the Soviets were beginning to test ABM components in 
situ, particularly radar tracking systems. In September 1963 the MTWP's contribution 
to the JIC paper `Soviet Bloc War Potential' on Soviet SA-2 sites that saw a new 
paragraph indicating recent intelligence: 
It is believed that development of an A. B. M. system has been undertaken with high priority 
since the end of 1960, and that construction of sites for A. B. M. deployment around one or two 
targets of major importance has been nearly completed. It is estimated that an A. B. M. system 
could already be in limited operational use for the defence of LENINGRAD. 1070 
This deployment turned out to be a proving ground for Soviet ABM work that would 
later be abandoned. On 21 October 1964 Squadron Leader Edwards, a representative 
1066 TNA, CAB 182/21, JIC(MT)(WP)(64)7`hMeeting, 25 March 1964, Confidential Annex 
1067 Stoddart, `The Wilson Government', p. 7, n. 46 
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from the Air Ministry, was able to report US intelligence, shared with the British at a 
recent UK-US Air Defence Conference, that `the Leningrad system had been reassessed 
as an anti-air-to-surface (A. SM. ) System. ' 1071 
The JIC were still unable to give any specifics on major ABM development in the 
USSR. The committee was aware of the future threat Soviet ABM would pose and, 
therefore, the high requirement for intelligence in this field, well before Labour came to 
power. In March 1964 the JIC stated that one of the measures the Soviets had been 
adopting `in recent years' to reduce the vulnerability of their deterrent was the 
development of `air defences including an anti-ballistic missile system'. 1072 The same 
month they were anticipating a high requirement for this topic. It was reported at the 
JIC's Missile Threat Sub-Committee that there was expected to be `considerable interest 
in the Anti-Ballistic Missile System... when the [Missile Threat Working Party's] 
report on `Soviet Bloc Air Defence Missile Capabilities 1964-1968' was distributed. 1073 
In October 1964, and throughout the time that Labour Ministers had been looking at 
Polaris in connection to the ANF/MLF, intelligence was starting to draw conclusions 
about the ABM impact on the planned British Polaris force. On 1 October the JIC's 
attention was drawn to a DIS-produced report on `Soviet Air Defence Policy'. 
Denning, the new DCDS(I), queried whether the `validity of the assessment made in the 
last paragraph of the conclusions should be reviewed against the introduction of the 
Polaris'. '074 He called on the committee to review the `phraseology used' and argued 
that the paragraph's conclusions were not `weighed in the paper' even though they 
1°70 TNA, CAB 182/20, Missile Threat Co-ordination Working Party, 1963, JIC (MT)(WP) 14/63 -'Draft 
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`might be substantially correct'. 1075 The paper in question, which has not been released 
among the main JIC memoranda, appears to have been an expansion on the JIC's 
previous conclusions about Soviet Air Defences. '°76 An earlier assessment gives an 
approximate of the paragraph in question: 
There is already a very widespread deployment of a surface-to-air missile system which unless 
degraded by a previous missile attack, should be effective against attacks by manned bombers at 
medium and high altitudes... They are giving priority to countering the increasing threat from 
missiles and an A. B. M system limited to terminal interception of I. R. B. Ms and M. R. B. Ms 
might be deployed during the period in defence of a limited number of targets of special 
importance. This system might have a very limited capability against I. C. B. M. s'077 
The paper Denning criticised appears to have taken these conclusions and applied them 
specifically to British capabilities with more pessimistic results. When the JIC met to 
discuss the subject again a week later Denning reiterated his point that it was not a 
question of the veracity of the conclusions, but that `an assessment of United 
Kingdom... capabilities against Soviet Air Defences had not been weighed in the 
paper'. 1078 However, it is his next point that is most revealing about the lines drawn 
between intelligence conclusions and defence advice, and particularly about the need to 
provide Ministers with a clear picture: 
If Ministers required a more general assessment, which took into account not only Soviet air 
defences but also United Kingdom... capabilities, this would be provided by other Ministry of 
Defence papers based, inter alia, on this report. '0'9 
1075 Ibid. 
1076 TNA, CAB 158/53, JIC(64)46, The paper is described as being in `Secretary's Standard File', at time 
of writing it has not been released amongst other papers with that description from the 1950s. 
107 TNA, CAB 158/51, JIC(64) 4, 'Employment of Soviet Forces in the Event of General War up to the 
End of 1968', 24 February 1964 
1°78 TNA, CAB 159/42, JIC(64)50'hMeeting, 8 October 1964 
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Denning did not feel that intelligence assessments were able, at that time, to fully 
analyse the likely performance of the Polaris A3 against the expected Soviet ABM 
system as it was currently understood. The UK just did not have enough information on 
the exo-atmospheric explosions that defined ABM and their effect on the Polaris 
warheads. Nevertheless, Denning's acknowledgement that the pessimistic view might 
well be correct, if not supported at that time by the evidence, shows that there was some 
belief that Polaris would be challenged by this development. 
Wilson and Healey were briefed on the latest and likely future developments in nuclear 
technology. A letter from Healey to Wilson in January 1965 is revealing both of this 
and in terms of Healey's commitment at this time to avoid upgrading beyond Polaris. 
He informed Wilson of American President Lyndon Johnson's recent speech to 
Congress, announcing that the US intended to develop a successor missile to Polaris, 
Poseidon C3. '°8° This, with a Multiple Independently-Targetable Re-entry Vehicle 
(MIRV) capability, would increase the number of targets and thus confuse radar 
tracking. Healey thought it was `an aspect of strategic deterrent development which is of 
interest to the U. K. '108' 
The Americans have so far fully implemented Article IV of the Polaris Sales Agreement by 
keeping us informed of the general aims of the POSEIDON development... Our position may 
be summed up briefly. If POSEIDON goes into production, we could, if we wanted to, opt to 
buy it under the provisions of the Polaris Sales Agreement... However, the [Polaris] A. 3 
missile, which will remain standard American equipment, is completely adequate and suitable 
for known British needs - at any rate in the early life of our boats. A final decision might 
soso Lyndon B. Johnson, `Special Message to the Congress on the State of the Nation's Defenses', 18 
January 1965. Accessible at American Presidency Project: 
htt: //www. r sidenc . ucsb. edu/ws/index. 
h? id=26974&st=&stl, 9 May 2008 
1081 TNA, PREM13/228, Healey to Wilson, 22 January 1965 
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depend on evaluation of the targets to be covered. 
'082 
A month later it was clear that the US did not consider the A3 to be `completely 
adequate' any longer. A note from the Foreign Secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker, to 
Wilson brought to Wilson's attention a statement by Secretary of Defense, Robert 
McNamara. 1083 McNamara, addressing the House Armed Services Committee on 
Poseidon progress, had stated that the US was `still uncertain about the ultimate shelf 
life of the present Polaris missile and the time when a potential aggressor might deploy 
an ABM system'. '°84 Wilson became concerned as to what the `shelf life' might refer. 
What McNamara meant was the expected future capability of the missiles - how long 
they would be sufficiently advanced to keep ahead of Soviet attempts to defend against 
them. Gordon Walker's was concerned that Britain would find its Polaris nuclear force 
undermined by technological advance: 
I would not wish to read too much into the McNamara statement, but it certainly looks as if the 
Americans now foresee the possibility of the development by the Russians of an ABM system 
and that a sophisticated missile like Poseidon thus becomes essential if vital areas of the Soviet 
Union are to be penetrated. This means, of course, that at the time when we are embarking on 
the costly course of building a Polaris fleet the Americans are adopting a policy that will once 
again mean we are providing weapons which are about to become obsolescent. Thus true to 
form we either buy weapons which don't exist or buy those destined for the junkyard of Steptoe 
'oss and Son. 
There were similarities with the Blue Streak/Skybolt crises that had led to the Polaris 
purchase in the first place. The difference was that this time, in reverse, the dilemma 
would lead to Britain seeking a home-grown solution. 
1082 Ibid. 
1083 TNA, PREM13/228, Gordon Walker to Wilson, 24 February 1965 
1084 Ibid. 
259 
By 1967 the topic would come to vex Labour Ministers at a time when crises over 
devaluation, defence spending cuts and subsequent withdrawal from bases East of Suez 
provided added pressure. '°86 As will be seen, a combination of intelligence warnings 
and evidence from the US about the susceptibility of the A3 to ABM nuclear explosions 
from mid-1966 would begin to sway the argument towards, at the very least, further 
study of Polaris improvement options. The ABM question and the decision to upgrade 
Polaris would also go to the core of the debate over what constituted a realistic, as well 
as credible, deterrent to the USSR. 
Super-Antelope: An Intelligence-led Solution? 
It was yet another moment of Soviet propaganda that would push intelligence forward. 
Lacking substantial access to the growing technical knowledge on ABM in the US, the 
JIC repeated American assessments that `believed that the Russians would not have any 
anti-ballistic-missile missile system before 1970'. 
1087 In fact, the USSR's Moscow ABM system would stall in 1967 precisely because of 
the `system's inability to intercept ballistic missiles with independently targetable re- 
entry vehicles and ABM penetration aids. ' 1088 In November 1964 the USSR displayed 
two new missiles, which were given the codename `Galosh'. It would take nearly a full 
year for the DSTI to produce a substantial report on the missiles `based solely on parade 
photography'. 1089 This material fed into a section on the Soviet Air Force in the JIC's 
1965 `Periodic Intelligence Summary for NATO Commands'. 1090 Galosh, it reported, 
was initially `shown in the November 1964 Moscow parade and two - probably the 
1085 Ibid. 
1086 Dockrill, East of Suez; Dock ill, British Defence, pp. 93-8 
1087 TNA, CAB 182/21, JIC(MT)(WP)(64) I Oth Meeting, 6 May 1964 
1088 Podvig, Russian Strategic, pp. 414-5 
1089 TNA, DEFE44/115, `Moscow Parade - November 1964-5: GALOSH- A. M. M. ', August 1965 
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same - in May 1965'. 
1091 
Only the missile's booster nozzles were visible, the rest being hidden within a cylinder but there 
is evidence that the missile has two stages, a liquid or solid sustainer and a cluster of four solid 
boosters. GALOSH is launched from within the cylinder and is almost certainly intended as an 
exo-atmospheric AMM [Anti-Missile Missile] interceptor. No associated equipment has been 
identified and the system operation, deployment and effectiveness is unknown. 1092 
In 1966 the link was made explicit and Galosh became the main focus for ABM 
intelligence. The 1966 version of `Soviet Bloc War Potential' now examined in detail 
`Anti-missile missile Systems'. The JIC warned that they still had `no knowledge of any 
comprehensive Soviet AMM systems although they are known to have an extensive 
research and development programme and published statements of the leaders indicate 
that deployment has [occurred]'. 1093 There was, however, a firmer view of the success it 
afforded the USSR. It was now `assessed as a high performance AMM designed for 
exo-atmospheric interception employing a nuclear warhead'. 1094 
It is to be expected that the defence of Moscow would be given priority in any limited 
deployment of an AMM system with a significant capability against ICBM. Current reports of 
modification to certain of the SA-1 sites together with the construction of large radars suggest 
that the installation of a new weapon system has begun. Some sites will probably become 
operational during the period [to 1970]. 1095 
This report marked a significant change with the previous year. However, it was an ad 
hoc paper by the MTWP assessing evidence on SAM deployment in Leningrad, 








circulated in April, that reveals the degree to which British intelligence were now 
focusing on Soviet ABM success with increased concern. The paper, `Assessment of 
New Soviet Air Defence System Deployment', dated 6 April 1966, identified that `the 
Russians have gradually been progressing from the SA-2 SAM system towards an 
AMM system'. 1096 The difficulty for intelligence, mentioned when Galosh first 
appeared, was in identifying and assessing the associated equipment necessary for an 
ABM system, particularly radar tracking and interception. The ABM system around 
Moscow, known as System A-35 in the USSR, began in 1959 and saw the construction 
of facilities from 1962. It was scheduled to become operational on 7 November 1967 
but only began tests in that year. A ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) for 
the system was located at sites on the periphery of the USSR, and given the codename 
`Henhouse'. The tracking of missiles for interception was through radars built 70km 
from Moscow (`Doghouse'). 1097 
In their February 1965 report on Soviet Bloc War Potential the JIC reported that `large 
radars are believed to be under construction which could function in an acquisition role 
for an AMM system or as the radar component of a ballistic missile early warning 
system [but] there is at present no evidence to suggest that a system capable of giving a 
comprehensive early warning of ballistic missile attack has been deployed. ' 1098 The 
following year the updated version of this paper contained the same paragraph, but 
referred to the BMEWS for the first time as `Hen House'. '°99 As Soviet construction 
continued, so intelligence was able to fuller provide an account of their progress. 
1096TNA, CAB182/23, JIC(MT)(WP)5/66, `Assessment of New Soviet Air Defence System 
Deployment', 6 April 1966 
109 Podvig, Russian Strategic, pp. 413-5; Baylis and Stoddart, `Britain and the Chevaline Project', pp. 
127-8; R. G. Ridley, 'Soviet ABM Challenge to UK Polaris A3T', Proceedings of the Royal Aeronautical 
Society, `The History of the UK Strategic Deterrent: The Chevaline Programme, 28 October 2004, p. B-1 
1098 TNA, CAB 158/56, JIC(65)3, `Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1965-69', 18 February 1965 
1099 TNA, CAB 158/61, JIC(66)3, 'Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1966-70', 7 February 1966 
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HEN HOUSE radars have been under construction for some time in the Kola Peninsula and on 
the Baltic Coast, and the former is believed to be close to operational status... these radars 
should be capable of detecting and tracking practically any type of ballistic missile approaching 
north-western USSR launched from the United States or intermediate areas. This system would 
provide up to seventeen minutes warning to Moscow of attack from the United States. ' 100 
All the intelligence showed that the USSR was pressing ahead in their ABM 
development. Yet the deficiency of intelligence on accompanying radar work 
undermined the ability of the JIC to provide detailed advice on the technical difficulties 
that would stall progress and the eventual capability of any ABM system. This factor 
would become the main point upon which debates about upgrading Polaris rested. The 
evidence that the Polaris A3 warheads were susceptible to the effects of an ABM exo- 
atmospheric nuclear explosion would be countered by doubts about the ability of such a 
system to successfully target large numbers of incoming warheads. 
The accumulating intelligence was beginning to propel the government towards a 
reconsideration of any further Polaris upgrade. On 28 September 1966, Wilson, wishing 
to `provide a focus of discussion and to enable a comprehensive and consistent view to 
be taken of all the issues involved before major decisions of policy were reached', set 
up a standing Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy (PN). 1101 At the first meeting, 
Foreign Secretary, George Brown, set out what he hoped to achieve in a forthcoming 
visit to Washington. Brown told the group that he hoped to `clarify the United States 
attitude on the wider question of the United Kingdom retaining a nuclear defence 
capability. ' 1102 In discussion it was argued, anonymously in the minutes, that it `was 
often said that we could no longer count on United States co-operation in nuclear 
10° TNA, CAB 158/65, JIC(67)3, `Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1967-71', 16 February 1967 
1101 TNA, CAB134/3120, PN(66)13'Meeting, 28 September 1966 
1102 Ibid. 
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defence matters unless we retained a nuclear weapons capability. It was not clear, 
however, whether this represented the settled policy of the United States 
Administration, and particularly of the President himself'. 1103 
In fact the Labour government's reluctance to be drawn into decisions to upgrade 
Polaris was causing problems to the UK-US nuclear relationship. Sir Solly Zuckerman, 
CSA at the MOD, has been seen as a major cause. Panton identifies the most significant 
moment as being Zuckerman's statement to a joint UK-US meeting in 1965 that `the 
UK had no interest in research into new nuclear warhead systems beyond Polaris. From 
that point up-to-date information from the US ... began to dry up. ' 
1104 In addition, 
Labour's reluctance to approve UK testing in the Nevada desert was both stifling 
AWRE progress and reducing the ability of the UK to `make sufficient contribution to 
1958 agreement exchanges to ensure that the US interest in [the UK] would 
continue'. "' 
Kate Pyne, technical historian at AWRE, has also emphasised disinclination towards 
future technological development as having led to the lack of a significant UK 
contribution to Anglo-American collaboration: 
You've got the Director at that time, Ted Newly, saying `Can we think of something to impress 
the Americans, some new deterrent system? ' ... the 1958 Bi-lateral was - "moribund" would be 
too strong a word for it, but it was deteriorating fast, lying down and not being energised at all. 
It is a trade; you have to have something to get the Americans interested. 1106 
Panton argued that this `drying up of up-to-date information from the US under the 
1958 Agreement in the second half of the 1960s [also] precluded information on 
1103 Ibid. 
11°4 Panton, `Governments, Scientists', p. 6 
1105 Ibid. 
1106 Kate Pyne, workshop, 27 March 2007 
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vulnerability [of Polaris A3] being obtained' from the US. 1107 Whilst UK intelligence 
knew about the ABM progress in the US and USSR, they required greater detail on 
Polaris vulnerability from the US. This was one thing that initial AWRE studies in 
Polaris improvement were to address. 
The difficulty facing the government was that of economic pressures. The mid to late 
1960s was a period of rolling defence reviews. In March 1966 cuts to the UK's military 
presence in the Mediterranean accompanied the cancellation of a planned new aircraft 
carrier led to the resignations of both Christopher Mayhew, the Navy Minister, and 
Admiral Sir David Luce, the Chief of the Naval Staff. ' los A particular concern was 
whether the UK could maintain the spread of bases to enable strategic deployment in the 
Far East. The loss of the carrier put added pressure on the ability to deploy `East of 
Suez'. 11°9 The ministerial Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (OPD) agreed in 
March 1967 that Britain should begin to draw back from bases in South East Asia. ' 110 
A draft MOD paper prepared at Healey's request in early 1967 `on the case for retaining 
a British nuclear capability' emphasised that the 1966 Defence Review and Defence 
Expenditure Studies had balanced with `the retention of nuclear power'. 111 I 
Any decisions which might alter this basic assumption would have far reaching repercussions 
on both our foreign and defence policies and the study of these implications could not be 
adequately completed in the next week or two... The keystone of British defence policy is the 
prevention of war in Europe and this is based primarily on the West's nuclear deterrent. 
Deterrence depends on convincing the Soviet Government that they would attract unacceptable 
1107 Frank Panton, `Governments, Scientists', p. 6 
1108 Dockrill, East of Suez, pp. 157-9 
109 Ibid. 
1110 TNA, CAB148/30, OPD(67)14thMeeting, 22 March 1967 
1111 TNA, DEFE15/544, Sabbatini to Broadbent, 3 Jan 1967 
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devastation from aggression. 1112 
The report, produced by staff under Frank Cooper, Assistant Under-Secretary of State 
(Policy) (AUS (P05)) to the CDS, also saw particular danger at a time when `there 
could be doubts about the United States' will to risk nuclear devastation by using their 
nuclear weapons in defence of Europe... With the growing American disenchantment 
with their European allies and their increasing pre-occupations with South-East Asia 
and China, the room for ... a miscalculation 
[by the Soviet Union] grows'. 1113 It also 
answered those critics who questioned whether the UK required a nuclear force that was 
so much smaller than the US if it was not expected that the UK could enter a nuclear 
war without US involvement: 
It is inconceivable that the U. K. would start nuclear war independently of the U. S. against the 
Soviet Union. However, the retention of a nuclear capability by the U. K. is not intended to get 
us involved in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union but rather as a deterrent against Soviet 
attack on us. It is not inconceivable that the U. K. would retaliate independently if attacked. In 
these circumstances Soviet leaders could not regard as insignificant the possible devastation of 
all Soviet cities with a population of more than 300,000.1114 
In December 1966 Zuckerman, also Secretary of the Zoological Society of London, had 
a lunch at London Zoo with Tony Benn, who was then Minister of Technology and 
involved in the question of upgrading Polaris. Benn recorded his version of the meeting 
in his diary and it reveals much about Zuckerman's overriding motivation. 
We talked about nuclear weapons and he told me that he was keen that Denis Healey and the 





hardening the Polaris submarines warheads. 1115 
Following a visit to Washington in early 1967, Zuckerman admitted that collaboration 
difficulties `had stemmed primarily from a lack of declared UK intent to apply new 
technological knowledge to develop new systems. ' 1116 He seemed to provoke the ire of 
Healey when he told US defence officials that he held `responsibility to the Ministerial 
Committee on Nuclear Policy, for co-ordinating nuclear matters in the civil and military 
fields'. '117 Healey's copy has a large question mark next to this passage. Zuckerman 
transferred from the MOD, because of his ongoing problems with Healey, and became 
CSA to the Cabinet. ' 118 
In March 1967 studies by AWRE and RAE had begun to examine possible 
improvements to Polaris and to establish the actual vulnerability of Polaris to ABM. 1119 
A handwritten note of a meeting between Sir William Cook, replacing Zuckerman as 
CSA, and Sir William Penney, Chairman of the UKAEA, went over some of the 
relevant issues prior to a PN Committee seeking to pre-empt ministerial questions. One 
of the subjects examined was `how much new work' AWRE had undertaken in the 
previous five years. Penney reported that `not much new thinking on new weapon 
systems' for the British nuclear force had been initiated but that there was `some 
thought on new weapon for Soviet ABM system ... what could an ABM missile 
do? ' 1120 
When Cook and Penney visited Washington in early January 1967 the Americans they 
spoke to appeared to accept that the British wished `to maintain a viable establishment 
1115 Tony Benn, The Benn Diaries, (Single Volume Edition) (London: Arrow Books, 1996), p. 166, entry 
for 6 December 1966 
116 TNA, DEFE13/544, `Summary of My Discussions in Washington during period 30`h January to 2nd 
February 1967', Solly Zuckerman SZI 0603,25 February 1967 
1117 Ibid 
1118 Zuckerman, Monkeys, pp. 379-380 
1119 Ibid., `Nuclear Weapons Development Policy', draft paper for PN prepared for Healey by Sir William 
Cook, 16 March 1967 
1120 Ibid., 'Development of Nuclear Policy, Cook/Penney Mtg', 17 March 1967 
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at AWRE without commitment at this stage to the development of weapons systems' 
and that the `American side ... gave the 
impression of being ready to make a serious 
attempt to find a basis for a collaborative programme. ' 
1121 When Zuckerman visited a 
couple of weeks later he, according to Cook's draft report, `received a less hopeful 
impression of the extent to which the Americans would be willing to collaborate. ' 
1122 
Healey was struggling to initiate preliminary analysis of Polaris improvement and ABM 
effects, partly in the hope that to do so would encourage the US to provide more 
information that would in turn help the UK government decide on the next step. 
On 22 March 1967 Brown complained to Healey that he had only agreed to a 
provisional programme on exploring Polaris improvements `based on the assumption 
that maintaining our capability of doing work in the field of nuclear weapons for the 
present would not cause us to be led involuntarily into further developments and 
especially that it would not lead us along the path to a new generation of nuclear 
weapons'. 1123 On 30 March, responding to Brown's letter, Healey attempted to reassure 
him that they were only `considering the implications of the possible development of 
Soviet ABM systems. ' 1124 Healey's priority, in early 1967, was to get from the 
Americans further technical interpretation of the effects of ABMs. 1125 The UK's nuclear 
intelligence was again, as with the period before 1958, struggling because AWRE 
lacked access to US advances. The specific area of concern was on the `effects of 
radiation on the Polaris system', an issue that could not be resolved by any amount of 
intelligence but by US testing of the A3.1126 Zuckerman wished to resolve this by 
1121 Ibid., 'Nuclear Weapons Development Policy', draft paper for PN prepared for Healey by Sir William 
Cook, 16 March 1967 
1122 Ibid. 
1123 Ibid., Brown to Healey, 22 March 1967 
1124 Ibid., Healey to Brown, 30 March 1967 
1125 Ibid., Healey to Robert McNamara US Secretary of State for Defence, 10 April 1967 
1126 Ibid., draft letter from Healey to McNamara sent to Prime Minister and other ministers for comment, 
7 April 1967 
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sending a list of questions, of a technical nature formulated by AWRE, to the USA. This 
was not a method of which Sir William Cook approved. 
1127 
A note from Frank Cooper, to be circulated among relevant Ministry of Defence 
officials, shows that some in the MOD were troubled by the Government's handling of 
the question. Attached was a series of questions prepared by the MOD for a meeting of 
the Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee (OPD(O)). The paper had `been 
an unconscionable long time in production. This is partly because there was no wish to 
allow it to surface before the Labour Party Conference', although that was not the only 
reason for its delay. ' 128 With his usual panache, Cooper set out what he thought the 
`main strands of thought that are likely to be encountered at OPD(O)' would be and 
gave a brief synopsis of the counter-arguments: 
Polaris should be discarded and AWRE shut ... The arguments here are purely economic with a 
dash of nuclear disarmament... Polaris and all our British nuclear capability should be discarded 
and AWRE should be shut ... Again the arguments are purely economic with a rather larger 
dose of nuclear disarmament. 
1129 
The questions Ministry of Defence officials were attempting to answer shows 
intelligence was still central. They included, how far the Soviet Union had `got with the 
development of an ABM system, how effective is it, and what indicators have we got of 
where develop[ment] is likely to lead to by the end of the 1970s' along with estimates 
of the capability of the Soviet system. ' 130 Of the handful of Labour ministers involved, 
in late 1966 and early 1967, most were not keen to see any advancement of the British 
nuclear force beyond Polaris. Yet for Denis Healey, and perhaps Wilson himself, the 
1127 Ibid., Cook to Healey, 11 April 1967 
1128 Ibid., Cooper to CDS, 10 October 1967 
1'29 Ibid. 
1130 Ibid., `British Nuclear Weapons Policy', Annex to Cooper to CDS, 10 October 1967, 
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weight of evidence from intelligence and pressure from the US were making this 
position untenable. A paper produced in September 1967 to examine the options open to 
ministers summarised what had changed in late-1966: 
when both the extent of the damaging effects of X-rays outside the atmosphere was confirmed 
by U. S. information and it became clear that the Russians had started to deploy an ABM system 
round Moscow, the U. K. POLARIS force was expected to retain a credible strategic deterrent 
capability throughout the life of the submarines, i. e. throughout the 1980's... it is now apparent 
that a practical ABM defence in the outer atmosphere can be achieved against the existing 
Western deterrent systems... it is estimated that Russia could have by then an ABM defence, 
directed primarily against the much larger American missile threat, which would make the U. K. 
nuclear contribution militarily and politically irrelevant in a European context. 
1131 
This was an unequivocal warning to the government. The latest intelligence and 
technical appreciations supported the argument that failure to upgrade Polaris would 
effectively mean its abandonment. The next section was more explicit: 
It is axiomatic that, so long as we wish to deploy POLARIS in a NATO context and to reap the 
political advantages of so doing, our weapons must remain credible in the eyes of the 
Americans, our other NATO allies and the Russians. 1132 
The combination of Soviet and US technical advances were putting pressure on the 
British as the pace of nuclear technology advanced. It would not be intelligence, but the 
evaluation of it, that became an area of controversy, particularly how probable and 
capable a future Soviet ABM system protecting Moscow would be. 
Having rejected the option of MIRVs with Poseidon, the focus of those in favour of 
upgrading was towards two methods of improvement to the front-end of the Polaris 
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missiles; hardening and decoys. Hardening entailed shielding the warheads from the x- 
rays, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and other disabling effects of a defensive exo- 
atmospheric nuclear blast. ' 133 The decoys or penetration aids (Penaids) worked by 
confusing radars tracking the incoming warheads and increasing the number of targets 
to be intercepted. 1134 By September 1967 the UK had obtained more information from 
the US on the vulnerability of Polaris. A briefing paper by the Ministry of Defence for 
PN detailed the results of US work in the previous year. 
The U. S. have recently disclosed information obtained from underground nuclear tests in which 
POLARIS warheads and other components have been exposed to the effects produced by 
detonating nuclear devices which simulate ABM conditions. These tests confirm the technical 
feasibility of damaging POLARIS by X-rays at very long ranges but have not revealed any other 
more damaging effect. Therefore, saving the emergence of a radically new idea, the extent of 
ABM defences capability can now be estimated. 1135 
The paper went on to recommend that hardening, `shielding against X-ray damage', 
without the use of decoys, would hardly be worthwhile ... 
It would only marginally 
degrade the Russian defence system and would not by itself be sufficient to prolong the 
credibility of the U. K. POLARIS force. ' 1136 
The option that was proposed was for `Advanced hardening', which AWRE advised 
they could achieve to a `standard higher than that chosen by the United States', coupled 
with a home-grown development of decoys by the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) 
13' Ibid., `Nuclear Policy Paper, Polaris Improvement Programme - Contribution B', Ministry of 
Defence Contribution, 12 September 1967 
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at Farnborough, rather than bought off the shelf from the US. 
1137 The paper stressed that 
this `could be expected to increase the task of the defence by a factor of between 20 and 
40; it is expected that it would give the POLARIS system a capability comparable with 
that of POSEIDON'. 1138 It would, they admitted `cost somewhat more and delay the in- 
service date by up to four years', but by doing the work in the UK `it would minimise 
dollar expenditure', an important issue given the wider pressures on defence 
expenditure. Finally, the report added, that advanced hardening could, `on the best 
technical and intelligence assessment now possible, restore the original expectation of 
life and credibility of the U. K. POLARIS force. ' 
1139 
The proposal was ostensibly for an improved version of the American Antelope design. 
Pyne has revealed more about its origins. 
when the first schemes for what became Super-Antelope were first propounded it was in fact 
taking the basic idea of the American Antelope scheme... You take out one of the warheads and 
you use the mass that you have gained from doing that for a thing called a penetration aid carrier 
or PAC... they decided to call it Super-Antelope although it was not very much like Antelope at 
all except in principle, on the grounds that at least Antelope had had 14 flight tests and this 
would reassure the Treasury et al that this thing was grounded in tried technology. 1140 
Though the plans had been laid for Polaris improvement, no decision had been taken. 
As well as the seeing the first detailed analysis of the UK's options, the Autumn of 1967 
would also see far more detailed intelligence assessments that appeared to provide 
support for upgrading. 
1137 Ibid. 
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Intelligence and the limits of ABM 
It was only as the question of Soviet ABM development collided with this new concern 
about the consequent deterrence credibility of Polaris that more detailed JIC reports 
were produced specifically on Soviet Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), a change from a 
more general paper on Soviet Air Defence in 1966. 
"a' The first, in October 1967, 
summarised the `ballistic missile defences (BMD) which the Russians are deploying 
and the possible reasons for this deployment. ' 
1142 It concluded that `the Moscow BMD 
system... will provide a degree of protection against attack from the north west and 
possibly the south-east' by the end of 1970 and that it `will probably be extended to 
cover attack from all directions'. 
1143 The paper also gave more information that ever 
before about the limitations of the system, including factors that pointed to the value of 
upgrading Polaris: 
The Moscow system as now known could be saturated by mass attack. The performance of the 
system would be reduced by manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles, by decoys, and particularly by 
hardened warheads. Further development of penetration aids will render the system even less 
effective... The Russians must now realise that, barring an unforeseen technical breakthrough, a 
defence capable of destroying the credibility of the Western deterrent will not be feasible, but 
that defence against a small-scale attack may be. 
1144 
The report also, by comparing the dates of development, portrayed the Soviet ABM 
programme as a reaction to Western development and deployment: 
Western research has shown that existing Western strategic missiles are exceedingly vulnerable 
to the effects of exo-atmospheric nuclear explosions, and it is possible that the results of their 
1140 Kate Pyne, workshop, 27 March 2007 
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[the Soviet's] high altitude nuclear tests in 1961-62 suggested to the Russians that "killing" 
missiles at long range outside the atmosphere was feasible... It is probable that the impending 
large scale United States deployment of MINUTEMAN and POLARIS was a further factor 
which influenced the decision to construct the Moscow system. 1145 
The paper also revealed that Moscow was aware of the limitations of the system: 
The public parading in November 1964 of the exo-atmospheric interceptor GALOSH was 
accompanied by the claim that missiles could "be destroyed at great distances" from their 
targets. However, from this time Soviet statements, when examined closely, indicate a 
somewhat more cautious attitude towards ABM potentialities and the concept of only partial 
BMD has begun to appear. Indeed, since April 1966, it has been admitted that not all aircraft 
and missiles could be intercepted, and that only "most" or "many" types of missile were 
susceptible to ABM attack. This change may have reflected Russian appreciation of the scope of 
possible improvements in the capabilities of offensive systems. 1146 
In fact, the very month that this paper was produced, the results of tests of the ABM, 
System A-35 would lead to its virtual abandonment by the USSR. 1147 A `change in 
attitude toward missile defence among the Soviet leadership', reflected the realisation of 
its limits that the JIC had identified. "48 Soviet research moved away from attempting to 
provide `impenetrable ballistic missile defences' and concentrated upon developing a 
shield for Moscow against a limited strike. "49 This formed part of the basis upon which 
negotiations for limitations on ABMs as part of the Strategic Arms Limitation talks in 
1 144 Ibid. 
1145 Ibid.; Minuteman I was a two-stage, solid fuel, silo-based ICBM with a IMT warhead and a range of 
10,000 km. 800 were deployed between 1962 and 1969. Minuteman II had a range of 12,500 km and a 
more accurate warhead. 450 were deployed from 1966, replacing the entire Minuteman I by 1969, and 
continued in service until the 1990s. Minuteman III, a three-stage rocket, was the world's first MIRV 
ICBM with a range of 13,000,550 have been deployed since 1970 and are still in service. Miller, Cold 
War, pp. 97-8,406; US Air Force Factsheet. http: //www. afmil/factsheets/factsheet. asp? id=l 13,3 June 
2008 
'I46 TNA, CAB158/66, JIC(67)32, 'Soviet Intentions on Ballistic Missile Defence, 31 October 1967 




Not knowing the scale of the problems affecting Soviet research, American pressure for 
a British decision on Polaris was also starting to stray into the public realm. On 16 
November 1967 the Washington Post carried an article on the credibility of the British 
Polaris force. "5° The article, originally by the Foreign and National Security 
correspondent of the Los Angeles Times, Robert C. Toth, was probably based upon 
briefings from those in the US defence circles who were keen to see the UK make up 
their minds. The article stated that the British Polaris fleet `along with its airborne 
nuclear weapons, have been largely irrelevant in the big contest between the Soviet 
Union and the United States'. ' 151 
Now that anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems are being constructed, the submarines will be 
almost obsolete before they become operational in 1970 ... The introduction of ABM has thus 
sharpened the question of why Britain persists in keeping a nuclear deterrent - or if it keeps one, 
why it is not insuring that it will be effective'. 1152 
The MOD planned a rebuttal that both refused to comment on `details of nuclear 
weapons' whilst reiterating their confidence that `Polaris will be a credible and effective 
system for many years to come. ' 1153 They did not need to use it, as British newspapers 
did not pick up the story. 1154 
One reason why the story was not more widely covered was that the Wilson 
Government was, on that very day, far more consumed by economic crisis. In the 
morning of 16 November 1967 the Cabinet decided to devalue the pound from $2.80 to 
'149 Ibid. 
1150 TNA, DEFE13/547, Chief of Public Relations to Broadbent, 17 November 1967; Washington Post, 16 
November 1967 
1151 Robert C. Toth, `British nuclear arms outmoded', Los Angeles Times, 15 November 1967 
1152 Ibid. 
1153 TNA, DEFE13/547, Chief of Public Relations to Broadbent, 17 November 1967 
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$2.40, after repeated attempts since 1964 to stave off such an action. 1155 Devaluation 
would hasten the East of Suez withdrawals but it also put immediate pressure upon the 
question of Polaris upgrade. The papers that had been prepared by the JIC, the CSA and 
the Defence Review Working Party were collated by the Defence and Oversea Policy 
(Official) Committee (OPD(O), and laid out for a ministerial debate under PN. The 
paper concluded that it was `unable to make agreed recommendations... except that we 
are agreed in doubting whether there is adequate advantage in retaining the rest of our 
nuclear capability while abandoning Polaris'. 
1156 It summarised the views from different 
sections of the government: 
The Treasury and the Department of Economic Affairs consider that Polaris should be 
abandoned at once, or, if it is to be retained, that there should be no improvement. The Board of 
Trade and the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government consider that we should retain 
Polaris, but not improve it. The Foreign Office, Commonwealth Office, and Ministry of 
Defence consider that we should retain our nuclear capability and improve Polaris. The Ministry 
of Technology agree that we should retain Polaris and.., that an improvement programme will 
be necessary if we are to be sure we can retain even our currently-planned capability. 
1157 
Ministers for the concerned departments debated the issue on 5 December. Healey went 
through many of the same arguments that had been used in 1964, geared towards 
addressing the concerns of those with the strongest objections. "58 His main priority was 
in avoiding a decision on improvement rather than see one lead to abandonment. He 
stressed that, in the absence of any immediate international disarmament agreements, a 
unilateral abandonment of the UK's nuclear capability would have little effect on 
1154 Ibid. 
1155 TNA, CAB 128/42, CC(67)66`hMeeting, 16 November 1967; Dockrill, East of Suez 
"56 TNA, CAB 134/3120, PN(66)6,1 December 1967. The views of Zuckerman were also included in a 
parate paper, PN(67)7 se 
11 Ibid. 
1158 TNA, CAB 134/3120, PN(67)4thMeeting, 5 December 1967 
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furthering the reduction of nuclear weapons or proliferation by other countries. He 
emphasised the `cost-effective' contribution Polaris made to the UK's NATO 
commitment, particularly compared to any equivalent conventional forces. 
Healey also stressed factors that were of great contemporary relevance. At a time when 
Anglo-American relations overall were at a low point over the British refusal to send 
troops to the Vietnam War, he again argued the possibility, however remote, of a 
scenario Britain needed to deter a Soviet attack without US support. Perhaps most 
effectively, however, he raised the spectre of a Europe in which France was the only 
nuclear nation; a sensitive issue following the second French veto of British entry into 
the European Economic Community only a few days earlier on the 27 November. 
Whether it was his arguments or Wilson's preconceived support, the issue did not come 
at a head and agreements were reached to set in motion more detailed examinations of 
the options. Wilson, summing up, stressed to the opponents of improvement that the 
option of not improving or abandoning would still be on the table because the UK's 
`economic situation' meant that `no particular element of the defence programme could 
be regarded as sacrosanct. ' 1159 
On 21 December 1967 Victor Macklen, ACSA(N), passed on to Broadbent, Private 
Secretary to Healey, a personal letter from `Mr. [Harry] Weeks, our representative in 
Washington on nuclear matters, and suggested that [Broadbent] might like to draw the 
Secretary of State's attention' to a particular paragraph which revealed the what the US 
had been told of the PN meeting on 6th December. ' 160 Weeks warned that the U. S. 
Embassy in London had been informed... that the U. K. had considered the Polaris 
situation and had decided to defer a decision. ' 161 Healey had met Paul Nitze, American 
"s9 Ibid. 
160 TNA, DEFE13/547, Macklen to Broadbent, 21 December 1967 
1161 Ibid., Harry Weeks to Victor Macklen, 18 December 1967 
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Deputy Secretary of Defense, on 14 December 1967 in Brussels. Healey was able to 
provide a more reassuring tone. He later sent a note explaining the background to the 
recent PN decision to delay a decision until after AWRE and RAE had completed their 
studies: 
On the UK side it has taken somewhat longer than was expected to firm up views ... The aim is 
to take stock of this research [by AWRE and RAE into hardening and penetration aid carriers 
respectively] in May 1968. We understand that it would be necessary to take decisions at about 
that time in order to retain the option of switching to US penetration aids. Any deferment of this 
date would mean that we could be too late to make arrangements for production of Antelope 
components in the US. 1162 
By early 1968 a programme to improve Polaris was linked directly to the development 
of Soviet ABM defences. 1163 Political reasoning, rather than intelligence assessments, 
now dominated many of the arguments. But the use of intelligence in arguments for and 
against upgrading had put increased pressure on the intelligence organisation at a time 
when some were coming to call into question its competency. 
No longer `growed like Topsy': Rationalising the Joint Intelligence Structure 
The year 1968 also saw one of the most significant developments in the post-war 
history of the JIC - the creation of an Assessments Staff and Intelligence and Security 
Coordinator. This change has been interpreted, among other things, as stemming from 
failures in intelligence prior to the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. ' 164 
More recently, both John Young and Sir Percy Cradock have identified the role of 
1162 Ibid., Healey to Nitze, Appendix C 
1163 Ibid., `Aide-Memoir6' to Denis Healey, undated and anonymous. The dates of previous papers 
suggest the note was from February 1968 
" John Young, 'The Wilson Government's Reform of Intelligence Coordination, 1967-68', Intelligence 
and National Security, Vol. 16/2 (Summer 2001), p. 133 
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Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend in the rethink earlier in 1967.1165 Trend's influence 
was substantial, as will be seen, and undoubtedly brought the question to the table. But 
it is also worth analysing the origins of the requirement for an expanded staff to tackle 
the drafting of reports within the Committee itself. 
It would be misleading to overplay the degree to which the DIS, as a comparable all- 
source assessment body albeit with a military remit, highlighted the deficiencies in the 
JIC organisation by its relative success. Nonetheless there are clear signs that DIS 
provoked concerns over their respective areas of focus. As seen earlier, in 1965 the JIC 
went through a process of revising its terms of references and that of its major sub- 
committees and working parties, `in light of the re-organisation in the Defence 
Intelligence Staff'. ' 166 The primary focus was on trying to cut down the degree of 
overlap in the preparation of reports. In May 1966 the members of the Missile Threat 
Co-ordinating Sub-Committee - who were themselves almost entirely made up of DIS 
members with a sole Division of Scientific and Technical Intelligence (DSTI) 
representative - again discussed the need to consider their terms of reference. The 
chairman, Rear Admiral P. W. W. Graham, Director of Service Intelligence, made it 
abundantly clear that his concern was in locating the line between JIC and DIS work: 
It was not always readily apparent to him why, when and for whom the Sub-Committee's 
reports should be prepared; the programme of work laid down for the Working Party, and the 
procedures adopted for the preparation of papers should, it seemed, be kept under very close 
scrutiny if the needs of the users were to be met at the right time... he would be calling a small 
meeting of the Defence Intelligence Staff, to whom the subject was of more basic concern, in an 
endeavour to clear their minds and obtain recommendations. 1167 
1165 Ibid., pp. 133-4; Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p. 265 
1166 TNA, CAB 182/15, MT(65)4t' Meeting, 8 August 1965 
1167 Ibid., MT(66)4t'Meeting, 11 May 1966 
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DIS staff, as well as forming the majority of the seconded staff on nuclear matters, also 
undertook significant amounts of the drafting process, submitting contributions and 
amendments in the majority of the JIC's key Soviet military papers. The draft schedule 
of work for the MTWP for 1967 reveals that the co-ordination and contribution to the 
production of MTSC reports was entirely undertaken by DI divisions. 1168 
Though there is no explicit link, it was only eleven days after this draft schedule of 
work was issued that Trend sent a letter to Wilson outlining the very problems seen in 
the MTWP's work. Trend kept a close eye on intelligence matters and would have been 
well aware of the balance of control in the JIC's sub-committees and the degree of DIS 
reliance. 169 Certainly he made clear that his concerns were of problems that had existed 
for some time. 
The existing organisation for the collation and distribution of intelligence has developed over 
the years by a process of rather spasmodic evolution. It has simply `growed', like Topsy. 
1170 
Trend also revealed his thinking about the `professionalism' of British intelligence 
assessment. These may have reflected wider concerns about the need to improve wider 
quality of the Civil Service, but certainly appear to have stemmed from US criticisms: 
A Staff serving a committee never has an easy life. Somehow or other it has got to reconcile 
conflicting views and to produce a report to which all the members of the Committee will 
subscribe. Only too often, the result is a kind of lowest common denominator of agreement, 
which lacks clarity and definition and sometimes sacrifices depth of analysis to the need to 
produce superficial agreement. This is what the Americans really mean when they accuse us - 
1168 TNA, CAB182/16, MT(ST)1/67,2 March 1967 
1169 Cradock, Know Your, p. 265; Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, (London: Pimlico, 2001), p. 213 
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popular phrase from the novel Uncle Tom's Cabin by Madeleine Stowe. 
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as they always do - of not being sufficiently `professional' in our attitude to intelligence. 
1171 
Trend then expanded on what he had in mind to instil `greater professionalism': 
First, we should need to recruit staff of the JIC on a longer-term basis than at present and to 
transform the existing collection of temporarily seconded individuals into a permanent entity, 
whose members would have time and scope to immerse themselves in problems... Second, this 
staff would need to be directed by an individual of sufficient seniority and experience to control 
it with authority and to enable it to give the JIC advice, guidance and suggestions instead of 
merely carrying out such tasks of collation and dissemination as the busy members of the 
Committee, meeting for a few hours once a week, have time to prescribe. 
1172 
Defence intelligence did not, however, form the greatest impetus to Trend's action. 
Perhaps reflecting later accounts that interpreted the change as a reaction to intelligence 
failures, there is some indication that instead of Czechoslovakia in 1968, it was the 
quality of assessments over the actions of the illegal white minority Government in 
Rhodesia in 1966 and early 1967 may have been a factor. 1173 Trend argued that `the 
Rhodesian episode has shown [that] the arrangement [for Economic intelligence] is still 
hampered by various inhibitions'. 1174 Indeed, the subsequent creation in April 1968 of a 
separate JIC to cover only Economic Intelligence, which lasted until 1974, was a direct 
result of Trend's suggestions and is in itself a fascinating episode in both the history of 
the JIC and the Wilson Government's Economic policy. 1175 
Alongside economic intelligence Trend also criticised the deficiency in coverage of 
scientific intelligence. Trend argued that both `have come to be recognised as subjects 
1171 Ibid. 
1172 Ibid. 
1173 Young, `The Wilson Government's Reform', p. 134 
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which need to be developed in their own right and can have a wider application to the 
Departmental policy-making of Whitehall than to the purely politico-military 
Departments'. 1176 Trend's desire to elevate the status of scientific intelligence may have 
represented welcome relief to those who had consistently criticised the treatment of this 
subject since the Second World War. Yet his reasoning was actually in direct contrast 
with the complaints that had been made before and the problem he identified could 
actually be ascribed, in part, to the influence of nuclear intelligence. 
Trend stated that `scientific intelligence has always been located in the Ministry of 
Defence and has formed part of the intelligence machine which serves the Chiefs of 
Staff . 1177 He did not stress the lack of centralisation before 1964. Also, some of the 
greatest criticisms of scientific intelligence stemmed from the lack of scientific 
intelligence ownership over nuclear matters, particularly in its earliest years. 
Conversely, Trend's belief that scientific intelligence needed to cover wider matters, 
such as economic and trade issues, could be seen as a concern that it had become 
blinded by the urgency of nuclear-related matters, to the detriment of other areas. 
In the end, the creation of the Assessments Staff in April 1968 was not intended to 
undermine the degree to which defence intelligence was dominated by military 
questions on the Soviet nuclear threat. The degree of `professionalism' that it did bring 
has been well described by Michael Herman, who became Secretary of the JIC between 
1972 and 1975: 
[It] drew in additional manpower and high-flying talent, principally in the form of seconded 
diplomats. The result was to produce strong central leadership in the collegial process... Papers 
Davies, Strategic Intelligence and the Dismal Science: British Economic Intelligence 1928-1991. Thesis 
still underway. 
1176 TNA, PREM13/2688, Trend to Wilson, 13 March 1967 
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are drafted by the Assessments Staff independently of departmental positions... But those on 
subjects for important Cabinet decisions are still processed through, and approved by, the 
interdepartmental machinery; most of what Ministers receive is a genuinely collegial view, not 
just a central view produced after purely formal consultation. 1178 
In the drafting of the range of JIC memorandum relating to Soviet nuclear capabilities 
and intentions up to 1970 there appears to have been little discernible immediate 
impact. Likewise, in terms of content, in 1969 the JIC could still offer no `direct 
intelligence' to military planners on the likely types of Soviet warheads in production, a 
position that had not altered much since the 1940s. 1179 They could also offer little more 
than in previous years on the likely intentions behind the development of ABM systems. 
Without intelligence able to sway either side of the argument, diverging views about the 
kind of deterrence needed meant that by 1970 little further progress was made, 
politically, on the question of Polaris improvement. 
Targeting Moscow, 1968-70 
In 1967, amidst the debate over Polaris improvement, Solly Zuckerman' dissented 
from the majority view of the Official Committee on Defence and Oversea Policy. He 
accepted `the basis technical facts' but did `not believe that these facts do more than 
provide a theoretical basis for an ABM system'. "8° He concluded that reacting to Soviet 
ABM meant that any increased credibility for the UK's strategic nuclear forces `would 
require not just hardening but an increase in the size of our strike forces and, logically, 
our entry into the ABM race '. 1181 
Zuckerman's criticism of the reaction to Soviet and American ABM schemes, set out in 
1178 Herman, Intelligence Power, p. 272 
119 TNA, CAB 186/1, JIC(A)(69)3, Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1969-73,17 January 1969 
1180 TNA, CAB 134/3120, PN(67)6, `British Nuclear Weapons Policy', 1 December 1967 1181 Ibid. 
his memoirs, centred upon whether it was possible `to devise a defence that could not be 
defeated or, at the least, rendered strategically impotent. 1182 He also argued that; 
In the field of nuclear weaponry, anything which enhanced technological sophistication or 
multiplied variety and numbers was assumed to bestow some strategic advantage. 
1183 
He criticised the way strategic rationales were applied to expectations of Soviet 
intentions, querying `what difference it made what our Polaris tubes contained, provided 
the Russians believed that they were nuclear missiles that could hit Moscow or 
Leningrad. ' 1184 British economic constraints meant that the UK was always incapable of 
the level of spending afforded by the two superpowers. However, there was still a 
longstanding belief that the UK deterrent had to be credible in the eyes of the Soviets. 
These factors were not, in the event, as strong as consideration of the cost of 
improvement. In late 1967 Healey had effectively set a deadline of May 1968 if the UK 
wanted access to US Antelope technology. 
' 185 A study into the `feasibility and cost of 
alternative means of improving' Polaris had been agreed at the PN meeting on 5 
December 1967.1186 It was placed under the chairmanship of Lord Kings-Norton, an 
aeronautical engineer with a background in the wartime Ministry of Aircraft Production, 
and eventually reported in July. 1187 Its main focus was cost-assessment of the three main 
options under scrutiny, including limiting work to `maintenance... of our existing and 
presently planned nuclear weapons', hardening Polaris, or incorporating penetration 
aids or warhead modifications. 1188 
"82 Zuckerman, Monkeys, p. 387 
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Under the first hypothesis, care and maintenance, was the continuation of the 
monitoring network, and related intelligence work. The minimum cost of maintaining 
this function was estimated as £1.6 million in 1968/9 rising to £1.8m in 1974/5, 
although this was in conjunction with the continuation of the present nuclear weapons 
programme and consequent `retention of high quality scientific and technological staff, 
and much complex capital equipment'. In the body of the report, the UK contribution to 
worldwide monitoring was described as consisting of `operating several monitoring 
stations overseas and in this country and running a data centre at Aldermaston for 
receiving, handling and analysing the data obtained' by the whole network. 11S9 The 
threat to the competency of UK nuclear intelligence, through the abandonment of 
nuclear weapons development, was also made explicitly: 
From past experience it is very questionable whether the U. S. would be willing to continue this 
collaboration if this country were not undertaking further weapon development; it would depend 
to some extent on the U. K. continuing to carry out a research programme of such high quality 
that the U. S. felt it would make a real contribution to their own programme. ' 190 
On the whole, the majority report stuck firmly to its remit and set out only the expected 
expense that would be required for each of the hypotheses. It did not stray into the 
political and strategic factors. Their findings eventually concluded that the UK Super- 
Antelope option, compared to purchasing the American version, was expected to be 
more expensive in 1971-2, but this would decrease rapidly by the following year. 
However, they also `felt it important to note certain factors' about the `relative merits' 
of either one. The UK system `would involve a lower foreign exchange cost and the 
Exchequer would gain tax revenue from value added in this country'. They also 
repeated the argument of that, where `a new field of technology such as hardening is 
1189 Ibid. 
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concerned, [AWRE] does not gain real technological understanding if a U. S. system is 
adopted'. 1191 
Lord Rothschild, a scientist and former M15 officer who sat on the working party and 
had a close relationship with Zuckerman, dissented from its findings and produced a 
minority report. 1192 Rothschild `did not believe the Working Party can adequately and 
conscientiously discharge its duties without consideration of certain strategic issues', 
such as the value of a UK nuclear deterrent in the first place. 
' 193 He included in his 
paper a table showing the expected population survival figures if the Soviets dropped `a 
mere ten nuclear bombs, one above London, with a yield of twenty megatons, and the 
rest with yields of one megaton each' above nine other cities. His table showed a 
combined population of 13.6 million across the ten cities would decrease to 4.5 million, 
a loss of life of around 60 or 70%. He argued that `the effective elimination of the 
United Kingdom by a small number of H-bombs must raise very serious doubts about 
the desirability of our having Polaris missiles at all'. 1194 
Rothschild, therefore, called into question the scientific rationale behind `what seems 
often to be believed in Government circles ... that hardening would 
be of major 
counter-defensive value', and was using intelligence to do so. He told how `a senior 
Ministry of Defence official told the Committee that Russian technology was such as to 
enable their defence system to explode a nuclear weapon within about 1000 feet of an 
incoming H-bomb, at which range Hardening would be useless'. 1195 He also played 
upon the supposed independence of the UK's nuclear force and whether the reality of it 
190 Ibid. 
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undermined any requirement for improvements: 
The Committee has been told that the probability of our firing Polaris missiles is in the 
neighbourhood of zero except when the U. S. A. engages in a nuclear war against Russia ... It 
follows that the U. K. only has to wait a few minutes for the road to be clear ... If one H-bomb 
explodes over or on Moscow ... the effectiveness of the radar on which the 
Russian anti- 
ballistic missile system depends is likely to be reduced, in which case Hardening becomes an 
unnecessary luxury. 1196 
Despite this argument, the `independence' of British deterrence was still at the heart of 
thinking. In 1968, David Owen was Navy Minister with a remit that included the 
deployment of the first Polaris submarine. As Foreign Secretary in the 1976-9 Labour 
Government, he would come to dispute the direction and rationale of British nuclear 
policy. Yet in his memoirs he would also explain why the desire for a degree of 
independence from the US was still a strong motivation in British nuclear policy at this 
time. 
I do not wish my country to be wholly dependent on the reaction of a US President if we are 
ever threatened by nuclear blackmail. Our possession of nuclear weapons, as for the French, 
also ensures that no US President can ignore our views on major security questions, nor those of 
Western Europe. These facts are sufficient to convince me that it is a crucial national interest to 
maintain an independent deterrent. 1197 
The preference for the UK Super-Antelope, if upgrading was to occur, meant that the 
May 1968 deadline had passed without incident. By December 1968 the impasse at 
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Polaris submarine, HMS Resolution, had deployed in the autumn of 1968.1198 From June 
1969, a permanent Polaris force was in operation, with at least one boat on patrol at all 
times. 1199 The question for the future of the deterrent was, however, again overtaken by 
events. New reasons for deferring a decision were given by Healey and Benn to their 
colleagues on the PN Committee: 
A detailed technical study was set in hand of Polaris improvements, their merits and their costs. 
An internal report should be available by the end of this year, but this may well require 
discussion was a new United States Administration and this cannot be relied upon before the 
Spring of 1969. The picture will not, therefore, be complete for some little while, and until it is 
a final decision on the Polaris question and on whether and how it should be improved should 
be deferred. 1200 
Despite the strength of debate through 1967-8 little further progress was made at the 
policy level. The period demonstrated the degree to which the Polaris deal left the UK 
susceptible to the pace of Soviet and American development. The question of Polaris 
improvements was not resolved by the time a new Conservative Government was 
elected in June 1970. Indeed, many of those involved in 1967-8 would find themselves 
grappling once more with Polaris improvement in the mid and late 1970s. 
In 1969 the JIC could still say no more than that there `is evidence that Soviet defensive 
policy includes an active defence against ballistic missiles of all types', without any 
clarification on the country from which they originated. 1201 In the end, the absence of 
the kind of intelligence that could provide definitive evidence to either side allowed the 
opportunity for disagreements about the impact and likelihood of a successful Soviet 
1198 John Coker, `The Impact of Polaris', 27 March 2008 
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ABM system. It was not known that the USSR's Moscow ABM system had suffered a 
major setback in 1967 as a result of radar problems against a `high-intensity attack in a 
cluttered environment', particularly when MIRV and Penaids were used. 
1202 The 
likelihood of future American success in this sphere was also not clear and the problems 
of such systems would be better understood by the time of the 1972 Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty (SALT), which limited the number of sites on which the US and 
USSR could develop ABMs. Furthermore, the intelligence could not fully resolve the 
question of the capability of either the Soviet ABM and Polaris missile capabilities. Put 
simply, the issue came down to interpretations of deterrence. 
This question of the `credibility' of Britain's deterrent, specifically the ability to target 
Moscow, would form a major part of nuclear defence debates for the next 15 years. 1203 
As senior officials who had experienced the course of the debate reflected, at a March 
2007 conference on British nuclear policy, the arguments may sometimes have appeared 
abstract, but they came to the heart of he terrible `what-if' scenarios that hung over Cold 
War Whitehall. 1204 Sir Michael Quinlan was Private Secretary to the Chief of the Air 
Staff 1962 to 1965 and as the MOD's PUS(POL) in the early 1970s played a crucial 
role in Polaris replacement. He pointed out that the 
characteristic of the Soviet system being exo-atmospheric meant that it didn't just defend 
Moscow, it stood to defend a very much larger area, certainly measured in tens of thousands of 
square miles, the precise size dependent upon the trajectory of the incoming missile. Therefore 
it was not just a question of Moscow, there was a great deal else which, if we believed in its 
efficacy, it would give sanctuary to, and we thought that to allow that sanctuary would diminish 
1202 John Holst, 'Missile Defence, the Soviet Union, and the Arms Race', J. J. Holst, and W. Jr. Schneider 
(eds), Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defence Controversy (Oxford: Pergamon, 
1969), pp. 145-86; Stoddart, `The Wilson Government', p. 8, n. 57 
1203 Baylis, "Moscow Criterion", p. 60-3 
1204 Workshop, 27 March 2007 
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the credibility of our capability. 1205 
David Young, who sat `on the Ministry of Defence's nuclear desk in 1971 to 1973', ran 
through the `whole clutter of issues' that were of concern in the late 1960s, and would 
be throughout the 1970s. On the one hand were the arguments of those who questioned 
the realism involved in the concept of the balance of nuclear forces: 
One was troubled by finding it quite hard to believe that if you turned round and you had an 
ABM system around London, that the politicians here would be totally reliant in the military 
telling them that these things would work like a dream and nothing would get through and you 
could completely rely on that. 1206 
In addition, the requirement to be able to target Moscow with confidence would also be 
considered, particularly, 
this sort of punching above our weight and all the rest of it, and the argument `Why do we have 
to take out Moscow? ' - that on any conceivable scenario what the Soviets would be getting out 
of an attack as it were on the UK alone and not the Americans an not the rest of Europe, that 
they could be persuaded that if we could obliterate Minsk that was enough. 1207 
Yet this would continually be set against the `what-if concern, `that who knows what 
the next bend in this will reveal? ' The preference to err on the side of caution was 
keenly felt, as Young explained: 
[O]nce you give this up you are done, you will never go back and you can never afford to start 
again... and in the end, over and above the financial and military arguments, there is a powerful 
political argument. 1208 
1205 Sir Michael Quinlan, workshop, 27 March 2007 




UK intelligence on ABMs was also characterised by the overwhelming reliance on the 
US both in intelligence collection, through their satellite imagery, and in technical 
analysis of the effects of ABM defences and Polaris performance. 
The Labour government had initiated studies for the programme to upgrade Polaris that 
would be authorised by Ted Heath's government in 1973. Yet Wilson's government had 
only done so reluctantly because of political connotations and the scarcity of decisive 
evidence to sway the argument. The lack of a green light for AWRE to launch full-scale 
technical studies and the deficiency of crucial information from the US meant little 
progress had been made by 1970. Though the story of Super-Antelope/Chevaline was as 
much characterised by subsequent Conservative policy, much of its character originated 
in this period. The episode is greatly revealing about the pressures faced by successive 
governments in maintaining a UK nuclear capability and the degree of continuity in 
British nuclear policy. It also highlights the role and limits of intelligence in 
contributing to debates about, and therefore the history of, the form and strategic 
importance of the UK nuclear deterrent. The extraordinary access to American 
intelligence and nuclear know-how at this time , and the effects of it being limited, 
demonstrates the `special' nature of the Anglo-American relationship. Yet it also 
highlighted the pressure over policy decisions that could accompany such contact. 
Ultimately, British politicians still needed their `bloody union jack', even if it was just 
to stamp on the policy and not the bomb itself. 
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Conclusion: British Nuclear Intelligence and Nuclear Weapons Policy 
in the first half of the Cold War 
The Chevaline programme was complete by 1983 and performed the function for which 
it was intended until the mid-1990s. In December 1994 HMS Vanguard, the first of four 
Trident class submarines purchased from the US by Margaret Thatcher's government in 
1980, sailed on its first operational patrol. 
1209 Both developments built upon .: the 
strengths of British nuclear technology and the benefits of the Anglo-American 
relationship. The perceived necessity of the deterrent value of such weapons, the greater 
international standing and involvement in questions of the future of nuclear proliferation 
and international relations were all part of the factors that shaped British policy. 
1210 
Many of the themes that were apparent in the first half of the Cold War remained 
constant in the latter, though the personalities and the technology changed and 
developed. 
More recently, in 2005-6, the Labour government moved towards agreeing the next 
stage in the development of the British deterrent, a successor to Trident that would see 
the UK remain a nuclear power up to 2050.1211 The White Paper that set out the 
Government's position, The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent, k 
some of the rationale behind the decision. Though the adversary was no longer clearly 
Russian, the insurance of remaining a nuclear power was based on similar thinking to 
that expressed throughout the 1940s, 50s and 60s. As Prime Minister Tony Blair 
expressed, in his foreword; 
We believe that an independent British nuclear deterrent is an essential part of our insurance 
1209 Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb, pp. 18,256-330 
'210 Ibid., p. 256-328 
1211 Ibid., p. 331 
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against the uncertainties and risks of the future ... I believe it is crucial that, for the foreseeable 
future, British Prime Ministers have the necessary assurance that no aggressor can escalate a 
crisis beyond UK control. 1212 
Knowledge of the Soviet nuclear threat was a principal feature in British intelligence 
from almost the moment the A-bomb was first used in 1945. However, the fulfilment of 
this intelligence requirement demanded increasing resources and new techniques of 
collection that took time to be developed. The threat was identified and prioritised 
highly, but it was a struggle to make inroads in intelligence penetration. The efficiency 
of Soviet security and counter-espionage gave added impetus to the new methods of 
espionage required for the unique characteristics of nuclear weapon development. Yet 
this is only half the story. 
Analysing the twin subjects of nuclear intelligence and nuclear weapons policy over an 
extended timeframe has drawn out the character of both. Likewise, by synthesising 
existing and related historical studies with new and increased documentary evidence the 
use that was made of that intelligence is more apparent. Such an approach is 
constructive in tracing both the frequently complex and concealed role of intelligence in 
the Cold War and the rationales behind the development and expectations of Britain's 
strategic nuclear forces. Specifically, this examination of the history of British 
intelligence on the Soviet nuclear threat between 1945 and 1970 has highlighted three 
important areas; intelligence organisation in the UK, the Cold War Anglo-American 
relationship and the progress of British nuclear weapons policy. 
Developments in British intelligence organisation 
The story of cold war nuclear scientific and technical intelligence is a fascinating lesson 
1212 The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (London: HMSO, December 2006) 
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for questions of intelligence organisation that still dominate both practitioners and 
observers. 1213 It also has a great bearing on the wider story of the creation of the MOD 
and a combined defence intelligence organisation, the DIS, in 1964. Throughout the 
period under review nuclear intelligence was characterised by problems of its 
organisation and particularly its continued dislocation from the growing JIC 
configuration. It was also, to frequent and sometimes serious complaints, kept wholly 
separate from other forms of scientific and technical intelligence. Initially this was 
justifiable given both the special nature of the subject and the particular nature of 
nuclear relations with the US. 
Nuclear knowledge had been highly secret during the war, limited to a handful of 
people, and intelligence, first on the German nuclear programme and then the USSR's, 
was equally restricted. It is, therefore, not easy to argue that nuclear intelligence 
organisation could have been absorbed more fully into the JIC or scientific intelligence 
structures, given the US stance after the 1946 McMahon Act. Goodman also comes to 
this conclusion, arguing that `it is difficult to see how a different organisation could 
have fared better'. 1214 Any moves towards a major widening of access to nuclear 
secrets, as it was feared any amalgamation with scientific intelligence or JIC would 
entail, would likely have given greater ammunition to US pessimism about British 
security and broken the few remaining ties which were exploited by the limited number 
of British scientists and intelligence officials in the loop. The dangers of rocking the 
boat overrode concerns from both Jones and the JIC about lack of access. It was for this 
reason that in 1947 Sir Douglas Evill opted to maintain the status quo as far as possible. 
By 1954, with the US contribution increasingly valued and the threat from the USSR 
growing, Admiral Daniel's concluded similarly. The creation of the UKAEA in that 
1213 Rand, Towards a Theory of Intelligence: Workshop Report (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006) 
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year saw the first moves of atomic intelligence back towards more `normal' intelligence 
channels, giving the MOD more direction over nuclear intelligence. 1215 
There were, therefore, good reasons in this period to try to retain the positive parts of 
Welsh's set-up whilst tweaking the less favourable aspects. Indeed, as Goodman's 
analysis has shown, through his greater comparison with the US structure, `the relative 
stability of the architecture of British atomic intelligence' was in `stark contrast' to `the 
organisational chaos of the American system'. 1216 There was still much that was 
anomalous, not least the close relationship between SIS and TRU that continued after 
Welsh's death in 1954 and which bypassed other centralising intelligence bodies such 
as the JIB, DSI and JIC. SIS continued to operate a separate specialist intelligence 
section with the ear of `C' and a close relationship with the technical, scientific and 
military specialists at the forefront of British nuclear weapons work throughout the 
period under review. 1217 However, this reflected the special nature of nuclear work. It 
was treated differently from other intelligence because of the highly scientific nature of 
much collection and evaluation, concerns over the security of nuclear know-how and 
the subject's ever-increasing importance to the MOD and its primacy in British defence 
policy. 
The high priority for nuclear intelligence work meant that, even after 1954 it retained 
many of the same characteristics and could still function separately from the JIC and 
scientific intelligence bodies. The Joint Intelligence Staff formed the core of a special 
team, with JIB, technical and scientific intelligence representatives, which was to collate 
the TRU's raw material. The Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (AEIC) and a 
'214 Goodman, British Intelligence Estimates, p. 431 
'215 TNA, CAB81/130, JIC(45)272, `Intelligence on Atomic Energy', 12 September 1945; DEFE 32/4, 
COSC(54)30`h Meeting, 17 March 1954 
1216 Goodman, British Intelligence Estimates, p. 433 
1217 Private information 
295 
smaller working sub-committee, were to provide oversight and intelligence assessment. 
The JIS team, the AEIC and sub-AEIC committees all operated independently of the 
JIC, but the links were formed and it was recognised as early as 1954 that this was a 
compromise that would eventually lead to effective JIC control. 
1218 
There were efforts towards more co-ordinated intelligence analysis and in greater 
oversight of nuclear intelligence work. The position of the JIC was similar to that of the 
Service Scientific Intelligence Staffs in 1947 that were, according to Evill, receiving 
raw intelligence on nuclear and related matters from sources other than the United 
States, but only `occasional collated statements' from Welsh. 1219 In 1954, Admiral 
Daniel's recommendation to take Welsh out of the collation process gave the 
Directorate of Scientific Intelligence and the JIC greater scope over requirements and a 
more coordinated approach to the collation of nuclear work with other aspects of the 
Soviet nuclear threat such as guided missiles. 
The importance of nuclear matters is strikingly seen in the responsibility given to 
dominant figures in nuclear weapons development for intelligence assessment, through 
the AEIC. Whilst collation and assessment was divorced from collection in 1954, it was 
given over to the leading nuclear specialists rather than absorbed within scientific 
intelligence. Sir William Penney, the Director of the AWRE at Aldermaston and Sir 
John Cockcroft, Head of the AERE at Harwell, were central to the British nuclear 
programme and to intelligence on the Soviet nuclear threat. This was formalised in 1954 
by their role on the AEIC. They were also leaders of the teams of nuclear scientists who 
undertook much of the scientific and technical interpretation of intelligence, especially 
in the 1950s. AWRE and AERE scientists provided the chemical analysis and technical 
1218 TNA, DEFE32/4, COSC(54)30th Meeting, Comments of Patrick Dean, JIC Chairman, 17 March 1954 
1219 TNA, CAB I63! 7, MISC/P(47)31, `Review of Intelligence Organisations', 6 November 1947 
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interpretation on debris from Soviet nuclear tests. 
In examining the reasons for maintaining such an idiosyncratic structure it is important 
to recall Welsh's argument in 1953, that nuclear intelligence required `interpretation ... 
by the best scientific brains available... essentially men with the insight which can only 
come from active engagement on the forefront of atomic energy research' . 
1220 There is 
certainly scope for arguing that certain individuals, like Penney and Cockcroft, 
dominated some parts of the intelligence machine at certain times, but this seems 
considerably outweighed by the practical benefits of their considerable expertise. This 
was particularly visible at times when British nuclear weapons work lagged behind US 
or Soviet scientific understanding, as was seen in the period before the H-Bomb 
decision. It also contrasts with the turmoil of the 1960s, when parts of the MOD 
struggled to counter Zuckerman's interpretation of the latest technological advances. 
Such an organisation could also lead to the sort of monopolisation Jones felt that Welsh 
and Perrin had acquired in 1945. However, Daniel's correspondence from 1954 reveals 
that Welsh had the support of those within the British nuclear weapons community. 
Both Penney and Cockcroft were consulted over the Daniel Review and the former 
summed up the wider view of Welsh, that, for all his faults, he was good at getting stuff 
out of scientists. Both were also, like Welsh, on good terms with notable figures in the 
US. The same is true of Dr Robert Press, who succeeded him as head of the TRU in 
1954, and who had previously been Welsh's representative in Washington, so important 
a post for maintaining that relationship. Later, Press's great successes and experience in 
joint Anglo-American long-range monitoring operations would see him well placed as 
the British scientific representative on work towards the nuclear test-ban in the late 




Jones's concerns about the need for cohesive scientific intelligence became more 
pertinent as the 1950s and early 1960s progressed and the range of nuclear weapon 
components and related technologies widened with the ballistic missile age. The 
extreme compartmentalisation of the various Soviet programmes, and the enhanced 
secrecy this created, exacerbated the need for co-ordinated collation in the intelligence 
process. The successive commissioning of separate but interrelated JIC subcommittees 
to deal with different aspects of this subject highlights the problem. As Goodman also 
shows, intelligence work in estimating `the size of the Soviet stockpile' was `a very 
successful endeavour'. 1221 Where nuclear intelligence started to suffer was in converting 
information on fissile stocks and warhead design into estimates of weapon production 
and operational deployment. The Intelligence on Nuclear Weapons Sub-committee, 
formed in 1954, was intended to bring co-ordination to the subjects of guided weapons, 
scientific and electronic intelligence, but problems still existed in the early 1960s. 
The special treatment of nuclear intelligence, the limited numbers of people with expert 
understanding and the priority over estimating fissile material and warhead capability, 
made it a relatively more compact subject capable of being controlled by a smaller 
group in the earlier period. There was, therefore a `streamlined centralisation' that made 
it both effective and capable. 1222 However, in the period beyond Goodman's thesis, 
especially the late 1950s and early 1960s this was no longer possible. The wider number 
of people involved in nuclear work, guided weaponry and related technologies, saw 
greater infighting over ownership. This was exacerbated by the Air Ministry's desire to 
retain control of the intelligence, to match its special status as the UK's nuclear strike 
1221 Goodman, British Intelligence Estimates, p. 440 
1222 Ibid., p. 434 
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force. In the late 1950s missile deployment and development were dealt with separately 
by the Air Ministry the DSI and JIB. As Herman recalled, there `was a regrettable 
conflict between the big battalions at GCHQ, and the under-resourced underpaid 
London efforts amid the interservice rivalry of nuclear politics in which advertising was 
necessary for survival. ' 1223 
In 1961 the Missile Threat Co-ordination Subcommittee and Working Party were to 
collate intelligence on guided weapons, their delivery systems and warheads. Both still 
struggled at times to provide comprehensive intelligence assessment. Fissile material 
availability, warhead capability, delivery capability and intentions were all too often 
dealt with separately to recurrent complaints, both from those receiving the final 
product and those charged with the work. Frequent concerns within the records include 
the release of memoranda before one or more contributing departments had included 
their input and the occasional circulation of reports on particular subject that seemed to 
contradict that of another department. More than this, the sudden influx of highly 
valuable intelligence, from Penkovsky but more importantly from American satellites, 
masked remaining problems by providing an unprecedented insight into Soviet 
deployment. It was only with the creation of the DIS in 1964 that scientific intelligence 
was more efficiently organised. Its success was to a degree its own worst enemy as it 
came to be over-relied upon to produce draft reports. This in turn highlighted further 
weaknesses of the JIS, some of which were addressed by the creation of the 
Assessments Staff in 1968. 
The course of nuclear and scientific intelligence organisation reflects the growing 
importance and stature of the JIC more widely. In the period under review, and given 
the constraints upon them in the area of nuclear intelligence, the JIC appears to have 
1223 Michael Herman, email correspondence, 21 June 2008 
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operated as a central assessment body on the basis of the criteria set-out by those, like 
Herman, who have attempted to pursue the `theory' of intelligence. 1224 There were 
conflicts of opinion, problems of staffing, resource and organisation and difficulties 
resulting from their early lack of responsibility and scope, especially regards the 
ownership of atomic intelligence before 1957. Yet the strength of the JIC was the sum 
of its members' combined authority, particularly the strength of its Chairman, seen in 
Dean's influence in 1957.1225 Its move from the Chiefs of Staff to the Cabinet Office in 
that year, whilst to some degree a `tidying up exercise', does demonstrate the 
importance that was attached to its work. 
Like most of Whitehall, it is erroneous to overlook the organic, sometimes reactive, 
growth of these bodies. They were, in a sense, only as good as those who peopled them. 
Also, having to deal with the continuous tumult of events intelligence structures could 
not easily be subjected to wholesale overhaul. The major disasters of British intelligence 
in the Cold War - the infiltration of M16 and the Foreign Office by Philby, Burgess and 
Maclean, the Crabb affair and also failures of prediction such as the outbreak of the 
Korean War - were largely problems of the collection agencies and deserving of their 
own explanation and histories. More than this, the impenetrability of the USSR, and the 
particular difficulty in establishing HUMINT sources, meant that intelligence was hard 
to come by and what was available therefore had to be mined for all its worth. Thus, as 
Goodman also acknowledges, Cradock's assessment still holds true that the greatest 
problems for `lay not so much in inadequate organisation or lack of interest.... [than] in 
the shortage of hard evidence about Soviet developments in the Soviet Union'. 1226 The 
experience of 1961, when hard evidence was available more widely, demonstrates this 
1224 Herman, Intelligence Power, pp. 25-28 
'225 Cradock, Know You, p. 3 
1226 Ibid., p. 261; Good n, British Intelligence Estimates, p. 435 
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particularly well. 
There is still much work that can be done, and a great deal that presently cannot, on the 
collection aspects of UK intelligence, and indeed some parts of the US. The 
aforementioned importance of radar intelligence from bases in Cyprus and elsewhere 
will hopefully be explored in greater depth in Richard Aldrich's forthcoming study of 
GCHQ. Likewise, we are only becoming aware of the variety of means and scale of 
technical intelligence collection operations against the Soviet testing of nuclear weapons 
and missiles. 1227 More than this, it is possible, given the pace of releases at the National 
Archives, to trace the story well into the latter half of the 1970s. Whilst there is not the 
space available here to continue beyond 1970, it will soon be possible to examine many 
aspects of the course of nuclear intelligence in the second half of the Cold War, taking 
into account the Conservative Government's 1980 decision to purchase the American 
Trident system, the UK's current deterrent force. 
Without access to complete records of all operations it is difficult to make a reasonable 
judgement on whether British intelligence could have improved collection. It is possible 
to discern that in the collation, assessment and dissemination there were periods when 
problems, if not failures, occurred. This was particularly true in the immediate postwar 
period when the lack of intelligence led to scientific guestimates and mistakes of 
emphasis such as ignorance of the role of Igor Kurchatov and the sidelining of Peter 
Kapitza. In the decade after 1945 a large amount of intelligence was collected in 
occupied Germany. The huge post-war debriefing programme was a holistic and patient 
approach to intelligence, gathering, not only knowledge of German work on nuclear 
weapons and guided missiles during the war, but also what the Soviets had learned from 
this source and, later, from German who had been expatriated for work inside the 
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USSR on early Soviet nuclear and missile programmes. However, this effort could only 
ever answer so many questions and the difficulty in penetrating the USSR itself, 
combined with the extreme secrecy of Soviet projects, could lead to false impressions. 
Operations in Soviet-occupied, and later East, Germany and in Czechoslovakia were 
evidence of the wider importance of, relatively, easier access to Satellite states than 
inside the USSR. Important work was done in these countries in monitoring Soviet 
uranium mines to garner the amount of fissile material available to the USSR. From 
this, and through worldwide appreciation of fissile stocks, useful scientific appreciations 
were produced on the likely future availability of warheads, based upon the amount of 
raw material that could be converted. However, by 1954 it was clear that the evidence 
obtained, like most on the USSR, had been too limited and had produced under- 
estimations. Re-assessment in the years after soon led to the realisation by the JIC that 
Soviet uranium stocks were `sufficient' for all their needs. For this reason, as well as the 
rapid growth of new technology, JIC appreciations and requirements focused, especially 
after 1957, on likely Soviet capabilities in delivery systems 
Nuclear intelligence was increasingly geared towards seeking answers to questions the 
JIC and its customers needed answering, rather than generating reports based on what 
was available. This was seen both in greater practical efforts to produce timely JIC 
reports during high-profile Whitehall debates about the future of the British nuclear 
deterrent. The greatest problem for nuclear intelligence work in the 1960s was not 
organisational, but access to US knowledge and its effect upon British knowledge on 
the latest nuclear technology. What is clear is that without the Anglo-American 
relationship British nuclear intelligence would have faced a greater struggle in 
infiltrating the secrets of the Soviet nuclear programme. 
1227 Sontag and Drew, Blind Man's Bluff 
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The nuclear `special' relationship 
British nuclear intelligence on the USSR was, from its beginnings in 1945, immediately 
and heavily characterised by its relationship with US work. It became one of the core 
pillars of the UK-US relationship and, as such, is deserving of the `special' 
description. 1228 It brought a quantity of intelligence that the British would otherwise 
have struggled to acquire, given its relative economic decline and the rise of the US as 
an intelligence superpower. This is particularly true of those intelligence capabilities 
that require huge resources and technical advancements, demonstrated most vividly by 
the US satellite programme that achieved success in the early 1960s and which was 
hugely instrumental in obtaining imagery within the USSR without risking overflights. 
However, the value of the satellites was itself partly a result of the dearth of other 
intelligence sources from within the USSR. Though they were not without HUMINT 
sources in the period as a whole, neither Britain nor the US attained the scale of 
successes comparable to those achieved by the Soviets through the likes of Maclean and 
Philby, let alone Fuchs or Nunn May. 
It was the interception and deciphering of Soviet wartime communications, the 
American Venona project, which provided a significant insight into the Soviet 
programme when little was known in any depth. Venona's revelation of the depth of 
Soviet penetration of the wartime Manhattan project, and the arrest and confession of 
Fuchs, provided an indication of one method by which the Soviets had achieved their 
success and what, given Western understanding of nuclear technology, they thought 
Soviet scientists knew. There was some justification for believing that the Soviets had 
avoided certain scientific blind alleys both in their atomic and thermonuclear 
1228 David Reynolds, 'Rethinking Anglo-American relations', International Affairs Vol. 65/1 (1986), 
pp. 89-111; Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart, (eds), US-UK Relations at the Start of the 21" 
Century (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006) 
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progression thanks to their spies in the west. However, it also supported and helped 
foster a picture that was somewhat blinkered to other, independent, Soviet work on 
different designs. 
Even before the British were called upon to collect and verify air samples from the 
debris cloud of the first Soviet atomic test in 1949 collaboration had been achieved in 
the development of worldwide coverage of long-range detection. The UK, through the 
residual British Empire and expanding Commonwealth, was able to bring a greater 
geographic reach to US operations. The development of long-range seismic detection 
techniques in the 1950s required carefully chosen overseas stations. The benefits, 
therefore, the British could bring to the US-UK intelligence relationship were a central 
and significant part of the wider post-war Anglo-American relationship. It was also, 
particularly through nuclear-related operations before the restoration of wider nuclear 
collaboration in 1958, a vital source of expertise for British nuclear science. 
Work on estimating the size of Soviet fissile material stocks from worldwide uranium 
stocks, the Music programme and from operations in satellite Soviet states were all part 
of this combined work. The UK acted as second laboratory distinct from US ones that 
could provide reassurance in agreement and insight in disagreement. 1229 This is one 
reason for the development, in addition to the combined body dealing with nuclear 
intelligence, of multiple joint bodies and conferences, with Canada also, covering all 
aspects of missiles, electronics, and guidance systems. 
Shared Anglo-American worldwide signals intelligence coverage was formalised in the 
1946, un-documented and unavowed, UK-US Communications Agreement and 1948 
UKUSA. Through bases, such as those in Cyprus, the UK participated in radar and 
1229 Goodman, British Intelligence Estimates, p. 449 
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aerial reconnaissance and the collection of technical information on Soviet nuclear 
warhead and missile testing. Indeed, the very scale and significance of British 
involvement in this work is one of the least known of cold war UK intelligence. 1230 
When testing a new radar system, `Zinnia' in 1959-60, the UK had to ask the US to test 
the system against their own missile tests, as the British had lacked `missile targets' in 
their own UK based experiments. 1231 
However, it was the benefits the UK obtained through this relationship that were of 
greatest significance. British involvement in joint scientific intelligence on the USSR's 
nuclear programme, particularly following the first Soviet atomic test in 1949, kept 
senior British nuclear scientists such as Sir William Penney linked to some of the latest 
advances in the US. As Goodman argues, it `allowed a channel of communication into 
the US weapons programme'. 1232 Yet, as this thesis has shown, it was even more crucial 
than Goodman has demonstrated. He pointed out that `after the Soviet weapons 
programme progressed to advanced thermonuclear designs, it would have been difficult 
for British scientists to assist in analysis because until early 1956, the British did not 
know how to construct a hydrogen bomb. 1233 Goodman's question of whether it was 
possible `that the American intelligence community also provided the British with some 
hints on what to look for' has been answered here; British involvement in the spring 
1954 Castle series was based upon this need. Penney's increasing understanding of 
thermonuclear technology and science in 1954 was a reflection of the assessments that 
Welsh's team had produced following the tests. This was crucial in the consequent 
1230 Pocock, U2; Richard Aldrich has indicated that new documents in the National Archives on the 
development of Zinnia radar development in 1959-61 only represented the tip of the iceberg in terms of 
GCHQ work out of Cyprus bases. I am very grateful to Professor Aldrich for drawing my attention to 
these files. TNA, DEFE 44/90, `Further Report on "Zinnia", September 1959; TNA, DEFE 44/93, `Zinnia 
trials in the United States', April 1960 
1231 Ibid. 
1232 Goodman, British Intelligence Estimates, pp. 449-50 
1233 Ibid., p. 449 
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British H-bomb decision. 
It was also a further encouragement to the US in the benefits of the relationship. 
Following the launch of the Soviet satellite, Sputnik, in 1957 the British were able to 
press the case for closer collaboration through emphasis on the intelligence picture. 
This, and the shared experience of a decade of operations, was a significant facilitator in 
the 1958 restoration of atomic collaboration between the two countries. Conversely, in 
the later 1960s, technical interpretation of nuclear intelligence in Britain itself suffered 
to some degree from reduced nuclear collaboration with the Americans as a result of the 
Labour Government's reluctance to commit to new delivery system developments. 1234 
Zuckerman contended that the intelligence overestimated the likely efficiency of Soviet 
ABM and the, widely accepted, US technical appreciation of likely penetration 
problems Polaris faced against it. The preponderance of US intelligence on Soviet 
ABMs was closely linked to the influence of US technical nuclear know-how. Panton, 
part of the atomic intelligence unit in the 1950s and early 1960s and Assistant Chief 
Scientific Adviser (Nuclear) from 1970 to 1976, formed his own view of what 
happened: 
the UK's stated lack of interest in the [latest US design] Poseidon, and the known views of 
Zuckerman ... that ABM defences would not work and there was no need to 
improve UK 
Polaris, did not encourage the speedy release to [the] UK of necessary US data, test[s] and 
studies. Consequently, it was not until early 1970 that AWRE produced an evaluation to the 
effect that improvement of the UK deterrent would be needed in the face of possible Soviet 
ABM developments. 1235 
'234 Richard Moore, 'Why Chevaline? Political Military Context, 1966-73', Proceedings of the Royal 
Aeronautical Society; The History of the UK Strategic Deterrent: The Chevaline Programme', 29 
October 2004, p. D-6 
1235 Dr Frank Panton, 'Politics and Strategic Background. 1964-1982', Proceedings of the Royal 
Aeronautical Society; The History of the UK Strategic Deterrent: The Chevaline Programme', 29 
October 2004, p. C-2 
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Yet, despite Panton's criticisms, Zuckerman's role in other ways reflected the 
importance of personal relationships in the same way as it had for Welsh, Perrin and 
Penney. As David Owen acknowledged Zuckerman may well have `saved Britain 
billions of pounds', as `without his friendship with the prickly Admiral Rickover of the 
US Navy we would never have had Polaris and then the Trident Agreement which 
allowed us access to US missile technology at knock-down prices'. 1236 Thus, it was not 
`one over-riding factor' in the UK-US relationship that was so important but `rather a 
combination'. 1237 However, looking more fully at both intelligence and the development 
of British nuclear weapons, it is clear that the urgency of intelligence on both sides of 
the channel was the prime motivator in maintaining links that were crucial to the UK's 
ability to keep up with the pace of technological change. The times when this did not 
occur demonstrate the importance of this relationship most vividly. 
As with the origins of Super Antelope/Chevaline, the UK-US relationship was also 
important because of the wider influence of US policy on UK decisions and the role 
British intelligence would play in questioning or supporting the US take. The 
importance of separate British assessments of shared US-UK raw intelligence would be 
a mainstay of British nuclear, and other, intelligence throughout the period. The 
necessity of technical and scientific expertise to accurately assess intelligence to a 
degree to be able to challenge US assessments when necessary was itself a significant 
factor in British government's decisions to stay in the nuclear business. 
As Baylis argued in his analysis of nuclear collaboration, the `fact that the partnership 
was renewed under successive presidents and prime ministers, through to the present 
day, suggests that both scientific communities have continued to advise their leaders 
1236 Owen, Time to Declare, p. 48 
1237 Goodman, British Intelligence Estimates, p. 449 
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that important mutual interests have been served'. 1238 Even if definitions of the wider 
`special relationship' are still as `complex' as Reynolds felt in 1989, it is clear from the 
amount of research undertaken in nuclear and intelligence matters since then, and the 
analysis of this thesis, that this relationship was, as Oliver Franks described, an 
`exceptional and unique degree of collaboration'. 1239 Aldrich has probably summed up 
the intelligence association most aptly, arguing that there `can be no question but that 
the Anglo-American intelligence relationship has been uniquely close' but it contained 
two facets, both `co-operation and conflict'. '240 The ebb and flow of this relationship, 
equally apparent in nuclear collaboration, was one of the defining factors in British 
nuclear weapons policy throughout the Cold War. 
Intelligence and British Nuclear Weapons Policy 
In 2007 Sir Michael Quinlan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of 
Defence from 1988 to 1992, ran through the reasons why he thought the UK had 
maintained a nuclear deterrent since 1945. Among the them he included `prestige 
[including that]... other countries will continue to take us seriously... the seat at the top 
table... influence with the United States ... [and] the contribution to Western deterrence 
capability'. 1241 Examining this rationale through successive decisions between 1945 and 
1970, and in comparison to the intelligence input, it is clear that these were dominant 
factors that formed part of a complex history of British nuclear policy. Yet the 
importance of intelligence within the decisions themselves is also apparent in the 
research of this thesis. Intelligence appreciations often formed the backdrop, and 
1238 Baylis, 'Exchanging Nuclear Secrets', p. 59 
1239 Reynolds, 'Rethinking', p. 89; Oliver Franks, Anglo-American Relations and the "Special 
Relationship", 1947-1952 (Austin: Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, University of Texas, 
1990), p. 21 
1240 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, p. 11 
1241 Quinlan, 'Introduction' to Cabinets and the Bomb, p. ix 
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sometimes the wording, upon which ministers and defence chiefs examined the options 
open to the UK. More than this, many of the crucial moments in British nuclear history 
took place in an atmosphere of urgency about the pace of nuclear technology and the 
threat posed by the USSR. At different times intelligence could, and did, provide both 
reassure and anxiety about these developments. However, intelligence would only form 
one part of the influences upon which decision-making took place. Examining the 
history of nuclear intelligence and nuclear weapons development during this period 
shows that the greatest influence intelligence had was in its particular relationship with 
related American work. 'Access to American nuclear technology, or 
lack of it, was often an important factor in determining the form that the British 
deterrent should take. 
The 1947 and 1954 decisions to produce atomic and thermonuclear bombs respectively 
are prime examples of the way in which intelligence was used. Ministers seemed as 
concerned with the impact on relations with the US, as with the Soviet threat a British 
bomb was supposed to deter. This did not mean that intelligence played no role. The 
British government and military was not always as well informed as they would wish. 
Concern over the need for information about the Soviet threat is clear during both the 
1954 H-bomb decision and in the early and late 1960s when the potentialities of guided 
weapons put great pressure on the future of the British deterrent. The pace of US and 
Soviet technology put pressure on British nuclear weapons policy and intelligence 
sometimes contributed rather than mitigated this sense of urgency. Yet decisions were 
often based equally on political concerns over Britain's wider relationship with the US, 
domestic public opinion and, most consistently, over the UK's international standing as 
a world power. 
The records of nuclear weapons decisions made by Harold Macmillan's government 
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between 1960 and 1962 underscore the limitations of intelligence on ministerial 
thinking, even in the sphere of nuclear defence policy. The decision-making in this 
period resulted from a number of factors, including intelligence. The British adoption of 
a US nuclear delivery system was a pragmatic one based as much upon economy as 
upon the perception of the Soviet threat. Indeed, in hastening the UK's nuclear 
technology development through Anglo-American `interdependence', the UK was 
responding to the progress of the USSR. Most significantly, appreciations of Soviet 
capabilities and estimated timetables for their ballistic missile programmes formed part 
of the rationale that supported the Macmillan government's arguments, particularly 
regarding the deterrent credibility of the UK's nuclear delivery system. 
It has been shown that British assessments also at times suffered in judging likely 
Soviet advancement on the basis of British expectations of their own nuclear weapons 
progress. This was true of the timetable towards the first successful atomic tests and for 
ballistic missile development in the mid 1950s. Only after the dramatic success of 
Sputnik in 1957 did JIC appreciations come to portray consistently the degree of 
priority and access to resources Soviet nuclear weapons programmes enjoyed. Prototype 
successes by the USSR, such as its first nuclear test, the Sputnik launch and the 
parading of Galosh missiles, caused no little consternation, but in British assessments 
there was more often than not understanding that this did not entail operational 
capability. 
Despite Sputnik's propaganda impact, in the early 1960s the USSR were struggling to 
iron out the problems of ballistic missile design, particularly at ICBM range. Yet this 
issue was not the same for British intelligence as it was for US. The implications of 
overall strategic capability of the USSR versus the US were significant in that it they 
held ominous repercussions for Western and NATO defence and the overall likelihood 
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of war, and as such they held a high priority in British intelligence. Yet, for the UK's 
own defence and that of mainland Europe, questions of accuracy, vulnerability and 
second-strike capability of medium-range nuclear weaponry held a more immediate 
threat. Goodman's conclusion, that more than `any other aspect of British intelligence, 
the atomic intelligence programme directly addressed Britain's sense of its own 
alarming strategic vulnerability', is accurate, particularly of the 1954 decision and in the 
urgency of missile intelligence in the late 1950s. '242 However, the comparative dearth of 
sources before 1961 mean that it probably did not provide as much `psychological 
reassurance' as he suggests. 1243 Though there was no major overreaction to Sputnik, 
there was a real sense of concern about the possible deployment numbers of both 
ICBMs and shorter-range missiles. 
Although, by 1957, British intelligence had been working on the Soviet nuclear threat 
for over a decade, they were only beginning to coordinate fully intelligence on warhead 
design and fissile stocks with the missile technology and operational numbers by 1961. 
Assessments now acknowledged the Soviets had sufficient warhead stocks, in certain 
yields, to meet their requirements. Any limitations the JIC could point to regarding the 
Soviet nuclear threat increasingly rested on the success of Soviet missile delivery 
systems and how this compared with US and UK progress. Between 1957 and 1963 and 
the JIC's portrayal of a predominantly bomber-led strike against the UK with increasing 
MRBM and IRBM forces was an accurate picture. The Soviet ICBM programme was 
not as urgent a threat as Sputnik had led many to fear. By 1962 intelligence was 
advising to this effect but was also aware of the future technological advances that 
would prove challenging to the continuing credibility of the UK deterrent. This 
challenge, and the vulnerability of the V-Bombers, was a growing factor in military and 
1242 Goodman, British Intelligence Estimates, p. 453 
311 
ministerial thinking in the early 1960s. Though the possibility of American options and 
the wider political rationales of British nuclear policy were both dominant causes, the 
pace of the arms race and the intelligence work that told of this were both continuous 
and influential factors. 
Intelligence on Soviet intentions were very much more difficult to acquire, especially 
given the scarcity of HUMINT. Even when human sources such as GRU officer Oleg 
Penkovsky offered insights, they were several stages removed from the leadership and 
as prone to reproducing gossip or accepting propaganda. There was no insight on a par 
with that achieved by the allies in the Second World War into the signals 
communications of the German Command. Before his death in 1953 the West appeared 
to think they understood Stalin and post-war difficulties had led British appreciations to 
expect belligerence short of global war. There is, as Goodman also argues, some 
significance in the JIC's emphasis from the late 1950s that the Soviet leadership did not 
wish for war and would not seek it. 1244 Instead, reflecting the character of international 
relations, concern focused upon the danger of miscalculation and therefore how the 
USSR might react in particular circumstances - both borne out and reinforced by the 
Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. 
The theory of `independent deterrence' for the UK led to intelligence's role in the wider 
military estimation of the minimum UK nuclear capability required to deter the Soviet 
Union. In the earlier period this was as much about intelligence on the likely intentions 
and reactions of the Soviet leadership before, in the lead-up and during the early stages 
of nuclear war, as well as the later concern over miscalculation. By the 1960s this role 
had became also a question of the target choices for UK forces and the impact of Soviet 
1243 Ibid., p. 454 
1 24`' Ibid., p. 453 
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missile defences. The consistent MOD position on the need to be able to target Moscow 
effectively brought intelligence on Soviet ABM development to the forefront on the 
British nuclear debate and was a right in the middle of the origins of the Super 
Antelope/Chevaline programme. 1245 The scientific take and interpretation of intelligence 
on ballistic missile and anti-missile technologies conflicted with political concerns over 
the continuing arms race to produce a degree of indecisiveness in that Government's 
nuclear defence policy and a controversy in which British intelligence played a central 
role. 
Recent scholarship on the Polaris improvement programme reveals much about the role 
of intelligence in a time of controversy. Sir Solly Zuckerman's opposition to the 
argument that Soviet ABM advances required improvements to the British deterrent 
shows the limits of intelligence, its relationship with, and danger of being subsumed by, 
the wider military viewpoint and the difficulties of the interpretation of technical 
intelligence. What is clear from the files is that British intelligence had been warning of 
Soviet defensive developments for over a decade but that they became more focused in 
the late 1960s towards the implications for British defence policy. This was partly 
because of the input of America's own ABM testing on the expected Polaris 
performance against Soviet ABM, but the increasingly unambiguous intelligence 
warnings also reflected the view put forward by the MOD and AWRE that some 
improvement to Polaris warheads was necessary. The presence of so many DIS and 
AWRE staff in the bodies that undertook this intelligence work contributed to this 
shared outlook. This was probably nearer to `intimacy' in intelligence's relationship 
with its customers than `distance' -a mixture of which Michael Herman sees as 
necessary. However, it was not a complete breach of the `permeable membrane 
1245 Baylis, `The `Moscow Criterion", pp. 53-65 
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separating it from the decision-taking centre. ' 1246 
Graham Spinardi, in his attempt to counter Zuckerman's `thesis' that the cold war arms 
race was pushed by the interests of scientists, has argued that analysis of the decision 
process at each stage in the British nuclear programme shows the `degree of influence 
of technologists relative to politicians' was limited. 
1247 Whilst this does not fully explain 
the entirety of the nuclear weapon technological developments in the whole of the Cold 
War, it is a salient reminder of the need to examine the detail of decision-making. 
Indeed, it is clear from the intelligence picture that where scientific advancement did 
push the arms race it was still guided by the overwhelming and all-encompassing 
spectre of nuclear annihilation. 
Intelligence was a constant reminder that the threat of nuclear war, for all its esoteric 
qualities, was very real. This was particularly important at times when new technical 
developments drove expectations about future threats. An inability of intelligence to 
specify how great the threat of future Soviet capabilities would be was more likely to 
lead to challenges to nuclear deterrence rationales. It was perhaps the amount of 
opposition in the late 1960s that Zuckerman, and others, directed towards the 
intelligence itself, as well as the contentious nature of the problem, which allowed this 
state of affairs to arise. The JIC files themselves do not reveal the full story of the 
animosity in this chapter of British nuclear history. However, the frequency of the 
subject and wording in JIC reports does suggest something out of the ordinary. 
It is easy in retrospect, given that the Cold War never turned into a third, nuclear war, to 
underestimate the degree to which British policy-makers and defence military officials 
1246 Herman, Intelligence Power, p. 110 
1247 Graham Spinardi, 'Aldermaston and British Nuclear Weapons Development: Testing the `Zuckerman 
Thesis', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Aug, 1997), pp. 547-582, p. 575 
314 
had to contemplate the possibility of nuclear war. As has been seen, intelligence could 
at times be a reassurance by de-mystifying the Soviet threat but it could also highlight, 
and be used to emphasise, the dangers facing the UK. This was apparent in 1954 
whereby the awful consequences, and realistic prospect, of a Soviet thermonuclear 
strike against the UK was at the forefront of the decision to build a British H-bomb. The 
period between 1957 and 1963, in particular, shows a close link between emerging 
intelligence on the pace of Soviet progress and demands on the British government to 
keep up and maintain the credibility of the UK deterrent. In 1967, perceived ambiguity 
about what Soviet ABM development would mean for Polaris was at the centre of 
controversy over the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent. Intelligence played a crucial 
role at the heart of government in all these decisions. 
Examining the intelligence input into British nuclear weapons policy over the first half 
of the Cold War has expanded upon existing knowledge and revealed some more about 
the continuities and controversies of the period. Whilst there are many avenues for 
further research, this study has attempted to add to our understanding from a different 
angle, as with the Skybolt/ Blue Streak crisis, and to explore previously under-studied 
aspects, such as the intelligence angle of the 1960s ABM debate. 
In tracing the assessment and use of this intelligence in times of acute focus on the 
future course of British nuclear weapons policy, it is possible to see the value and 
importance of intelligence, as it was felt at the time and viewed in hindsight. Indeed, as 
with intelligence itself, the accumulation of analysis from varied perspectives, on 
different aspects, and with increased evidence, brings greater confidence in the accuracy 
of the picture that emerges. Many of the episodes and themes will benefit further from 
increased analysis and the pursuit of greater documentary evidence still withheld. The 
focus and scope of such histories will be better served by an understanding of the 
overall picture and course of events. As well as expanding upon what is currently 
known about nuclear weapons and intelligence in the UK during the Cold War, this 
study hopefully brings greater direction and context for future historians. 
Appendix A- Chronology of major nuclear events 
March 1940 Frisch-Peierls Memorandum 
July 1941 Maud Report 
19 August 1943 Quebec Agreement 
19 September 1944 Hyde-Park Aide-memoird 
16 July 1945 First American atomic bomb test 'Trinity' (2lkT) 
26 July 1945 Labour win General Election 
6 August 1945 United States drop 'Little Boy' ('Gun' Injection using U-235) on 
Hiroshima. (13kT) 
9 August 1945 U. S. drop 'Fat Man' (Implosion device using Plutonium-239) on Nagasaki. 
(2lkT) 
28 August 1945 Attlee Memorandum on 'The Atomic Bomb' circulated to GEN 75 
August 1946 McMahon Act 
8 January 1947 GEN 163 authorises the development of atomic weapons 
29 August 1949 Soviet atomic bomb test (plutonium) (22 kT) 'Joe-1' 
September/ October Further Soviet tests including U-235 bomb, 'Joe 2 and 3' (38 and 40 kT) 
1951 
31 Oct 1952 US thermonuclear test 'Mike' (IOMT yield but not deliverable) 
1 November 1952 British atomic bomb test 'Hurricane'. (25kT) 
1953 First 'Blue Danube' bombs based on Hurricane prototype delivered to 
RAF. 
12 August 1953 Soviet 'hybrid' thermonuclear test 'Joe-4' (200-400 KT) 
Feb - May 1954 US 'Castle' test series including 'Bravo' (15 MT) 
1955 Tu-16 (BADGER) medium range bomber and MRBM (SS-3) enter service 
in USSR. 
22 November 1955 Soviet 'true' thermonuclear test 'Joe-19' (1.6MT) 
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1956 Mya-4 (BISON) and Tu-95 (BEAR) intercontinental bombers enter service 
in Soviet LRAF. 
4 April 1957 Sandys White Paper 
May/June 1957 British H-bomb tests 'Grapple' (0.2-0.72 MT) 
August 1957 1' Soviet ICBM test flights (SS-6) and continued MRBM (SS-4) tests. 
October 1957 First earth orbiting satellite by Soviets (Sputnik) 
8 November 1957 British 'Grapple X' test (1.8 MT) 
28 April 1958 British 'Grapple Y' test (3MT) 
30 June 1958 US amend McMahon Act 
4 August 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement 
August/September 1958 British 'Grapple Z' series (0.8 and 2MT) 
13 April 1960 Cancellation of Blue Streak 
1 May 1960 Gary Powers shot-down in U-2 over USSR 
October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis 
11 December 1962 US announce cancellation of Skybolt 
18 December 1962 Macmillan and Kennedy discuss British purchase of Polaris 
6 April 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement signed in Washington 
5 August 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty signed in Moscow by US, Britain and Soviet 
Union 
November 1964 Galosh ABM missiles on display in Moscow 
26 November 1964 Wilson Cabinet discuss number of Polaris submarines 
29 January 1965 Cabinet agree to build four submarines 
28 September 1966 First PN meeting on future of deterrent 
October - November Soviet ABM system struggles in tests and is effectively abandoned 
1967 
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1 December 1967 
5 December 1967 
31 July 1968 
June 1969 
Papers on Polaris improvements circulated to PN 
PN discuss options and agree Kings-Norton Inquiry 
Kings Norton Report 
Polaris Submarines fully deployed 
319 
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Appendix C- Images 
Images I and 2: Views of Hiroshima, From The L//eels (? /the Atomic /? o, nl,. s ut llirashiº, º (, ºº, / 
Nagasaki. Report of the British Mission to Japan (London: HMSO, 194(), photos I and 2 
between page 8 and 9. Arrow marks centre of blast 
11 
Image 3: Valiant in flight late 1950s (R. Caruana). From Chris Pocock, The (1-2 S'pvj, lune: 
Toward the Unknown. A New History of the Earl. ), Years (Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer 
Publishing, 2000), p. 108 
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Ji Image 4: Vulcan releasing conventional honth load over weapons range. 1()6(),, Uni 
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Image 5: Victors on the ground, Singapore, 1960s (R. Brooks C'ollecºion). From Pocock. I). 130 
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Image 6: Corona Satellite imagery of ICBM complex showing conslruclion of SS-7 launch site. 
28. lune 1962. From US National Reconnaissance Office: 
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Image 7: HMS Resolution. From Royal Navy Suhmarine Museum: 
httV: //www. rnsubmus. co. uk/general/service. htni 
......, k. u+p. ... ,.,. 
Image h: HMS Resolution Firing Polaris missile, 3 April I9t, 8: 
http: //subirr, u-iiier: s. co. uk/13oats/l3arrowhui It/l"0Iaris/ 
;,; 
Image 9: Photograph of Galosh ABM missile. From TNA, I)FFF44/I I5, 'Moscow Parade 
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Images 10 and 11: Photo interpretation of Galosh missiles. From TNA, I)h, Iýh: 44/I 15, 'Moscow 
Parade - November, 1964.5. Galosh - A. M. M', August 1965 
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Images 12 and 13: Henhouse Radar. Olengorsk. From Global Security 
http: //www. globalsecurity. org/wmd/world/russi, UoIenrgurtik. lit ni 
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Chart showing expected stages and progress of Soviet atomic weapons prugr; nnnie. INA, I)I'. I T.? I/4i. 
Appendix 'Estimate of Russian Atomic Weapons Programme and Timetable', I)ereinher I947 
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Chart showing intelligence contribution to Joint Intelligence Organisation. TNA, CAB 163/50, Annex B to 





Chart showing JIC Subcommittees, 1957. TNA, CAB 163/50, Annex B to `History of the JIC'. November 1957 
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